Introduction

The terror attack in Pahalgam in April not only reaffirmed Pakistan as India's innate adversary but also highlighted the strategic depth of the Pakistan-Türkiye partnership—seen in the use of Turkish weapons systems by Pakistan and statements of solidarity from Türkiye.^[1] The crisis revealed a nascent anti-India nexus involving Islamabad, Ankara, and Baku. India's commitment to continuous reprisal against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and ensuring its citizens' security and prosperity (Yogakshema) necessitates acknowledging the intertwined mandalas^[1] (circles of states) of the Caucasus and the Indian subcontinent. From a Kautilyan perspective, it is strategically imperative for India to cultivate comprehensive ties with Armenia, given their common adversaries.

Both India and Armenia operate in hostile neighbourhoods, facing threats from what Kautilya would term an “innate enemy”.^[2] Armenia's enduring conflict with Azerbaijan since its independence from the Soviet Union mirrors India's predicament with a rogue military state to its west. Crucially, the axis of powers threatening both nations creates complex, yet nuanced and overlapping mandalas. This brief shows the relationship between the geopolitical realities of these two theatres through the prism of the Arthashastra, and offers foreign policy suggestions for both India and Armenia to achieve their respective strategic objectives.

Contemporary scholarship has increasingly sought to bridge the conceptual gap between ancient Indian strategic thought, as articulated in its foundational scriptures, and the exigencies of modern Indian statecraft. This nascent yet significant body of work aims to extract pertinent insights and enduring lessons applicable to contemporary foreign policy challenges.

Amrita and Aruna Narlikar (2014) have notably contributed to this discourse by persuasively linking classical interpretations of the Mahabharata to independent India’s distinctive negotiation and bargaining style on issues of international trade and nuclear non-proliferation.^[3] S. Jaishankar (2020) draws extensively from India’s ancient strategic tradition, particularly from the Mahabharata, to articulate India’s trajectory as a civilisational power on the global stage.^[4]

Furthering this line of enquiry, Narlikar and Narlikar, in collaboration with Amitabh Mattoo (2023), analyse select episodes from the Mahabharata to distil enduring lessons relevant to contemporary foreign policy.^[5] Beyond the Mahabharata, the strategic treatise of Kautilya's Arthashastra has also garnered scholarly attention. Manjeet S. Pardesi (2020) notably advocates for analysing the Indo-Pacific as a de-centred mandala regional order, a conceptualisation directly derived from Kautilya’s theory of international order.^[6]

This brief is particularly concerned with India’s foreign policy challenges within a fractious, multipolar global order. It applies Kautilya’s mandala theory to a real-world geopolitical region—the Caucasus. With its vital position as a connecting bridge between Central Asia, West Asia, and Europe, the Caucasus have historically been the staging ground for the actions of certain global powers. Its approach builds upon existing scholarship that has utilised Kautilyan foreign policy principles to derive insights for modern statecraft, especially concerning India's strategic responses to China and Pakistan, its commitment to enhanced cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and its pursuit of non-zero-sum relationships with neighbouring states.^[7]

Organised into three sections, this brief first explores India’s strategic interest in the Caucasus. The following section delineates Armenia’s Rajamandala, analysing regional actors, their motivations, and the historical context of the conflict. The final section recasts India as the Udasina (Neutral King) within Armenia’s Rajamandala, contending that evolving dynamics prioritise active, interest-based engagement over passive neutrality. The brief’s core objective is to generate policy insights for India’s engagement in the Caucasus, grounded in the contemporary configuration of Armenia’s mandala.

India’s Yogakshema Through the Caucasus

Kautilya's Arthashastra, though rooted in the pre-Westphalian political milieu of the Indian subcontinent and framed from the vantage point of smaller states aspiring to power, offers enduring insights into statecraft. Its core objectives—outmanoeuvring adversaries and accumulating wealth—along with the fundamental strategies for achieving them, remain pertinent across historical eras. The ultimate political aim articulated in Kautilya’s treatise is the security and well-being of its populace, a concept called Yogakshema.

However, scepticism regarding the applicability of Kautilyan tenets, particularly those emphasising “forcefulness, interrelations, and expansiveness”, to the contemporary Indian geopolitical landscape is not entirely unfounded.^[8] A global order that relies on interstate collaboration and competition arguably calls for a nuanced reinterpretation or updating of this classic. Nevertheless, a close textual analysis reveals a deeply entrenched philosophy of political realism within the Arthashastra. This philosophy emphasises material wealth and power, acknowledges anarchy in the interstate realm, and underscores the centrality of power and self-interest. These are some of the same principles that arguably prefigured and even inspired the conceptual writings of modern political realism, notably expounded by German-American political scientist Hans Morgenthau thus: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavoured to discover them. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect.”^[9]

According to political scientist George Modelski, Yogakshema comprises two interconnected pillars: 'power' and 'happiness’. 'Power' refers to the strength accrued through the strategic application of the saptangas (seven constituent elements of state power).^[2] 'Happiness’, by extension, is achieved through the effective deployment of this power, manifested as successful foreign policy and further characterised by 'righteousness' and 'internal stability’, all of which contribute to a state's international standing.^[10]

To be sure, central to Kautilyan statecraft is the intrinsic link between the internal and interstate realms―a secure external environment aids domestic capacity-building, while enhanced, comprehensive national power strengthens and diversifies the conduct of foreign policy. Importantly, the ruler (Swami) “being ever active, should carry out the management of material beings; the root of material well-being is activity.”^[11] In ancient times, agriculture, cattle rearing, and trade constituted the backbone of economic life. Through these domains, the king exercised his influence over his own subjects and subjugated adversaries, leveraging the treasury and the army. Today, India’s engagement with the Caucasus is crucial, not only for security (Raksha), but also for prosperity (Palana).

Approximately 80 percent of India’s merchandise trade with Europe—including key products such as crude oil, auto parts, chemicals, and textiles—transits via the Red Sea route. Missile and drone attacks by Yemen's Houthi militants have forced many shipping firms to re-route vessels around the southern tip of Africa, away from the Suez Canal.^[12] The demand for alternative transport corridors, driven by conflicts in Russia and the Middle East, highlights the Caucasus's potential as a vital link between Asia and Europe.^[13]

Indian policymakers have constantly evaluated various possibilities for an efficient route to Europe, with options such as IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor), and COGH (Cape of Good Hope) under consideration.^[14] Demonstrating foresight, they have consistently invested in the INSTC^[15] over the past 15 years, even securing sanction exemptions for their investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar in 2018. A policy brief by the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) emphasises that the INSTC is a viable alternative to the Suez Canal, particularly amidst geopolitical tensions and maritime disruptions. Its reliance on rail connectivity also makes it a cost-effective and low-emission route, compared with the Suez Canal.^[16]

However, recent India-Pakistan tensions have exposed vulnerabilities within this corridor. Of the three possible INSTC route options, two traverse Azerbaijani territory, raising concerns in New Delhi, given Azerbaijan's overt support for Pakistan’s actions in the recent conflict.^[17] To diversify its dependence on Azerbaijan, investing in Armenia presents a prudent option for establishing an alternative trade route.

Figure 1. The Possible Trade Routes Under the INSTC

Source: thecradle.co

Critically important for both economic and strategic considerations is the burgeoning India-Armenia defence partnership. Armenia is actively diversifying its foreign relations and seeking military support from India, evidenced by substantial acquisitions of India-made weapons systems, including the Akash-1S air defence system, under a US$2-billion defence partnership signed in 2020.^[18] In light of the emerging strategic alignment among Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, India’s efforts to deepen defence cooperation and build comprehensive ties with Armenia warrant renewed momentum.

Despite New Delhi’s overtures to Ankara (e.g., relief aid during the recent earthquake via ‘Operation Dost’^[19]) and Baku (India being the third largest export destination for Azeri crude and recently becoming the fourth largest contributor of tourists to the country), the recent conflict has unequivocally exposed the trilateral nexus. This alignment—fostered by their 2017 agreement on regional cooperation, Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 Karabakh War, and the 2021 Trilateral Islamabad Declaration—has laid the foundation for a friendship detrimental to both India and Armenia. In this context, Kautilya suggests, “He who secures an excellent ally (conferring benefit), or an ally in an ally’s difficulty, over-reaches. For, trouble produces firmness in friendship.”^[20]

Armenia’s Rajamandala: Regional Actors and Dynamics

For a credible proposition of closer India-Armenia ties, it is imperative to gauge the geopolitical compulsions and inclinations of Armenia within its Rajamandala. For Kautilya, "The welfare of a state [ensuring the security of a state within its existing boundaries and acquiring new territory to enlarge it] depends on adopting a policy of non-intervention or overt action―establishes the basis for all foreign policy." To this effect, Kautilya maps out an intricate framework of a geographical space named the Rajamandala to describe interstate dynamics, defining the roles of 12 distinct actors and the factors that shape their behaviour. The central ruler whose perspective defines the mandala is the Vijigishu.

Figure 2. An Adaptation of the Rajamandala illustrated in L.N. Rangarajan's The Arthashastra

Source: ‘The Arthashashtra’ by L.N. Rangarajan^[21]

While Kautilya's mandala theory originated from historical conditions that emphasised a revisionist posture for the conqueror (Vijigishu), its core concepts and underlying theoretical framework remain robust for any state seeking to enhance its relative power. Central to this framework, alongside the Vijigishu, is the Ari (enemy), conceived as the primary combatant. Additionally, two other actors are of particular strategic importance within this framework.

The Madhyama (Middle King) is characterised by its geographical proximity to both the Vijigishu and the Ari. Crucially, the Madhyama possesses significantly greater strength than either, making it capable of suppressing both when they are disunited and wielding sufficient influence to decisively alter the regional balance of power. In contrast, the Udasina (Neutral King) is geographically distant from the Vijigishu, Ari, and Madhyama. While typically neutral and seemingly uninterested in their immediate conflict, the Udasina retains the capacity to influence regional power balances should its political interests dictate intervention.

Referring to these four principal members (Vijigishu, Ari, Madhyama, and Udasina) as a ‘quadrivium’ and categorising other states as either ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’, positioned frontwards and rearwards of the central Vijigishu, social scientist Benoy Kumar Sarkar argues, "There is nothing queer, archaic, or unworkable in this conception of international relations."^[22] Referring to the alternating pattern of friends and enemies as producing a “checkerboard effect” for the system, Modelski considers this a “more illuminating model of world politics than the bloc-pattern recently in vogue.”^[23]

Mapping Armenia’s Rajamandala offers valuable insights into the region’s complex dynamics, revealing the intentions and motivations of key stakeholders. It also facilitates a deeper understanding of the historical trajectory of regional conflict and its enduring impact on contemporary alignments. Armenia, located in the South Caucasus, bridges Eastern Europe and Western Asia. This positioning places the nation at a critical juncture between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, making it a pivotal land corridor for trade and energy routes connecting Europe with the Middle East and Central Asia.

Indeed, throughout history, Armenia has frequently served as a buffer state among competing empires, including the Roman, Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. This historical role has bequeathed a legacy of diverse cultural influences and a complex geopolitical identity that continues to shape its international interactions. The contours of the current Armenian nation were laid down by the creation of the first Armenian Republic (1918‒1920), before its absorption into the Soviet Union by the Bolsheviks.^[24]

The origins of the current crisis in the region lie in the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This ethnically Armenian region was transferred to Azerbaijan during the Stalin era. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the first major conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was fought between 1988 and 1994, resulting in a decisive victory for Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh was subsequently administered by the Artsakh Defence Forces, although it was never officially recognised internationally, including by Armenia itself.^[25]  Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan since 2003, leveraged his country’s oil wealth to sign defence contracts with Türkiye, Israel, and Russia, rapidly re-arming his forces over the following decades.

Like most post-Soviet states, Armenia was predominantly ruled by pro-Kremlin leaders in its post-Soviet existence. This trend was disrupted by the 2018 Velvet Revolution, which led to the resignation of the sitting prime minister and the democratic election of the current one, Nikol Pashinyan. While Armenia generally aligned with Russian interests on most issues, even joining the Eurasian Economic Union and siding with Russia on crucial United Nations (UN) resolutions, this period marked a strain in relations with Russia.^[26]

Actors in the Mandala

If Armenia is viewed as the potential conqueror (Vijigishu), Azerbaijan serves as its innate enemy (Ari). In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale war against Armenia and the Artsakh Defence Forces. The Armenian military, underprepared and largely relying on Soviet-era weaponry, was decisively defeated by the well-equipped Azeri forces. Azerbaijan reclaimed significant territory by the end of the conflict, including parts of Nagorno-Karabakh. This was followed by another offensive in 2023, leading to the complete displacement of the Armenian population from the region and its full integration into Azerbaijan.

Türkiye functions as the ‘rear enemy’ (Parshnigraha). It has consistently supported the Azeri state, partly due to common Turkic ancestry and historical animosity towards the Armenian population. Türkiye exemplifies the profile of an ally to Armenia’s adversary and is strategically positioned to its rear. Ankara’s direct involvement in the 2020 conflict, through military equipment and assistance as well as the transfer of mercenaries from Libya, Syria, and Iraq to support Azerbaijan, undermined Armenia’s strategic position.^[27]  The Türkiye-Azerbaijan alliance was elevated to a strategic partnership in 2022.^[28]

Türkiye and Azerbaijan lack a direct land connection; establishing such a link has long been a shared strategic and geopolitical goal. With the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh, only Armenia’s Syunik and Vayots Dzor regions separate Türkiye from Azerbaijan. This narrow section has now become the next potential target. Azerbaijan has aggressively promoted the concept of the ‘Zangezur corridor’, implying an extraterritorial land connection between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave (bordering Türkiye) via Armenia’s southern Syunik region. Azerbaijan seeks a corridor with no Armenian control, while Armenia has offered a road controlled by it within the framework of international law.^[29] The opening of such a corridor would further Türkiye’s ambitions of connecting the pan-Turkic world, with the Turkish transport and infrastructure minister^[30] stating it would benefit the entire “Turkic world”. The proposed TRIPP corridor seems to have solved this logjam.^[31]

Iran is the ally (Mitra). Until recently, Iran was the only country sharing a border with all three conflicting parties: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Artsakh. The disruption of the post-war status quo has precipitated a security dilemma for Iran. The reinforcement of a Turkish military presence across its northern border implies a NATO security threat. Iran’s three northern provinces (West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, and Ardabil) have a large Azerbaijani-speaking population that could be incited against the central government. Compounding this, there has been considerable Israeli involvement in the conflict, with direct military support to Azerbaijan.^[32] Iran has consistently reiterated its support for Armenia’s territorial integrity, noting that any border changes in the region would be unacceptable.^[33] It has even implied intervention in case of attempts to alter the status quo, conducting joint military exercises and opening a consulate in Armenia's Syunik region where the ‘Zangezur corridor’ is proposed.^[34]

Russia serves as the Middle King (Madhyama). It has traditionally been the hegemon of this region, with the fate of all South Caucasus nations closely linked to its fortunes. However, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has strained its capabilities, leading to inaction in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which many perceive as tacit approval for Azerbaijan’s actions. Although Russia was the primary peace broker in the 2020 conflict, its withdrawal of peacekeepers in 2024 was seen as an effort to maintain friendly relations with Baku and Ankara amidst the Ukraine crisis.^[35] Others view it as Russia’s message to other post-Soviet republics regarding the consequences of hosting pro-Western forces on its soil. Overall, the prospect of Turkish dominance in the region following Russia's withdrawal would undoubtedly perturb Moscow. The currently proposed TRIPP corridor, and consequently increased Turkish (NATO power) influence in Central Asia, would not be welcomed by Russia in the current geopolitical climate. The current standoff with Azeri authorities and the prospect of backing a pro-Kremlin candidate in the upcoming Armenian elections could mean doubling down of Russian involvement in the region.^[36]

France and the European Union (EU) function as the ‘rear ally’ (Akranda). France has emerged as a geopolitical player in this region, hosting a large Armenian diaspora and establishing a presence by increasingly supplying sophisticated weaponry to Armenia. A potential goal appears to be countering Russian interference in its African sphere of influence.^[37] Armenian‒EU relations are underpinned by the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed in November 2017,^[38] predating the Velvet Revolution. While the EU is willing to support Armenia in various reform areas, it has limited capacity to offer hard security, address the Karabakh conflict, or influence relations with Türkiye.^[39] Furthermore, under five special flagship initiatives, the EU plans to mobilise 2.6 billion euros for Armenia.^[40]  However, the complexities of the Russia-Ukraine war and Europe's enormous need for natural gas have led to gas deals with Baku, thereby diluting the EU's potential impact on the two parties involved.

The United States (US) is the absent superpower here. It demands that Armenia scale back its relations with Iran, distance itself from Russia, limit its engagement with China, and normalise relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye as conditions for large-scale financial support.^[41] All these requirements seem to have been waived with the US signing a 99-year lease to oversee the Zangezur corridor.^[42] The US currently sees this route as a vital connectivity initiative to the Central Asian republics for NATO and also a new front to counter Iran on its borders.

India is the potential Neutral King (Udasina) in this mandala. It is a relatively new entrant to this conflict but has already made a substantial commitment to the region, becoming Armenia’s largest defence supplier and replacing Russia by meeting close to 43 percent of Armenia’s needs. Compatibility with Soviet weapons systems gives India’s defence offerings an extra edge in Armenia’s market. Until recently, India had broadly maintained an even-handed approach towards Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.^[43]

Speaking at the 2024 APRI Forum in Yerevan (26‒28 June), Manu Pubby, senior editor at The Economic Times, stated that India does not aspire to be Armenia’s security guarantor nor does its policy in the region support one side over the other. He emphasised India's pursuit of balanced non-alignment, maintaining good relations with Azerbaijan in trade, tourism, and other sectors: “We want to be the provider of security for the region and not to start an arms war at all.” Interestingly, until the recent Pahalgam crisis, India maintained robust ties with Azerbaijan, being the third largest buyer of its crude and the fourth largest contributor of inbound tourists in 2023.^[44]

Figure 3. Armenia's Rajamandala and All Actors

Source: Authors’ own, created with Mapchart.net

Armenia’s Yogakshema

In the classical Kautilyan framework, a state secures its Yogakshema—the security and well-being of its populace—through a dynamic mix of internal strengthening and external engagement via Upayas (four methods of politics) and Sadgunyas (foreign policy postures). Armenia has pragmatically applied the first two Upayas—beginning with Sama (conciliatory dialogue), offering transit rights under its Crossroads for Peace initiative, followed by Dana (concessions) in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, faced with Azerbaijan’s military superiority and Türkiye’s backing, it has had limited leverage to apply the other two Upayas of Bheda (dissension) and Danda (force). Kautilya’s prescription for a smaller power like Armenia, confronted by an expansionist adversary backed by stronger allies, is to seek strategic partnerships (Samavaya) to alter the balance of power. As Armenia builds its post-Russian security strategy, it must deepen ties with India, not merely as a weapons supplier but also as a comprehensive partner, maintaining trade ties with Russia and Iran, while expanding multidimensional cooperation with India.

New Delhi offers Yerevan a robust strategic alignment due to shared adversaries, especially after Pahalgam, offsetting the leverage of relative strength that India enjoys. Therefore, Armenia’s best bet is a balanced multilateral posture: strengthening ties with India, France, and Iran, while managing Russian disengagement and pursuing backchannel de-escalation with Azerbaijan. Within this mandala, Armenia’s Yogakshema can only be secured through a delicate act of equilibrium, drawing from every layer of Kautilya’s statecraft.

India as the Udasina: From Passive Neutrality to Strategic Engagement

India has historically played the role of a strategic balancer in this region. India's Operation Sindoor and the fallout from the actions of the Türkiye-Pakistan-Azerbaijan axis carry important implications for the country’s Yogakshema, shaping its posture as an Udasina in the region. This brief argues that India needs to swiftly pivot from its position of neutrality to that of calibrated, interest-based engagement.

The immediate fallout from the conflict has been a de facto boycott of travel by Indian tourists to Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Online travel platform MakeMyTrip, for instance, reported a 60-percent drop in flight bookings to these destinations in the week of 14 May (a week after Operation Sindoor), with cancellations surging by 250 percent. There is also a possibility that India may scale down its crude oil purchases from Azerbaijan to incentivise Baku to restrain its engagement with Pakistan. India has also made overtures towards Cyprus, with Prime Minister Modi creating the necessary optics to ruffle feathers in Ankara.^[45]

Overall, the broader implications for India, both in terms of security and trade, necessitate securing the INSTC trade route by exploring alternatives to those passing through Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, India must also counter the emerging security partnership between Türkiye and Pakistan by bolstering Armenia’s defences to address the strategic imbalance of power it faces vis-à-vis Türkiye and Azerbaijan.

Any disruption to the ‘Zangezur corridor’ would undermine the security of the INSTC. The recent US overtures to contribute a peacekeeping force for corridor security signal a tilt towards safeguarding NATO’s interests, thereby advancing Türkiye’s geopolitical ambitions.^[46] In light of this, India would be well-advised to proactively secure its own strategic interests.

India’s evolving engagement with Armenia represents a textbook case of strategic outreach by a Udasina power recalibrating towards a Samavaya (strategic partnership) posture. Over the past few years, India has emerged as Armenia’s top arms supplier, providing systems like the Pinaka MBRLs, Swathi radars, and Akash SAMs. This marks a notable shift, given Armenia’s historical dependence on Russian equipment. Going forward, this defence relationship can be broadened by including advanced surveillance drones, integrated battlefield communications, and counter-drone systems, making Armenia’s forces interoperable with Indian platforms. Training exchanges and battlefield simulations on Indian terrains—particularly high-altitude warfare—can offer Armenia critical asymmetrical advantages.

Beyond defence, India can help Armenia secure Yogakshema through economic resilience by actively investing in infrastructure linked to the INSTC, particularly through the Syunik region. Armenia is a node in India's westward logistics vision, especially as instability in the Red Sea and Ukraine raises the strategic value of land-based trade routes. India can provide lines of credit, soft loans, and public‒private investments for road and rail infrastructure, and export UPI-based digital payment systems to help Armenia build financial autonomy. This would be consistent with India’s broader fintech diplomacy across Central Asia and Africa, helping Armenia reduce reliance on traditional Western financial architecture.

India must also support Armenia in building a narrative of sovereignty and strategic relevance in multilateral forums. This can be achieved by expanding initiatives like ORF’s Yerevan Dialogue, which brought policy voices to the region, and by creating regular trilateral or quadrilateral conferences (e.g. with France and Greece). Through diplomatic capacity-building, media training, and think-tank partnerships, India can help Armenia amplify its geopolitical concerns—especially on the ‘Zangezur corridor’ and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) abandonment^[47]—across global institutions. Finally, the space, cybersecurity, and AI sectors present low-cost, high-impact opportunities for Indo-Armenian tech partnerships, positioning India as not just an arms supplier but a partner in statecraft, sovereignty, and self-reliance as well.

Conclusion

The story of Armenia today echoes the dilemmas of many small yet strategically located states navigating an increasingly volatile, multipolar world. Through the lens of Kautilya’s mandala, Armenia stands as the Vijigishu (the protagonist in any mandala), constrained by a stronger Ari (enemy) and an occupied Madhyama (an influential neighbour―Russia), yet still capable of strategic rebalancing. Kautilya's brilliance lay in his understanding that alliances are temporary, interests are permanent, and neutrality is an illusion when Yogakshema is at stake.

India’s engagement in the South Caucasus—once defined by historical warmth—now reflects a subtle but deliberate shift from being a neutral observer to playing the role of a strategic enabler. With the great-power dynamics spilling over to this region via the establishment of the TRIPP project, Armenia may find that it has limited room to navigate its relations between the West and Russia. This is where India could stand out as a worthy backer for Armenia.

By securing access routes through the INSTC, countering the Turkic bloc diplomatically, and building Armenia’s institutional and technological resilience, India can advance its own Yogakshema, while safeguarding Armenia’s. In doing so, both states exemplify the Kautilyan principle of mutual gain through calibrated realignment—wherein every mandala, when navigated with foresight, transforms from a potential trap into a theatre of opportunity.

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Kajari Kamal is Associate Professor, Takshashila Institution.

Varun Potturu is a geopolitical analyst with a keen interest in Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and History.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

^[1] ‘Mandala’ is a Sanskrit word for concentric circles. In this brief, ‘mandala’ refers to Kautilya’s state system that presupposes the existence of 12 categories of states in concentric circles.

^[2] Saptangas (literally ‘seven organs’) are the constituent elements of the Kautilyan state. These are (in descending order of importance) King, Ministers, Population and Territory, Fort, Treasury, Army, and Ally.

^[1] Sushim Mukul, "Erdogan Unmoved by Boycott‑Turkey Calls, Backs True Brother Pakistan," India Today, May 15, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/boycott-turkey-calls-india-turkiye-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-unmoved-support-true-brother-pakistan-2725186-2025-05-15

^[2] The terms ‘innate enemy’ and ‘contingent enemy’ have been used in a translation by Patrick Olivelle, trans., King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kautilya’s Arthashastra (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 274.

^[3] Amrita Narlikar and Aruna Narlikar, Bargaining with a Rising India: Lessons from the Mahabharata (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

^[4] S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2020).

^[5] Aruna Narlikar, Amitabh Mattoo, and Amrita Narlikar, Strategic Choices, Ethical Dilemmas: Stories from the Mahabharat (New York: Penguin Random House, 2023).

^[6] Manjeet Pardesi, "International Order in Ancient India," in Bridging Two Worlds: Comparing Classical Political Thought and Statecraft in India and China, Amitav Acharya et al., eds (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2023).

^[7] Kajari Kamal and Gokul Sahni, "The Relevance of Ancient Indian Strategy in Contemporary Geopolitics," ORF Issue Brief No. 470, Observer Research Foundation, July 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-relevance-of-ancient-indian-strategy-in-contemporary-geopolitics; Kajari Kamal and Gokul Sahni, "India in the Indo-Pacific: A Kautilyan Strategy for the Maritime Mandala," ORF Issue Brief No. 522, Observer Research Foundation, February 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-in-the-indo-pacific-a-kautilyan-strategy-for-the-maritime-mandala; Kajari Kamal and Gokul Sahni, "A Kautilyan View of India's Non-Zero-Sum Game in the Neighbourhood," ORF Issue Brief No. 653, Observer Research Foundation, August 11, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-kautilyan-view-of-india-s-non-zero-sum-game-in-the-neighbourhood.

^[8] Atul Mishra, "Classic Strategy: What to Remember When Reading the Arthashastra," India's World 1, no. 4 (2025).

^[9] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp.4.

^[10] George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," The American Political Science Review 58, no. 3 (1964): 551.

^[11] RP Kangle, The Kautilya Arthashastra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2014), pp. 47.

^[12] “India's Inflation, Growth at Risk from Red Sea Crisis-driven Oil Price Rise, Govt Says,” Reuters, March 22, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-inflation-growth-risk-red-sea-crisis-driven-oil-price-rise-govt-says-2024-03-22/

^[13]  Nvard Chalikyan, Benyamin Poghosyan, and Verej Isanians, “The Geopolitical Aspects of the India-Armenia Partnership,” Observer Research Foundation, December 29, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-geopolitical-aspects-of-the-india-armenia-partnership

^[14] Nilanjan Ghosh et al., Rethinking India-Europe Trade Routes in a New Era of Connectivity, Observer Research Foundation, June 2025.

^[15] Asia Regional Integration Centre, “International North-South Transport Corridor,” Asia Regional Integration Centre, https://aric.adb.org/initiative/international-north-south-transport-corridor

^[16] Ghosh et al., Rethinking India-Europe Trade Routes in a New Era of Connectivity.

^[17] “Türkiye, Azerbaijan Back Pakistan after Operation Sindoor; Qatar Urges Restraint,” Hindustan Times, April 1, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/Türkiye-azerbaijan-back-pakistan-after-operation-sindoor-qatar-urges-restraint-101746616080495.html

^[18] Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “India Becomes Armenia’s Largest Defence Supplier,”  Eurasia Daily Monitor 21, no. 131, https://jamestown.org/program/india-becomes-armenias-largest-defence-supplier/

^[19] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/36209/Operation_Dost

^[20] Kangle, The Kautilya Arthashastra.

^[21] L. N. Rangarajan, ed. and trans., Kautilya: The Arthashastra (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1992), 557.

^[22] Benoy Kumar Sarkar, "Hindu Theory of International Relations," The American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 406.

^[23] Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," pp. 555.

^[24] Smbat Minasyan, “First Republic of Armenia (1918-1920),” Armenian History.com, May 6, 2021, https://armenian-history.com/first-republic-of-armenia-1918-1920/

^[25] Julian McBride, “Armenia: Geography as Geopolitical Kryptonite,” Geopolitical Monitor, August 17, 2022, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/armenia-geography-as-geopolitical-kryptonite/

^[26] Benyamin Poghosyan, "Deciphering Armenia–Russia Relations after the 'Velvet Revolution'," New Eastern Europe (2019), https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/07/09/deciphering-armenia-russia-relations-after-the-velvet-revolution/.

^[27] “Macron Reprimands Türkiye, Accuses Erdogan of Sending 'Jihadists' to Azerbaijan,” France 24, October 2, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20201002-macron-reprimands-turkey-accusing-erdogan-of-sending-jihadists-to-azerbaijan

^[28] Ruslan Rehimov, “Landmark Shusha Declaration between Türkiye, Azerbaijan Turns Year-old,” AA World, June 15, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/landmark-shusha-declaration-between-turkiye-azerbaijan-turns-year-old/2614301

^[29] Prime Minister’s Office of the Republic of Armenia, Crossroads of Peace (2023), https://www.primeminister.am/u_files/file/documents/The%20Crossroad%20of%20Peace-Brochure.pdf

^[30] “Turkey Continues to Demand Armenian ‘Corridor’ For Azerbaijan,” Azatutyun (RFE/RL Armenian Service), March 15, 2024, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32863071.html

^[31] “Trump’s Geopolitical Gambit in the South Caucasus,” Observer Research Foundation, August 19, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/trump-s-geopolitical-gambit-in-the-south-caucasus

^[32] “Azerbaijani Military Using Israeli-made Drones in War with Armenia, Official Says,” Ynetnews.com, September 30, 2020, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/SygcfSf8P

 

^[33] “Any Territorial Changes Are Unacceptable for Iran: Ambassador on the ‘Zangezur Corridor’,” Armenpress, February 16, 2024, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1130512

^[34] “’In Case of Pressure on Armenia, Iran Will Intervene’: Opinion,” Jam News, August 12, 2022, https://jam-news.net/in-case-of-pressure-on-armenia-iran-will-intervene-opinion/

^[35] “Russia Quietly Exits Nagorno-Karabakh Seven Months after Azerbaijani Offensive, Ceding Its Clout 'for Good',” Abc.net, April 20, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-04-20/russia-quietly-exits-karabakh-ceding-its-clout-for-good-/103749418

^[36] Bashir Kitachaev, “Why Is Azerbaijan Ramping up Tensions with Russia?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 9, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/07/azerbaijan-russia-arguments?lang=en

^[37] Aleksander Olech, “France Retaliates against Russia in Central Asia and Caucasus,” Defence 24.com, June 10, 2024, https://defence24.com/geopolitics/france-retaliates-against-russia-in-central-asia-and-caucasus

^[38] European Parliament Delegation, “EU–Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement,” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/eu-armenia-comprehensive-and-enhanced-pa/product-details/20170703DPU09427

^[39] Poghosyan, “Deciphering Armenia – Russia Relations after the ‘Velvet Revolution’.”

^[40] European Commission, “Commission Outlines Further Support Measures for Armenia,” October 5, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4787

^[41] Poghosyan, “Deciphering Armenia – Russia Relations after the ‘Velvet Revolution’.”

^[42] Natia Seskuria, “Trump Could Transform Caucases with the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace, August 14, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/427934ae-792a-48f1-bca8-92daa9418ee4

^[43]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl%2F33084%2FPress+Statement+on+Armenia+Azerbaijan+Conflict=

^[44] “Strong India-Azerbaijan Ties Will Benefit Both Nations,” Global Strategic and Defence Analysis, April 5, 2025, https://gsdn.live/strong-india-azerbaijan-ties-will-benefit-both-nations/

^[45] “Η Ινδία αυξάνει το μεσογειακό της αποτύπωμα,” Naftemporiki, 2025, https://www.naftemporiki.gr/opinion/1987447/i-india-ayxanei-to-mesogeiako-tis-apotypoma/

(Language refinement assistance provided by Google Gemini)

^[46] Ragip Soylu, “US Offers to Oversee Disputed Armenia-Azerbaijan Corridor,” Middle East Eye, July 14, 2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-offers-oversee-disputed-armenia-azerbaijan-corridor

^[47] “Armenia to Leave Russia-led Security Bloc, Says PM,” Reuters, June 12, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/armenia-leave-russia-led-security-bloc-says-pm-2024-06-12/

• International Affairs
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