Introduction

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad is a security partnership between the United States (US), India, Japan, and Australia. Its formation was a response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, giving the four countries a platform for coordinating humanitarian relief and rescue operations in the aftermath. The momentum built in 2004 culminated in two meetings in 2007 and 2008 among senior officials of the Quad partners; however, diplomatic pressure from China would eventually lead to the informal dissolution of the Quad.^[1]

It was in the following decade when the Quad was revitalised. Quad foreign ministry officials met in Manila in 2017 on the sidelines^[2] of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia Summits.^[3] The realignment was driven by shared concerns regarding China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, the need to further promote cooperation and strategic consultations among its members, and a desire to uphold peace and stability in the region. As of 2025, the grouping’s foreign ministers have met nine times, and the Quad leaders have met on seven occasions.

In 2021, the Quad leaders released a document, titled, “The Spirit of the Quad”, delineating the founding principles of Quad 2.0.^[4] Accordingly, the Quad countries will uphold and strengthen a “free and open Indo-Pacific,”^[5] modelled as an open and inclusive rules-based order that respects territorial integrity, is rooted in international law, advances security and prosperity, and counters threats in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

This broad, principled framework further compelled the Quad to address global challenges in the domains of counterterrorism, infrastructure, maritime security, global health, climate change, and critical and emerging technologies (CETs). As a result, the Quad leaders established six Working Groups focused on infrastructure, climate, space, cyber, CETs, and health security.^[6] Ranging from pandemic preparedness and COVID-19 vaccine distribution to furthering green energy supply chains, and undertaking capacity-building and information sharing efforts in CETs, cyber, space, and infrastructure, the Quad has delivered across these various domains. However, more needs to be done to deliver tangible, on-the-ground outcomes—particularly in infrastructure. In 2022, the Quad pledged US$50 billion for infrastructure development between 2022 and 2027.^[7] By 2025, halfway to the deadline, the deliverables remain minimal: a subsea cable in Palau; and fewer than ten small-scale, scattered green energy power plants worth under-US$ 0.5 billion.^[8]

The need for strategic foreign assistance in infrastructure development and connectivity cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region is more dire when analysed through a geostrategic lens. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested, loaned or contracted over US$600 billion to the Indo-Pacific countries.^[9] As with any economic project of this scale, the BRI has accorded China considerable economic and geopolitical heft in the region. So far, the BRI has delivered mixed results, with many large-scale projects running into cost overruns and mismanagement. Moreover, Chinese companies and officials have been accused of corruption and creating unsustainable debt burdens in recipient nations.

As a self-proclaimed force for global good, the Quad should present the Indo-Pacific region with a robust alternative to the BRI in the domains of connectivity cooperation and infrastructure development.^[10] Furthermore, from a development perspective, the Indo-Pacific economies face a staggering infrastructure financing requirement of US$4.5 trillion between 2015 and 2030.^[11] The Quad should lead the international community in financing this gap, given that development diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region also aligns with each member’s foreign policy and economic priorities.

Mapping Development Finance in the Indo-Pacific

In the Indo-Pacific region, developed economies like the US, Japan, Australia, and the European Union (EU), alongside India and China—both big Global South economies—serve as the primary bilateral development partners. Multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), are also proponents for pursuing infrastructure development and connectivity.

Table 1: Biggest Donors in the Indo-Pacific (2017-2025, in US$ billions)

Country/Institution	ODA (Loans, Grants, Credit Lines)	Top Recipient Countries	Top Economic Sectors
ADB	126.74	(ADB has not disclosed the data.)	Transport, Energy, Urban Infrastructure
The World Bank	139.66	India, Bangladesh, Indonesia (Loans and credit lines); Ethiopia, Tanzania, Vietnam (Grants)	Transport, Water and Sanitation, Energy and Extractives
AIIB	42.11	India, Bangladesh, Indonesia	Transport, Energy Infrastructure
India	8.90	Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka	Transport, Energy, Social Infrastructure
Japan	49.20	India, Bangladesh, Philippines	Maritime Infrastructure, Transport, Energy
United States	149.32	Bangladesh, Vietnam, Philippines	Economic Assistance, Energy, Humanitarian Aid
China	58.40	Pakistan, Angola, Kenya	Energy, Metals and Mining, Transport
Australia	27.34	Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands	Health, Education, Infrastructure Development
European Union	11.80	(The information is not publicly available.)	Connectivity Cooperation, Infrastructure Development, Health Security
Total Donors: 9	Total Amount Committed: US$ 593.37 billion		Total Economic Sectors Engaged: 12

Sources: Annual reports of the World Bank Group,^[12] ADB,^[13] AIIB,^[14] JICA;^[15] the annual budgets of the External Affairs ministries of India and Australia; Chinese Commerce Ministry; OECD Data Explorer for the US’s regional ODA.^[16]

As shown in Table 1, MDBs are the largest source of development finance in the Indo-Pacific, totalling US$308.51 billion between 2017 and 2025. These funds are disbursed in four ways: lines of credit, grants, low- or zero-interest loans, and technical assistance programmes. In terms of bilateral development partnerships, China leads in the Indo-Pacific, due to its massive BRI economic engagement. Between 2017 and 2024, BRI-related investments in the Indo-Pacific totalled approximately US$440 billion, of which only US$58.4 billion qualified as official development assistance (ODA).^[17]

During the same period, the remaining financial flows—classified as other official flows (OOFs)^[18]—under the BRI framework largely comprised strategic investments by Chinese state-owned or private enterprises, construction contracts in BRI partner countries, and sovereign or commercial loans. These BRI-related OOFs are channelled primarily through Chinese policy banks—the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank). A majority of China’s investments, loans, and construction contracts are thus categorised as OOFs instead of ODA under the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) aid classification system. This implies that Chinese development assistance often takes the form of loans with less concessional terms, often tied to commercial contracts, and primarily aimed at furthering China's strategic and economic interests rather than development outcomes. These economic engagement strategies have led to allegations of “debt-trap diplomacy,” “market-imperialism,” and “extractive economic diplomacy”  from both experts and recipient countries.^[19]

Other bilateral development partners in the Indo-Pacific include India, Japan, Australia, the US, France, and the EU. India, Japan, and Australia have historically directed the majority of their aid budgets to South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific, respectively. Between 2017 and 2024, South Asia accounted for 82.5 percent of Indian aid (US$7.34 billion);^[20] Southeast Asia accounted for 54.3 percent of the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s (JICA) ODA (US$26.7 billion);^[21] and 65 percent of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) aid budget (US$17.77 billion)^[22] was earmarked for South Pacific countries. Prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the primary recipients of US aid in the Middle East were Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. Collectively, the Quad countries’ economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific was worth US$284.26 billion during this period (see Table 1).

Of the Quad partners’ Indo-Pacific commitments, the US’s share stands at 52 percent (see Table 1). Between 2017 and 2024, US foreign aid was delivered largely through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which managed 65 percent of all US ODA during this time.^[23] However, the Trump administration’s recent decision to impose a 90-day freeze on foreign aid and to dissolve USAID—historically the principal vehicle for US development assistance—undermines American leadership abroad and places vulnerable communities and countries at heightened risk. On 10 March 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suspended 83 percent of all USAID programmes (5,200 of 6,200), the value of which amounted to US$54.4 billion.^[24] The administration has claimed that USAID is a vehicle for advancing ‘leftist’ propaganda, making the agency a subject of domestic political contestation. It has further alleged that USAID was instrumental in facilitating regime change in the developing world at the directive of the so-called ‘deep state’.^[a] From a historical foreign policy perspective, however, the USAID has been pivotal in cementing American soft power through development diplomacy and the strategic deployment of foreign assistance. In 2023, the US was the largest bilateral ODA donor, disbursing over US$63.3 billion to more than 90 countries.^[25] The US was also the largest global foreign assistance provider in the same year, disbursing more than US$100 billion in aid, grants, loans credit lines, and guarantees.^[26]

Trump’s pause on USAID activities also provides China an opportunity to enhance its geoeconomic heft in the region by furthering the BRI and taking advantage of the political tumult apropos of US foreign aid. It is likely that the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)^[b] will eventually take the lead in Washington’s development finance efforts in the Trump era.

However, despite his transactional foreign policy approach, President Trump seems to view the Quad favourably. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first ministerial engagement was the ninth Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington, D.C., on the sidelines of Trump’s inauguration as US president.^[27] In his recent bilateral meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the two leaders reiterated their shared commitment to the Quad as a “force for good” in the Indo-Pacific.^[28]

To strengthen this narrative, the Quad countries must revitalise the Infrastructure Working Group by infusing disbursable funds for infrastructure development projects in the region. While Japan, India, and Australia have traditionally operated in silos within their respective neighbourhoods, combining strengths and delivering on the US$50-billion infrastructure development assistance—first announced in 2022—would help demonstrate to the Indo-Pacific nations that the Quad’s commitments are not misguided. Moreover, delivering on these commitments aligns closely with Washington’s evolving foreign aid doctrine. President Trump’s idea of foreign aid as “strategic foreign assistance,” wherein development aid is made available primarily to nations that align closely with his administration’s foreign policy objectives.^[29] The Quad (along with its partners) and the Indo-Pacific region are both crucial to furthering US foreign policy objectives, including its pivot to Asia and managing its strategic rivalry with China.

The Intensifying Geopolitics of Connectivity Cooperation

President Trump approaches foreign assistance and development diplomacy through the lens of great-power contestation and strategic rivalry with China. The Quad’s initiatives under Trump’s first administration and the subsequent Biden administration were targeted at non-traditional security concerns and development cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region. While the Quad has delivered limited outcomes under its leader-level Infrastructure Working Group, its member states have individually undertaken groundwork in their respective littorals and neighbourhoods—primarily to counter China’s BRI engagement and promote regional stability and economic interdependence.

These developments reflect the broader intensification of the geopolitics surrounding connectivity cooperation and infrastructure development in the international system. Beyond the Quad countries (whether acting individually or as a grouping), other actors such as the G7 and the EU have also proposed their counterweights to the BRI—the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)^[30] and the Global Gateway, respectively, for instance.^[31] Collectively, these projects aim to mobilise US$600 billion by 2027 for connectivity cooperation, energy initiatives, and infrastructure development. There are also other projects such as the US-India-led India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)^[32] and the India-Iran-Russia-led International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).^[33]

A closer look reveals that China’s economic engagement under the BRI framework far surpasses the Quad’s collective and individual economic presence across key economic sectors in the Indo-Pacific—the minilateral’s stated priority region. The Quad’s combined private and public sector engagement in the region’s critical economic sectors—transport, energy and mining—lags behind China’s BRI by approximately 33 percent in investment volume and 25 percent in the total number of projects, even after excluding the metals and mining sector (see Table 2).

Table 2: BRI vs Quad: Economic Engagement in the Indo-Pacific, by Sector (2017-2024, in US$ billions)

Sector	BRI: Economic Engagement	BRI: Total Projects	Quad: Economic Engagement	Quad: Total Projects
Oil/Gas	91.40	268	38.05 (Japan: 22.7, US: 10.20, India: 4.90, Australia: 0.25)	264 (Japan: 41, US: 179, India: 9, Australia: 35)
Renewables	84.76	282	33.57 (Japan: 12.60, US: 3.70, India: 3.20, Australia: 4.71)	211 (Japan: 69, US: 110, India: 5, Australia: 32)
Metals and Mining	54.05	164	77.25 (Japan: 32.97, US: 14.50, India: 5.38, Australia: 24.40)	Not publicly available*
Roads, Railways and Highways	62.20	290	41.00 (Japan: 12.34, US: 18.29, India: 3.83, Australia: 6.54)	159 (Japan: 39, US: 59, India: 28, Australia: 33)
Ports and Maritime Infrastructure	48.90	86	41.72 (Japan: 18.39, US: 10.82, India: 4.29, Australia: 8.22)	78 (Japan: 37, US: 28, India: 6, Australia: 7)
Total Economic Sectors Covered: 5	Total Amount Committed (BRI): US$ 341.31 billion	Total Projects (BRI): 1,090 / 926 (excluding Metals and Mining)	Total Amount Committed (Quad): US$ 231.59 billion	Total Projects (Quad): 712
Quad’s individual investments and project count			Japan: 99, US: 65.08, India: 24.11, Australia: 43.4	Japan: 186, US: 376, India: 48, Australia: 105

 * Metals and Mining: Investments and commitments in the metals and mining sector have greater strategic and geopolitical undertones. While the amounts committed or invested may be available, the number of projects or the specifics of the projects may not be available publicly. Keeping that in mind, this paper will not project a possibly inaccurate number. 

Sources: AEI China Global Investment Tracker,^[34] AidData Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset 3.0,^[35] China’s Ministry of Commerce (Annual sectoral, regional and country-wise BRI investments/construction contracts),^[36] OCI Public Finance for Energy Database,^[37] Overseas Direct Investment Data Factsheets 2017-24, Ministry of Finance, the Government of India;^[38] OECD FDI Data Explorer,^[39] AusDev Portal, Government of Australia;^[40] Investments and Ongoing Projects, Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban Development;^[41] JBIC annual reports and FDI statistics,^[42] ForeignAssistance.gov,^[43] USDFC’s Ongoing Projects.^[44]

Within the Quad, Japan and the US dominate economic activity in the region, accounting for 70.84 percent of the grouping’s total economic engagement and 68.29 percent of the projects executed between 2017 and 2024 (see Table 2). In contrast, New Delhi’s and Canberra’s economic footprint remains largely limited to their neighbourhoods—South Asia and the South Pacific, respectively—though these efforts are also aimed at countering the BRI.

The Quad countries’ individual ODA outflows are driven by their respective national, economic, and strategic priorities. However, due to differing degrees of strategic rivalry with China and their domestic priorities, the Quad partners have been unable to find coherence in their China policy and their BRI counter-initiative. The Quad partners and China are competing for geopolitical and strategic influence across three connectivity domains: (i) new and traditional energy systems; (ii) trade-enabling infrastructure; and (iii) the global standards and norms that govern infrastructure development and connectivity cooperation.

Through the BRI, China has embedded itself in critical components of the global green energy and technology supply chains—including electric vehicles (EVs), battery manufacturing, solar photovoltaics (PVs), and critical minerals. Chinese firms account for over 75 percent of global battery cell production,^[45] 85 percent of rare-earth element refining,^[46] and 80 percent of the world’s solar panel production.^[47] China exports its renewable energy development overcapacity through the BRI while simultaneously securing access to critical minerals through its investments under the BRI framework. Furthermore, projects such as the China-Indonesia ‘Nickel BRI’ corridor allow Chinese companies to vertically integrate EV supply chains from mine to factory.^[48] Through the BRI, China has also supported the development of battery factories and EV assembly plants in countries such as Morocco, Hungary, Indonesia, and Thailand, integrating them into its expanding energy-tech sphere.

Another domain of focus within the BRI is trade-enabling infrastructure, including the development of multimodal transport and energy corridors. Projects such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the Central Asian energy corridor, and investments in Russia’s energy sector and Southeast Asia’s port infrastructure are strategically designed to mitigate the risks associated with traditional trade routes like the Suez Canal and the Northern rail corridor via Russia.^[49] These investments and trade corridors have directly contributed to Beijing’s emergence as a leading trading partner to over 100 countries, by ensuring reliable access to energy and export markets.^[50] For recipient nations, these projects also address domestic infrastructure deficits, particularly in the transport and logistics sectors.

China has also institutionalised multilevel policy coordination through over 240 agreements with 150 countries and 30 international organisations, enabling Beijing to align national development plans and regulatory standards across strategic geographies.^[51],[52] Framed as a development initiative, the BRI embeds China’s geopolitical vision within global governance frameworks, thereby consolidating its influence in regions such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and Eurasia. Bilateral alignment with national development plans provides China with strategic entry points for long-term geopolitical entrenchment. Through BRI-specific dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Standard Information Platform and arbitration centres based in Hong Kong, Beijing advances a Sino-centric regulatory ecosystem.^[53] Through this architecture, the BRI operates not only as a channel for infrastructure financing but also as an instrument aimed at reshaping the rules and norms governing the global political economy—thereby challenging Western-led governance structures and enhancing China’s capacity to dictate the terms of connectivity and economic integration.

The Quad seeks to counter this agenda through a multilayered response. The Quad Clean Energy Supply Chains Initiative^[54] is aimed at building resilient networks for hydrogen, EV batteries, and solar technologies across Indo-Pacific partner countries. The Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)—led by the US, with Australia and Japan as members—fosters collaborative investment in critical mineral projects in third countries such as Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo  (DRC), and Mongolia.^[55] Similarly, India’s Khanij Bidesh India Ltd. (KABIL)^[56] and Australia’s US$2.6 billion Critical Minerals Facility support upstream exploration and downstream processing capabilities outside China’s orbit of influence. Furthermore, initiatives such as the IMEC and the PGII-backed Lobito Corridor^[57] in Africa integrate clean energy and logistics corridors, offering alternatives to China’s BRI. Japan’s JICA and the US’s DFC are also co-financing solar and grid infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia and Africa to counter the BRI’s energy lock-ins. Energy and connectivity have thus emerged as the backbone of a strategic competition where infrastructure development assistance is not a neutral domain; but rather a geopolitical choice shaping the flows of trade, technology, and power within the broader international system. The Quad’s emphasis on delivering public goods through connectivity cooperation and infrastructure development—embedded in the vision of a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific—further serves as a normative counterweight to the BRI.

Quad’s Future Steps: Recommendations

Over the past three years, the Quad’s Development Finance Corporations (DFCs) have convened twice, and the grouping’s respective credit agencies have signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to enhance collaboration in critical domains such as supply chain resilience, critical and emerging technologies, renewable energy, and other high-quality projects across the Indo-Pacific.^[58] Notable initiatives include the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience^[59] (QPCCR) and the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership^[60] (QFPF) launched in 2022 and 2025, respectively. In the realm of digital connectivity, the QPCCR supports secure and reliable undersea cable networks, with the grouping’s partners having committed over US$140 million for the development of the same in the South Pacific. The QFPF, meanwhile, focuses on developing sustainable and resilient port infrastructure in collaboration with regional partners.^[61] As part of this effort, India hosted the inaugural Regional Ports and Transportation Conference in Mumbai in May 2025, facilitating maritime coordination, information exchange, and mobilisation of investments in quality port infrastructure throughout the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the Quad has pledged US$50 billion in investments by 2027, reaffirming its commitment to the Indo-Pacific’s infrastructure development and connectivity cooperation needs. However, implementation gaps persist between financial commitments, actual disbursements, and on-ground project execution.

Resource allocation constraints in India and Australia, coupled with evolving global dynamics and regional crises that divert the attention of Quad partners, hamper sustained and coordinated engagement. Differing regulations for standard setting and project implementation frameworks further complicate coordination. For instance, India is not part of the Blue Dot Network (BDN),^[62] implying that it is not legally obligated to adhere to  BDN standards when executing a project.

A strategic priority for the Quad should be support for and development of transport corridors—whether unimodal, bimodal, and multimodal—to counter China’s BRI in the Indo-Pacific. While some Western analysts and China-sceptics have argued that the BRI is losing momentum, the initiative is in fact evolving. President Xi’s flagship infrastructure development and connectivity project has entered a transitional phase, shifting focus toward greener, cleaner and small-scale infrastructure projects in response to criticisms around debt, transparency, and environmental harm. The Quad must proactively counter the BRI’s strategic entrenchment if it is to emerge as a consequential grouping in the Indo-Pacific region.

The following are some actionable policy recommendations that will help the Quad further its infrastructure work under the ambit of its Infrastructure Working Group.

1. India should join the BDN.

India has yet to formally accede to the BDN, despite staunch support for its core principles of transparency and sustainability in infrastructure development. Discussions about India’s potential participation are ongoing, especially within the Quad, as alignment with BDN standards would complement New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific connectivity initiatives. India’s accession to the BDN would enhance the Quad’s capacity to deliver coordinated, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific. By aligning with BDN standards, India would help streamline infrastructure norms across Quad members, ensuring consistency and reducing regulatory hurdles. This would also improve efficiency in the execution of joint projects, rendering the Quad a more reliable partner for regional connectivity.

A unified approach through BDN standards would enhance coordination among Quad countries, enabling them to pool resources, expertise, and investments more effectively. This would not only accelerate project timelines but also optimise financial and operational efficiencies. India holds geostrategic weight in the Indo-Pacific and is central to the Quad’s long-term viability. Given its complex and often tense relations with China—particularly in view of Beijing’s BRI encroachments in South Asia and the Indian Ocean—India has both strategic and economic incentives to align with an alternative infrastructure framework such as the BDN. By joining, India can deepen its multilateral engagements with Quad members while expanding its influence over regional connectivity standards.

For the Quad, prioritising the BDN signals its commitment to a rules-based regional order without overtly appearing as an anti-China bloc. Engaging ASEAN, many of whose members are cautious of aligning exclusively with either major power, requires a nuanced and cooperative approach. Emphasising the BDN’s focus on quality infrastructure rather than geopolitics can appeal to Southeast Asian nations wary of Chinese assertiveness but dependent on Chinese trade.

Ultimately, India’s accession to the BDN would solidify the Quad’s role in shaping a free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific infrastructure landscape.

2. Build 2+1 partnerships within the Quad framework.

As evidenced by projects such as the subsea cables in Palau and fewer than ten small-scale, scattered green energy power plants in the South Pacific, quadrilateral development cooperation frameworks have been slow, staggered and excessively bureaucratic in their implementation.^[63] The 2+1 trilateral development cooperation framework can help resolve these issues. The goal must be to advance Quad-backed infrastructure development in various regions of the Indo-Pacific. Trilateral development partnerships amalgamate the strengths of North-South and South-South collaborations, fostering cost-effective, context-specific development solutions. This model enhances resource pooling, co-creation, and aid effectiveness, and aligns well with the multifaceted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).^[64]

In the infrastructure sector—heavily dominated by Chinese development finance—triangular cooperation is particularly relevant given the substantial investment requirements and the need for technical expertise. The BDN, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), and India-US-Nepal Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects^[65] exemplify efforts to offer high-quality infrastructure alternatives to China's BRI.

A 2+1 framework^[66] involving a non-Quad beneficiary and two Quad members—where one acts as the pivot (providing local, contextual and technical expertise), and the other as the facilitator (the financier)—can forge synergies and bridge gaps in foreign aid disbursement and infrastructure implementation across the Indo-Pacific. For instance, India and Australia must level up development coordination in the Bay of Bengal and the South Pacific. Both nations are viewed as trustworthy partners without colonial baggage—an important strategic advantage that must be leveraged by New Delhi and Canberra.

Their complementary strengths—such as India’s market insights and infrastructure development experience in the region, combined with Australia’s experience in port automation and green shipping—can address the gaps in their respective foreign assistance implementation strategies. Promoting high infrastructure standards could enhance trade and investment in the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, Southeast Asia remains a strategic priority for the US and Japan, both of which are engaged, in a geostrategic competition with China in the region. Converging interests and complementary capabilities (Japan’s development experience in the region and the US’s financial capabilities) must converge in infrastructure development cooperation in the region. The Quad countries can also collaborate with the PGII, the GCC, the Global Gateway and the Italian Mattei Plan for Africa^[67] in their later stages as broader trilateral institutional collaboration for furthering infrastructure and energy development. However, such steps should be considered only after achieving progress in the Quad’s internal cooperation.

This is not to say that the trilateral partnerships come without their fair share of challenges. Some of the challenges include: i) coordination complexity between three actors (donor, pivotal partner, recipient); ii) power asymmetries that affect decision-making and ownership; iii) divergent legal, procurement, and operational frameworks; iv) limited institutional capacity in recipient countries; v) uncertain or inconsistent funding and political commitment; vi) lack of scalable and replicable project models; vii) strategic mismatches in priorities among partners; and viii) recipient country’s hesitance due to perceived complexity or fears of donor dominance.

Indeed, India, Japan and the US have often encountered one or more of the aforementioned challenges in their trilateral development partnerships. However, given the robust coordination, deep political trust, and multilayered and wide-ranging collaboration among the Quad partners, the 2+1 development cooperation framework within the grouping could turn out to be a pivotal partnership framework for the development paradigms in the Indo-Pacific region.

3. Shore up financing for trade and transport corridors

In 2025, trade and transport corridors span nearly every region, often supplemented by energy pipelines, railway lines, and port infrastructure. China’s BRI has cemented its position as the world’s largest infrastructure development provider by promulgating and expanding these corridors—whether maritime, land-based or multimodal. If the Quad aspires to position itself as a viable alternative to the BRI, it must prioritise the financing and the development of such trade and transport corridors. Done correctly, these corridors can increase trade volumes, reduce trade costs, and further economic development. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor^[68] is one such project that warrants renewed attention. While politically dormant currently, the AAGC must be revitalised given the current geopolitical climate. Africa is vital to the US, Japan, and India, each of whom has distinct interests on the continent. Revitalising the AAGC would not only deepen their relations with African nations but also serve to counter Chinese influence in the continent. Working with like-minded groupings such as the G7 (through the PGII), by linking the Lobito Corridor^[69] with the AAGC or the EU’s Global Gateway^[70] could further bolster the Quad’s relevance in the Indo-Pacific, particularly as a credible development partner.

Another promising avenue is exploring cooperation with the I2U2,^[71] a grouping comprising the United Arab Emirates (UAE), India, the US, and Israel. The I2U2’s stated objective is to develop bankable infrastructure projects in areas such as water, energy, health, food security, and technology. With the UAE emerging as Africa’s largest bilateral development partner in 2024, surpassing even China, it becomes a critical stakeholder in the infrastructure development landscape.^[72] Synergising development cooperation between the two groupings in the medium term is an idea that could be worth exploring.

Conclusion

To meaningfully advance connectivity and infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad must deepen its cooperation. This entails expanding investment in areas such as green energy, digital infrastructure, and maritime connectivity—all while adhering to transparency, sustainability, and high-quality standards. India should consider joining the BDN to strengthen collective credibility, harmonise infrastructure standards, and attract private sector investment. Revitalising the AAGC could also offer strategic leverage against the BRI, enhancing economic linkages between the Indo-Pacific and Africa.

Quad DFCs and policy banks must work together to streamline funding mechanisms, reduce investment risks, and foster public-private partnerships. The Quad must also collaborate with regional institutions such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (of which the South Pacific countries like Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji are part) to tailor infrastructure projects to local needs, while ensuring inclusivity and regional buy-in. Ultimately, a cohesive, transparent, and resilient infrastructure strategy will allow the Quad establish itself as a credible development partner in the Indo-Pacific, offering a viable alternative to the BRI.

Endnotes

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• East Asia
• USA and Canada
• Oceania
• Belt and Road Initiative
• connectivity
• critical technologies
• development diplomacy
• Indo-Pacific
• infrastructure development
• maritime security
• Quad
• strategic cooperation
• vaccine diplomacy

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