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The stakes are often high in the intricate power play of international politics, and the paths to resolution are mired with political negotiations. An aspiring power like China has a primordial desire to build influence. Thus, in Chinese diplomacy, the art of influencing is a nuanced yet indispensable tool. Some international relations scholars also refer to this power of influence as “structural power.”
Without doubt, the power of influence is crucial in navigating any delicate situation. A country builds a strong image by fostering dialogue among all the concerned parties and paving the way for positive discussions. While the USA has remained the most influential international mediator, China is becoming increasingly assertive in its international mediator role, as evidenced during the Saudi-Iran or Niger-Benin dispute resolution.
As China sets out to create an alternative world order, complementary and sometimes contradictory to the West-led world order, China needs Africa by its side in different multilateral bodies. With 55 countries, indeed Africa is a substantial block in international negotiations and discussions. Therefore, Beijing is increasingly intensifying its efforts to influence Africa as it attempts to tilt the global order in its favor.
As China sets out to create an alternative world order, complementary and sometimes contradictory to the West-led world order, China needs Africa by its side in different multilateral bodies.
Yet, Western IR scholars, stuck in the binaries of centre and periphery or hegemon and challenger, are unable to comprehensively understand China’s rise in Africa due to the Eurocentrism in their analysis. Indeed, their overemphasis on economic aspects, such as trade, economic aid or resource interests, prevent them from exploring the cultural underpinnings of this relationship. This article attempts to evaluate China’s approach towards Africa from a relational perspective. Moving beyond Western-centric concepts such as sovereignty, anarchy, and democracy, the article introduces the traditional Chinese notion of Guanxi and its influence on China’s foreign policy practices. Further, the article evaluates China’s motivations behind setting up political party schools in Africa under the framework of guanxi diplomacy.
Guānxì ( 關係 ) is a defining feature of Chinese diplomacy. Although it is loosely translated as ‘relationship’, the meaning goes beyond the conventional Western definition. Its entry into English vocabulary is a relatively recent phenomenon. However, historically, it has been a cornerstone of China’s interstate relations, where Chinese rulers treated diplomacy as an extension of interpersonal relations. As a matter of fact, Guanxi is part of the Chinese word for international relations, ‘guoji guanxi’.
Guanxi continues to be an integral part of Chinese culture, built on the principles of reciprocity through personal ties and mutual obligations. Originating in pre-modern Chinese society, in Guanxi, an individual who benefits is obliged to return the favour to allow the relationship to continue and to ensure one’s goals are secure, creating a “win-win solution” (liǎng quán qí měi; 兩全其美). Structured both horizontally and vertically, it describes the particularities in an asymmetric relation between two unequal partners. In other words, it is a way of harmonising relationships based on responsibilities towards each other.
Originating in pre-modern Chinese society, in Guanxi, an individual who benefits is obliged to return the favour to allow the relationship to continue and to ensure one’s goals are secure, creating a “win-win solution” (liǎng quán qí měi; 兩全其美).
Many African countries have similar political settings which thrive on these dynamics and patron-client linkages. Different institutions, rules and regulations often play a secondary role in such situations. Thus, China’s governance model, characterized by one-party rule, absoluteness of party-state, fragmented authoritarianism model for policy process, strong political meritocracy, and top-down economic governance, particularly appeals to many African ruling parties.
Beijing has actively promoted its own model of governance to African leaders since independence days. China supported several African liberation movements in their cause, and after independence, China helped them develop their economies and consolidate the independent government. This includes the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, MPLA in Angola, Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe and Frelimo in Mozambique.
However, in recent years, it has intensified its efforts to strengthen its influence over African ruling parties. Every year, China invites hundreds of African officials on “study tours” to China, which often include lectures in Chinese universities, field visits to different provinces for firsthand experiences, as well as cultural programs to sensitize participants to Chinese traditions. In fact, except for very senior-level delegates, most of these courses take place outside Beijing, in the Chinese provinces.
During the 8th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Dakar, Senegal, in 2021, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released a white paper which acknowledged China’s diplomatic ties with 110 political parties in 51 countries out of 54. Now, the CCP has stepped up the training of party and government officials from Africa, as evidenced by the introduction of political schools.
China has long been an ideological and military ally to these liberation movements and is now the sole external partner of FLMSA.
In 2022, China developed its first political training school in the East African nation, Tanzania. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School, named after Tanzania’s revered founding father, was funded by the CCP with an estimated cost of US$40 million. Without wasting time, classes in the facility started in February 2022. 120 cadres from South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania have attended the school. Interestingly, all six countries have continued with their post-independence ruling governments without change, and all these six ruling parties have shared a strong historical relationship with China since pre-independence days.
Additionally, all six ruling parties belong to the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FLMSA) coalition, which evaluates geostrategic trends and challenges to their governance while coordinating mutual support. China has long been an ideological and military ally to these liberation movements and is now the sole external partner of FLMSA. The group has met regularly, the last meeting in March 2024.
The establishment of the Nyerere Leadership School will further strengthen this strategic alliance by providing a framework for the six FLMSA parties to develop their strategies more effectively through shared training, educational resources, and other collaborative facilities, all with Chinese characteristics.
China’s efforts to influence African policymaking are not limited to setting up new physical institutions in Africa. The CCP has also funded the refurbishing of the ZANU-PF party school in Zimbabwe, called the Herbert Chitepo School of Ideology.
Additionally, the CCP’s National Academy of Governance, which functions as the external arm of the CCP Central Party School, has established year-round training partnerships with governance academies in countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa. Since 2018, China has provided successive ruling parties with political leadership training. These efforts underscore China’s growing interest in shaping the governance structures of African nations, with a particular focus on entrenching single, dominant party models à la CCP. It is a way of instructing the revolutionary parties of Africa to maintain their permanent grip over power.
Scheduled to be inaugurated as a symbol of celebration for 60 years of China and Kenya relations, these investments will certainly promote China’s soft power in Kenya and beyond across the continent.
Recently, Kenya’s ruling United Democratic Alliance has also expressed its interest in building a CCP leadership school in Nairobi. Along with this school, Beijing is also likely to finance and develop Nairobi’s new foreign ministry headquarters. Scheduled to be inaugurated as a symbol of celebration for 60 years of China and Kenya relations, these investments will certainly promote China’s soft power in Kenya and beyond across the continent. As per some reports, political parties from Burundi, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, and Uganda have also shown interest in developing similar facilities in their respective countries.
Although China has built or supported African party schools since the 1960s, the Nyerere School was the first to be modelled on the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School. Similar to the CCP, all six participant political parties led their countries to independence. Moreover, they all have exhibited tendencies that undermine democracy and constitutionalism to different degrees.
Despite these countries’ official support for multiparty political systems, they have often been highly intolerant of opposition and have used various methods to suppress, limit, and even dismantle opposition parties. Additionally, issues such as fraudulent elections, electoral violence, and widespread corruption have become common, leading to the degradation of democratic institutions. Notably, none of these six nations have experienced a ruling party transition since their independence.
The CCP’s training programs often stress the benefits of a robust and centralized party system, which some African leaders believe is a sine qua non for maintaining power and stability without the “messiness” of multiparty democracy.
Given the historical connection and ideological similarities, the CCP model is compatible with their style of governance. However, with change of government, a country might decide to break away from the Chinese model and adopt a comparatively liberal Western model of democracy. Therefore, China will also want to nurture the opposition parties in different African countries to protect its interests in case of a drastic regime change. In that regard, China’s political schools, as part of its Guanxi diplomacy, will be highly effective.
Guanxi emphasizes the reciprocal obligations framed by hierarchical social relations. As emphasized in Guanxi, the relationship between ruler and subject provides the framework for the ruling party’s dominance over state and government. This concept resonates with the leadership of several African nations. The CCP’s training programs often stress the benefits of a robust and centralized party system, which some African leaders believe is a sine qua non for maintaining power and stability without the “messiness” of multiparty democracy.
China has patiently worked for decades to reach where it is today. It understands the long game of influencing and its associated rewards. Despite its rapid emergence in the international power game and accelerated efforts in developing a Sino-centric world order, the country is in no hurry. Clearly, China’s long game in promoting Guanxi is working in Africa.
This commentary originally appeared in Institute for National Defense and Security Research.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at ORF where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global order. He has a ...
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