Introduction

In a rather unexpected turn of events, United States (US)-Pakistan ties are seeing a reset under Trump 2.0. In an early sign of this shift, Trump—who had been particularly critical of Pakistan during his first term—thanked the country in his first address to Congress in his second term for its help in arresting the mastermind of the 2021 bombing at the Kabul airport in Afghanistan.^[1] The turning point in US-Pakistan relations, however, came when Trump, in an apparent disregard for India’s sensitivities, claimed to have personally stopped the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, after which Pakistan recommended the US president for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Soon after, back-to-back high-level exchanges occurred between American and Pakistani leaders.^[2] The US State Department approved  nearly US$397 million in assistance for the maintenance of Pakistan's F-16 fleet;^[3]  the Trump administration also pushed to reduce tariffs on Pakistani textiles from 29 percent to 19 percent^[4] and the two signed an oil deal,^[5] prompting American companies to show interest in investing in the country’s energy, critical minerals, and IT sectors.^[6] Pakistani officials soon travelled to the United States to discuss a plan allowing the US to develop a new deep-sea port at Pasni on the Arabian Sea, just over 100 kilometres from the China-funded Gwadar port,^[7] to transport some of Pakistan's minerals to the US. More recently, Pakistan made a political statement by becoming one of the founding members of Trump’s Board of Peace, even as many countries continue to view the initiative with suspicion.

The quick turnaround in US-Pakistan relations under Trump 2.0 seems to have alarmed not only Pakistan’s supposed adversaries, like India, but also its closest ally/partner, China. In the backdrop of intensifying US-China rivalry, the warming US-Pakistan relationship appears to be quietly altering the terms of the China-Pakistan “iron-clad friendship”. This paper studies Chinese language analyses around the subject and examines how the emerging US-Pakistan bonhomie is viewed from China.

China’s Expectations from a US-Pakistan Reset

This author has previously argued that China is averse to an internationally isolated and over-dependent Pakistan^[8] that treats China as a cash cow and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a panacea for its problems. China prefers a Pakistan that engages more extensively with the US, India, and the Gulf region, ensuring multiple funding sources and the smooth progress of CPEC construction. In other words, China encourages Pakistan to diversify its diplomatic strategy, on the condition that China remains the ultimate beneficiary of Pakistan’s external engagements.^[9]

With Pakistan now re-engaging with the US, China wants to ensure that any cooperation between Pakistan and the US benefits China and does not undermine its interests in the region. For example, as the US and Pakistan finalised an oil deal, China reportedly lobbied for Pakistan to include conditions that relevant equipment^[a] be transported through Chinese-invested infrastructure, particularly the Gwadar port, and that the transfer of core technology be handled in a way that benefits China.^[10] Chinese observers are also hopeful that US investment in Pakistan’s shale oil reserves will ultimately help China diversify its energy sources and strengthen its energy security.^[b] At the same time, Pakistan’s economic gains from US investments may translate into greater demand for Chinese weapons, equipment, and infrastructure services, which in turn would further deepen China-Pakistan economic and trade cooperation.^[11] After all, regardless of which country extracts oil from Pakistan, China controls much of the supply chain—from ports and pipelines to power grids and refining facilities—allowing profits to flow back to China.^[12]

Similarly, when the US State Department designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a “foreign terrorist organisation” in August 2025,^[13] the decision was welcomed by the Chinese strategic community. Many believed that, intentionally or not, Trump had done China a favour by alleviating some of the security pressure on CPEC.^[14] Even as some questioned Trump’s long-term interest in engaging in Balochistan affairs, others viewed the development as a rare opportunity for US-China cooperation in Pakistan.^[15]

If the US-Pakistan reset continues along the current trajectory and remains beneficial to China, Beijing is likely to respond with greater understanding and respect for Pakistan’s choice to deepen engagement with the US.

China’s Concerns

There are certain aspects of the current round of US-Pakistan re-engagement that are clearly bothering Beijing. A glance at the Chinese internet space reveals palpable anger and mistrust over Pakistan’s actions in recent months. The anti-Pakistan campaign in China’s public discourse can be traced back to the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, when China was particularly upset that “Pakistanis were flying Chinese jets, using Chinese weapons against India,” yet lauding the US president for his role in the conflict—even recommending him for the Nobel Peace Prize^[16]—while downplaying or even obscuring China's role.^[17] Chinese grievance on this issue may be gleaned from Foreign Minister Wang Yi later claiming credit for China’s mediating role in the India-Pakistan conflict.^[18] Apart from this, various reports circulating on the Chinese internet at that time claimed that Pakistan has secretly allowed the US to resume drone flights from the Shamsi base in the province of Balochistan, only a few km away from Gwadar.^[19]

Pakistan was also criticised for provoking Afghanistan^[20] to facilitate the return of the US military to the country (Afghanistan), thereby nullifying China’s long-term efforts to broker peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan and extend CPEC to Kabul.^[c] There were also claims about Pakistan having collaborated with US fintech companies to explore stablecoins pegged to the US dollar, in its attempt towards “Americanising” the country’s underlying financial architecture and achieving greater alignment with US standards in digital sovereignty.^[21]

The anti-Pakistan campaign in China reached a fever pitch in the following months as a week after launching the second phase of CPEC in Beijing, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited the White House in September 2025^[22] and showed Trump samples of rare-earths, gold, and other minerals from Pakistan.^[23] In the same month, Strategic Metals Inc. of the US signed a US$500-million memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Pakistan’s military engineering department, demonstrating strong US interest in Pakistan’s mining industry and its intention to build an oil refinery.^[24] Soon after, Pakistan shipped its first batch—less than two tons—of key rare-earth minerals to the US. Reports also suggested that Pakistan sent representatives to the United States with an invitation to build a port in Pasni^[25] in Balochistan, to facilitate the transport of critical minerals and rare-earth elements to the United States. Chinese observers noted that this port is only about 112 km from the Chinese-invested Gwadar Port and about 160 km from Iran.^[26] Once completed, the port would enable the steady transport of Pakistan's strategic materials to  the US—helping address US supply concerns—and also potentially serve as a temporary military port for US operations against Iran.^[27]

Accordingly, there has been hue and cry^[28] in China’s strategic circles^[29] about Pakistan “stealing China's rare earth resources and handing it over to the US,” thereby weakening China’s trump card^[30] in its competition with the US. Chinese public opinion came down heavily on Pakistan for “burning the bridge”, “aiding China’s enemy”, and “harming the interests of the Chinese people”. Indeed, many in China believed that Pakistan’s delivery of rare-earths and other strategic minerals to the US—using Chinese equipment and technology—in early October 2025 triggered China to introduce new regulations on 9 October to strictly control the export of rare-earth-related technologies.^[31]

Simultaneously, Pakistan’s approach to military cooperation came under criticism from China’s strategic community. The Chinese internet was abuzz with claims that Pakistan had leaked core technology of the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet—jointly developed by China and Pakistan—to countries such as Türkiye and Azerbaijan in an effort to expand its military exports.^[32] Some reports claimed that Türkiye’s KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet project, which had been expected to take years to overcome technical difficulties, made rapid progress following the alleged technology leak and secured big-ticket orders from Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, impacting China’s aviation manufacturing industry.^[33] Chinese online reports also claimed that this was not the first time Pakistan had leaked Chinese technology. In 2018, Türkiye allegedly obtained the blueprints for the Rainbow-3 UAV through Pakistan and subsequently copied it to produce the TB-2 UAV. This product later captured 60 percent of the Middle Eastern market through a low-price strategy, causing Chinese orders to be halved in Egypt and Morocco.

Yet another set of reports on the Chinese online space made even more controversial claims: that Pakistan not only leaked Chinese tech to Türkiye but also allowed US engineers access to the fire-control source code of the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet. Following this, China reportedly restricted the supply of the WS-13E engine and the PL-15E missile,^[34] rendering several Pakistani Air Force fighter jets unusable for a number of months.

The overall public perception in China is that there is a strong risk of cutting-edge weaponry, advanced tactical concepts, and operational systems leaking into the US intelligence system through Pakistan.^[35] It is argued that the US has its eye on Pakistan to obtain crucial data on Chinese combat systems and their vulnerabilities, enabling it to develop countermeasures for future conflicts. After all, Chinese weapons account for about 81 percent of Pakistan’s military arsenal, and Pakistan is one of the largest operators of “Chinese-style weapons system” in actual combat,^[36] making it a potential “gold mine” of intelligence for the US.

Under such circumstances, many in China believe that despite long-standing cooperation with Pakistan, China must remain vigilant and proactively prevent the US from extracting China’s operational concepts, technologies, and strategic thinking through Pakistan.^[37] Consequently, military decisions by the Pakistani leadership—such  as sending Chinese-made frigates to participate in joint military exercises with the US military^[38]—and high-profile visits between the two countries, were closely scrutinised in Beijing for signs of technology transfers or clandestine arrangements.

Although China’s mainstream media has largely skirted the Pakistan-related controversies, the uproar against Pakistan in the Chinese public opinion space was so intense in the past months that it forced the government to intervene, reaffirming that China-Pakistan friendship is still intact and that there has been prior communication between the two sides regarding the course of the US-Pakistan ties. There were also some domestic crackdowns on anti-Pakistan news and views in China, categorising them as rumour mongering.

For example, former Global Times editor Hu Xijin’s October 2025 article^[39] criticising Pakistan for “stealing” China’s rare-earth resources has been removed from leading media spaces (Guancha.com) but is still doing the rounds in China’s internet circles.^[40] Noted Chinese scholars such as Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies^[41] and Wang Shida of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) were also seen shifting the blame to vested interests both within and outside China (including the US and India) to pacify Chinese public opinion on Pakistan.^[42]

China’s Assessment of Pakistan’s Strategic Wavering

In the Chinese assessment, although the foundation of the traditional China-Pakistan friendship remains intact, Pakistan is currently facing what many describe as a survival crisis. Its foreign exchange reserves once dwindled to a paltry US$8 billion—barely enough to cover two months of imports—while external debt climbed to about US$130 billion.^[43] Inflation remains high, the rupee continues to depreciate, and the rising cost of basic necessities is causing widespread distress among ordinary citizens. Although China still believes that Pakistan’s tilt towards the US is more of a stopgap measure to cope with its extreme predicament than a fundamental rejection of China-Pakistan relations, it is now increasingly being felt that its overall negative impact on China’s core interests, particularly on the trust factor, can no longer be downplayed.

Another assessment in China is that Pakistan is seeking to leverage China’s overall dependence on the country—and the billions of dollars it has invested there—to extract further concessions from China. Pakistan, it is argued, knows that China will not easily adopt a tough diplomatic stance against Pakistan because the cooperative relationship between the two sides is of great strategic importance to China.^[44] Pakistan understands that Gwadar Port plays an irreplaceable role in China’s global trade layout, that Pakistan is critical to China’s ties with Central Asia and the Middle East, and that China will find it difficult to give up these key interests; it thus dares to play the US card and demand more benefits from China. In other words, Pakistan wants both Chinese money and the US’s global influence. This balancing act, certain Chinese commentators argue, has cast a shadow of uncertainty over the once-ironclad China-Pakistan friendship.

Another question raised in Chinese discussions is whether Pakistan’s national strength is sufficient to sustain such ambitions. Can a country struggling to meet basic economic needs successfully pursue such a double game in the great-power competition? Chinese scholars warn that Pakistan may be playing with fire by overestimating its strategic value and underestimating China’s strategic planning.^[45]

Chinese Countermeasures

China has yet to directly express dissatisfaction against Pakistan. However, there is a growing internal chorus that some cost must be imposed. If deviation from Beijing carries no consequences, the rules of the game may change globally—today it is Pakistan; tomorrow it could be Laos, Serbia, Thailand, and others.^[46]

One view holds that China should suspend all aid to Pakistan, including military, economic, and other forms of support, allowing Pakistan to deal independently with the current complex situation.^[47] However, this move may come at a substantial strategic cost, such as weakening China’s ability to balance India’s influence in South Asia and exposing key transportation routes through Central Asia to potential risks of external intervention. This is therefore seen as the least viable option for China.^[48]

Another strategy being considered is to moderately restart bilateral cooperation with Pakistan while strengthening constraints—forcing Pakistan to safeguard Chinese interests, including China assuming total control of the security management and operations of Gwadar Port and its surrounding areas, even at the cost of Pakistan’s sovereignty.^[49] The third feasible strategy is to adopt a more indifferent attitude, gradually shifting the strategic focus and resource allocation to Iran, Myanmar, and countries in Central Asia while monitoring how Pakistan finds a new balance in the struggle between the US, China, Türkiye, and other forces.^[50]

There seems to be a consensus that China’s Pakistan policy will have to be more cautious—moving away from emotional rhetoric to a pragmatic strategy grounded in national strength and national interest.

Actions on the Ground So Far

Under these circumstances, China seems to be quietly adjusting the pace of cooperation with Pakistan. Economically, there are signs of a gradual slowdown in investment, renewed negotiations over contract terms, and comprehensive upgrade of the review process of the security cooperation mechanisms. For example, in the domain of infrastructure cooperation, there are reports on the Chinese internet that China might have temporarily suspended construction of the Karakoram Highway and postponed all 23 Phase II projects originally planned under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).^[51] China has also reportedly suspended a loan for the second phase of the China-Pakistan Railway, a core project of CPEC.

There are also reports that a planned US$3.5-billion investment in Gwadar Port has been quietly diverted to Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar, while the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has adjusted the route of its long-planned Central Asia oil pipeline, bypassing Pakistan and instead routing through Afghanistan.^[52] Moreover, there are talks that China might be considering adjustment of commercial loan interest rates for Pakistan from “the preferential 2 percent level to market rates.”^[53] The actions of Chinese companies, such as reducing imports of cotton yarn and adjusting tariffs on photovoltaic projects, have also had an adverse impact on Pakistan’s pillar industries like energy and textile.^[54]

Apart from that, Chinese-funded projects are reportedly being subjected to stricter safeguards. These include mandatory technology confidentiality clauses, AI-based monitoring systems at construction sites to prevent technology leakages, and more stringent end-user agreements in arms sales. Violations involving resale to third parties are said to carry penalties up to ten times the correct value.^[55]

China is also expressing its displeasure by reportedly giving the cold shoulder to certain Pakistani demands. Pakistan's finance minister^[56] led an emergency delegation to China last year to seek a US$6-billion emergency loan, but negotiations with China stalled. Pakistan’s energy minister also flew to Beijing, seeking to renegotiate US$15 billion in Chinese energy debt, but reportedly failed to secure a meeting with the relevant officials.^[57]

More importantly, discussions have emerged in China about reassessing the strategic position of Gwadar Port in China’s overall strategic outlay if it is still as irreplaceable as it was in the past.^[58] It is being argued that no cooperation project is absolutely “un-adjustable”. Any transportation corridor can be rebuilt, and transportation routes can have alternative plans. To demonstrate that Pakistan is not irreplaceable, China is now looking at countries like Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Iran.

It is therefore notable that before beginning his visit to Pakistan last year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi travelled to Afghanistan. Chinese media reported that the original plan was to stay in India for three days and proceed to Pakistan for another three-day visit, but the foreign minister added a stop in Afghanistan. It was meant to be a message for Pakistan, that China has still not given up on the idea of the Wakhan Corridor, connecting China directly to Iran and the Arabian Sea coast. Again recently, as Pakistan and Afghanistan entered the state of war, and the US publicly declared support for Pakistan’s “right to self-defence,”^[59]  China took a rather neutral stance in the conflict and deployed a special envoy who shuttled between Kabul and Islamabad to secure an urgent ceasefire between the two. Such actions highlight China’s interest in enhancing its strategic initiative and security through new channels, while reducing Pakistan to just one of its options.^[60]

Meanwhile, China is also building up on the propaganda that Pakistan should not fall for strategic short-sightedness, while cosying up to the US. History has repeatedly shown that the US uses Pakistan often as a short-term tool rather than a long-term partner. This was true during the Cold War and the War on Terror years beginning in 2001. Once its strategic value is exhausted, Pakistan gets abandoned by the US. For instance, recently, Chinese internet was abuzz mocking Pakistan that after surrendering five strategically significant bases from Jacobabad to Peshawar, opening up two-thirds of its domestic airspace, and Pakistani leaders still lobbying in Washington, attempting to act as peacemakers in the ongoing US-Iran conflict, Pakistan ultimately gets officially labelled as the “security threat to the US homeland” alongside China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, which may eventually affect US military aid and technology transfer to Pakistan, and even the US's attitude in international financial institutions.^[61]

On the contrary, China, they argued, is Pakistan’s true strategic partner, and the “all-weather partnership” is not just an empty phrase. Therefore, taking China’s goodwill and support for granted to appease a country that has historically mistreated Pakistan is a rather unwise choice for Pakistani leadership.

Chinese analysts further caution that Pakistan’s attempt to hedge against China by leveraging its ties with the US is unrealistic, as China’s position in Pakistan is irreplaceable. They warn that Pakistan’s effort to balance between the US and China and benefit from both may prove rather counterproductive. As the Trump administration would not spend a penny more for Pakistan's national interests unless it directly serves its goal of containing China^[62] and true "ironclad friendship" can never be maintained if Pakistan continues to test China’s bottom line under Washington’s behest.^[63]

Accordingly, China has made several symbolic announcements aimed at reaffirming long-term cooperation vis-à-vis Pakistan, including the re-launch of CPEC 2.0,^[64] and a pledge to send Pakistani astronauts as the first foreign visitors to its space station.^[65] At the same time, China has been subtly urging Pakistan to address the “crisis of trust” that has started to undermine bilateral ties in recent months.^[66]

Conclusion

Despite the calm on the surface, Pakistan is increasingly becoming a focal point of the US-China power struggle. Pakistan’s economic constraints are forcing it into a high-risk balancing act between two competing superpowers, where a slight misstep can cost it the trust of its two biggest patrons.

Pakistan insists that it will continue to be an independent player between China and the US, but China feels that Pakistan today does not have enough resources, technology, or diplomatic influence to support such strategic autonomy and can only be a subject of disagreement between the great powers, with its (Pakistan’s) strategic space increasingly getting curtailed. Pakistan thus continuously finds itself at the crossroads of the strategic rivalry between the US and China. Every decision it makes is only exacerbating tensions between the two great powers.

As evident from the analysis of current discussions in the mainland, the Chinese side is already upset at Pakistan’s willingness to use the US to reduce its dependence on China. However, China knows that Pakistan is only a piece in a larger geopolitical game, with Washington seeking to use Pakistan to weaken the influence of CPEC and constrain China's access to the Indian Ocean.

China, however, is also confident of its grip over Pakistan. The operational rights of Gwadar Port are firmly held by the China Overseas Ports Holding Company; key aspects such as the port's power grid and foreign exchange settlement are designed according to Chinese requirements; the upgrade and reconstruction of the Karakoram Highway is nearing completion, cross-border optical cables are already in place—China’s total control over these key infrastructures in Pakistan ensures that even if Pakistan's diplomacy shifts, China's dominant position in Pakistan is unlikely to be shaken. China is therefore building up pressure on Pakistan to find a “true balance” between the US and China—that acknowledges China's irreplaceable role in Pakistan’s survival and safeguards and prioritises China's strategic interests over the US.

The future of this US-China contest over Pakistan remains uncertain. What is foreseeable is that Pakistan will face increasingly severe external pressure in the days to come, and every choice it makes will have a profound impact on its future and that of the subcontinent—a trend that needs to be acknowledged and leveraged by New Delhi.

Antara Ghosal Singh is Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.

All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• Pakistan
• USA and Canada
• china pakistan bilateral relations
• china pakistan relations
• china pakistan ties
• china pakistan trade
• cpec corridor
• trump pakistan policy
• us pakistan re engagement
• us pakistan relations
• us tariff on Pakistan

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