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Sandeep Bamzai, “The Sino-Indian War and the Nehru-Ayub Talks: A Recasting of the Kashmir Question in the ‘60s,” ORF Special Report No. 301, Observer Research Foundation, April 2026.
In the early 1960s, even as J&K premier Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Sheikh Abdullah’s other political heir, G M Sadiq, were engaged in a political firefight over the right to govern J&K, an extremely crucial engagement was unfolding between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan. Kashmir remained the overriding issue for both sides. It could not be siloed or partitioned in any India-Pakistan engagement of the period and, under the principles of Westphalian sovereignty, India maintained moral, constitutional, and legal control over J&K. Ayub Khan, appealing to his domestic audience, pressed his Kashmir agenda; Nehru was a realist and did not relent.
The Nehru-Ayub talks focused on resolving disputes like Kashmir and water sharing, culminating in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. The treaty, mediated by the World Bank, divided the waters of the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan and established a framework for cooperation.[a] The Murree talks followed the treaty’s signing and explored easing travel restrictions and improving relations. Yet, the dialogue remained strained. The logic of non-weaponised engagement was that certain red-lines would not be crossed by India, though Pakistan continued to test the limits. The two leaders met several times—in 1959 and 1960—and planned another meeting in 1964. After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the two sides agreed to ministerial-level discussions on Kashmir, though these did not materialise.
The New York Times reported on 30 November 1962 that India and Pakistan had agreed to negotiate their bitter dispute over the state of Kashmir.[b] The agreement was described as the most important advance towards a settlement of the dispute over the 86,000-square-mile state in the 15 years of the quarrel. Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistan President Ayub Khan signed the agreement after a week of separate talks in New Delhi and Rawalpindi with W. Averell Harriman, United States Assistant Secretary of State, and Duncan Sandys, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. The communiqué outlining the agreement was finalised in Rawalpindi and conveyed to New Delhi. Washington welcomed the announcement that the two countries had agreed to negotiate their differences. After a final meeting with Field Marshal Ayub, Harriman said: "I am very happy about this agreement and I hope that the present circumstances will make it possible for the two countries to come to an agreement."
A.G. Noorani, writing in Lessons of Murree: Chronicles of India-Pakistan Relations, noted that accounts of India-Pakistan diplomacy pay little attention to the summit between Nehru and Ayub at the hill station of Murree on 21 September 1960. The meeting failed, with lasting consequences. Ayub first met Nehru at Palam Airport in New Delhi on 1 September 1959, and again at Murree in 1960, when Nehru visited Pakistan to sign the Indus Waters Treaty in Karachi on 19 September. On 26 May 1964, the two agreed to meet again, following Sheikh Abdullah's visit to Pakistan with Nehru's backing.[c]
Noorani wrote that Nehru did not conceal his dislike of Ayub Khan, a disposition he argues was later echoed by Indira Gandhi, at the expense of India's national interest. India's High Commissioner to Pakistan, Rajeshwar Dayal, recorded in his memoirs, A Life of Our Times (Orient Longman, p. 57) the cordial rapport he shared with Ayub, recalling their association in Mathura in 1940, when Dayal was District Magistrate and Ayub a young Captain in the Service Corps who frequently visited his home.
The Nehru-Ayub talks comprised a series of crucial but largely inconclusive exchanges in the late 1950s and early 1960s, centred on Kashmir as well as water sharing and border issues. While the 1960 engagement produced the Indus Waters Treaty, subsequent efforts—including those after 1962—failed to bridge differences over Kashmir despite occasional diplomatic overtures.
Key Issues Discussed
Against the backdrop of these talks, the Kashmir point man was again in overdrive. The sense that the strategic order had shifted shaped the exchanges. The point man wrote:
“I had a further opportunity to elicit Bakshi’s views on the Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir last evening. He made some significant points which H.M. may like to see.”
A top-secret note addressed to Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on 1 December 1962 is revelatory for a glimpse into Bakshi's state of mind:
“I drew Bakshi’s attention to the PM's statement in the Parliament and also asked him what were his reactions after his meeting with the PM. When I told him that the PM's statement should help allay the fears and remove confusion both here and, in the State,” he emphatically retorted: “No. I see the writing on the wall. We will lose both Assam and the whole of Kashmir. There is complete disarray here. We are jittery and panic has overtaken us”. Furiously, he added: “Just for arms for which we shall have to pay every penny to the U.S. and U.K, we are likely to hand over Kashmir. Hindus had never had the tradition of ruling the whole of India. Even the great Shivaji did not go beyond Rohilkhand. Don’t you see how the army went helter-skelter in Assam and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh). While in Ladakh we gave them a bitter fight, at one post out of 96 Kashmir Militia men, 93 got killed and only three survived. They had my orders not to leave their posts at any cost”.
He then remarked that one of the Generals who had retreated from the NEFA front—covering 36 miles a day out of fear—was now back in Udhampur. “It is now when leadership is needed,” he said.
In response, the point man wrote: “I brought him back to the PM's statement and put it to him whether he has not categorically said that nothing would be done to upset the present arrangement.” He revealed that the PM's statement was differently worded before he met him at 11.30 a.m. yesterday. The general thought process being “That one should have not looked at complete surrender. I got this substantially changed. Somebody has to give courage and clarify to him”. When I suggested that his frequent presence in Delhi was therefore imperative, he said, “Why don’t you ask me to stay here permanently?" He added that the Prime Minister ought to consult his colleagues. When asked if this had not been done, he replied, “No. It is always on such occasions that he should take the opinion of some of his valued colleagues”. Then he mentioned the name of Home Minister and added that the PM should have taken him into confidence.
After repeating his earlier argument, he said: “Nothing should be done or said on Kashmir to show that out of fear of the Chinese we are handing over Kashmir to Pakistan now or at any later stage. Russia is vitally interested in this area because of the fear that if it goes to Pakistan, the U.S. will build bases there against Russia. Why should such an impression be allowed to fester? Once Russia gets that feeling, it might commit itself irrevocably against us in Kashmir. That would be a disaster not only for Kashmir but even for the rest of the country. To give an impression that Kashmir is still debatable and can be opened with the U.K. – U.S. pressure will make Russia wary. People in the whole country and Kashmir particularly will be demoralized”. I responded that Russia would understand India’s difficulty in outright rejection of talks.
He continued: “I am not opposed to talks, but what I see from the panic prevailing all around, we might blunder into a fresh commitment.” He added: “I knew three days ahead that the Chinese would declare a cease-fire and now I think it is likely that the Chinese might even withdraw to the September 8, 1962, line. This they would perhaps do as a gesture to the Afro-Asian countries who are going to meet in Colombo. But the fact remains that they have outwitted us both militarily and now diplomatically.”
Jammu & Kashmir's travails continued in an atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty. Bakshi's tendency to speak beyond his remit became more evident in the months that followed. Fresh complications arose with the re-emergence of Moulvi Nurrudin and Yusuf Shah—former Muslim Conference allies of Sheikh Abdullah—who had defected to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoJK) after the Afridi raiders had swooped down on Srinagar from Muzaffarabad in lashkars. Again, in a top-secret memorandum to the Government of India dated 13 May 1963, the Kashmir point man identified these new elements:
“On Bakshi Sahib’s return from his election tour on 9 May 1963, he indicated to me that Moulvi Nurrudin should meet him on the same day at 7 p.m. Accordingly, M. Saxena, Secretary, Kashmir Trade Commission, informed Nurrudin to call at 5 Prithvi Raj Road, on the same day. He also wanted me to be present in the meeting. Nurrudin was with Bakshi Sahib for nearly an hour, and he repeated more or less the same plea which he had put forward in his previous talks with me and also in his letter of 2.5.65.”
Bakshi Sahib referred to efforts by associates of Moulvi Yusuf Shah in Srinagar to secure the Government’s approval for their repatriation. He named Mr Makaya, a local businessman, Dr Hafizullah, and Mr Seraduddin and observed that public references to the matter in the Managing Committee of Islamia College, Srinagar, were unwise. He added that opposition to their return extended beyond Nurrudin and said that all pro-Abdullah elements are against any such move. Bakshi Sahib brushed aside this argument and said: “No, there were our own people like Sadiq etc. who are not favourable disposed to your return.” Explaining a little further, he said that they knew what it would mean to Kashmir if they returned to Kashmir.
Nurrudin again pressed for permission for himself and Yusuf Shah to return to the Valley with a few others to advocate full accession to India. Bakshi responded that the timing was not opportune and suggested waiting three to four months. He asked Nurrudin to leave contact addresses in Karachi and Rawalpindi for future communication.
“Nurrudin then sought permission for a ten-day visit to Kashmir to see his relations. Although I pointed out to him that his visit might harm their future plan to settle down in Kashmir permanently vis-à-vis Pakistan authorities Nurrudin countered it with the plea that on the other hand, he would have justification in telling them that his visit to India was only to see his family after the death of his father and brother. Bakshi agreed to raise the matter with the Secretary of Kashmir Affairs for necessary clearances. Before the meeting concluded, Shankar Prasad arrived, and Bakshi briefly introduced Nurrudin, indicating that short-term permission might be considered.”
Giving more details, the point man asserted: “Before I left, Bakshi Sahib expressed that he would have a further talk with Secretary K.A. and inform me on telephone accordingly about the future steps to be taken in this respect. I received no telephone from him and I checked up with Secretary, K.A. on 10.5.63 who informed me that since Bakshi Sahib had indicated his desire and also introduced Nurrudin to him, it meant that he has no objection from his side to Nurrudin’s visit. He had accordingly spoken to his Deputy Secretary, Shri Nambisan for further action in this respect. Secretary K.A. also desired that I should speak to Shri Nambisan and inform him about his talks with me. When I spoke to Shri Nambisan and asked what steps have been taken, he informed me that he is waiting till Monday the 13th for issuing necessary instructions. Nurrudin tried to contact me in the office on 13.5.63, but he was informed on telephone that I had gone out of station and would be back only on the 15th. Concurrently, underlying the gravity of the prevailing situation, a note on the above subject was sent to Secretary Kashmir Affairs on 10.5.63. On 16 May, the OSD contacted Shri Nambisan and was told that no action had yet been taken, pending a formal application from Nurrudin. Once received, he might be allowed to proceed to Srinagar on 30 May. DS (K) was asked to sound out the DIB regarding Nurrudin before clearance was granted.”
Bakshi was clearly wary of permitting Nurrudin or Yusuf Shah to visit Kashmir at that juncture, believing their presence could heighten volatility. Yusuf Shah had earlier clashed with Sheikh Abdullah in the famous “Sher-Bakra ki ladai”, later aligning with Pakistan, moving to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and eventually assuming leadership in exile. The Muslim Conference, led initially by Chowdhury Ghulam Abbas and later by Moulvi Yusuf Shah, positioned itself in opposition to the National Conference, framing its politics in religious terms and aligning with Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League and Pakistan.
It is against this combustible backdrop that one must revisit why Sher-e-Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah sided with India, in opposition to what he saw as Jinnah’s theocratic politics. Writing to the Congress President, Abdullah explained: “My stand is fully explained in the memorandum submitted by the National Congress to the Cabinet Mission, which is popularly known as “Quit Kashmir”. I stand by it. It calls for complete abrogation of the Treaty of Amritsar contracted between the representatives of the East India Company and Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846.”
“What should be the future relation between the people of Kashmir and the ruling family of the Dogra dynasty is for the people to decide. The National Conference has officially expressed its opinion with regard to this subject in a pamphlet known as “New Kashmir”. It is for His Highness to accept this constitutional position or go. The slogan “Quit Kashmir” is fundamentally raised in the same context and background as the slogan “Quit India” given by Gandhiji. It has no other meaning. We want people's rule here as Gandhiji wants people's rule in British India. It is for His Highness to adjust himself in the background. The Sovereignty must vest in the people and not in the person of the ruler. Ultimately it is for the people to decide to accept His Highness as the Constitutional Head of the State. Their decision will naturally be influenced by the attitude which His Highness adopts toward their legitimate demands and aspirations.”
(Copies marked to: Maulana Azad, President, Congress Committee, Bombay; and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.)
From this position as a nationalist Kashmiri and Indian, Sheikh Abdullah later entertained the idea of Kashmir as an “Eastern Switzerland” between competing powers, a trajectory that culminated in his dismissal and arrest in 1953. Yet his ascent as the dominant political figure in Kashmir in the run-up to independence and accession remains central to understanding the period.
With Sheikh Sahib’s call to defend the motherland against marauders, the National Conference sought not only political freedom but also to confront the entrenched poverty of peasants and artisans and the helplessness of workers. The Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 in India stirred a political awakening in Kashmir. Young Kashmiri activists attempted to plant the idea of Freedom in the State. Though shaped by local conditions, the movement’s objectives closely resembled those of the broader national struggle.
The spontaneous mass movement spread all over the State. The Maharaja’s Government responded swiftly, ruling by ordinance and enforcing the repressive Notification 19-L. Firing occurred in Srinagar, Jammu, and Baramulla; thousands were flogged. Yet the agitation for peasant and worker rights deepened over time, embedding itself in the political consciousness of the State.
The communal discord that had marked the beginning of 1931 subsided. Sheikh Abdullah, by dint of his sincerity and devotion to the masses, continued to fight for the poor and the exploited sons of Kashmir. In October 1932, the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim was formed under his presidency. Though communal in name, its policy was national in essence.[d] Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah said, “We stand for the rights of all communities. Our country’s progress is impossible so long as we do not establish amicable relations between the different communities. This is possible only when each community learns to appreciate the viewpoint of other communities.”
A landmark development was the appointment of the Glancy Constitutional Reforms Commission. Its report acknowledged the existence of genuine grievances that required redress. The Maharaja was forced to form a Legislative Assembly of 75 members, of whom 33 were elected. The Constitution permitted questions, resolutions, the introduction of Bills, and discussion of the State budget. The Report, also known as the ‘Magna Carta of the State’, recommended freedom to the Press on lines similar to those in British India.
In the summer of 1932, seeking to consolidate the gains promised in the Glancy Report and taking advantage of the new constitutional space, the Muslims formed the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. In December 1933, its second annual session was held at Mirpur, where Sheikh Abdullah was re-elected President. In his Presidential address, he observed: “The achievements of the Muslim Conference so far have benefited all communities equally. The freedom of press and platform and other concessions have not been wrested from any particular community but from the unwilling hands of the Durbar itself and have been distributed equally among all.”
Early in 1934, another movement was launched to secure greater powers for the people from the Maharaja. In a statement dated 29 January 1934, Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah said: “What hopes can the people of this country have in this kind of representative Assembly where the dead weight of the official and nominated majority will always be ready to crush the popular voice.” In the subsequent elections to the Legislature, the Muslim Conference won 19 of the 21 seats. From the beginning of 1935, Sheikh Abdullah worked to unite all communities and sought to foster unity in a land marked by communal distrust. In an interview with press representatives at Lahore, he observed: “It shall be my earnest endeavour henceforth to shape the political movement in the State expressly on the principles of the Indian National Congress. This will take a little time, but I am determined to purge my country of the bane of communalism, whatever be the obstacles in my way.”
In May 1936, the Muslim Conference formally adopted responsible government as its goal. Non-Muslims joined its ranks in large numbers, and peasants and labourers attended its meetings in significant strength. A wider political awakening spread across the state. During the summers of 1937 and 1938, Kashmir’s political climate shifted rapidly.
On 28 June 1938, the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference met in Srinagar and, after 52 hours of discussion, passed a resolution recommending that the General Council open membership to all, “irrespective of their caste, creed or religion.” In the early hours of 11 June 1939, the Muslim Conference ceased to exist and was replaced by the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. Khwaja Mohammed Sadiq, its first President said: “This day will be written in bold letters in the history of the national awakening of Jammu and Kashmir.”
Since then, the National Conference has weathered many storms and battles, growing from strength to strength on the basis of its democratic ideals and expanding mass support. In August 1942, the arrest of the leaders of the Indian National Congress and the ensuing turmoil cast a shadow over Kashmir. On 16 August 1942, the National Conference, in a resolution, stated: “The National Conference is of the opinion that the demand of the Congress is based on just reasons. The working committee condemns the reign of terror and repression which the Government of India has launched by declaring the Indian National Congress illegal, by the arrest of the leaders, and by shooting down unarmed people.”
The year 1944 marked the final stage in this phase—the adoption of full-fledged Socialism, articulated in the official pamphlet New Kashmir. It represented Sheikh Abdullah’s conception of a Model State in which democratic and responsible Government is only a means to an end—the amelioration of the people “through freedom from all forms of economic exploitation.” It was an “all-sides advance along all avenues of human activities regulated in a democratic manner on a country-wide scale.”
On the eve of the session, the Maharaja announced the appointment of two popular ministers to be chosen from among the elected members of the Legislature. The National Conference nominated Sheikh Abdullah’s key lieutenant, M.A. Beg, to the Cabinet.
The National Conference envisaged the future of ‘New Kashmir’ in both political and economic terms. It drew up a scheme based on the democratic principles of responsible government, with the elective principle applied from the local Panchayat to the National Assembly. This framework was linked to judicial independence and the ultimate responsibility of the executive to the people.
During this period, the Muslim Conference sought to capitalise on the political uncertainty prevailing in India. Jinnah visited the state, accompanied by his associates, and intervened in its politics. While in Jammu, en route to Kashmir, he stated: “I am going to Kashmir for rest and have no idea to take part in their politics.”
In a welcome address to Jinnah in Srinagar, Sheikh Abdullah said: “We Kashmiris receive you as a prominent Indian, despite ideological differences we have with you. We hope that you, along with other leaders of India, will try to arrive at a solution which will go a long way to emancipate the teeming millions of India.” In reply, Jinnah observed: “I am happy to see all classes and creeds combined here to receive and honour me.” An hour later, at a reception organised by the Muslim Conference, Jinnah appealed to Muslims to unite under its banner. He stated: “Muslims have one platform, one Kalma and one God. I would request Muslims to come under the banner of Muslim Conference and fight for their rights.” Despite these developments, Sheikh Abdullah responded in measured terms. In a statement, he said: “After 13 years’ experience I am of the opinion that the ills of this land can only be remedied by carrying Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs together.”
The exchange reflected a deeper ideological contest over Kashmir’s political future. Jinnah later agreed to preside over the annual session of the Muslim Conference, where he made very bitter and hostile comments on Sheikh Sahib and his organisation. In response, Sheikh Abdullah stated: “Mr Jinnah must know that he cannot fiddle with Kashmiris as he has done with the Muslims of India…I would like Mr Jinnah to come in the open and ask for a vote of confidence from the Kashmiri Muslim.”
Jinnah’s campaign against Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference failed to gain traction. He denounced Sheikh Abdullah as a ‘goonda (a ruffian)’ and described his organisation as a ‘band of gangsters’. In Baramulla, he again criticised the National Conference but was heckled and compelled to leave. He was escorted away by Maqbool Sherwani, who was later killed in Baramulla by tribal raiders shouting “Pakistan Zindabad”.
In the summer of 1945, a unique session of the National Conference was held at Sopore. Among those present were Pandit Nehru, Maulana Azad, and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, recently released from prison. Their visit strengthened the Conference’s political position and reinforced its association with the wider Indian ‘freedom' movement. The session contributed to the articulation of the “Quit Kashmir” slogan. Speeches emphasised the bonds between Kashmir and India, and reflected the influence of the ideals of the Indian National Congress on politically awakened Kashmiris.
The meeting of the Standing Committee of the All-India States’ Peoples’ Conference (where Sheikh Abdullah was co-opted as Vice President) under Pandit Nehru, a stalking horse of Princely states was one of hectic activity and functioned as a battering ram to wreak havoc and usher in democratic tenets. Representatives from several princely states participated in deliberations on issues affecting state governance and democratic reform. An important resolution on Kashmir was passed, which J&K Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak described as “wishy-washy”. This session was the mightiest hammer-blow.
At a time when Kashmir faced acute hunger, poverty and slavery, the National Conference offered to assist in administering the State. However, the popular minister, Mirza Mohd. Afzal Beg, encountered administrative non-cooperation and indifference from senior Cabinet members. He was constrained by bureaucratic restrictions, even within his own departments. A constitutional dispute between him and the Prime Minister further sharpened tensions. On 17 March 1946, Beg resigned. Commenting on the episode, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said: “Some states have attempted rather feebly to introduce a misuse of Dyarchy. This has not been successful and in the context of today has still less chances of success. Recently it has failed in Kashmir where one of the popular Ministers has had to resign because he was given no opportunity to function effectively.”
With Pandit Ram Chandra Kak as Premier of the State, dyarchy was reduced to a farce. The Prime Minister, backed by his clique of irresponsible bureaucrats, resorted to base tactics to disrupt the ranks of the National Conference. However, the events in India gave a new impetus to the people of Kashmir and urged them to achieve full responsible Government.
The National Conference in its historical memorandum to the Cabinet Mission declared: “Today the national demand of the people of Kashmir is not merely the demand of a responsible Government but their right to absolute freedom from the autocratic rule of the Dogra Force.”
The memorandum also questioned the validity of the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), under which the British transferred Kashmir to the Dogra ruler for 75 lakhs of Nanakshahi rupees. This trend took the shape of the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement, which was a logical corollary of the “New Kashmir” slogan. Sheikh Abdullah proclaimed “We, the people of Kashmir, are determined to mold our own destiny, and we appeal to the members of the Cabinet Mission to recognize the justice and strength of our cause.”
The poverty and misery of the Kashmiris formed the background to Sheikh Abdullah’s revolutionary demand “Quit Kashmir’. Journalist and writer H.N. Brailsford said, “Thanks to the curse of communal divisions, the reign of autocracy has been prolonged for a time in Kashmir. It will not long survive the coming of independence.” Negotiations by Dwarka Nath Kachru, Nehru’s Private Secretary and a fellow Kashmiri Pandit, with the State authorities failed. The State authorities also attempted to fabricate ‘Abdullah’s clique with League’. The Kashmir Government refused to realise the revolutionary changes that had come to stay.
On 20 May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah left Srinagar to meet Pandit Nehru in Delhi but was arrested en-route, about 100 miles from the city. The same day, the Valley of Kashmir was handed over to the military. From 21 May onwards there was “blood, sweat and tears” in Kashmir. Here are the observations by the Special Correspondent of the Globe News Agency: “People were ordered to walk with one leg leaping like lame men shouting, “Maharaja Bahadur Ki Jai”. Old men and respectable citizens were forced to crawl on the roads at the point of a rifle. Lawyers, professors and even Government servants were forced to fill up trenches and sweep the roads.”
The end of the Sham dyarchy had given the people's upsurge a mighty fresh impetus. The National Conference’s historic memorandum had called for the scrapping of the slave Treaty of Amritsar of 1846. Security forces opened fire in several instances, and casualties followed.[e] Activists such as Ghulam Mohiuddin and others ran from village to village—spreading the message of ‘Quit Kashmir’ and ‘New Kashmir’, hunted all the time by the military. Facing imminent arrest, Ghulam Mohd. Bakshi and G.M. Sadiq left the State and continued the movement from outside.
In a press statement on developments in Kashmir following Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said: “Srinagar is almost a city of the dead where movement is difficult.....apart from the many hundreds who have been put in prison, clashes occur daily and even women have been shot down. But what is far worse is the deliberate attempt reminiscent of the Martial Law days in Punjab in 1919 to humiliate human beings. The Colonel Blimps have ceased to exercise control in most countries. It is the unfortunate fate of Kashmir today to be under the charge of such blimps.” Nehru used “Colonel Blimp” as a derogatory term for reactionary imperial officials clinging to outdated colonial views.
On 3 June, Sheikh Abdullah’s trial began. The case had to be adjourned till 11 June since Sheikh Sahib wanted to consult lawyers in connection with his defence. The case was again adjourned due to the inconvenience to the defence. On 28 May 1946, Nehru sent a telegram to Ram Chandra Kak, stating, “Press reports indicate the trial of Sheikh Abdullah and others, I desire to organize his proper defence. I request full facilities and time for this.”
The state authorities maintained that Nehru’s visit will only create complications. Nehru, however, declared: “There could be no peace in Kashmir unless Sheikh Abdullah was released.” In June 1946, while attempting to enter the State to assist in the defence, he was detained at Domel for defying a ban on his entry. He and his companions, including Kachru, were stopped at the Kohala Bridge, where an altercation occurred with armed sentries. This move galvanised common Kashmiris, for they understood that Nehru had common cause with J&K even as he was fighting for India's freedom.
The weight of Jammu & Kashmir’s turbulent history always weighed heavily on the shoulders of those who helmed the State. An attritional battle of wits has constantly existed between Delhi and Srinagar, with Pakistan acting as an aggravator. The Kashmiri body politic grappled with intractable contradictions trying to please all three audiences which led to testing the moral fibre of those governing the frontline state. Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mhd. fell prey to this balancing act at different times in their political careers as they flirted with the idea of becoming independent. Kashmir’s political crown could indeed be likened to a poisoned chalice.
Sandeep Bamzai is author of the trilogy, Bonfire of Kashmiriyat, Princestan, and Gilded Cage (Rupa & Co).
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] This treaty was held in abeyance in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack in April 2025.
[b] Paul Grimes, “Nehru and Ayub Agree to Parley on Kashmir Issue,” The New York Times, November 30, 1962.
[c] Nehru would die the next day.
[d] In March 1933, he set up a sub-committee to enlist the sympathy and support of the Sikhs and the Hindus of the State in order to build up a united front against the bureaucracy. Hindus and Muslims worked jointly for the welfare of the masses and made them rise above petty communal bickering. Immediately after this, the Muslim Conference was forced to launch a civil Disobedience Movement. This time the Notification 19-L was again enforced and the rights of the people were smashed indiscriminately.
[e] The soldiers ran amuck. ‘Kill’ was their slogan, and they killed. Tales of Kashmiri ‘cowardice’ were blown up; the people did in fact fight back.
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