Introduction

The advent of 5G technology marks a new age in telecommunications that promises to redefine industries and everyday life. Unlike older cellular network technologies, 5G is designed to enhance mobile broadband and catalyse transformative advancements across sectors. Its higher speeds, ultra-low latency, and massive connectivity capabilities are revolutionising applications, from autonomous vehicles to remote surgeries, heralding the era of the Internet of Things (IoT) and smart cities.

Taking the lead in developing and commercialising 5G technology are Chinese telecom companies, rapidly entering new markets by undercutting Western competitors on price.^[1] This is raising concerns in many countries over its impact on the commercial prospects of Western telecom companies and provoking fears of surveillance and espionage through the use of Chinese telecom equipment.^[2] Various instances and allegations of Chinese telecom companies engaging in cyber espionage  have exacerbated these concerns.  For example, in 2020, a report from the Australian government and Papua New Guinea’s National Cyber Security Centre noted that the latter’s National Data Centre built by Huawei had multiple cybersecurity issues that exposed confidential government data.^[3] Likewise, in 2019, Vodafone Group acknowledged that it had found vulnerabilities with Huawei equipment deployed for the carrier’s business in Italy.^[4]

The open radio access network (O-RAN) has emerged as a disruptive alternative to the dominance of Chinese firms. O-RAN separates hardware and software components within the radio access network (RAN)—a major component of a wireless telecom system. This challenges the traditional approach of Chinese telecom companies that have succeeded by offering solutions along the entire 5G value chain, including network equipment, applications, and services. O-RAN offers more flexibility, reduced costs, improved network management, and enhanced security.

While O-RAN is still in the testing and experimentation phase, it warrants a deeper assessment given its transformative possibilities. This brief explores the potential of O-RAN by situating it in the broader context of 5G connectivity, the initiatives underway to counter China’s dominance, and what it means for India.

The Importance of 5G Connectivity

In addition to being an incremental upgrade over its predecessor,^[5] 5G technology also signifies a transformative shift in telecom infrastructure. Unlike previous network generations, which primarily focused on enhancing mobile broadband services, 5G aims to be a transformative force across multiple industries by increasing the speed, responsiveness, and capacity of wireless networks. The technology operates on higher frequency bands, enabling faster data transfer rates and reducing latency, thereby enhancing the efficiency of real-time applications such as autonomous vehicles and remote surgeries. Moreover, its capacity to connect many devices simultaneously makes it a cornerstone of the IoT revolution.

At its core, 5G technology is built on three pillars:^[6]

• Enhanced mobile broadband that aims to deliver gigabit-level speeds to mobile devices, enabling high-definition video streaming, virtual reality applications, and other bandwidth-intensive services
• Ultra-reliable low latency communications that focus on reducing latency and increasing reliability, making it suitable for applications such as autonomous vehicles, remote surgeries, and industrial automation
• Massive machine-type communications that target IoT’s connectivity needs, supporting many devices with varying data requirements

The real-world impacts of 5G cover most sectors, with its global economic value expected to reach US$13.2 trillion by 2035 and creating 22.3 million jobs.^[7] Additionally, its ability to support many connected devices simultaneously facilitates the growth of interconnected systems.^[8] This enables smart city initiatives such as efficient traffic management, enhanced energy distribution, and improved public safety through interconnected sensors and devices. Industries are poised to undergo remarkable transformations with 5G, particularly manufacturing and logistics, where low latency and high reliability are crucial for deploying robotics and automation systems.^[9] These advancements are expected to boost efficiency, enable predictive maintenance, and create safer working environments. The technology also opens new frontiers in healthcare with telemedicine and remote surgery capabilities, allowing healthcare professionals to deliver real-time diagnoses and treatments beyond geographical borders. The technology also enhances augmented and virtual reality experiences, revolutionising sectors as diverse as entertainment, gaming, and education.

As 5G adoption continues to grow, its full impact on society, the economy, and technology will only become more evident.

China’s Dominance in 5G

The potential impact of 5G across various sectors makes its deployment and vendors key to shaping the future of governments and soft power. China has emerged as a frontrunner in this deployment race. Companies like Huawei, ZTE, and China Mobile have made heavy investments in research and development, resulting in cutting-edge infrastructure and equipment and positioning China at the forefront of 5G technology.^[10] Additionally, an increased focus on telecom in Chinese foreign policy has led to increased domestic manufacturing and investment in global emerging economies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.^[11] This dominance extends beyond hardware manufacturing to standard-setting bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), where Chinese influence has grown over the years.^[a],[12]

The Chinese government has reiterated its focus on telecom in its foreign policy under initiatives such as ‘Made in China 2025’ and the ‘Digital Silk Road’ (DSR). The ‘Made in China’ strategy, unveiled in 2015, seeks to transform China into a global leader in high-tech industries, including telecom.^[13] This initiative focuses on bolstering domestic innovation, reducing reliance on foreign technology, and achieving global competitiveness in multiple sectors, particularly advanced manufacturing and information technology. A key objective is for Chinese-made optical communication equipment to achieve a 60-percent share in the international market, and for the router and switch industry to secure a 25-percent share.^[14]

While Made in China has spurred advancements in 5G technology manufacturing domestically, the DSR has focused on exporting digital infrastructure to establish a network between China and the Indo-Pacific and Africa through private companies. Through memoranda of understanding (MoUs), investments, and partnerships, Chinese companies are engaged in over 220 and 475 telecom-related projects in Africa^[15] and the Indo-Pacific,^[16] respectively. Additionally, China has some 1,500 ongoing telecom projects in different parts of the world.^[17] These initiatives underscore Beijing’s ambitions to dominate technological standards and expand its influence across continents through extensive investments in telecom infrastructure.

China’s dominance in the 5G sector has raised concerns that, as part of the DSR, Beijing may push its telecom companies to capture newer markets, integrate Chinese technology into critical national telecom infrastructure (that serves as the backbone of national communications), and establish an eavesdropping network monitoring real-time data that could ultimately infringe on privacy. For example, in Zimbabwe, Chinese firm Cloudwalk’s partnership agreement with the government saw the widespread implementation of surveillance technologies, with all collected biometric data being transferred to China.^[18] Multiple security breaches have occurred in countries that rely on Chinese technology, such as Papua New Guinea and Myanmar.^[19] The COVID-19 pandemic only increased the demand for technologies such as digital contact tracing in developing countries, leading to a higher risk of surveillance.^[20] These developments have positioned China at the forefront of 5G deployment but are also provoking concerns in the international community about security, fair competition, and global market dynamics.

Consequently, several countries have implemented stringent measures against Chinese tech firms. The Five-Eyes intelligence alliance^[b],[21] and countries such as Japan,^[22] France,^[23] and Vietnam^[24] have either banned or restricted the use of Chinese equipment in their 5G networks, citing national security risks. At the same time, many developing nations have chosen to deploy Chinese equipment and technology as it is more financially viable—a motivation that often supersedes national security concerns. The Chinese government offers firms like Huawei substantial support through loans, tax breaks, and grants,^[25] which allows it to offer market prices at almost 30 percent lower than its competitors.^[26] Non-Chinese firms such as Ericsson (Sweden), Nokia (Finland), and Samsung (South Korea) are vital in advancing 5G technology and infrastructure deployment worldwide as an alternative to the dependence on China. However, to compete with China, these firms must provide comparable services at a similar cost,^[27] which they are currently unable to do.

Experimenting with O-RAN

O-RAN has emerged as a potential alternative to Chinese 5G technology.^[28] RAN is the critical link between mobile devices and the wider telecom network. At its core, it consists of a network of base stations, antennas, and other equipment that facilitate data transmission between mobile devices and the core network. Its primary function is to provide wireless access to mobile devices, enabling them to connect to the broader network and access services such as voice calls, messaging, and internet browsing. Combining radio frequency signals and advanced modulation techniques, RAN ensures efficient and reliable communication between devices and the network infrastructure. The RAN architecture typically comprises three main components^[29]:

• The radio unit, responsible for converting digital data into radio waves for transmission over the air interface
• The distributed unit that handles tasks such as radio resource management and coordination between base stations
• The centralised unit, which manages higher-level functions such as network control and data processing

At the heart of O-RAN is virtualisation, which involves decoupling hardware from software and running network functions on standard off-the-shelf hardware. This means that rather than relying on specialised, proprietary hardware for each network component, the functions traditionally performed by dedicated hardware are now implemented as software that can run on regular servers.^[30] This approach enables greater flexibility and scalability, as operators can deploy software networks and network functions virtualisation to dynamically allocate resources and adapt to changing traffic patterns.^[31]

Traditional 5G RAN infrastructure typically relies on proprietary hardware and software solutions from a single vendor, which can lead to a vendor lock-in situation.^[32] In contrast, O-RAN embraces openness and interoperability, allowing operators to deploy multi-vendor networks and choose the best-of-breed solutions for their specific needs.

While both 5G and O-RAN represent notable advancements in mobile networking, they differ in their approaches to architecture and deployment. O-RAN is an enabler for 5G. It promotes innovation, lowers costs, and facilitates easier upgrades, thereby offering flexibility and resilience in 5G deployment. O-RAN’s interoperability, standardisation, and promotion of vendor diversity reduce the dependence on dominant suppliers like Huawei.^[33] Eliminating single-vendor dependency can mitigate risks and prevent the weaponisation of supply chains. This approach will encourage collaboration on standards and protocols, facilitating global connectivity without exclusive dependencies on any single company or country. Furthermore, O-RAN’s openness promotes fair competition, potentially lowering costs and improving service quality for consumers. Decoupling from the traditional end-to-end structure of 5G deployment allows companies and countries to manufacture some parts of the digital infrastructure interchangeably. This will increase competitiveness, lower the barriers to entry in the telecom sector, and increase transparency worldwide.

Given the potential benefits, several countries such as the United States (US) and Japan have endorsed O-RAN to enhance cybersecurity and preserve national sovereignty and security in telecom infrastructure.^[34] This allows local vendors to enter the domestic market, ensuring that the telecom systems remain under local control and reducing the risks of external interference. Notably, investments in O-RAN are being spearheaded by the private sector. Mobile operators are expected to invest over US$30 billion in O-RAN globally by 2030.^[35] In the US, the Open RAN Policy Coalition brings together leading companies and organisations to advocate for policies that support the development and deployment of O-RAN solutions.^[36] Similarly, the Telecom Infra Project (TIP), founded in 2016 by Meta (formerly Facebook) and other tech and telecom firms, aims to accelerate innovation in the telecom industry by promoting open and interoperable technologies such as O-RAN.^[37] Through initiatives like the OpenRAN Project Group, TIP is working to develop and deploy O-RAN solutions that can be adopted by operators around the world.^[38]

By diversifying supply chains and reducing dependence on specific vendors—particularly those from geopolitically sensitive regions—countries can bolster their strategic autonomy and safeguard national security interests. This shift towards open standards also encourages healthy competition, driving innovation and ensuring technological advancements benefit consumers globally. Table 1 lists examples of country-level O-RAN investments.

Table 1: O-RAN Investments Worldwide

Country	Department/Company	Goal
Germany	Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone[39]	To invest in research labs and collaborate with industry partners and academia to advance O-RAN standards and technologies
Japan	Rakuten Mobile[40]	To capitalise on virtualisation and cloud-native technologies to enhance efficiency and scalability
South Korea	SK Telecom and KT Corporation[41]	To conduct trials and pilot projects to evaluate the feasibility and benefits of O-RAN deployment
UK	British Telecom Group and O2 (Telefonica UK)[42]	To collaborate with technology partners to pilot solutions and demonstrate their potential to enhance network efficiency and service quality
	Government- Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)[43]	To diversify the telecom supply chain.
US	Multiple Companies- O-RAN Policy Coalition[44]	To advocate for policies conducive to O-RAN adoption and promote competition and innovation.
Worldwide	O-RAN Alliance (multiple companies, vendors, and research institutions)[45]	To drive innovation and competitiveness in the telecom sector at the national and regional levels through research programmes.

Source: Authors’ own, using various open sources

At the global level, the Quad, comprising the US, Australia, India, and Japan, has been leading the charge in O-RAN research and development. In the South Pacific, the Quad has partnered with Palau’s National Communications Corporation to replace the country’s existing mobile network and deploy an O-RAN system.^[46] Several countries have also formalised bilateral cooperation on this front. In January 2024, India and the US formalised the ‘US-India OpenRAN Acceleration Roadmap’ to promote O-RAN through trusted suppliers.^[47] Additionally, the two countries signed an MoU to collaborate in O-RAN and research for 5G and 6G. Under this, a US will undertake a 5G O-RAN pilot in a leading Indian telecom operator before its field deployment.^[48] Japan carried out 5G O-RAN tests in 2022^[49] and established the Open Testing & Integration Centres that provide an independent and open interconnectivity verification environment to test and certify hardware, including base station equipment, based on the O-RAN specifications.^[50] It has also announced plans to cooperate with the United Kingdom (UK) in sharing O-RAN technology among telecom companies.^[51] The UK has also taken steps to promote O-RAN use, with its Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport investing US$306 million in 5G innovation, which includes O-RAN. The US, Canada, and Australia have backed this initiative.^[52]

Current Challenges

Despite its promise, O-RAN faces technical, financial, and political challenges that can hinder its widespread deployment and long-term viability.

The decentralised and disaggregated nature of O-RAN networks introduces new complexities that will need to be carefully managed. While the modular architecture offers flexibility, it also means that the network relies on multiple vendors and open interfaces, increasing the potential for vulnerabilities. Introducing open interfaces between disaggregated components may increase the attack surface, making it easier for malicious actors to exploit entry points.^[53] The Quad’s Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group has noted that a lack of standardisation of security specifications can constitute a vulnerability for 5G and O-RAN.^[54]

Furthermore, highly skilled resources are necessary for the design, engineering, and integration of O-RAN systems. The technical challenges of integrating open interfaces across multi-vendor components—ensuring compatibility and smooth operation—pose hurdles not just for India, but other countries too, particularly in the early stages of O-RAN adoption.^[55] India’s talent pool, while growing, may face difficulties meeting the demand for these specialised skills in the short term, delaying progress. Ensuring security at open interfaces between disaggregated components is crucial to prevent cyberattacks. While enhancing flexibility, these open interfaces could become targets for attackers if not properly secured.^[56] Therefore, securing these interfaces must be a top priority to maintain the integrity of O-RAN deployment.

O-RAN has not yet proved to be a cost-effective method compared to the traditional RAN systems that are, for instance, used by Chinese companies.^[57] Although O-RAN operating costs could eventually reduce by about 40 percent, current configurations cannot compete financially with the existing systems.^[58],[59] The high upfront costs associated with building a multi-vendor O-RAN ecosystem and the added complexity of managing disaggregated networks contribute to the financial barriers for telecom providers.

Finally, the political reason for the big push for O-RAN is to challenge Chinese telecom companies. However, Chinese firms remain dominant in O-RAN. For example, China Mobile is a veto-powered founding member of the O-RAN Alliance.

These challenges may neutralise the advantage of the O-RAN approach to counter China’s 5G dominance as effectively as is expected.^[60] However, O-RAN is still in its initial phase of research and development. It is possible that by adopting open standards and best practices, O-RAN operators can leverage the collective expertise and resources of the broader ecosystem to identify and address security threats more effectively, while also addressing the bigger financial and political hurdles.

The Indian Scenario

India and China have a tense security relationship, and 5G and telecom are facets of the rivalry. Chinese vendors accounted for about 20 percent of India’s 4G network rollout equipment.^[61] However, in 2021, India joined the US in blocking Huawei and ZTE from its 5G trials over national security risks.^[62] As a result, Chinese firms were effectively excluded when India launched 5G services in October 2022,^[63] with Indian telecom companies like Airtel and Jio opting to partner with firms such as Nokia, Ericsson, and Samsung. Notably, given the importance of Chinese vendors in its 4G rollout, there were apprehensions that the lack of Chinese equipment would hinder India’s 5G accessibility. However, the network has been continuously expanding since launch; as of March 2025, India is estimated to have over 250 million 5G users, and 469,000 5G base transceiver stations have been installed.^[64]

In 2021, the Indian government had updated the telecom license conditions to implement the ‘trusted source/product’ model.^[65] These mandate that the licensees (i.e., the telecom operators) only connect with trusted vendors and products to upgrade or expand the existing network. What constitutes ‘trusted’ is unclear but the list of equipment and the methodology to designate ‘trusted products’ is devised by the National Cyber Security Coordinator in the National Security Council Secretariat.

Since India can sustain the expansion of its telecom sector, it has supported the US and other like-minded partners. New Delhi has emerged as a strong advocate for the O-RAN approach as a counter to Chinese vendors. In addition to investments at the global level, the Indian government is also involving its private sector through public-private partnerships. The US and India have established a joint task force led by Bharat 6G and Next G Alliance to further research and development, deploy O-RAN systems, and collaborate with academia and startups.^[66]

Despite these efforts, the current landscape for O-RAN adoption in India presents challenges. India is still largely reliant on established vendors, with little movement toward leveraging the full potential of O-RAN’s multi-vendor, disaggregated framework.^[67] Telecom service providers are not yet fully prepared for O-RAN integration.^[68] Since the technology’s ecosystem is still relatively new, it is not yet widely adopted commercially by the telecom industry.^[69]

Moreover, India is still grappling with foundational issues in its 5G network rollout. Indeed, 5G in India is nascent and its full benefits have yet to be realised. India’s telecom infrastructure is still struggling to provide stable and comprehensive network coverage. While its embrace of O-RAN could eventually address some of these challenges, whether it will help smaller telecom providers remains to be seen, especially given India’s reliance on foreign vendors for core network equipment. Notably, domestic manufacturers such as Tejas Networks and Sterlite are gradually expanding their capacity to meet India’s 5G requirements.^[70],[71]

Key factors driving India’s interest in O-RAN include the potential to reduce costs and increase flexibility. Having a decoupled, multi-vendor system will also help India increase its digital connectivity to rural areas. This allows for specialised solutions tailored to local needs and infrastructure, enabling more flexible deployment. In addition to potential economic benefits, O-RAN offers strategic advantages for India in terms of national security and developing domestic capacity. By reducing dependence on foreign vendors and embracing domestic innovation, India can enhance its strategic autonomy and ensure the integrity and security of its telecom infrastructure.

Government action is also critical. To make O-RAN viable, the government must foster an ecosystem where companies are incentivised to share technologies, potentially through tax holidays, subsidies, grants, and loans. Without clear incentives, smaller companies will not be able to compete, and larger firms will continue to dominate. India’s transition to and incorporation of O-RAN into its 5G infrastructure will depend on how effectively the country can overcome economic barriers, incentivise local companies, and ensure the necessary infrastructure and integration capabilities are in place.

India can consider implementing the following measures:

• Cybersecurity Research and Mitigation: India should invest in cybersecurity research related to 5G and 6G. This should focus on identifying potential vulnerabilities in O-RAN networks and developing robust mitigation strategies.
• Boosting Domestic Manufacturing: India should leverage its market size and strategic interests to incentivise domestic manufacturing in telecom equipment.^[72] The government should encourage private sector companies through financial incentives, tax holidays, and streamlined regulatory processes by reinvigorating initiatives such as the production-linked incentive scheme. This will support the ‘Make in India’ initiative and foster a competitive domestic ecosystem capable of fulfilling the country’s growing telecom needs.
• O-RAN Adoption for Digital Connectivity: The endorsement of the O-RAN approach offers India advantages in cost reduction, flexibility, and enhancing rural connectivity. The government should continue to support and promote the deployment of O-RAN solutions across the country, including through pilot projects, subsidies for O-RAN infrastructure deployment, and partnerships with leading global providers. It is also an opportunity to bridge the domestic skill-set gap.^[73]
• Regulatory Framework and Standards: India should help develop a robust regulatory framework for O-RAN deployment that ensures interoperability, security standards, and quality assurance. Clear guidelines and certification processes will instil confidence in domestic and international stakeholders, encouraging the broader adoption of O-RAN solutions across the telecom sector.

Conclusion

As 5G continues to reshape global connectivity, the competition for technological dominance has intensified. China’s proactive approach to 5G development and deployment underscores its ambitions for global influence through telecom infrastructure. The emergence of technologies like O-RAN represents a promising alternative to traditional 5G infrastructure and offers countries the opportunity to diversify supply chains, enhance cybersecurity, and preserve sovereignty in telecom.

However, O-RAN is facing challenges in terms of maturity, interoperability, and ecosystem support, and there is much work to be done to realise its full potential. Nevertheless, the momentum behind O-RAN continues to grow, driven by the global telecom industry’s strategic, economic, and technological imperatives. The future of 5G RAN will be defined by strategic alliances, technological innovation, and policy frameworks that balance economic progress with national security imperatives.

Endnotes

^[a] China’s influence within the ITU has grown through the strategic placement of Chinese nationals in key positions, increased participation, and subsidised contributions to ITU processes. China also leads in filing Standard Essential Patent applications, aiming to internationalise its own technical standards and bring economic benefit to its domestic companies. Since 2014, the ITU Secretary-General has deepened ties with Beijing and supported Chinese-led initiatives. This growing influence has raised concerns about China dominating critical and emerging technologies such as 5G and AI, posing potential economic, strategic, privacy, and security risks. Furthermore, China is advocating for a more intergovernmental approach to internet governance, in contrast to the multi-stakeholder model favoured by many Western nations. See: https://www.gatewayhouse.in/chinas-expanding-influence-un-system/.

^[b] Comprising the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK.

^[1] Sameer Patil, “Taking a Strategic View of Telecom Networks in Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation, December 9, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/taking-a-strategic-view-of-telecom-networks-in-indo-pacific

^[2] Noah Berman, Lindsay Maizland and Andrew Chatzky, “Is China’s Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security?,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-huawei-threat-us-national-security

^[3] Angus Grigg, “Huawei Data Centre Built to Spy on PNG,” The Australian Financial Review, August 11, 2020, https://www.afr.com/companies/telecommunications/huawei-data-centre-built-to-spy-on-png-20200810-p55k7w

^[4] Daniele Lepido, “Vodafone Found Hidden Backdoors in Huawei Equipment,” Bloomberg, April 30, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-30/vodafone-found-hidden-backdoors-in-huawei-equipment.

^[5] “What Is 5G?,” Cisco, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/what-is-5g.html

^[6] Verizon News Center, “Understanding Important 5G Concepts: What Are eMBB, URLLC and mMTC?,” Verizon, March 30, 2023, https://www.verizon.com/about/news/5g-understanding-embb-urllc-mmtc

^[7] World Economic Forum and PwC, The Impact of 5g: Creating New Value across Industries and Society, January 2020, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/about-pwc/contribution-to-debate/wef-the-impact-of-fiveg-report.pdf

^[8] Craig Wigginton and Brian Greenberg, “Smart Cities and 5G: Taking It to the Next Level,” Forbes,  November 15, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/deloitte/2022/11/15/smart-cities-and-5g-taking-it-to-the-next-level/

^[9] World Economic Forum and PwC, The Impact of 5G

^[10]“China’s 5G Market is Set to Add Almost $260 Billion to the Chinese Economy in 2030 with Connections Set to Top 1 Billion This Year,” GSMA,  March 26, 2024, https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/press-release/chinas-5g-market-is-set-to-add-almost-260-billion-to-the-chinese-economy-in-2030-with-connections-set-to-top-1-billion-this-year/

^[11] Patil, “Taking a Strategic View of Telecom Networks in Indo-Pacific”

^[12] Brett Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “Countering China’s Growing Influence at the International Telecommunication Union,” The Heritage Foundation, March 7, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/countering-chinas-growing-influence-the-international-telecommunication#

^[13] The State Strategic Advisory Committee for Building China into a Manufacturing Superpower, “Roadmap of Major Technical Domains for Made in China 2025,” Center for Security and Emerging Technologies, October 29, 2015, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0181_Made_in_China_roadmap_EN.pdf

^[14] The State Strategic Advisory Committee for Building China into a Manufacturing Superpower, “Roadmap of Major Technical Domains for Made in China 2025”

^[15] Australian Strategic Policy Institute, International Cyber Policy Centre, “Mapping China’s Tech Giants”.

^[16] Australian Strategic Policy Institute, International Cyber Policy Centre, “Mapping China’s Tech Giant”.

^[17] Australian Strategic Policy Institute, International Cyber Policy Centre, “Mapping China’s Tech Giants,” https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/map/f3-Telecommunications

^[18] Evan Williams, “China’s Digital Silk Road Taking Its Shot at the Global Stage,” East Asia Forum, May 9, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/05/09/chinas-digital-silk-road-taking-its-shot-at-the-global-stage/

^[19] Williams, “China’s Digital Silk Road Taking Its Shot at the Global Stage”

^[20] “Assessing China’s Digital Silk Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/

^[21] Berman, Maizland and Chatzky, “Is China’s Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security?”

^[22] Simon Denyer, “Japan Effectively Bans China’s Huawei and ZTE from Government Contracts, Joining U.S.,” The Washington Post, December 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-effectively-bans-chinas-huawei-zte-from-government-contracts-joining-us/2018/12/10/748fe98a-fc69-11e8-ba87-8c7facdf6739_story.html

^[23] Oliver Pinaud, “Huawei Retains a Presence in France, Despite 5G Ban,” Le Monde, February 21, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2023/02/21/huawei-retains-a-presence-in-france-despite-5g-ban_6016751_19.html

^[24] “Vietnam Shuns Huawei As It Seeks to Build Southeast Asia’s First 5G Network,” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3024479/vietnam-shuns-huawei-it-seeks-build-aseans-first-5g

^[25] Chuin-Wei Yap, “State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise,” The Wall Street Journal,  December 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736

^[26] Ngor Luong, “Forging the 5G Future: Strategic Imperatives for the US and Its Allies,” Atlantic Council, September 4, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/forging-the-5g-future-strategic-imperatives-for-the-us-and-its-allies/

^[27] Axel de Vernou, “The U.S. Must Offer a Substantive 5G Alternative to China’s Huawei,” The National Interest, May 17, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland/us-must-offer-substantive-5g-alternative-china%E2%80%99s-huawei-211072

^[28] “Update: Open RAN Explained,” Nokia, https://www.nokia.com/networks/radio-access-networks/open-ran/open-ran-explained/.

^[29] “What is Open RAN (ORAN),” Cisco, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/what-is-open-ran.html

^[30] Verizon News Center, “Virtualization: What is It and How It’s Shaping Verizon’s 5G Network,” Verizon, https://www.verizon.com/about/news/virtualization-positioning-our-5g-network-for-the-future

^[31] Robert A. Manning, “Emerging Technologies: New Challenges to Global Stability,” Atlantic Council, May 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Emerging-Technologies-New-Challenges-To-Global-Stability-May-2020.pdf

^[32] “Critical 5g Components- Radio Access Networks,” Ericsson, https://www.ericsson.com/en/public-policy-and-government-affairs/5-key-facts-about-5g-radio-access-networks

^[33] Geoff Hollingworth, “Top 10 Benefits of Open RAN: A Comprehensive Breakdown,” Rakuten Symphony,  April 6, 2023, https://symphony.rakuten.com/blog/top-10-benefits-of-open-ran-a-comprehensive-breakdown

^[34] Tomoko Tanaka-Makino, “U.S.-Japan Focus on Scaling Up Open RAN Technology Can Support Secure 5G Globally,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation, https://spfusa.org/publications/u-s-japan-focus-on-scaling-up-open-ran-technology-can-support-secure-5g-globally/

^[35] “Mobile Operators to Invest over $30 Bn in Open Radio Access Networks by 2030,” The Economic Times Government,  November 13, 2023, https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/mobility/mobile-operators-to-invest-over-30-bn-in-open-radio-access-networks-by-2030/105183212

^[36] “About Us,” Open RAN Policy Coalition, https://www.openranpolicy.org/about-us/

^[37] “About Us,” Telecom Infra Project, https://telecominfraproject.com/who-we-are/

^[38] “The OpenRAN Project Group Initiative,” Telecom Infra Project, https://telecominfraproject.com/openran/

^[39] “Major European Operators Commit to Open RAN Developments,” Vodafone, January 20, 2021, https://www.vodafone.com/news/technology-news/major-european-operators-commit-open-ran-developments

^[40] “Open RAN Explained: All You Need to Know and More,” Rakuten Symphony, May 3, 2023, https://symphony.rakuten.com/blog/open-ran-explained-all-you-need-to-know-and-more

^[41] Juan Pedro Tomas, “South Korea Launches Local Alliance to Boost O-RAN Ecosystem,” RCR Wireless News,  August 25, 2023, https://www.rcrwireless.com/20230825/open_ran/south-korea-launches-local-alliance-boost-o-ran-ecosystem

^[42] Ryan Daws, “UK Invests 88M in Open RAN Initiatives Transforming Mobile Connectivity,” Telecoms,  September 14, 2023, https://www.telecomstechnews.com/news/uk-invests-88m-open-ran-initiatives-mobile-connectivity/

^[43] Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport, Government of the United Kingdom, UK/ROK Open RAN R&D Collaboration Application Guidance,  September 20, 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62debd768fa8f5649e8bfe3e/UK_ROK_-_application_guidance.pdf

^[44]  “About Us,” Open RAN Policy Coalition, https://www.openranpolicy.org/about-us/

^[45] “Who We Are,” O-RAN Alliance, https://www.o-ran.org/who-we-are

^[46] US Trade and Development Agency, “USTDA, Palau Partner on Mobile Network Modernisation,” June 21, 2023, https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-palau-partner-on-mobile-network-modernization/

^[47] Ministry of Communications, Government of India,  https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2020823#:~:text=During%20the%20visits%20in%20Sept,instil%20user%20confidence%20progressed%20considerably .

^[48] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Joint Statement from India and the United States,  September 8, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/37078/Joint+Statement+from+India+and+the+United+States

^[49] “Japan to Carry Out 5G O-RAN Tests in 2022: Report,” Carolinas Wireless Association, https://carolinaswirelessassociation.com/feed-rss/japan-to-carry-out-5g-o-ran-tests-in-2022-report/

^[50] Japan OTIC, “Outline of Japan OTIC,” https://japan-otic.jp/en

^[51] Juan Pedro Tomas, “The UK, Japan to Cooperate on Open RAN,” RCR Wireless News, January 3, 2023, https://www.rcrwireless.com/20230103/5g/uk-japan-cooperate-oran-field

^[52] Paul Lipscombe, “US, Canada, and Australia Join UK’s Open RAN 5G Vision,” Data Center Dynamics,  December 8, 2022, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/us-canada-and-australia-join-uks-open-ran-5g-vision/

^[53] European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2881

^[54] National Telecommunications and Information Administration, United States Department of Commerce, Open RAN Security Report, 2023, https://www.ntia.gov/report/2023/open-ran-security-report

^[55] Radhakant Das, “ORAN: Breaking Free from the Shackles of Legacy RAN,” Tata Consultancy Services, https://www.tcs.com/insights/blogs/open-ran-oran-advantages-challenges

^[56] Amy Zwarico et al., “The O-RAN ALLIANCE Security Task Group Tackles Security Challenges on All O-RAN Interfaces and Components,” O-RAN Alliance, https://www.o-ran.org/blog/the-o-ran-alliance-security-task-group-tackles-security-challenges-on-all-o-ran-interfaces-and-components

^[57] Mike Dano, “Ericsson: Actually, Open RAN is More Expensive,” Light Reading, November 18, 2021, https://www.lightreading.com/open-ran/ericsson-actually-open-ran-is-more-expensive

^[58] Dano, “Ericsson: Actually, Open RAN is More Expensive”

^[59] Manoj Harjani, “O-RAN is Overhyped As Avoiding Chinese 5G Influence,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 29, 2024, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/o-ran-is-overhyped-as-avoiding-chinese-5g-influence/

^[60] Harjani, “O-RAN is Overhyped As Avoiding Chinese 5G Influence”

^[61] “India Joins Global Peers in Keeping China Out of 5G Network,” The Business Standard, August 22, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/podcast/technology/india-joins-global-peers-in-keeping-china-out-of-5g-network-122082200015_1.html

^[62] Harsh V. Pant, “India Draws a Line in the 5G Sand,” Foreign Policy, May 18, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/18/india-draws-a-line-in-the-5g-sand/

^[63] Gulveen Aulakh, “RIL Issues Rs 7706 Crore Guarantee for Samsung’s 5G Equipment Supply to Jio,” Livemint, August 16, 2023, https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/ril-issues-rs-7-706-crore-guarantee-for-samsungs-5g-equipment-supply-to-jio-11692171783210.html

^[64] Ministry of Communications, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2113855,

^[65] “National Security Directive on Telecommunication Sector,” Trusted Telecom Portal, https://trustedtelecom.gov.in/

^[66] Sameer Patil, “Tech Cooperation Defines India-US Strategic Alignment,” Observer Research Foundation, July 3, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/tech-cooperation-defines-india-us-strategic-alignment

^[67] Interview with Industry Expert on 29 October 2024 via Zoom

^[68] Interview with Industry Expert on 29 October 2024 via Zoom

^[69] Gagandeep Kaur, “Indian Telcos Give Cold Shoulder to Open RAN As 5G Rollout Nears End,” Light Reading, October 17, 2023, https://www.lightreading.com/open-ran/indian-telcos-give-cold-shoulder-to-open-ran-as-5g-rollout-nears-end

^[70] M Ramesh, “Tejas Networks Get Key 5G Tech from IIT-Madras,” The Hindu BusinessLine, December 12, 2023, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/tejas-networks-gets-key-5g-tech-from-iit-madras/article67629721.ece

^[71] “Sterlite Technologies Unveils Its 5G-from-India Offering at IMC 2021,” Business Standard, December 11, 2021, https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/sterlite-technologies-unveils-its-5g-from-india-offering-at-imc-2021-121121100519_1.html

^[72] “India Will Have its Own Big Telecom Equipment Manufacturers Soon: C-DOT CEO,” The Business Standard, April 18, 2023, https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/india-will-have-its-own-big-telecom-equipment-manufacturers-soon-c-dot-ceo-123041800402_1.html

^[73] Anirban Sarma, “5G: New skills for a New Era,” Observer Research Foundation, October 15, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/5g-new-skills-for-a-new-era

• International Affairs
• Cyber and Technology
• China
• India
• 5G technology
• Chinese telecom
• cyber espionage
• Huawei
• Internet of Things
• network security
• O-RAN
• smart cities
• telecom infrastructure

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