Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami that devastated the Indian Ocean region, India, the United States (US), Japan, and Australia collaborated to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.^[1] In 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe initiated diplomatic engagement among the four countries, marking the inception of the Quad.^[2] The early twenty-first century was characterised by a shifting global order, driven by the rapid rise of China as a global power.^[3] Beijing’s rise was marked by its expanding political, economic, and military capabilities. As a peripheral actor, China’s advances in the Indo-Pacific were strategic and challenged the prevailing maritime order in the region.^[4] Prime Minister Abe framed the rationale for enhancing cooperation among like-minded democratic states in the Indo-Pacific on the need to uphold and protect a rules-based regional order.^[5]

This period also coincided with sustained efforts by Prime Minister Abe to introduce and popularise the Indo-Pacific construct—a reimagining of the Indian and Pacific oceans as a unified theatre bound by shared opportunities and challenges to foster growth and cooperation. This vision was articulated in his address to the Indian Parliament in 2007.^[6] The progress made by the four countries to establish cooperation under the Quad framework drew criticism from China, which perceived it as a strategy aimed at containing its rise.^[7] Prime Minister Abe’s departure from his office in 2007, Australia’s withdrawal from the grouping due to its efforts to manage relations with China, and a general lack of momentum among the four Quad countries contributed to the grouping’s temporary dormancy.^[8]

However, China’s continued political and military expansion across the Indo-Pacific region and increasingly assertive position, which is perceived as risking the regional maritime order, gradually contributed to the adoption and acceptance of the Indo-Pacific construct as a conceptual framework of shared interests among the four Quad countries.^[9] In 2017, the Quad reconvened, marking its return as the foreign ministers of the four democracies resumed dialogue.^[10] At the core of the Quad’s efforts was the common ambition to uphold the Indo-Pacific maritime order grounded in a rules-based order and freedom of navigation.^[11] This necessitated a robust agenda for enhancing cooperation on maritime security preparedness in the Indo-Pacific. Since its return as a pivotal grouping in the region, the Quad has evolved to expand its agenda for cooperation, venturing into new domains such as critical minerals, technology, and people-to-people connectivity.^[12] In alignment with this important evolution, Prime Minister Modi described the Quad as a “force for global good”, emphasising its constructive orientation as “not directed against any country.”^[13]

The multifaceted nature of the Quad’s operational focus has, however, brought to the fore a growing scepticism about its utility and future given the shifting strategic and security landscape in the Indo-Pacific.^[14] At a time when China has continued to strengthen its military competitiveness in the South China Sea and President Donald Trump expresses reservations about Washington’s participation in non-security-related cooperation in various global strategic theatres, it is imperative to revisit whether the Quad’s focus on maritime security has in fact remained minimal.^[15]

This brief argues that despite venturing into new domains of cooperation, a detailed reading of the Quad’s operational focus illustrates that the grouping has remained most active in efforts to bolster maritime security preparedness. However, a context-driven interpretation of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific is imperative to appreciate the advances made by the Quad.

Maritime Security: An Anchor for the Quad

Maritime security has remained a pillar of the Quad’s agenda. The group’s emergence can be traced to its coordinated response through its HADR efforts in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami.^[16] Therefore, the origins of the Quad are rooted in maritime security cooperation. While the Quad has been subject to shifting priorities among its member states amidst changing geopolitical realities, the rise of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic construct prompted a vital acknowledgement that maritime security efforts must be strengthened to secure a free and open maritime order in the region.

While the Quad has largely operated as a diplomatic forum, its activities have expanded to include active maritime security cooperation among its member states. Appreciation of the Quad’s maritime security efforts must be preceded by reimagining maritime security in the Indo-Pacific context. The region—a joint maritime theatre that includes the Indian and Pacific oceans—remains a vast terrain where maritime security challenges are diverse in both character and intensity. Unlike various other ‘regions’, the Indo-Pacific is neither institutionalised nor geographically coherent. Countries continue to assign different geographical contours to the region in their respective strategic imaginations.^[17]

This divergence is also evident among the Quad countries in how they define the Indo-Pacific.^[18] This is partly due to the varied geographies of operational interests and capabilities among the four states. In the Indian Ocean, India’s assumed role is notable given its broader strategy to emerge as a preferred security partner in the region.^[19] Additionally, Australia also holds an important Indian Ocean interface.^[20] For the US and Japan, securing the strategic maritime environment in the Pacific remains central to their overall security outlook.

Figure 1: Geopolitical Interpretation of the Various Actors

Source: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politic ^[21]

The convergence and growing alignment within the Quad are premised on the acknowledgement and willingness to view the Indo-Pacific as a theatre of opportunities for growth and prosperity. Towards this end, securing the Indo-Pacific remains a priority for the Quad countries. It is vital to underscore that the Quad is not a military alliance nor a security bloc. Rather, it represents a partnership based on common interests and shared opportunities. While the four Quad countries continue to pursue their own interests and objectives, their broader outlook is marked by a shared consensus on the need to safeguard a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

Those who have argued that the Quad has not made sufficient progress towards advancing a robust maritime security agenda point to other minilateral groupings that have emerged in the region.^[22] Specifically, the emergence of AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, and United States) and the Squad (Philippines, Australia, United States, and Japan) has brought to the fore the question of whether the Quad’s security agenda has, in fact, evolved in alignment with the rapidly intensifying security environment in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad’s evolution has, in fact, been marked by a notable diversification of its agenda to include various other elements of global goods, such as technology, critical minerals, and health.^[23] While this diversification and expansion have strengthened the Quad’s ambit of cooperation, a detailed view of its evolution reveals that maritime security has also remained a central pillar in advancing its cooperative efforts.

Quad’s Maritime Security Cooperation: A Multifaceted Approach

Cooperation in the realm of maritime security has emerged as a pillar in fostering synergy within the Quad. However, it is important to recognise that maritime security in the Indo-Pacific encompasses two distinct dimensions. While the operational aspect of maritime security is critical to advancing a robust cooperative agenda, political intent is equally important. Without a normative framing of the Quad’s maritime security agenda, signalling its commitment to a rules-based order in a free and open Indo-Pacific, progress on the operational aspect will remain limited. Over the years, the Quad has not only sustained momentum in articulating its intent to uphold a free and open maritime order in the Indo-Pacific, thereby reaffirming the priority accorded to maritime security, but has also expanded its agenda by incorporating new elements into its cooperative framework.^[24] This evolution has occurred in tandem with the increasingly complex and rapidly intensifying maritime security challenges in the region.^[25]

How does the Quad make sense of the evolving maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific? During the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Wilmington, US, in 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi referred to the group’s character and its tacit mandate as a ‘force for good’.^[26] This remains a vital framework for understanding how the group continues to shape its outlook towards the maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. While China’s growing geopolitical influence and military presence across various theatres in the Indo-Pacific continue to shape the Quad’s maritime security outlook, the group has also appropriately acknowledged the multifaceted and complex nature of maritime security challenges in the region.^[27] These include the critical threats posed by climate change-induced natural disasters, which disproportionately affect regional countries, especially the small and developing island nations.^[28] This has necessitated cooperation in strengthening HADR efforts in the Indo-Pacific as a core pillar of synergy within the group.^[29] Furthermore, given the role of technological advancements in shaping maritime security preparedness, the Quad has made progress in fostering cooperation in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).^[30] In addition to specific initiatives, the four countries have also continued to enhance cooperation through joint naval exercises – notably, the Malabar Naval Exercise, conducted across the various sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific to improve interoperability and signal commitment to safeguarding a rules-based maritime order in a free and open Indo-Pacific.^[31]

Critics of the Quad, however, have argued that given the growing challenges posed by China’s increasingly confrontational and expansionist behaviour across the Indo-Pacific, the group must work towards actively pursuing a robust security agenda potentially manifesting as a militarised, naval alliance-like partnership.^[32] This criticism gained traction following the emergence of similar groupings in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the formation of AUKUS and the Squad has led many to question the relevance of the Quad in the face of rapidly intensifying maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.^[33] Furthermore, this has prompted a re-evaluation of how India seeks to define the role of the grouping and its own position within it. India’s reluctance to adopt a traditional security agenda within the Quad framework has drawn criticism from those who consider it the ‘weak link’ in the group.^[34]

The Quad’s evolution, however, can be understood in tandem with the emergent strategic realities in the Indo-Pacific. In many ways, the Quad has sought to position itself as a credible alternative to China’s expanding political influence in the region.^[35] As a ‘force for global good’, the Quad’s maritime security agenda must remain multifaceted and aligned to the complex strategic and security realities in the Indo-Pacific. Countries within the Indo-Pacific, which increasingly find themselves intertwined with China through growing economic engagement and development partnerships, may find it challenging to confront an escalating security contest between China and the Quad.^[36] In this context, the Quad’s efforts to construct a maritime security architecture by strengthening HADR activities and fostering maritime cooperation in MDA, technology, and critical minerals seek to enhance the group’s credibility as a ‘force for global good’.

Importantly, the Quad continues to face challenges, given that it is in its formative stages. The fact that the group has made significant advances while displaying strong intent to foster cooperation on key areas of mutual interest among its member states often obscures the reality that the momentum behind this synergy can be traced back to 2021 when then US President Joe Biden hosted the first leaders’ summit, albeit virtually. Since then, multiple changes have occurred in the leadership of the four Quad countries. The group has been presided over by two Australians, three Japanese, and two American leaders, with Prime Minister Modi being the only exception. Indeed, Donald Trump’s return as the President of the US has galvanised debates on his expectations regarding the nature and character of the group.^[37] However, it is important to note that Trump, in many ways, played a key role in the revival of the Quad in 2017. While he was the President of the US when the Quad resumed the Foreign Ministers’ track of dialogue, no leader-level summit took place during his tenure.^[38]

Quad’s Maritime Security Agenda

Importantly, the Quad’s origins remain embedded in strengthening efforts to safeguard freedom of navigation and establish a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, the four Quad countries continue to engage in initiatives aimed at strengthening maritime cooperation. A range of initiatives adopted by the Quad continue to characterise its multifaceted strategy for maritime security cooperation, aimed at preserving a free and open maritime order in the Indo-Pacific amidst the complexities posed by a variety of critical challenges.

Table 1: Major Quad Maritime Security and Cooperation Frameworks (2020–2024)

Initiative	Year of Launch	Area of Cooperation
Malabar Naval Exercise (including the four Quad countries)	2020	Naval patrolling and cooperation
Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness	2022	Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indo-Pacific	2022	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief (HADR)
Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience	2023	Undersea domain awareness
Quad-At-Sea Ship Observer Mission	2024	Coastguard-level cooperation
Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific	2024	supporting Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indo-Pacific through Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)
Quad Maritime Legal Dialogue	2024	Upholding a rules-based order at sea
Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network	2024	Assisting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.  

Malabar Naval Exercise

The Malabar Naval Exercise stands out in this regard. The exercise began as a bilateral arrangement between India and the US in 1992 and gradually acquired participation from up to five countries (India, the US, Australia, Japan, and Singapore) in 2007. Soon after, following China’s expression of discontent with a grouping perceived to be designed as a containment strategy against Beijing, the Malabar Naval Exercise lost momentum. Even as Japan sought to rejoin the exercise, China continued to express its concerns regarding the group. India, too, had previously been cautious about expanding the exercise beyond its bilateral format to avoid its perceived militarisation against China.^[39] In 2020, Australia rejoined the Malabar Naval Exercise, resulting in the participation of all four Quad navies.^[40] The Malabar Naval Exercise, comprising the four Quad navies, has increasingly expanded its geographical footprint across the Indo-Pacific. As part of the exercise, the navies have conducted joint patrols across critical pockets of emerging strategic theatres in the region. The aim of the exercise remains anchored in efforts to enhance interoperability, foster maritime cooperation, and ensure freedom of navigation. To this end, in addition to expanding the geographical scope of operations, the exercise has also deepened the nature of its engagement.^[41] The Malabar Exercises involve complex maritime operations, including anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and air-defence drills.

Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness 

MDA has emerged as a pillar in strengthening maritime security efforts. Undersea domain awareness remains critical to enhancing maritime security preparedness given the complex nature of challenges emerging in the seas. In the Indo-Pacific context, MDA has become a vital area of fostering cooperation to construct a stable and resilient maritime security architecture. The Quad group initiated its partnership on MDA through the launch of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) at the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo in 2022.^[42] Following this, in May 2023, the group launched the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience.^[43]

In alignment with the rapid integration of technology in securing the Indo-Pacific, the IPMDA aims to enhance cooperation in the domain of technology and training initiatives to improve transparency across the region’s critical waterways. Through the IPMDA, the Quad seeks to foster partnerships with resident countries in the Indo-Pacific to monitor and respond to a wide range of maritime security challenges. Notably, the region continues to face enormous challenges from China’s incremental military expansion.^[44] In the Indian Ocean, Beijing has sought to increase its presence through dual-use survey and research vessels, raising concerns about potential naval deployment. In addition, illicit activities at sea, such as Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing trafficking and transnational crimes, remain persistent threats.^[45] Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific remains vulnerable to climate change-induced natural disasters and calamities. By way of real-time information sharing, the IPMDA seeks to strengthen efforts to mitigate these multifaceted challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Since its announcement in 2022, the Quad has scaled the initiative by fostering cooperation with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency and the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region, enabling the tracking of dark shipping vessels and safeguarding maritime economic zones across the region.^[46]

Quad Partnership on HADR in the Indo-Pacific

HADR remains central to the Quad’s operations. Notably, in 2004, the four Quad countries first came together to strengthen HADR efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean.^[47] Given the capability differential among the navies of the Indo-Pacific region and the group’s stated objective of emerging as a ‘force for global good’, HADR continues to be a critical area for deepening cooperation among member states. In alignment with this, the Quad launched the Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indo-Pacific, an initiative aimed at enhancing efforts to respond to and mitigate maritime security challenges caused by natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific—at the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo in 2022.^[48]

Through this initiative, the group seeks to enhance coordination in rapid response efforts and secure the pre-positioning of essential relief supplies if natural calamities occur across the Indo-Pacific. The group aims to remain active as a responder to these threats across the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Notably, the group has successfully coordinated and demonstrated readiness in rapid response by addressing crises in Papua New Guinea during a landslide in May 2024, in Vietnam, when it was hit by Typhoon Yagi in September 2024, and during the Myanmar Earthquake in April 2025.^[49]

Quad-At-Sea Ship Observer Mission 

At the Wilmington Quad Leaders’ Summit in September 2024, the group launched its first initiative to enhance coastguard cooperation – the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission. Coastguard cooperation is a key area where the Quad holds considerable potential to increase synergy.^[50] While geographically distant from each other, the Quad countries venturing into coastguard-level cooperation seek to operationalise a critical facet of the group’s quest to establish a free and open maritime order in the Indo-Pacific, safeguarding freedom of navigation. Policing the maritime domain remains a priority in establishing a rules-based order at sea. Given the Indo-Pacific’s vulnerability to China’s assertive expansion in the South China Sea, as well as its incremental advances in the Indian Ocean, operationalising coastguard-level cooperation is crucial.^[51] The coastguard, as a vital policing arm of maritime security preparedness, also plays an important role in ensuring a rules-based order is established and sustained in the maritime domain.^[52] Towards this end, the launch of a dedicated initiative to foster cooperation among the coastguard services of the four Quad countries remains integral to safeguarding the Indo-Pacific maritime space amid continued challenges manifesting in the region.

Political Signalling Against Chinese Expansion 

Finally, as a politico-diplomatic group, the Quad has remained active in flagging the risks posed by Chinese aggression across the Indo-Pacific.^[53] Beijing’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea have arguably prompted many to question the utility of the Quad given its reluctance to militarise and emerge as a traditional security partnership. The emergence of alternative minilateral groups such as the AUKUS and the Squad has further drawn criticism regarding the utility of the Quad. However, notwithstanding the individual objectives and compulsions of the Quad member states, the group has reaffirmed its position on the need to condemn Chinese actions in the region. This may be seen as a vital facet of the Quad’s broader maritime security outlook.  If the Quad is to evolve as a vital force safeguarding the maritime security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, it must strengthen a critical political premise signalling its willingness to diplomatically counter China’s growing assertiveness in the region. Towards this end, the Quad continues to serve as a crucial diplomatic forum with a sustained commitment to safeguarding the regional maritime order.

Conclusion

It would be unfounded to posit that the Quad lacks a cohesive maritime security strategy. An examination of the Quad’s operations reveals that the grouping has placed consistent emphasis on maritime security. While the Quad has also ventured into other domains such as health security, technological cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges, its wider objective appears to be anchored in its ambition to emerge as a ‘force for global good’. Given the vast capability differential within the Indo-Pacific, it serves the Quad’s purpose to continue engaging in these multifaceted domains.

To appreciate Quad’s maritime security agenda, it is imperative to take a long and critical view of the group’s engagement across various domains. The emergence of other relatively more militarised minilateral groups in the Indo-Pacific, such as AUKUS and the Squad, has prompted the need for the Quad to adapt to the rapidly intensifying maritime security environment in the region. However, the Quad’s calibrated approach to strengthening maritime security cooperation can be seen as a strategy to positively define its agenda, rather than positioning itself in opposition to any actor. This was reflected in Prime Minister Modi’s assertion that the Quad is not against anyone but rather, ‘a force for good’. Indeed, the Quad continues to pursue a robust maritime security agenda – one that is not defined narrowly by a focus on militarisation but rather by an emphasis on delivering maritime security as a global good.

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Sayantan Haldar is Associate Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

^[1] Dominique Fraser, “The Quad: A Backgrounder,” Asia Society Policy Institute, May 16, 2023, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/quad-backgrounder

^[2] Jeff Smith, “The ‘Quad Father’: The Legacy of Shinzo Abe and the Quad,” Observer Research Foundation, August 16, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-quadfather-the-legacy-of-shinzo-abe-and-the-quad

^[3] David Scott, “Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century,” Asian Security, September 16, 2008, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14799850802306468

^[4] Amit Dev, “China’s Rise and the Implications for the Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation, April 27, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-rise-and-the-implications-for-the-indo-pacific

^[5] Gemma King, “Abe Shinzo: the ‘father’ of the Indo-Pacific,” Perth USAsia Centre, https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-and-insights/abe-shinzo-the-father-of-the-indo-pacific/

^[6] Suchet Vir Singh, “‘Confluence of Two Seas’: Shinzo Abe’s 2007 Speech that Shaped 21st-Century India-Japan Ties,” The Print, July 8, 2022, https://theprint.in/world/confluence-of-two-seas-shinzo-abes-2007-speech-that-shaped-21st-century-india-japan-ties/1031314/

^[7] Kevin Rudd, “Why the Quad Alarms China: The Success of an Australia-India-Japan-United States Strategic Dialogue Poses a Major Threat to Beijing's Ambitions,” Asia Society Policy Institute, December 9, 2021, https://asiasociety.org/magazine/article/why-quad-alarms-china

^[8] Dominique Fraser, “The Quad: A Backgrounder,” Asia Society Policy Institute, May 16, 2023, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/quad-backgrounder

^[9] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “How China Strengthens the Quad,” The Diplomat, September 4, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/how-china-strengthens-the-quad/

^[10] William Choong, “The revived ‘Quad’ – and an opportunity for the US,” IISS, January 10, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2018/01/revived-quad/

^[11] Atul Mishra, “India’s Policy for a Rules-Based Order: Inconsistency and Incoherence,” Center for the Advanced Study of India, August 19, 2024, https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/atul-mishra

^[12] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38320/, (2024)

^[13] Kallol Bhattacherjee and Dinakar Peri, “Quad is a ‘force for good’, Says PM Modi,” The Hindu, May 24, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/quad-leaders-meet-in-tokyo-at-2nd-in-person-summit/article65455849.ece

^[14] Rafiq Dossani, “After 18 Years, Has the Quad Failed?,” Rand, March 26, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/after-18-years-has-the-quad-failed.html

^[15] James C. Pearce, “Will the Quad Step Up Under Trump? Don’t Count on It,” Pacific Island Times, February 27, 2025, https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/post/will-the-quad-step-up-under-trump-don-t-count-on-it

^[16] “What is the Quad, and How Did it Come About?,” The Guardian, May 24, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/24/what-is-the-quad-and-how-did-it-come-about

^[17] Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The Institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: Problems and Prospects,” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020), https://academic.oup.com/ia/articleabstract/96/1/149/5697495?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false

^[18] Felix Heiduk and Gudrun Wacker, “From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politic, July 1, 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific

^[19] Antonie Levesque’s and Viraj Solanki, “Preferred Security Partner: Anchoring India in the Asia-Pacific,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, May, 2024,  https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2024/chapter-3/

^[20] Samuel Bashfield, “Halfway, right: Australia’s Approach to the Indian Ocean,” The Interpreter, June 17, 2024,  https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/halfway-right-australia-s-approach-indian-ocean

^[21] Felix Heiduk and Gudrun Wacker, “From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politic, July 1, 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific

^[22] Sayantan Haldar, “Does the Quad have a security agenda?,” Observer Research Foundation, October 4, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/does-the-quad-have-a-security-agenda

^[23] Garima Mohan and Kristi Govella, “The Future of the Quad and the Emerging Architecture in the Indo-Pacific,” German Marshall Fund, June 21, 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/future-quad-and-emerging-architecture-indo-pacific

^[24] Aditya Sinha, “How Quad is Countering China’s Hegemonic Claims in Indo-Pacific,” Firstpost, September 28, 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-quad-is-countering-chinas-hegemonic-claims-in-indo-pacific-13820120.html

^[25] To Anh Tuan, “Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Mixed Opportunities and Challenges from Connectivity Strategies,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February, 2019, https://www.kas.de/documents/288143/10822438/Panorama_2019_02_4c_v5d_ToAnhTuan.pdf/bb017d3b-c195-681c-c5a3-19054947fec5?t=1606102327617

^[26] Rezaul H Laskar, “Quad More Influential Today, a Force for Good in Indo-Pacific Region: PM Modi,” Hindustan Times, May 24, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/quad-more-influential-today-a-force-for-good-in-indo-pacific-region-pm-modi-101653361210715.html

^[27] Melissa Conley Tyler, “The Future of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation, February 22, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-future-of-the-quad-in-the-indo-pacific

^[28] Kate Clayton, “An Insecure Future: Climate Change-related Disaster Management in the Indo-Pacific,” Perth USAsia Centre, https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-and-insights/an-insecure-future-climate-change-related-disaster-management-in-the-indo-pacific/

^[29] Frédéric Grare, “Enhancing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indian Ocean,” NatStrat, June 25, 2024, https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/enhancing-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief-in-the-indian-ocean-146.html

^[30] Kyoko Hatakeyama et al., “The Quad’s Growing Focus on Maritime Security,” East Asia Forum, February 28, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/02/28/the-quads-growing-focus-on-maritime-security/

^[31] Sayantan Haldar, “Malabar Exercise: Strengthening Synergy Among Quad Nations,” Observer Research Foundation, October 23, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/malabar-exercise-strengthening-synergy-among-quad-nations

^[32] Aparna Pande, “India’s Evolving Role in the Quad,” GIS, November 29, 2024, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/india-quad/

^[33] Chietigj Bajpaee, “Has India Defanged the Quad?,” Lowy Institute, June 21, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/has-india-defanged-quad

^[34] Chet Lee, “India: The Quad’s Weakest Link,” The Diplomat, October 19, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/india-the-quads-weakest-link/

^[35] Maria Siow, “The Quad Says It’s a ‘Positive Alternative’ to China. What Can it Deliver for Asia?,” South China Morning Post, March 12, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3213142/quad-says-its-positive-alternative-china-what-can-it-deliver-asia

^[36] Jonathan Stromseth, “Don’t Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of US-China Rivalry,” Brookings, October, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/dont-make-us-choose-southeast-asia-in-the-throes-of-us-china-rivalry/

^[37] Laura van der Hoeven, “Trump’s Second Term and the Future of the Quad,” The Diplomat, November 6, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/trumps-second-term-and-the-future-of-the-quad/

^[38] Abhishek Sharma and Sayantan Haldar, “Trump 2.0 and the Indo-Pacific: Balancing Economic and Security Imperatives,” Observer Research Foundation, November 22, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/english/expert-speak/trump-2-0-and-the-indo-pacific-balancing-economic-and-security-imperatives

^[39] “What is Malabar Military Drill and Why it Concerns China,” Times of India, November 20, 2020,  https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/what-is-malabar-military-drill-and-why-it-concerns-china/articleshow/78768445.cms

^[40] Ankit Panda, “Australia Returns to the Malabar Exercise,” The Diplomat, October 19, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/australia-returns-to-the-malabar-exercise/

^[41] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2062316

^[42] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000401.html

^[43] Asha Hemrajani, “CO23166 | The Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience,” RSIS, November 17, 2023, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-quad-partnership-for-cable-connectivity-and-resilience/?doing_wp_cron=1751252057.8145699501037597656250

^[44] Abi McGowan and Aanika Veedon, “China in the Indo-Pacific: April 2025,” CFR, May 7, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/china-indo-pacific-april-2025

^[45] Snehesh Alex Philip, “3 Chinese Research Vessels Enter Indian Ocean, Tracked by Navy,” The Print, August 8, 2024, https://theprint.in/defence/3-chinese-research-vessels-enter-indian-ocean-tracked-by-navy/2214721/

^[46] “Quad Foreign Ministers Announce Plan to Expand IPMDA to Indian Ocean Region,” Economic Times, July 29, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/quad-foreign-ministers-announce-plan-to-expand-ipmda-to-indian-ocean-region/articleshow/112105577.cms?from=mdr

^[47] Dominique Fraser, “The Quad: A Backgrounder,” Asia Society Policy Institute, May 16, 2023, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/quad-backgrounder

^[48] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000401.html

^[49] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38320/

^[50] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38320/

^[51] SD Pradhan, “Escalating Belligerent Activities of China in the South China Sea: Strategic Impact,” The Times of India, April 5, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/escalating-belligerent-activities-of-china-in-the-south-china-sea-strategic-impact/

^[52] Himadri Das, “Marine Policing and Maritime Security in India: Evolving Dimensions,” National Maritime Foundation, November 25, 2021, https://maritimeindia.org/marine-policing-and-maritime-security-in-india-evolving-dimensions/

^[53] Sayantan Haldar, “Does the Quad Have a Security Agenda?,” Observer Research Foundation, October 4, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/does-the-quad-have-a-security-agenda

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