-
CENTRES
Progammes & Centres
Location
PDF Download 
Shu Fukuya, “Structural Realism and the Logic of Bilateral Trade,” ORF Issue Brief No. 842, Observer Research Foundation, November 2025.
Over the last decade, states have increasingly used economic tools such as sanctions, tariffs, and export controls as instruments of national strategy. These were previously used only in serious cases like nuclear threats or widespread human rights violations, but have now become a routine element of foreign policy.[1][2] Since the 2010s, states, irrespective of size or influence, have often chosen to act unilaterally or through bilateral channels to protect their interests.
This trend has accelerated following the return of Donald Trump to the United States (US) presidency in 2025. The inauguration of his second term has reinforced a move away from the liberal international order while supporting a broader global transition toward more transactional, bilateral statecraft. From the imposition of widespread tariffs to redefining alliances as zero-sum negotiations, Trump 2.0 has contributed to a fundamental change in how the US and its counterparts engage in international trade.
In this context, analysing trade policy through the lens of structural realism has become increasingly relevant. Structural realism, particularly as developed by a leading scholar of international relations theory, Kenneth Waltz, focuses on the anarchic nature of the international system and the primary role of self-help among states.[3] This analysis aims to explore that, within the framework of structural realism, self-interested states can find pathways to cooperation when mutual benefits are possible. It also seeks to explain why some bilateral negotiations have succeeded in reaching an agreement while others have failed, despite partial de-escalation. It builds on the observation that, under Trump’s renewed leadership, the US has consistently used tariffs as a tool for leverage in bilateral negotiations. Paradoxically, some of these initial economic coercive actions can lead to collaborative outcomes.
Through case studies of US-UK (United Kingdom) and US-China trade negotiations under Trump 2.0, the brief identifies the structural conditions that enabled the UK to secure a final agreement—i.e., a small-N format with high monitoring capacity, and a credible pre-play commitment. This is in contrast to the absence of such a commitment in the US-China case, which has rendered cooperation fragile. The analysis explores the conditions under which states, acting primarily in their self-interest, can still achieve cooperative trade outcomes.
By situating these negotiations within the broader shift toward unilateralism and strategic competition following the inauguration of Trump’s second administration, it offers a timely reassessment of the explanatory power of structural realism. It examines whether bilateral trade deals can endure under the ideas of realist logic and underscores that their success or failure depends on whether specific conditions for cooperation are met.
The resurgence of unilateralism has brought renewed attention to the role of power politics in trade policy. Structural realism, as developed by Waltz (cited earlier), provides a compelling framework to analyse this point in contemporary history. It begins with the premise that the international system is anarchic and there is no overarching authority to enforce rules. In such a system, states must rely on themselves and prioritise survival, autonomy, and relative power.[4]
In Trump’s second administration, the US has increasingly approached trade not as a matter of global welfare optimisation but as a domain of strategic competition.[5] Tariffs and economic sanctions are no longer reactive tools. They are now proactive instruments of leverage, framed in terms of national security, supply chain reconstruction, and domestic industrial revival.[6] This strategic use of economic policy aligns with the structural realist view that economic tools are part of a broader contest for power.
However, it must be considered how states, even under conditions of anarchy, coordinate to explain variation in recent cooperative trade deals. In this sense, it uses the “outside-in” approach, which is a systemic explanation based on Waltz’s theory.[7] This approach starts by analysing the international system as a whole. It treats domestic conditions as fixed and assumes that states are rational and act in their own self-interest—not as variables, but as basic assumptions.[8]
While structural realism provides a foundational understanding of how power dynamics shape state behaviour in the international economy, it does not by itself explain when and why self-interested states choose to cooperate. To address this gap, this brief incorporates theories that identify the mechanisms through which cooperation can emerge under anarchy, specifically the works of Mancur Olson (1971) and James Andreoni and Hal Varian (1999).
Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’ explains why cooperation is particularly challenging in large-N multilateral settings.[9] As the number of actors increases, the incentive for each participant to free-ride, enjoying the benefits of collective goods without bearing the costs, becomes stronger. Olson’s logic implies that cooperation is more likely in small-N settings where pre-play commitments are possible—a condition this author refers to as reciprocism. In such contexts, each actor’s contribution is more visible, reciprocity is easier to enforce, and selective incentives or coercion can be more effectively applied. Under Trump 2.0, this structural insight helps explain the deliberate pivot away from broad, multilateral trade frameworks toward bilateral, high-leverage negotiations (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Matrix of Member Size and Pre-Play Commitment
Source: Author’s own
Replacing Keohane’s emphasis on repeated games and the shadow of the future, it adopts James Andreoni and Hal Varian’s (1999) pre-play contract framework from two-stage game theory[10] (See Figure 2). In a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), mutual defection is the dominant strategy. However, Andreoni and Varian demonstrate that if players can negotiate binding or credible commitments before the strategic interaction begins, the payoff matrix can be altered so that cooperation becomes the rational equilibrium.[1] In other words, reciprocism arises not only from the visibility of contributions in small-N settings, but also from the possibility of pre-play commitments that reshape incentives.
The purpose of commitment is to increase each player’s incentive to cooperate and thereby make mutual cooperation possible. To induce the other player to cooperate, one must promise a payment that exceeds the payoff that the other player would obtain from defecting.[11] By doing so, cooperating becomes more profitable for the other player than defecting, thereby eliminating the incentives to betray.
Figure 2: Concept of Pre-play Commitment
Source: Author’s own
The second Trump administration’s bilateral trade deals often operationalise this logic. For example, the US-UK trade deal included a pre-agreed British defence procurement package before being concluded, locking-in incentives for cooperation before any potential breakdown in negotiations.[12] In contrast, the US-China talks in the same period often lacked such pre-agreement structures, leading to reactive, iterative bargaining with higher volatility.
From a structural realist perspective, both Olson’s and Varian’s logics operate within the constraints of an anarchic system where power determines the bounds of cooperation.
When both conditions of small-N interaction and credible pre-play commitments are met, cooperation can emerge among self-interested states (see Figure 3). In the post-2025 scenario, this synthesis helps explain why transactional bilateralism has become not just a tactical tool, but a structural feature of US trade policy under Trump 2.0.
Figure 3: Reciprocism under Structural Realism
Source: Author’s own
Trump 2.0 has redefined how the US uses economic statecraft as its primary tool. The administration’s preference for bilateral trade deals, imposing tariffs, and the political conditioning of economic exchanges has replaced multilateralism with direct transnationalism. In this environment, the logic of coercion and strategic bargaining can be observed in practice.
This brief examines two cases of the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal and the US-China bilateral trade negotiations that began with confrontation but ultimately led to negotiated cooperation. These cases demonstrate how economic pressure, when combined with credible incentives or mounting costs, can facilitate cooperation between rational, self-interested states.
Following the announcement in April 2025 that the US would impose “reciprocal tariffs”[13] on over 50 countries, including allies, the UK sought immediate high-level negotiations to avoid a full-scale trade conflict. Under the Trump administration’s approach to trade imbalances, the UK was threatened with sector-specific tariffs on automobiles and metals.
However, on 8 May 2025, the US and UK jointly announced that they had reached a deal called the “Economic Prosperity Deal”.[14] President Trump posted on social media: “This Deal shows that if you respect America, and bring serious proposals to the table, America is OPEN FOR BUSINESS.”[15]
The two countries agreed to begin negotiations on the Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD) during a summit on 27 February 2025. This was followed by ministerial talks in March, a second summit on 18 April, a finance ministerial meeting on 25 April, and eventually, a finalised agreement on 12 May.[16],[17],[18],[19],[20] According to the joint announcement, the deal maintains a general 10-percent tariff on American exports to the UK, but removes the 25-percent sector-specific tariffs on steel and aluminium. It also lowers tariffs on UK-manufactured automobiles exported to the US to 10 percent for up to 100,000 vehicles, allows the tariff-free exports of Rolls Royce engines and aircraft components to the US, and reduces the UK tariffs on US goods to 1.8 percent. Other key provisions include the removal of US tariffs on ethanol, US$10 billion worth of aircraft purchases from Boeing, the creation of a bilateral steel and aluminium trade zone, and joint efforts to secure pharmaceutical supply chains (see Figure 4).[21],[22],[23] These moves served as pre-play incentives that reshaped the strategic environment and made cooperation rational for both sides.
Figure 4: The US-UK EPD
| Sector | Provisions |
| Automobiles | The tariff on up to 100,000 UK-made cars exported to the US was lowered to 10 percent |
| Metals | Certain UK steel and aluminium products are exempted from US tariffs; creation of a dedicated US-UK steel and aluminium trade union |
| Aircraft | Rolls-Royce engines and aircraft components are exempt from tariffs |
| Pharmaceuticals | Agreement to strengthen cooperation on securing pharmaceutical supply chains |
| Agriculture | The US beef import quota increased from 1,000 to 13,000 tons; broader market opening for US agricultural products totalling US$5 billion |
| Biofuels | The tariff on US-produced ethanol was eliminated |
Source: The White House, Government of the United Kingdom, and Yasuda[24],[25],[26]
The US-UK negotiation can be modelled as a 2 x 2 game for the sake of simplification. Each side chooses between ‘Cooperate’ (reach a deal) or ‘Defect’ (impose high tariffs). The payoffs to each side can be represented as a classic PD structure.
Figure 5: Payoff Structure Before Commitments
| UK | |||
| Cooperate (Deal) | Defect (Tariffs) | ||
| US | Cooperate (Deal) | (+3, +3) | (-1, +5) |
| Defect (Tariffs) | (+5, -1) | (+1, +1) | |
Source: Author’s own
Note: The figures are illustrative payoffs, with the first number representing the US’s gains and the second, the UK’s. Positive numbers denote economic benefits such as growth or an improved trade balance, while negative numbers represent losses. Here, cases where the underlying payoff structure is not a PD (i.e., when cooperating is already optimal if the other side cooperates) have not been considered.
In this payoff structure, defection is the dominant strategy for both. If the other side cooperates, unilateral defection yields a higher payoff (+5 vs +3). If the other defects, it still results in a smaller loss (+1 vs -1). Rational play by both, therefore, leads to (Defect, Defect) as the Nash equilibrium. While (Cooperate, Cooperate) would deliver a better outcome (+3 each), the incentive structure makes such cooperation unlikely.
Let S1 denote the US commitment (the side payment it pledges to the UK if the UK cooperates) and S2 denote the UK commitment (the side payment it pledges to the US if the US cooperates) as below.
Figure 6: US and UK Commitments
| UK | |||
| Cooperate (Deal) | Defect (Tariffs) | ||
| US | Cooperate (Deal) | (+3-S1+S2, +3+S1-S2) | (-1+S2, +5-S2) |
| Defect (Tariffs) | (+5-S1, -1+S1) | (+1, +1) | |
Source: Author’s own
Suppose both countries adopt front-loaded incentives consistent with a pre-play commitment mechanism. On the UK side, this could include large-scale purchases of US goods and tariff reductions on US exports. On the US side, it might involve not just discretionary tariff cuts, but the institutional removal or reduction of sector-specific tariffs on the UK’s steel, aluminium, and automobiles embedded in a bilateral agreement rather than temporary suspensions, together with access to key US markets. If each side’s commitments raise the other’s payoff for mutual cooperation by +3, the matrix would be as follows:
Figure 7: Payoff Structure After Commitments
| UK | |||
| Cooperate (Deal) | Defect (Tariffs) | ||
| US | Cooperate (Deal) | (+3, +3) | (+2, +2) |
| Defect (Tariffs) | (+2, +2) | (+1, +1) | |
Source: Author’s own
Thus, the UK’s front-loaded incentives served as a pre-play commitment, transforming a potentially zero-sum negotiation into a mutually beneficial arrangement. From the US perspective, the deal offered both political capital and economic concessions that fit the administration’s ‘America First’ narrative. For the UK, it secured market access and helped protect critical industries from retaliatory tariffs.
The US-China negotiations, in contrast, were driven not by pre-agreed incentives but by escalatory pressures and mutual damage recognition. The US imposed cumulative tariffs of 145 percent on Chinese imports (combining a 10 percent baseline tariff and a 20 percent tariff as part of measures to curb illegal drugs), while China raised tariffs on US goods to 125 percent, escalating tensions to historic highs.[27]
Amid this (Defect, Defect) stalemate, the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings in April 2025 provided the first opening for de-escalation. The Trump administration signalled a willingness to step back from the brink, and Chinese officials responded by initiating informal consultations. On 12 May, the US and China issued a joint statement announcing their agreement to reduce the additional tariffs imposed on each other by 115 percent, with the reductions taking effect two days later.[28],[29] According to the statement, the US, which had raised tariffs on Chinese goods to 145 percent, agreed to lower them to 30 percent. China, in turn, reduced its tariffs from 125 percent to 10 percent, resulting in mutual de-escalation (See Figure 8). Of the 34 percent in reciprocal tariffs that the US had announced on 2 April, 24 percent was suspended for 90 days, leaving only a uniform 10 percent in place. Combined with an additional 20 percent tariff implemented between February and March 2025 as part of anti-illegal drug measures, the effective US tariff rate on Chinese imports now stands at 30 percent. Similarly, China suspended 24 percent of its retaliatory tariffs for 90 days, maintaining only a 10 percent tariff.[30] On 11 August 2025, the US government announced that the suspension period for these tariffs would be extended by an additional 90 days, continuing the de-escalation efforts.[31]
Figure 8: US-China Tariff Rates as of August 2025
| Country | Pre-Talk Tariffs | Post-Agreement Tariffs |
| The US | 145 percent on Chinese goods, including a 10 percent baseline tariff, a 20 percent tariff imposed as a part of anti-illegal drug measures | 30 percent effective tariff |
| China | 125 percent on US goods | 10 percent effective tariff |
Source: Author’s own
Initially, domestic political gains from showing toughness and the hope of extracting concessions made Defect (tariff increases) the dominant strategy for both. Over time, however, repeated retaliation drastically altered the payoffs. By spring 2025, the (Defect, Defect) outcome had shifted from a minor loss to a severe hit due to concerns about widespread economic contraction.[32]
The situational pressure pushed both sides toward a cooperative move. However, the 12 May agreement lacked a pre-play commitment mechanism. There were no conditional side payments or binding preconditions ensuring that cooperation would remain the rational choice in future rounds. The deal was a temporary 90-day suspension of part of the tariffs, not a permanent settlement. While a future escalation prevention mechanism was mentioned, it lacked detail and legal enforceability.
In game theory terms, the US and China temporarily reached the (Cooperate, Cooperate) outcome, but the shift was driven purely by the immediate pain of mutual losses rather than a redesigning of the underlying incentive structure. Without enough front-loaded incentives or enforceable penalties for defection, such as those seen in the US-UK case, to defect remains tempting if political or economic conditions change.[2]
Consequently, the cooperative equilibrium is fragile and reversible. This rapid rapprochement may signal mutual understanding, but without enough commitments, the risk of a renewed tariff war remains high.
The US had already started to grow frustrated with the system even before the Trump administration took office. This frustration came from the rapid rise of emerging economies, especially China, which weakened America’s ability to control global trade rules and dominate trade governance.[33]
What is important to note is that the bilateral trade negotiations conducted under Trump 2.0 reveal that economic coercion does not always undermine cooperation. Under the right structural conditions, it can precipitate. Small-N and pre-play commitment help explain why some bilateral negotiations produced stable agreements. Structural realism assumes that in an anarchic system, states must prioritise self-help and the maximisation of national interest. This baseline condition creates a political environment in which cooperation is possible only when it aligns with the strategic calculations of the parties involved.
The US-UK EPD illustrates how meeting both conditions can transform a coercive standoff into a mutually beneficial agreement. The bilateral format satisfied small-N by allowing both sides to observe and verify each other’s commitments in real time. Both sides’ decision to commit to the counterpart before the deal’s conclusion fulfilled the pre-play commitment. This restructured the game in a way that made cooperation the rational choice from the outset, reducing uncertainty and eliminating incentives to defect.
The ongoing US-China tariff talks present a clear contrast. The absence of pre-play commitment has left the negotiations without a stabilising anchor. Tariff reductions in May 2025, which lowered the US effective rate from 145 percent to 30 percent and China’s from 125 percent to 10 percent, were reactive measures prompted by mutual economic strain rather than pre-play commitments embedded in a negotiation process. Without an upfront restructuring of incentives, the cooperation equilibrium remains fragile, vulnerable to reversal under domestic political pressure or shifts in strategic calculation.
Taken together, these cases suggest that bilateralism, as practised under the second Trump administration, should not be understood as the abandonment of rules but as a realist adaptation of institutional design. When both small-N and pre-play commitment are satisfied, coercion can be converted into a stable cooperative arrangement. When one is missing or not enough, outcomes tend to be partial and unstable, as the US-China talks demonstrate.
These commitments can take the form of trade and investment packages or concessions in critical sectors. By designing agreements to meet both conditions, negotiators can ensure that cooperation is not only achieved but sustained, even in the competitive and coercive context of structural realism.
Shu Fukuya is Research Analyst and Deputy Director in the Strategic Research Department, Division 2 at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[1] In game theory, commitment refers to a mechanism by which a player credibly signals their intentions by altering their strategy or payoff structure. This is not limited to monetary payments. It encompasses any form of binding promise or pre-arranged mechanism.
[2] In Varian’s experiment, the introduction of a commitment mechanism led to a dramatic increase in the cooperation rate. While cooperative behaviour in a classical PD remained at around 20 percent, the average cooperation rate after applying the mechanism rose to approximately 50 percent. Not all players ultimately chose to cooperate, and Varian acknowledged that the mechanism was partially successful but not perfect.
[1] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79.
[2] Daniel W. Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011): 96–108.
[3] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979).
[4] Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
[5] William J. Norris, “China’s Post-Cold War Economic Statecraft: A Periodization,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 50, no. 1 (2021): 7–29.
[6] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Chained to Globalization: Why It’s Too Late to Decouple,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 1 (2020): 70–80.
[7] Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
[8] Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
[9] Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Third Edition (Harvard University Press, 1971).
[10] James Andreoni and Hal Varian, “Preplay Contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96, no. 19 (1999): 10933–38.
[11] Andreoni and Varian, “Preplay Contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.”
[12] Andrew Ross, “Trump Praises Starmer’s ‘Hard’ Lobbying As He Again Suggests UK Will Be Exempt from US Tariffs – As It Happened,” The Guardian, February 28, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2025/feb/27/keir-starmer-donald-trump-white-house-ukraine-uk-politics-live-news?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[13] The White House, “Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits,” The White House, April 2, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/.
[14] The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-UK Reach Historic Trade Deal,” The White House, May 8, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/05/fact-sheet-u-s-uk-reach-historic-trade-deal/
[15] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “Today is an incredible day for America as we deliver our first Fair, Open, and Reciprocal Trade Deal — Something our past Presidents never cared about. Together with our strong Ally, the United Kingdom, we have reached the first, historic Trade Deal since Liberation Day. As part of this Deal, America will raise $6 BILLION DOLLARS in External Revenue from 10% Tariffs, $5 BILLION DOLLARS in new Export Opportunities for our Great Ranchers, Farmers, and Producers, and enhance the National Security of both the U.S. and the UK through the creation of an Aluminum and Steel Trading Zone, and a secure Pharmaceutical Supply Chain. This Deal shows that if you respect America, and bring serious proposals to the table, America is OPEN FOR tBUSINESS. Many more to come — STAY TUNED!,” Truth Social, May 8, 2025, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114472802068018414.
[16] Ruxandra Iordache Kiderlin Sophie, “Trump Signals US and UK Could Reach ‘Real Trade Deal’ without Tariffs,” CNBC, February 28, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/28/trump-signals-us-uk-could-reach-real-trade-deal-without-tariffs.html.
[17]“UK Business Minister Reynolds to Visit Washington for Trade Talks,” Reuters, March 18, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-business-minister-reynolds-visit-washington-trade-talks-2025-03-17/.
[18] The White House, “Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call with Prime Minister Starmer of the United Kingdom,” The White House, April 18, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/04/readout-of-president-donald-j-trumps-call-with-prime-minister-starmer-of-the-united-kingdom-9426/.
[19] “UK’s Reeves Talks Trade with US’s Bessent after Stressing EU Ties,” Reuters, April 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uks-reeves-says-she-met-uss-bessent-discuss-trade-deal-2025-04-25/.
[20] The White House, “Fact Sheet,” May 8, 2025.
[21] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), "United Kingdom Trade Deal," Truth Social, May 9, 2025, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114472814702179777.
[22] Sawako Yasuda, “President Trump’s Remarks and Actions (May 1–May 8): First Trade Agreement Concluded Under the Trump Administration, One Month After the Announcement of Reciprocal Tariffs,” Foresight, May 9, 2025, https://www.fsight.jp/articles/-/51365.
[23] Government of United Kingdom, “Landmark Economic Deal with United States Saves Thousands of Jobs for British Car Makers and Steel Industry,” GOV.UK, May 8, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/landmark-economic-deal-with-united-states-saves-thousands-of-jobs-for-british-car-makers-and-steel-industry.
[24] The White House, “Fact Sheet,” May 8, 2025.
[25] Government of United Kingdom, “Landmark Economic Deal with United States Saves Thousands of Jobs for British Car Makers and Steel Industry,” Government of United Kingdom.
[26] Yasuda, “President Trump’s Remarks and Actions (May 1–May 8): First Trade Agreement Concluded under the Trump Administration, One Month after the Announcement of Reciprocal Tariffs,”
[27] Jhanvi Tripathi, “Tariffs, Deficits, and Trade Deals: The Trump Economy,” Observer Research Foundation, April 17, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/tariffs-deficits-and-trade-deals-the-trump-economy.
[28] The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures a Historic Trade Win for the United States,” The White House, May 12, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-a-historic-trade-win-for-the-united-states/.
[29] The White House, “Joint Statement on US-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva,” The White House, May 12, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/05/joint-statement-on-u-s-china-economic-and-trade-meeting-in-geneva/.
[30] Daisuke Wakabayashi, Amy Chang Chien, and Alan Rappeport, “US and China Agree to Temporarily Slash Tariffs in Bid to Defuse Trade War,” The New York Times, May 12, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/business/china-us-tariffs.html.
[31] The White House, “Further Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Reflect Ongoing Discussions with the People’s Republic of China,” The White House, August 11, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/further-modifying-reciprocal-tariff-rates-to-reflect-ongoing-discussions-with-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
[32] Marta Bengoa, “Trump’s Complex Tariff Deals Will Tax American Consumers,” ORF America, August 1, 2025, https://orfamerica.org/orf-america-comments/trump-tariffs-domestic-and-global-impact.
[33] Kristen Hopewell, “Trump & Trade: The Crisis in the Multilateral Trading System,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (2021).
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Shu Fukuya is Research Analyst and Deputy Director in the Strategic Research Department, Division 2 at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. ...
Read More +
PREV
