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DS Rana, “The Andaman and Nicobar Islands: A Fulcrum of India’s Pivot to the East,” ORF Issue Brief No. 856, Observer Research Foundation, January 2026.
Throughout much of history, Asian nations have struggled to fully harness the potential of their island territories. For India, its shift from the Look East to the Act East policy in 2014 marked a transition in its Indo-Pacific outlook from what has been largely economic and diplomatic engagement to a more proactive and strategic approach across the wider region. However, massive delays to the planned 1,360-km India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway caused by ongoing political instability and civil war in Myanmar since 2021, have exposed the vulnerabilities of land-based connectivity. These disruptions have, in turn, accentuated the necessity of developing the geo-strategically located Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) as a vital maritime and logistics hub for the Act East Policy.[1],[2]
Figure 1: Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Source: Author’s own[3]
The ANI offer India a natural and enduring strategic vantage point in the eastern Indian Ocean. Positioned at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, the islands have long served as silent sentinels along one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints.
The ANI has witnessed the passage of successive maritime powers, each eager to control trade flowing through the strait. European colonisation marked a decisive phase, transforming the islands into critical hubs for securing sea routes and supporting voyages en route to Singapore.[4] Yet their significance extends further back in history. Jules Verne, renowned 19th-century French writer, in Around the World in Eighty Days (1873) describes the Andaman Islands as rich in forests of palms, areca palm, bamboo, and teak.[5] The 1931 census of the ANI by M.C.C. Bonington indicates that as early as the 11th century, the Chola dynasty used the Nicobar Islands as a base for expeditions across littoral kingdoms near the Malacca Strait.[6] This continuity of empires, traders, and powers engaging with the islands underscores their enduring value as a maritime gateway.
Geologically, the ANI form part of the Southeast Asian landmass and display a distinct topography, comprising 836 islands and islets spread over 700 km from Landfall Island in the north to Indira Point in the south, thereby projecting India’s sovereign reach. The islands overlook key sea passages, including the Preparis Channel, the 6° Degree channel, the 10° Degree channel, and Duncan’s Passage, in addition to the Malacca Strait. These waterways are vital trade routes for shipping moving between the west and the east. Located just 35 km from Myanmar’s Coco Islands and 150 km from Indonesia’s Banda Aceh, the ANI also form a natural arc from Cape Negrais to Sumatra, offering valuable surveillance coverage extending over 1,200 km from the mainland.[7]
Key milestones in the development of the ANI include the establishment of India’s first Joint Services Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) in 2001, followed by sustained impetus from the Government of India through the Island Development Agency. The ANC has acted as a catalyst for infrastructure development and the plough-back of funds into the local economy, driven by the dispersion of military personnel and facilities across the islands.[8] This has translated into improved healthcare, employment opportunities, access to quality education, effective disaster response, most notably during the 2004 tsunami, and an overall improvement in Human Development Indices (HDI), especially in remote areas.
In this context, streamlined environmental clearances for enhancing military capabilities are critical to ensure that strategic infrastructure for the ANI aligns with the national priority to Act East, akin to exemptions granted for highways within 100 km of land borders.[9] Further, under the UDAN regional connectivity scheme (UDAN RCS), launched in October 2016, military airstrips in the ANC including Car Nicobar, Campbell Bay, and Diglipur have been designated for dual‑use activation to expand civilian air services across the archipelago, thus reflecting a model of symbiotic civil‑military growth. A phased transformation of the ANC from a springboard into a strategic outpost would strengthen India’s image as a preferred security partner among Indian Ocean littorals.
Across India, the establishment of military facilities has catalysed broader regional transformation. The Indian Navy’s Seabird Project at Karwar, for instance, transformed a modest fishing town into a growing urban centre, generating employment and improving healthcare access, connectivity, and civic amenities. Similarly, the Indian Coast Guard’s expansion at Okha and Paradip has uplifted local economies while enhancing maritime safety. Inland, the Indian Air Force’s Hindon Air Base and the Indian Army’s cantonments have driven infrastructure growth, educational outreach, and community engagement in surrounding areas. These examples underscore the potential of defence-led infrastructure as a strategic tool for development. Applying this model to the ANI, particularly in areas such as Car Nicobar (Carnic), could unlock socio-economic gains, improve HDI outcomes in remote regions, integrate the islands more deeply into India’s national security architecture, and reinforce the country’s maritime posture in the Indo-Pacific.
China’s economic and strategic engagement with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia in the eastern Indian Ocean has grown significantly. As India’s foremost strategic asset in the Far East, the ANI has the potential to support New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific engagement and lend diplomatic credibility to the Act East policy. Thus, India’s development of the ANI, the establishment of the ANC, and constant engagement with Andaman Sea littorals have progressively emerged as pillars of India’s maritime diplomacy in the eastern IOR.[10]
Engagement through BIMSTEC and the QUAD, alongside the provision of Operational Turnaround (OTR) facilities to friendly navies and the undertaking of Coordinated Patrols (CORPATs), can further promote regional order and cooperation. As a responsible, rules-based actor, India has also settled maritime boundaries with all friendly neighbours, at times making concessions to achieve consensus.[11] Additionally, the ANC’s assistance to littoral nations during natural calamities such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2025 Myanmar earthquake also strengthened people-to-people ties. Collectively, these opportunities could catalyse the evolution of the Act East policy into a broader Indo-Pacific economic, strategic, and cultural collaboration under the MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), building on the SAGAR construct for engagement with the Global South, unveiled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Mauritius in 2025.[12]
With a substantial share of global trade transiting the IOR, forays by Extra-Regional Forces (ERFs) to safeguard economic and strategic interests are unsurprising. What is notable, however, is the unprecedented growth in both their capabilities and frequency of presence over the past decade. Beyond developing ports and maintaining permanent warship deployments under the guise of anti-piracy deployments, China’s growing influence has begun reshaping regional politics and is challenging India’s diplomatic space across the IOR. This impact is evident in the Maldives, Seychelles, and several African nations, where Beijing’s engagement has altered established maritime partnerships. China’s approach blends arms sales, military diplomacy, preferential relations with IOR littorals, and large-scale real estate and infrastructure investments, collectively aimed at eroding India’s position as the preferred regional partner. The deployment of Chinese research vessels in the Bay of Bengal, especially along the submerged 85 Degree and 90 Degree East Ridges areas rich in polymetallic nodules,[a] further signals strategic intent.[13] Countering the development of multiple ERF havens and lines of effort in the IOR therefore requires sustained Indian naval presence and stringent access monitoring at the Malacca Strait, staged through the ANI, to enable timely responses to potential military build-ups. This will also preclude Pakistan’s growing attempt to collude and build a nexus with inimical states and non-state actors on the eastern periphery of India taking advantage of instability.
Surveillance of extra-regional warships, deep-sea fishing fleets, “dark shipping”,[14] illegal activities, and research vessels along key chokepoints is essential and the ANI offer distinct advantages in facilitating this task. Threats from illegal immigration, drug and arms trafficking, poaching of genetic resources and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing have escalated in the eastern IOR, driven in part by instability in Bangladesh and Myanmar. A surge in poaching and smuggling attempts including during the harsh monsoon season around the ANI, with recent apprehensions of multiple groups of poachers of Myanmar origin, underscores the growing operational push by foreign-based actors. If left unchecked, the growing sophistication and reach of such inimical elements risk evolving into organised, terrorism-linked activity, necessitating proactive surveillance, interdiction and coordinated regional countermeasures. This places greater responsibility on the ANC to safeguard India’s maritime security in coordination with local administration and central and state agencies, including the marine police.
The ANI also serve as a launchpad for monitoring maritime traffic through the Malacca, Sunda, and other regional straits. To this end, the Indian Armed Forces in the ANI have established a balanced posture and area-monitoring framework focused on the so-called “Malacca Dilemma”,[15] supported by white-shipping agreements with like-minded partners and operational turn-around (OTR) facilities at remote locations such as the Cocos (Keeling) Islands[16] in the north-eastern IOR and Réunion Island.
The three island chains articulated by the US also shape how China perceives its seaward strategic space, reinforcing a geo-historical urge to break free from perceived maritime confinement.[17] It is proposed that India can also adopt an island‑chain strategy in the Indian Ocean Region to shape connectivity and partnerships through two arcs anchored in its geography and interests. The Eastern Island Chain, referred to as YANI, extends from Yangon through the ANI to Sabang in Indonesia, forming a continuous corridor that secures approaches to the Bay of Bengal and the western gateway to the Malacca Strait where dense maritime traffic and strategic competition intersect. This configuration would also enable monitoring and influence over initiatives such as the proposed Kra Canal[18] and the Yunnan-Indian Ocean Freight Corridor (Zheng He),[19] thereby reinforcing the Malacca dilemma. The Western Island Chain, LMD, extends from Lakshadweep across the Maldives to Diego Garcia, shaping central Indian Ocean sea lanes, the approaches to the Arabian Sea and traffic toward the Mozambique Channel. Together, YANI and LMD could convert dispersed island territories into a coherent theatre design that secures chokepoints, protects sea lanes, and enables partnered operations through shared awareness, access, and logistics.[20]
Figure 2: Proposed Eastern and Western Island Chain in IOR
Source: Author’s own[21]
With focused development and military empowerment, the ANI and the ANC are on a trajectory to emerge as India’s strategic fulcrum against misadventures along its Northern borders. The ANC continues to train and equip for operations in the “grey zone”, a domain that also requires effective narrative management at the strategic level to ensure calibrated signalling in the Andaman Sea.[22] In this context, the Indian Armed Forces regularly conduct long-range missile and precision-weapons trials from the ANI.[23] The permanent deployment of a warship at the exit of the Malacca Strait under the Malacca Deployment (MALDEP) enables monitoring of extra-regional forces transiting the area,[24] while simultaneously reassuring global commerce through the principle of mare liberum (freedom of the seas).[25] Further, it is also imperative to develop underwater domain awareness in the region especially along the straits providing access to the IOR.
Historically, the balance between ecology, protection of indigenous tribes, national security, and development has tilted towards isolating the ANI, largely due to ecological and cultural considerations. The revision in April 2025 of India’s coastline—from 7,516.6 km to 11,098.81 km—and the formulation of the ANI archipelago’s eastern baseline (see Figure 1 for a rough alignment) have significantly expanded the maritime zones of India, including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[26] Notably, a third of the coastline belongs to ANI (3,083.50km), thereby securing more than one-third of India’s EEZ. With around 6,60,000km² of EEZ rich in under-exploited sea resources, ANI have unmatched potential to contribute to India’s Blue Economy.[27] The discovery of oil and gas in the North Andaman Basin has further added both strategic and economic dimensions to the security calculus of the ANC,[28] which now carries the added responsibility of protecting valuable drilling and processing assets at sea located close to threats emanating from the Coco Islands[29] and instabilities in Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The ANI lie close to important East-West shipping lanes and near Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar, giving them a clear geographic advantage as a regional logistics hub. With deep‑draft port capacity at Great Nicobar and improved internal links, the islands could host feeder and transshipment services that shorten supply chains and reclaim value now routed through foreign hubs. A functioning transshipment node would attract integrated logistics parks and cold‑chain facilities, enabling direct exports of higher‑value seafood, horticulture, and processed goods to ASEAN markets. This would also support a maritime services cluster, growth in mariculture and post‑harvest processing, adding local value and jobs. Niche eco- and cruise tourism tied to Southeast Asian circuits could diversify incomes and increase port calls. Improved submarine cable connectivity would enable telemedicine, e‑education, and cross‑border SME platforms, strengthening the digital economy. Together, these changes would position ANI as a multifunctional node for container trade, cold‑chain exports, maritime services, and digital commerce, creating steady demand for feeder services, warehousing, and skilled local employment while deepening India’s integration with Bay of Bengal littorals and ASEAN supply chains.[30]
Cognisant of the economic potential of ANI, the Government of India has constituted the Island Development Agency to spearhead the archipelago’s infrastructure development.[31] Pivotal to establishing the ANI as a fulcrum of India’s eastern strategy is the development of the International Container Transhipment Port (ICTP) at Galathea Bay on Great Nicobar Island, located just 75 km from the mouth of the Malacca Strait.[32] Kamarajar Port Ltd (KPL) has been asked to lead and structure the International Container Transhipment Port (ICTP) at Galathea Bay under a Build‑Operate‑Transfer (BOT)/public–private partnership (PPP) model.[33]
The proposed ICTP is widely seen as a potential game-changer due to its natural deep draft (>20 m), direct access to the East–West shipping route, and a phased capacity plan targeting 4 million twenty-foot equivalent container units (TEUs) in Phase 1, rising to ~16 million TEUs at maturity. Government analysts estimate potential annual savings of US$200–220 million for Indian ports by reducing reliance on overseas transshipment hubs.[34] In parallel, India’s proposed development of the Sabang port in Sumatra,[35] Indonesia, also at the entrance to the Malacca Strait, could reinforce the ANI’s role as an economic gateway to the region. Additionally, despite being located around 1,200 km from the mainland, the islands’ digital connectivity has received a boost through the completion of the Chennai-ANI submarine cable (CANI), laying a strong foundation for sustained future growth.
While the scale of investment and development envisaged for the ANI adds substantial military and economic value and strengthens India’s strategic signalling, it also carries an equally important responsibility to safeguard fragile ecosystems, preserve indigenous cultures, and protect the archipelago’s heritage. The ANI are home to several Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs), including the Great Andamanese, Onges, Jarawas, Nicobarese, Sentinelese, and Shompens. Their customs and ways of life have endured for centuries, sustained by a delicate balance between carefully managed development and the preservation of indigenous traditions and identities.[36] The islands also have an exceptionally high forest share at 86.93 percent of the Union Territory’s geographical area, low population density (46/sq km), and high rainfall (1,400-3,000 mm)—[37] conditions that allow for tightly regulated, compact development supported by ecological buffers and water self-sufficiency measures. With deliberate planning that enables strategic infrastructure and ecological integrity to advance in tandem, the ANI can emerge as a model for sustainable development in sensitive maritime regions.
Overseeing a substantial share of global trade routes, including crude oil flows, the ANI have the potential to be critical to the functioning of global economies. Viewing the ANI as an intersection of the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean underscores their role as the fulcrum of India’s eastward and Indo-Pacific pivot. Described as ‘India’s unsinkable aircraft carriers’[38] by former Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, these islands form a bulwark against conventional and non-conventional threats in the IOR. Recent Chinese maritime activity in the South China Sea, coupled with delays to the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT) due to Myanmar’s security situation,[39] has renewed strategic focus on the ANI.
Further, the growing tendency of revisionist powers to erode the international rules-based order necessitates the calibrated use of both military and non-military means.[40] Accordingly, plurilateral and extra-regional partnerships with friendly foreign nations and strategic signalling at the apex level need to be leveraged to India’s benefit.[41] The bargain would most certainly be tilted towards India, given the ANI’s strategic geography and India’s balanced diplomacy and political stability.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are no longer a peripheral outpost. They are the hinge on which India’s eastern maritime strategy can turn. Positioned astride the approaches to the Malacca Strait, they provide India with a rare strategic advantage: the ability to observe, influence and help secure one of the world’s busiest and most vital sea lanes. The challenge now is to move beyond recognising this potential and towards acting on it with urgency and precision.
Beyond ASEAN, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands should be woven into wider Indo‑Pacific security architectures. Leveraging ANI’s forward location, India can participate or develop complementary frameworks alongside the Quad Plus and the Indo‑Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). As a regional fusion point for maritime intelligence, the ANI can link the Information Fusion Centre - Indian Ocean Region (IFC‑IOR) with partner networks, enabling real-time sharing of data on shipping, illegal fishing and emerging threats, fostering coordinated responses across a broad coalition.[42] The recent revitalisation of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), marked by expanded exercises and a renewed strategic roadmap, underscores growing regional attention.[b] Leveraging its location, the ANI can act as BIMSTEC’s maritime node, host disaster management initiatives, and provide OTR facilities to friendly navies. By institutionalising regular multilateral defence diplomacy and pairing it with concrete capacity‑building measures such as shared radar networks, enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA), coordinated disaster relief and defence scholarships while integrating with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Region states (IORS), Indo‑Pacific MDA (IP-MDA), the Indo‑Pacific Maritime Cooperation Centre (IP-MCC) and the Bangladesh‑Bhutan‑India‑Nepal (BBIN) frameworks, the ANC can become the Indo‑Pacific’s central hub for information sharing and rapid, unified responses to both conventional and grey-zone threats. Standard Operating Procedures for grey-zone scenarios will ensure readiness against blockades, disinformation, maritime militia activity, and hostile research activities.
A clear starting point is to enhance India’s influence in the Malacca Strait which opens into the Indian Ocean and carries more than half of India’s trade. Singapore’s recent public recognition of India’s interest in the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP)[c] offers a timely opening. While full membership may take time due to the preference of littoral states for exclusive control, India can credibly pursue a formal coordination role at the Indian Ocean approaches to the Strait. Anchored by the tri‑service ANC, India brings together persistent MDA, rapid‑response capabilities and proven interoperability developed through years of coordinated patrols with Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar. These capabilities provide a strong foundation for a structured role in the MSP through observer status, joint surveillance, and real‑time information exchange, enhancing security at the strait’s western gateway while deepening trust with littoral partners.
Alongside this, the islands should become a regular base for high-level multinational exercises, expanding scope, complexity and diplomatic reach. Hosting high-visibility maritime exercises like Malabar, an expanded MILAN, ASEAN‑India Maritime Exercises (AIME), amphibious drills, and humanitarian operations from the ANI would strengthen interoperability and signal India’s commitment to regional security. Designating Port Blair and Campbell Bay as permanent venues for key multilateral naval exercises would leverage the islands’ geography and infrastructure while deepening India’s integration with Southeast and East Asian partners. This would require targeted upgrades to berthing, logistics and airfields to support visiting forces without straining local resources and to ensure that exercise objectives directly reinforce surveillance and coordination requirements along the Malacca front.[43]
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands can be transformed into a premium eco-tourism and Meetings, Incentives, Conferences and Exhibitions (MICE) hub[44] through high-end eco-luxury resorts at Smith-Ross, Long Island, Shaheed Dweep, and Great Nicobar, complemented by cruise connectivity with Southeast Asia. Creating a maritime industrial cluster, connectivity upgrades, expanded airstrips, ferries, seaplanes, heliports, and the Andaman Trunk Road will integrate civilian and military mobility. Digital resilience should be built by adding the CANI submarine cable, branch links to Great Nicobar and satellite-based systems to ensure disaster warnings and secure communications as part of the islands’ development architecture. Defence-led development models from the mainland offer a tested template demonstrating how military infrastructure can catalyse economic activity while supporting environmental regeneration and civilian prosperity. Applying this approach in ANI, particularly through the Galathea Bay project and initiatives such as Kamorta in Car Nicobar, could extend employment, healthcare, education and transport access to remote islands while enhancing operational readiness.
The development of the Great Nicobar Transshipment Port must be prioritised as a strategic initiative anchoring India’s maritime ambitions in the eastern Indian Ocean. Policy measures including exemptions from environmental, forest and coastal regulation zone clearances for strategic defence projects in the ANI are essential to advance the blue economy agenda and execute Vision 2030 in the region. Strategic road and highway projects in the islands should be accorded priority under PM Gati Shakti and cleared expeditiously without lengthy clearance procedures. As border roads within 100 km of India’s frontiers are fast-tracked for defence imperatives,[d] connectivity in the islands would accelerate critical connectivity while maintaining environmental safeguards through standard operating procedures, ensuring timely delivery of military and dual-use infrastructure. India must counter the narrative that development must come at the expense of the environment.[45]
The ANC’s unique mix of Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard assets positions it as an ideal “sandbox” for testing theatre command concepts, joint operational doctrines and indigenous technologies .[46] Security planning in the ANI therefore integrates civil and military requirements, ensuring that critical infrastructure ports, airports, telecommunications, and power follows a dual-use design philosophy. Regular military capability enhancements in all domains, including underwater domain awareness and enhanced air operations with all kinds of aircraft, need to be continued on mission mode.
In parallel, India should advance its submissions for an extended continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea in line with provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while promoting marine biosphere reserves and strengthened high-seas monitoring to protect legitimate resource rights and counter IUU fishing, unauthorised research and grey-zone activities. Establishing multi-institutional ocean e-stations equipped with oceanographic, seismic and biosecurity sensors would enable rapid hazard warnings, ecological assessments, and disaster response while also supporting sustainable tourism.
If India can align security, connectivity, human progress and ecological balance, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands will do more than guard the eastern gateway of the Indian Ocean. They will serve as a living demonstration of how strategic geography when matched with strategic vision can shape the Indo-Pacific balance of power for times to come.
To present a balanced assessment of the ANI’s development, opportunities must be weighed against the challenges. Strategically, India’s ambition to position the ANC as a hub for exercises, logistics, and surveillance is constrained by geopolitical sensitivities. Littoral states may resist expanded external involvement in the Malacca Strait, while China could respond through more complex grey-zone tactics. Expanding forces to a fleet‑level naval presence also demands sustained resources and political commitment which may be difficult to maintain without adequate supporting infrastructure. Environmentally, the ANI’s fragile ecosystems and tribal reserves render large-scale projects such as ports, highways, and airstrips contentious, with regulatory hurdles and climate risks compounding delays. Infrastructure development is further slowed by logistical isolation, high costs and the challenge of balancing dual‑use requirements without overstretching limited resources, while digital redundancy remains limited. Socially, concerns over displacement and cultural erosion persist among local communities and gaps in skilled workforce, healthcare, and education complicate long-term sustainability. Financially, high capital costs, slow approvals, and uncertainty around long‑term maintenance of advanced facilities pose additional constraints. The implementation of the proposals set out in this brief depends entirely on the government’s political will, rigorous and sustained planning, and effective execution.
The challenge is to align defence imperatives with sustainable development, ensuring that the ANI emerge as a model of “security enables sustainability” rather than a flashpoint of overreach.
India stands at a crossroads shaped by dynamic geopolitical shifts and the ANI has evolved from a strategic outpost into an unsinkable hub of the Act East policy, overlooking vital sea lines of communication and generating strategic leverage on an increasingly complex Indian Ocean chessboard. The ANI and the ANC should therefore be further developed as India’s forward base in the Indo‑Pacific, realising its true maritime potential and shedding a long-standing continental outlook. This role depends less on troop numbers or runways and more on an integrated mix of strategy, economy, infrastructure, law, environment, and diplomacy.
If the ANC is fully integrated into national and regional defence plans, coordinates with friendly countries, protects biosecurity, speeds up infrastructure, and promotes sustainable growth, the islands can move from a remote outpost to a central player in India’s Act East policy and regional maritime affairs. Making the ANI and the ANC a strategic and economic heart of Act East is not optional but essential for India’s regional standing. The success will come from combining security with prosperity, environmental care, and cooperative leadership so that the islands can take their place at the centre of India’s Indo‑Pacific role.
Lt Gen DS Rana, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, PhD is a serving Commander-in-Chief in Indian Defence Forces. He is former Commander-in-Chief of Andaman Nicobar Command and Director General, Defence Intelligence Agency.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] It is estimated that the Indian Ocean nodule field covers 300,000 km² and has a potential yield of 1.4 billion tons of nodules valued at over US$8 trillion. The Government of India approved the Deep Ocean Mission in 2021 to develop deep‑sea technologies for seabed exploration.
[b] Sustaining constructive engagement with FPDA member countries Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom offers value through insights into a long‑standing regional security framework, improved interoperability and strengthened confidence‑building with key Southeast Asian and Commonwealth partners.
[c] In the India–Singapore Joint Statement of 4 September 2025, issued during the adoption of the Comprehensive Strategic Pa India–Singapore Joint Statement, September 4, 2025, Comprehensive Strategic Partnership roadmap; “Singapore acknowledges with appreciation India’s interest in the Malacca Straits Patrol,” marking the first formal public endorsement by a littoral state of India’s potential role in this security framework.
[d] Recommendation: Model this on the existing exemption that waives prior environment clearances for defence/strategic highway projects within 100 km of international borders/LoC under the EIA Notification 2006 (as amended July 14, 2022), with mandatory compliance to the MoEFCC’s Standard Operating Procedure for environmental safeguards and without waiving other statutory consents.
[1] M. Baruah, India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia (New Delhi: Carnegie India, 2018).
[2] Panda, “The Andaman and Nicobar Islands in India’s Act East Policy: A Maritime Pivot to the Indo‑Pacific,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 16, no. 1 (2021): 1-18.
[3] Authors Construct on image: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/Map_of_Nicobar_and_Andaman_Islands-en_without_Port_Blair.svg
[4] I. P. Mathur, History of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 1756–1966 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1968).
[5] Jules Verne, Around the World in Eighty Days (Penguin Select Classics, 1873). pp. 87.
[6] M.C.C Bonington, Census of India, 1931, Volume II - The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Government of India Press, 1931).
[7] Air Marshal Saju Balakrishnan, “Arc of Power: India’s Andaman & Nicobar Command,” episode 3, May 23, 2025, StratNews Global, https://www.stratnewsglobal.com.
[8] Cmde Prashant Handu and Cdr Abhishek Jain, “Andaman and Nicobar Islands: Guardian of India’s Ocean,” Medals & Ribbons, July 2025 edition, 107.
[9] The Gazette of India Extraordinary, No. 3036; Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change notification dated July 14, 2022, 4.
[10] Yogesh Joshi, “China and India Maritime Rivalry Has a New Flash Point: The Andaman Sea,” South China Morning Post, December 12, 2019, https://sc.mp/w4tvs
[11] Pragya Pandey, “India‑Bangladesh Augmenting Maritime Cooperation in the Indo‑Pacific,” Indian Council of World Affairs, July 16, 2024, https://www.icwa.in
[12] Ministry of External Affairs, “Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi announced Vision MAHASAGAR — Mutual And Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions,” March 12, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/newsdetail1.htm?13355/
[13] Satyabrata Nayak, “A Conceptual Study: Petroleum System Related to 85° E Ridge,” AAPG Search & Discovery (2011), https://www.searchanddiscovery.com/pdfz/documents/2011/50497nayak/ndx_nayak.pdf.html
[14] Sylvie Rouat, “Indian Occean: Suspicious Activities of a Chinese Research Vessel,” Sciences et Avenir, https://www.sciencesetavenir.fr.
[15] Pawel Pazwak, “China and the Malacca Dilemma,” Warsaw Institute, February 2021, https://warsawinstitute.org/china-malacca-dilemma/
[16] “Two Indian Military Aircraft Visit Australia’s Strategic Cocos Islands,” The Hindu, July 30, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/dornier-c-130-aircraft-deployed-to-australias-strategic-cocos-keeling-islands/article67138889.ece
[17] Andrew S. Erickson, “Geography Matters, Time Collides: Mapping China’s Maritime Strategic Space under Xi,” Strategic Space, August 2024, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2024/08/geography-matters-time-collides-mapping-chinas-maritime-strategic-space-under-xi/
[18] Paulo Aguiar, “Kra Canal: The Impossible Dream of Southeast Asia Shipping,” Eurasia Review, March 15, 2025, https://www.eurasiareview.com/15032025-kra-canal-the-impossible-dream-of-southeast-asia-shipping-analysis/
[19] Li Xiuzhong, “China Opens New Freight Corridor Linking Yunnan to the Indian Ocean,” July 10, 2025, Yicai Global, https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/new-freight-corridor-linking-chinas-yunnan-to-indian-ocean-rim-countries-opens
[20] A. Naha, “Strategic Salience of India’s Island Chains in the IOR: Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep Islands,” in Small Islands and Invisible Boundaries, ed. D. Nandy and M. Das (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-7090-1_11.
[21] Authors construct on image: https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/Nicobar_islands#/media/File:Nicobar_Islands.PNG
[22] Col. Deepak Kumar, “China’s Grey Zone Operations and India’s Response,” Indian Defence Review, January 16, 2024.
[23] “India Likely to Test Extended‑Range BrahMos Variant in IOR,” New Indian Express, May 23, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/May/23/india-likely-to-test-extended-range-brahmos-air-variant-in-indian-ocean-region
[24] Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, “The Indian Navy in the Changing Geo‑politics of the Indo‑Pacific,” National Maritime Foundation Journal August 31, 2023.
[25] Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, sive de jure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana commercial dissertatio (1609).
[26] The Gazette of India Extraordinary, No. 177 dated April 3, 2025; Ministry of External Affairs notification dated April 2, 2025, G.S.R. 216(E), “Baseline System in WGS 84 Datum for Andaman and Nicobar,” 15–16.
[27] Firstpost News Desk, “Why India’s Sea Borders Are All Set to Expand,” April 4, 2025, https://www.firstpost.com/india/why-indias-sea-borders-are-all-set-to-expand-further-13876995.html
[28] “The Prospect of Energy Exploration at Andaman and Nicobar Islands,” The Hindu, July 3, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/explained-the-prospect-of-energy-exploration-at-andaman/article69766875.ece
[29] John Pollock and Damien Symon, “Is Myanmar Building a Spy Base on Great Coco Island?,” Chatham House, May 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-04/myanmar-building-spy-base-great-coco-island
[30] CNBCTV18 Travel Desk, “Andaman and Nicobar Islands poised to become India’s gateway to Southeast Asia: Admiral D. K. Joshi,” CNBC‑TV18, October 31, 2025, https://www.cnbctv18.com/travel/destinations/andaman-and-nicobar-islands-poised-to-become-indias-gateway-to-southeast-asia-admiral-dk-joshi-19736657.htm
[31] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “First Meeting of Island Development Agency Held,” July 24, 2017, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1496881®=3&lang=2; “Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah Lays Foundation Stone of Development Projects Worth Rs. 1,150 Crore in Great Nicobar,” October 4, 2024, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2089935.
[32] Government of India, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, “Environmental and CRZ Clearance of ICTT of 14.2 Million TEU and Greenfield International Airport of 4,000 Peak Hour Passengers Capacity,” November 4, 2022, https://aniidco.and.nic.in/announcement/EC%20CRZ%20Approvals%20%20Airport%20ICTTTownship%20Power%20plant.pdf
[33] Kamarajar Port Ltd., press release on submission of Detailed Project Report for the ₹1 lakh crore International Container Transshipment Port (ICTP) at Galathea Bay, Great Nicobar Island, Indian Defence News, https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2025/10/dpr-for-1-lakh-crore-great-nicobar.html.
[34] NITI Aayog, “Transforming the Islands Through Creativity & Innovation,” May 2019, https://www.niti.gov.in, 21.
[35] Anshuman Choudhury, “India‑Indonesia and Sabang Port: A Game Changer,” June 21, 2018, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5482
[36] S. K. Chaudhary and S. S. Chaudhary, The Primitive Tribes in Contemporary India: The Primitive Tribes of Andaman and Nicobar Islands (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2005), pp. 35–73.
[37] Forest Survey of India, India State of Forest Report 2019, Vol. II: Andaman & Nicobar Islands, https://fsi.nic.in/isfr2019/isfr-fsi-vol2.pdf
[38] Colonel Ajai Shukla (retd), “A Big Stick for India Navy,” Broadsword, August 22, 2025, https://www.ajaishukla.com/2021/11/a-big-stick-for-indian-navy.html.
[39] “Completion of the India‑Myanmar‑Thailand Highway Will Be a Gamechanger: Jaishankar,” Hindustan Times, February 25, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/completion-of-the-india-myanmar-thailand-highway-will-be-a-game-changer-jaishankar-101740503707349.html
[40] Cmde Himadri Bose, “Grey Zones in Blue Waters,” Indian Naval Despatch 4, no. 1: 51.
[41] Satoru Nagao, “Talk on Oceanic Choices: India, Japan and the Dragon’s Fire,” Raisina Debates, 2022.
[42] Premesha Saha and Abhishek Mishra, “The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative: Towards a Coherent Indo-Pacific Policy for India,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 292, Observer Research Foundation, December 2020.
[43] Indo‑Pacific Defense Forum, “ASEAN‑India Maritime Exercise Stresses Cooperation, Interoperability,” May 17, 2023.
[44] Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy, Dweep Diksha Dialogue, September 19-20, 2025.
[45] “Explained: Why the Great Nicobar Project Is Vital for India’s National Security,” Firstpost, September 8, 2025, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/explained-why-the-great-nicobar-project-is-vital-for-indias-national-security-13931941.html
[46] Vice Admiral A. K. Chawla, Dweep Diksha Dialogue, September 19–20, 2025.
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Lt Gen DS Rana, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, PhD is a serving Commander-in-Chief in Indian Defence Forces. He is former Commander-in-Chief of Andaman Nicobar Command ...
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