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Sujan R. Chinoy, “The EU Joint White Paper for Defence Readiness 2030: Opportunities for India,” ORF Issue Brief No. 823, Observer Research Foundation, August 2025.
On 19 March 2025, the European Commission issued a Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030,[1] following the widely publicised exchange between United States (US) President Donald Trump and his Ukraine counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House and subsequent meetings involving key European leaders.[2] It is clear that a historic shift in the US position on European security is underway. The US endeavour to end the war in Ukraine and its reluctance to underwrite European security have put the European Union (EU) at a strategic crossroads. It has brought to the fore key issues of inadequate defence expenditure and the weakening of defence preparedness due to decades of European underinvestment in the continent’s own security.
Indeed, the US push for Europe to spend more on its defence is indicative of a paradigm shift in the trans-Atlantic partnership. The white paper argues that Europe now sees Trump 2.0 marking the end of an era in which the US could be counted on as a reliable financier and guarantor of global security. The far-reaching policy measures outlined in the white paper point to a fundamental turnaround in European defence expenditure and preparedness as part of the ReArm Europe Plan.[a] It provides a roadmap for the future that can withstand the potential vagaries of US policies over the next four years.
The white paper is a clarion call for rearming Europe through multiple measures, including increasing defence spending by EU member states. The target is to mobilise additional defence expenditure of up to 1.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Based on projections of gradual progression, defence investment could reach at least 800 billion euros over the next four years.
While urging the EU to strengthen collective defence, consolidate defence procurement, promote its defence-industrial complex, and streamline military logistics, the white paper does not make any attempt to repudiate the existing partnership with the US or the NATO alliance. It states that the “strong transatlantic bond remains crucial for Europe’s defence” and that “NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence of its members in Europe.” It adds, “EU-NATO cooperation is an indispensable pillar for the development of the EU’s security and defence dimension.” The UK too, continues to be regarded as “an essential European ally with which cooperation on security and defence should be enhanced in mutual interest, starting with a potential Security and Defence partnership.”
The white paper also underscores the need to explore defence-industrial cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. More importantly, it calls for further exploring “a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP)” with India. At the same time, the white paper unambiguously asserts that “traditional allies and partners, such as the US, are changing their focus away from Europe to other regions of the world.”
Other challenges outlined in the paper are terrorism and violent extremism, hybrid attacks, and actions of international organised crime groups and networks of cybercriminals. There is also a focus on hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, sabotage, electronic interference in global navigation and satellite systems, disinformation campaigns, political and industrial espionage, as well as weaponisation of migration. The security of supply chains for critical raw materials is part of the spectrum of concerns, besides transnational challenges such as rapid technological transformations, migration, and climate change.
Rapidly rearming Europe is viewed as a key to safeguarding its future amidst the strategic threat posed by Russia, reasserting the continent’s strategic autonomy in defending both itself and Ukraine. This, while strengthening the EU’s defence contributions to the trans-Atlantic partnership and NATO without excessive reliance on the US or the alliance. This calls for increasing defence spending and fostering EU-wide cooperation on enhanced military capabilities.
China is identified as an authoritarian state that is seeking to assert its authority and control in Europe’s economy and society. Notably, the security implications of the rise of China have been equated with the strategic challenge posed by Russia. This provides a peg for building strategic convergence between India and the EU.
On the other hand, the NATO Summit Declaration of 2025[3] has no reference to China, unlike the 2023 and 2024 declarations that highlighted the systemic challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic security, apart from the sustained and malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation. As the 2023 Declaration put it, “China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interest, security, and values.”[4]
Such wavering risks sowing policy confusion within the EU and undermining a unified stand on the China challenge. The truncated declaration issued in 2025 may reflect the overwhelming influence of the US on drafting the document. The absence of a reference to China does not suggest that the concerns about the country have disappeared overnight. Under these circumstances, it is in the mutual interest of India and EU member states to frequently engage on the evolving security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, occasioned by the economic and military rise of China. After all, some major EU members, such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, have long-standing presence and interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Central to the white paper is the recognition that the global order in place since 1945 has changed irrevocably and that a new order is expected to take shape by the end of this decade. The EU would not wish to be relegated to being an observer in this unfolding scenario.
By creating the necessary conditions to massively frontload investment in the defence sector, providing the necessary predictability to industry and reducing red tape, the EU intends to support member states in achieving full defence readiness by 2030. This is sought to be achieved by reinforcing industrial capacities across Europe, engaging in greater collaboration on procurement, production, and marketing of weapons systems through an EU-wide market for defence equipment, cutting red tape, boosting R&D, facilitating cross-certification of weapons platforms and parts, supporting SMEs, as well as ensuring the common, efficient, and priority use of multimodal corridors across Europe and other infrastructure for military purposes.
The aim is to integrate the military industrial complex with Ukraine. The white paper carries a strong undercurrent of commitment to enhancing Ukraine’s defence and security capacities. The provision of air defence systems, missiles, drones, and two million rounds of ammunition per year has been mentioned. The sharing of EU’s military mobility corridors, space assets, and related services is seen as integral to Ukraine’s defence.
Moreover, cooperation with Ukraine is regarded as a two-way process in which the EU, while helping to strengthen the country’s defence and military-industrial complex, would also seek to benefit from its “highly innovative and thriving defence industry,” especially in sectors such as AI and drones. The white paper, at the same time, does not gloss over the capability gaps. Seven priority areas have been identified as being critical to building a robust European defence. These are: (1) air and missile defence; (2) artillery systems; (3) ammunition and missiles including stockpiles of ammunition, missiles, and components; (4) drones and counter-drone systems; (5) military mobility; (6) AI, quantum, cyber, and electronic warfare; and (7) strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection.
It is clear from the white paper that the EU is expected to emerge as a single defence and security domain over the next few years by bringing down the barriers that may exist currently within the EU in terms of the flow of funding, innovation, research and development, start-ups and SMEs, production, marketing, and military mobility corridors. Notably, this plan includes Ukraine. The roadmap cannot, of course, be without its own challenges. The EU member states do not enjoy uniform prosperity or fiscal resource availability. Moreover, while NATO allies in Europe have agreed to increase their defence spending from less than 2 percent of GDP today to 5 percent by 2035,[5] with a view to ameliorating the trade tensions between the EU and the US, not all NATO members in Europe are on board. Spain, for instance, considers the target to be unrealistic.[6] Moreover, Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta are EU states but not NATO members, which means that the spending targets will not apply to them. When Germany steps up its military expenditure as the largest economy in the EU, it may well create unease among some European nations. In any case, joint procurement may bring to the fore inherent competition among the large European military conglomerates.
These changes present an opportunity for India’s defence industry to acquire or establish startups and SMEs in Europe, especially in the Eastern European member states of the EU, such as Poland, Croatia, Romania, and the Baltics, but excluding Hungary and Slovakia, whose idiosyncratic policies towards Russia have generated friction with other members. The opportunities cover Ukraine as well and should be explored, potentially affording India some leverage with Russia. Unlike the EU, which remains constrained by internal concerns over the Russia-friendly policies of Hungary and Slovakia, India faces no such limitations.
In the short term, the emphasis in the white paper is on urgently replenishing member states’ stocks of ammunition, weapons, and military equipment. There seems to be an opportunity to export to Europe ‘Made in India’ ammunition, which is rapidly emerging as a success story in India’s Atmanirbharta in defence manufacturing and exports. Efforts should also be made to explore selling competitive defence equipment, such as the Advanced Towed Artillery Guns (ATAGs) and other artillery guns, the Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher, air defence missiles, and radars.
The Indian defence industry, involving both public and private sectors, has achieved notable success in exporting arms and ammunition to some countries. In its Annual Report 2022-23, the new DPSU, Advanced Weapons and Equipment India Limited (AWEIL), noted that it had received an export order worth INR 47 crore from a European country.[7] The Export Import Data Bank of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India indicates that the country exported to EU countries arms and ammunition worth US$67.4 million in 2023-24. This figure more than doubled to US$135.6 million in the first nine months of FY 2024-25.[8] Evidently, the groundwork has been laid for a higher quantum of sales in the coming years.
Russia’s sensitivities to Indian defence exports to Europe may not be relevant since India does not export arms and ammunition to Ukraine.
Given the white paper’s focus on securing Europe against terrorism, extremism, and organised crime, including cybercrime, there could be fresh opportunities for India to explore collaboration with all EU member states on countering these threats through intelligence-sharing and exchange of best practices. EU members have condemned terrorist incidents, such as the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, without naming Pakistan.[9] India’s endeavour through such a dialogue would be to nudge them towards adopting more explicit positions on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, acknowledging its far-reaching global footprint.
At the geostrategic level, since China is identified as a systematic security challenge in trade, investment, and technologies, India should step up its strategic dialogue with all EU members, especially those with which India may not have had strategic consultations so far on the Indo-Pacific and related issues, including the rise of China. An important part of India’s roadmap should be to have structured dialogues at Track 1.5 and Track 2 levels with as many EU member states as possible, with funding support from the Ministry of External Affairs through Indian missions. This should be carried out by involving important Indian think tanks. Indian ambassadors in the EU member states should organise at least one such roundtable every year.
Furthermore, the white paper’s emphasis on critical and foundational technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and hypersonic systems, and their classification as dual-use with both economic and military implications offers scope for collaboration with EU member states. A key is in Indian companies being part of the EU landscape at an early stage in the process of their internal integration and harmonisation of the regulatory framework. The EU intends to simplify regulations regarding intra-EU transfers of defence-related products.
Indian industry should move to acquire startups and SMEs in the defence and high-tech space in Europe and secure a toehold. Investments in the defence technology startup/SME space in Europe will potentially benefit from the common structures being planned for the military-industrial complex across Europe. They could resort to ‘white labelling’—wherein one company rebrands and sells products or services created by another company, allowing businesses to offer products under their own brand without investing in production or development. This, in turn, would boost their technological capabilities in India, especially in the defence manufacturing sector.
The four priority multimodal corridors identified by the EU (rail, road, sea, and air) for military mobility at short notice as well as the 500 hotspot projects present a valuable opportunity for India. Each of these is likely to involve considerable upgrades of different kinds of hard and soft infrastructure. Indian engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) companies should explore the potential for securing contracts for the physical expansion of corridors, including ports and terminals. From software solutions to air-conditioning to integrated computer/data networks, the opportunities would be numerous. Indian missions should be asked to file regular reports on upcoming opportunities. Indian companies should also bid for contracts with lobbying by the Indian government, where possible.
The EU is set to bring about stringent rules for ownership and control of critical transport infrastructure, drawing renewed attention to China’s deepening footprint in Europe through strategic investments in critical infrastructure, which remain a growing concern. At the same time, this does not rule out opportunities for expanding Indian presence in the sector, especially in light of the white paper’s favourable recognition of India as an external partner.
All this―whether selling arms or ammunition or participating in multimodal corridors―may receive a fillip through a security and defence partnership (SDP) with the EU. The Union has concluded SDPs with six countries—namely, Norway, Moldova, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Albania, and North Macedonia.[10] More are envisaged. The SDP is reported to be a legally non-binding and broad-based instrument for mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation at the practical level.
According to the white paper, the EU’s plan is to closely integrate Ukraine with the Union’s defence and security capabilities, including in terms of their respective military-industrial complexes. It is important to keep in mind that Ukraine is likely to emerge as one of the gateways to EU’s technologies. India could look for opportunities to step up defence collaboration with Ukraine, apart from the existing partnership with Russia. India’s neutral posture amid the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is likely to serve its strategic interests well.
The EU is set to continue mutually beneficial cooperation in the defence and security fields with “European enlargement and neighbouring countries” (including Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, North Macedonia, and Switzerland). Leaving aside Moldova, which has strained relations with Moscow, India should enhance its own defence and security dialogue with all these countries.
The white paper calls for the establishment of a ‘Defence Union’. By implementing its European Defence Readiness 2030 strategy, the EU will emerge as a powerful pole in international relations both on account of its economic might (roughly equal to China’s GDP at US$20 trillion) as well as its newfound military integration and the potent capabilities of individual member states. The emergence of an EU ‘Defence Union’ will mark a scaling-up of all existing European defence and security structures. As an aspiring global power and strategically autonomous pole, India should bet on this partnership.
As the EU moves to higher levels of excellence in innovation and R&D, India should explore fresh opportunities for joint research, especially in defence technologies. India should closely study the evolving EU model and adopt best practices to improve its own roadmap for Atmanirbharta in aerial mobility, particularly in the development of domestic civil transport aircraft manufacturing and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) hubs. The EU’s Defence Omnibus Package also offers India a chance to collaborate and engage the Union in cross-certification of defence products and mutual recognition of certification to create the basis for a future market for India’s military and dual-use products.
As the EU’s defence initiative continues to evolve, India stands to draw lessons from its approach. Notably, India should learn from the EU’s measures to ensure availability of materials and the security of its own defence supply chains. The EU’s initiative on ensuring timely availability of finance for critical indigenous defence projects would serve as a useful example to eliminate bottlenecks in India. Further areas of relevance for India include the EU’s measures to streamline delivery timelines for defence products. An important point highlighted in the white paper is the EU’s commitment to placing long-term orders with its military-industrial complex—an approach that remains underdeveloped in the Indian system.
There could be fresh opportunities for enhancing India-EU cooperation in space and cybersecurity as well, since the white paper has listed space as a key domain for modern defence. Today, developing resilient space-based infrastructure is intrinsically linked to expanded investment in space-based defence capabilities.
Overall, according to the white paper, there is a plan to skill human resources in Defence Advanced STEM to “attract, train, employ, up- and reskill far more talent, from technicians to engineers and specialised experts.” In the coming years, the EU will clearly require more skilled science and technology/STEM human resources. This offers a four-fold opportunity for India:
Migration is mentioned as an area of concern for the EU. There is every reason to believe that over the next few years, ‘Fortress Europe’ could become a reality with greater conservatism on migration and mobility policies. This could have some impact on mobility and migration issues between the EU and India in the context of the ongoing FTA negotiations. Currently, India has migration and mobility agreements with Germany and France; however, having a greater number of entry points across Europe should be the aim. It is, therefore, vital for India to engage other EU members on these issues to build trust and confidence, and create a broad consensus in favour of Indian workers.
If the EU moves towards aggregation of demand, collaborative procurement, and prioritisation of defence production and supplies within a pan-European defence marketplace, there could be some implications for India. The country needs to carefully examine the fallout on each defence procurement agreement that has been concluded with European partners to assess potential disruption or delay in supplies to India. If the capacities of the European military-industrial complex get increasingly self-absorbed to meet the requirements of the ReArm Europe Plan, India would have to devise new approaches to avoid unwarranted dependencies.
The EU’s harmonisation of rules and procedures for defence procurement could bring about certain changes in the policies that each of the EU member states has hitherto followed with regard to defence collaboration and exports to India. If harmonisation results in changes in the export regulations of a major defence partner like France, this could have an impact on the scope and content of future cooperation with India. Such changes should be anticipated in advance, rather than accepted as a fait accompli.
The government may consider setting up an inter-ministerial Working Group at the functional level to examine in depth all issues surrounding the white paper and monitor the progress of the initiatives outlined in it.
In an uncertain world, the EU is seeking better guarantees for the continent’s defence and security through improved internal policy convergence. Central to the White Paper on Defence Readiness is the effort on the part of the EU to retain agency in an emerging order, given the US’s reluctance to underwrite European security. EU member states are expected to coalesce and bolster their defence and security policies by improving flow of funding, innovation, research and development, startups and SMEs, production, marketing, and military mobility corridors. The goal is to achieve full defence readiness by 2030.
These policy changes are creating new channels for India’s defence exports, technological collaboration including in startups, and, mobility of human resources. Wider outreach in across EU member states reduces India’s dependence on a single European power. As an aspiring global power and strategically autonomous pole, India should bet on this partnership.
[a] This is another term for European Defence Readiness 2030.
[1] “Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030,” European Defence Agency, March 19, 2025.
[2] “Trump’s Explosive Clash with Zelenskyy: Read the Full Transcript,” The Guardian, February 28, 2025.
[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Hague Summit Declaration,” June 25, 2025.
[4] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Vilnius Summit Communiqué,” July 11, 2023.
[5] “The Hague Summit Declaration”
[6] “Spain Strikes Deal with NATO to be Exempt from 5 Percent Defence Spending Target,” France 24, June 22, 2025.
[7] Advanced Weapons and Equipment and India limited, "Annual Report 2022-23," p. 4.
[8] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, Government of India, “Exports: Commodity Wise,”
[9] European External Action Service, “India/Pakistan: Statement by the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union on the Latest Developments,” May 8, 2025.
[10] European Parliament, “The EU's New Bilateral Security and Defence Partnerships”.
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Amb Sujan R. Chinoy is the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi since 2019. A career ...
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