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SK Gadeock, “Strategy and Culture: India’s Continued Relevance in a Complex Multipolar World,” ORF Issue Brief No. 844, Observer Research Foundation, November 2025.
Indian civilisation is among the world’s oldest and most diverse, shaped over millennia by influences such as the Indus Valley civilisation, Vedic tradition, the Mauryan and Gupta empires, Islamic rule, and British colonialism. Known for its rich traditions in art, music, dance, cuisine, and spirituality, India is home to an array of languages, religions, and ethnic groups, all of them contributing to the nation’s dynamic cultural landscape. India has produced strategic thinkers like Chanakya and Thiruvalluvar, whose lessons on statecraft, diplomacy, economics, and warfare remain relevant in the contemporary world. In the post-Independence era, India’s strategic culture has emphasised non-alignment, diplomacy, and peaceful co-existence. Indeed, the country has a long history of successfully managing external threats and has developed a strategic doctrine focused on defence, deterrence, dissuasion, and dialogue. These principles are reflected in key events: the loss of Gilgit to Pakistan in 1947, China’s annexation of Aksai Chin in the 1950s, the decision not to utilise the Indian Air Force (IAF) during the 1962 war, the underutilisation of leverage from 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) in 1971, retraint during the Kargil conflict (1999), and the ongoing challenges in Jammu and Kashmir.[1],[2]
When analysed through a strategic lens, the situation imposes high costs without an enduring resolution. India’s policy with its immediate neighbours, China and Pakistan, has remained cautious. Internal security challenges—such as Naxalism and insurgency in the Northeastern states of Manipur and Nagaland—remain unresolved. India’s nuclear weapons programme, developed in response to security concerns, is a key component of its strategic posture focused on defence and deterrence.[3]
In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in revisiting India’s ancient strategic culture. Engaging with these texts requires a nuanced, scholarly approach rooted in an Indian perspective, free from external biases. This involves analysing the factors shaping the country’s strategic environment through indigenous frameworks and formulating balanced, long-term plans. Such a vision must transcend political affiliations, ensuring continuity and national ownership regardless of the government in power. A critical question, therefore, is whether ancient Indian texts offer insights relevant to today’s challenges—and, if so, how this wisdom can be effectively applied.
At its core, strategy[a] aligns military operations with political objectives. At a higher level, ‘grand strategy’ encompasses the coordination of all state policies, including economic and diplomatic tools of statecraft, to pursue national or coalitional long-term goals and their corresponding ends.[4]
Strategic culture has traditionally been viewed through the lens of military strategy, defence planning, and the use of force. However, it is often argued that economic and diplomatic dimensions are integral to a nation’s security policy.[5] This broader conceptualisation reflects a shift toward recognising security as a multifaceted construct that extends beyond military capabilities.
Typically, the scholarship about India’s strategic culture leans towards a generalist and monolithic interpretation, treating it as a singular entity. This approach, however, overlooks the potential richness offered by a more pluralistic perspective—one that acknowledges the existence of multiple, sometimes competing, strategic subcultures within India. Such subcultures—shaped by regional, political, institutional, and ideological variations—can offer a more nuanced understanding of how strategic thinking evolves in a complex polity like India. Clausewitz’s most cited assertion is that “war is a continuation of politics by other means.”[6] Yet his view of war is more radical than a superficial reading of his dictum might suggest. If war is not a “mere act of policy” but “a true political instrument,” political contemplations may pervade all of war.[7]
If strategy is understood as the use of military means to achieve political ends, its scope expands across many fields. In The Art of War,[8] traditionally attributed to Sun Tzu (5th century BCE) but also thought to have been likely composed during China's Warring States period (475–221 BCE), presents war as an instrument for achieving significant objectives.[9] It emphasises targeting intangible elements—such as an opponent's strategy—over direct confrontation.[10] While this aligns with some of Clausewitz’s ideas, The Art of War diverges in key respects. Unlike Clausewitz’s On War (1832),[11] which emphasises the distinction between high command and lower-level military leadership, The Art of War places greater faith in the intelligence and adaptability of a skilled general.[12] It urges commanders to prioritise strategic outcomes over strict adherence to a ruler’s commands. Clausewitz views battle as the central mechanism of war, often involving substantial loss of life; in contrast, The Art of War champions avoiding direct conflict whenever possible, viewing unnecessary casualties as evidence of poor leadership. As the text asserts, “The expert in using the military subdues the enemy’s forces without going to battle.”[13]
The 16th and 17th centuries marked the evolution of strategy into its modern form, driven by the rise of centralised states and the refinement of military technologies. Charles Tilly’s observation, “War makes the state, and the state makes war,” encapsulates this transformation.[14] Bureaucratic institutions and professionalised armies brought greater efficiency to warfare. Gunpowder and geometric fortifications reshaped military balance, with fortified cities becoming critical strategic assets. Influenced by engineering and science, strategy became a disciplined practice of planning and execution. Road construction and improved cartography enhanced military mobility and predictability. The period also revived classical strategic thought—drill masters studied Roman tactics, and strategists emphasised the integration of policy and warfare. Military leaders like Guibert anticipated larger changes, advocating for intellectual rigour in strategic planning.[15]
The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars marked a turning point in strategy. Revolutionary zeal, mass conscription, and centralised authority transformed warfare. On War highlighted the interplay between government, military leadership, and the people, emphasising strategy as a balance between rational planning and the chaos of war.[16] Mass mobilisation during the Napoleonic era made moderation in peacemaking difficult and conscripted armies challenging to manage. The telegraph and journalism added complexity, accelerating communication and exposing decisions to public scrutiny. Technological advancements like breech-loading rifles, advanced artillery, and early machine guns reshaped land warfare. At sea, steam power and ironclad ships revolutionised the naval strategy. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s analysis underscored the strategic projection of sea power, arguing that naval dominance could decisively shape global power dynamics.[17]
The First World War exposed the challenges of modern strategy. Technological advances outpaced organisational capabilities, resulting in attritional warfare characterised by massive casualties. Peripheral campaigns like Gallipoli showcased the difficulties of manoeuvring in a technologically advanced battlefield.[18] Ultimately, the war’s outcome was dictated by exhaustion and collapse rather than strategic brilliance. Postwar thinking focused on refining the art of war. Advances in weaponry, such as tanks and aircraft, pointed toward future breakthroughs. Advocates like J.F.C. Fuller and Charles de Gaulle proposed mechanised warfare, though their ideas often faced resistance from traditionalists.
The Second World War demonstrated the culmination of modern strategic trends. Mass mobilisation, scientific advancements, and coordinated strategies defined the conflict. Armoured divisions restored battlefield mobility, enabling rapid campaigns like Germany’s Blitzkrieg in France. Naval strategy, exemplified by aircraft carriers, and air power—including strategic bombing—highlighted the integration of technology and tactics. The Allied invasion of Normandy (1944), led by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, combined deception, logistics, and military precision to deliver a decisive blow to Nazi Germany.[19] The war underscored the growing complexity of strategy, with society and technology fully mobilised for total war.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the dawn of nuclear strategy, intertwining military power with the avoidance of direct war. A year later, in 1946, Bernard Brodie, a pioneer in nuclear strategy, observed, “The chief purpose of our military establishment must now be to avoid wars.”[20] Nuclear weapons created a stark division between nuclear and non-nuclear states, raising questions about deployment, delivery, and deterrence. Early doctrines like Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) aimed to maintain stability by ensuring that no nuclear conflict could be won without catastrophic consequences.
The complexities of nuclear deterrence raise critical questions: What actions can be deterred, and how effective is deterrence across different cultural or geopolitical contexts? While nuclear weapons arguably prevented direct US-Soviet conflict during the Cold War, they failed to deter conventional wars like the Falklands War or the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Similarly, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has not deterred India from responding to terrorism, as seen in the Balakot strikes—challenging assumptions about nuclear thresholds.
Today, the greatest modern threat lies in terrorism, spanning physical, cyber, religious, and technological domains. Non-state actors, often covertly supported by states, aim to bypass conventional warfare objectives. Terrorism frequently turns on its sponsors, as seen in Afghanistan and ongoing unrest in regions like Jammu and Kashmir. Motivations vary from Islamist ideologies to separatist movements in Northeast India, with persistence due to time, population support, and state sponsorship.[21] Technological advancements have revolutionised warfare. The First Gulf War showcased joint, network-centric operations, leveraging stealth, precision munitions, and satellite-based coordination. Conversely, the Second Gulf War highlighted the challenges of insurgency and prolonged conflict despite an initial “shock and awe” campaign. Recent conflicts, like the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, underscore the rise of drone warfare, which has challenged traditional weaponry like tanks. The Russia-Ukraine war has further demonstrated the cost-effectiveness and adaptability of drones in modern combat, the emergence of hypersonic missiles, and Russia’s implicit nuclear threats—particularly in response to NATO’s supply of advanced weapons and potential troop involvement. Thus, strategy today is both a discipline and a practical art, deeply influenced by culture and innovation. A modern strategist must integrate economic, technological, and military expertise while understanding the terrain, the enemy, and alliances. Adaptability and innovation remain essential to shaping strategic culture.
The debate on strategic culture,[b] which began nearly four decades ago, introduced a new framework for analysing the strategic choices available to decision-makers in politics and foreign policy. Historically, culture was either dismissed or treated as a last resort to explain state behaviour in international politics. However, its relevance has gained renewed attention in light of recent international events, such as the conflicts in Ukraine, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and the Israel-Hamas conflict. This perspective also sheds light on the evolving security strategies of many nations. Strategic culture provides an analytical lens to understand the continuities underlying international crises and a state’s historical tendency to preserve its perceived spheres of influence. It integrates cultural thought and historical memory, shaping national security policies and international relations.
Booth (1979) reintroduced ethnocentrism into the study of strategic culture, asserting that societies perceive the world through a group-centred lens, judging others within their own cultural framework.[22] This bias shapes how nations define their strategic culture, influencing their attitudes toward threats and conflict resolution.[23] Gray (1991) defined strategic culture as the persistent, socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, and traditions of a geographically based security community shaped by its historical experiences.[24] Similarly, Longhurst (2004) described it as a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, formed over time through unique historical processes.[25] While strategic culture is enduring, it is not static; it evolves at critical junctures in a state's history. It influences decision-making by framing or constraining choices about when and how to use force and can lead to misperceptions of threats both internally and externally.[26] These cultural underpinnings are crucial in understanding state behaviour in security and military contexts.
Johnston (1995) offered a comprehensive concept of strategic culture with four key features. First, it must be distinguishable from non-strategic cultural variables.[27] While frameworks like Geert Hofstede's six cultural dimensions explain general cultural traits, they differ from the factors shaping strategic behaviour. Second, strategic culture provides decision-makers with a ranked set of strategic preferences, enabling analysts to predict state behaviour. These preferences remain consistent over time and across varying circumstances, even when non-cultural factors (e.g., technological advancements or threat levels) change. Third, strategic culture must manifest in tangible objects, such as speeches, policy documents, or other expressions of state priorities. Fourth, its evolution and transmission must be traceable, reflecting historical milestones and formative influences. Strategic culture integrates historical experience, cultural thought, and normative values to shape a state's security policies and international behaviour. While it is not immune to change, it provides a durable framework for understanding how nations use force and navigate complex global challenges.
Every state enters the international arena carrying its own historical experiences, cultural influences, beliefs, geographic realities, and material limitations—all of which shape its conduct. Strategic culture reflects a nation’s self-perception of its culture and history, often playing a critical role in state-building narratives. Countries such as Israel, China, the United States, Türkiye, Japan, and India exhibit strong historical motivators that influence their strategic behaviour.
Israel: Israel’s strategic culture is deeply rooted in its history and identity. It embodies a “no choice war” doctrine, where wars are perceived as necessary for survival rather than optional.[28] This ethos was evident in missions like Operation Thunderbolt (1976), a 2,500-mile rescue operation, and retaliatory actions following the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. Prime Minister Golda Meir’s authorisation of Mossad to target members of the Black September group demonstrated this mindset.[29] The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) plays a central role in shaping strategic culture, with military service unifying Israel’s diverse immigrant population. The country’s military-industrial complex reinforces its self-image as a “nation in arms”, committed to maintaining regional superiority.
China: China’s strategic culture is rooted in endurance, historical humiliation, and a commitment to national unification. The “century of humiliation” inflicted by Western powers and Japan remains a cornerstone of Chinese historical memory, influencing its security doctrines. Chinese strategic thought draws heavily from Sun Tzu and Confucian philosophy, emphasising patience, indirect approaches, and long-term planning. Leaders such as President Hu Jintao have integrated historical and philosophical elements into modern diplomacy.[30] While interpretations vary, the core of China’s strategic culture blends historical experience with cultural tradition to promote national resilience and unity.
United States: The United States exhibits one of the most consistent strategic cultures. Rooted in the Monroe Doctrine (1823), US foreign policy historically sought to separate itself from Europe’s geopolitical rivalries while asserting dominance in the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine laid the foundation for an isolationist approach that persisted for a century. American strategic culture is shaped by a sense of exceptionalism, grounded in middle-class liberal values and the absence of European-style social hierarchies. This ethos guided US conduct during the Cold War and was reaffirmed during the Clinton and Bush administrations. US foreign interventions are often framed through moral and legal principles, though its pragmatic approach to international law sometimes includes bypassing traditional norms.
A 2017 study by the American Foreign Service Association emphasised the importance of understanding host nations’ strategic cultures in diplomacy—seeking to address risk-averse mindsets and improve policy implementation.[31] Strategic culture, shaped by history, geography, and values, continues to define how states respond to international challenges. Whether through Israel’s focus on survival, China’s emphasis on resilience, or the US’s exceptionalist worldview, strategic culture remains a critical lens for understanding global state behaviour.
In this era of globalisation, states are increasingly interconnected and interdependent, making concepts like ‘national interest’, ‘power’, and ‘risk’ transcend national boundaries. Economic and security interests now hinge on international and transnational cooperation, requiring states to reconcile historical narratives with contemporary realities. Pragmatism must find a place within competitive frameworks, exemplified by evolving US-China relations.
At present, the five dimensions of global security—national, transnational, human, environmental, and transcultural—have become critically important. Despite ideological incompatibilities, mistrust, and historical divisions, states increasingly recognise that competition must be approached through a framework of symbiotic realism. This model reflects the complexities of the international system, where interconnected actors operate across subnational, transnational, and transcultural levels, often challenging traditional state authority.[32] Pakistan exemplifies how strategic culture is shaped by these dynamics. Strategic culture is neither static nor fixed to a singular narrative. It is dynamic and evolves over time, shaped by parallel national debates and shifting interpretations of a country’s history and global role. These shifts often reflect generational reassessments and adjustments.[33]
Japan: Benedict’s observation in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) that Japan’s motto is “Everything in its place” aptly captured its pre-Second World War worldview.[34] At that time, Japan viewed international relations through a classical realist lens, seeing the world as anarchic. Rooted in a hierarchical societal structure, Japan sought to establish itself as the “elder brother” of East Asia, aspiring to unify and liberate the region from Western influence. This vision, however, disregarded the agency and perspectives of other nations, as evidenced by Japan’s actions during the war. On the same day as the Pearl Harbor attack on 7 December 1941, Japan’s envoy delivered a statement to the US Secretary of State asserting that its policy aimed to help each nation find its “proper place”. This philosophy was tied to ‘State Shinto’, which elevated the emperor as a symbol of unity and superiority. State Shinto became central to education and national identity but was banned by American occupiers after the war. In recent years, efforts have emerged to revive elements of State Shinto within Japanese society.
Following the war, then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru established a doctrine prioritising economic production over military engagement, with Japan aligning its security and international political stance with that of the United States. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) remained constrained in both technology and resources. However, this dependency on the US has been increasingly questioned by Japan’s conservative elite, prompting a gradual shift in strategic culture.[35] In recent decades, Japan has moved away from post-war pacifism toward what former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe termed “proactive pacifism.”[c],[36] While Japan has primarily taken defensive military actions, these have become more assertive and, at times, provocative, reflecting a reinterpretation of its Constitution.
Several factors have driven this evolution. First, rising tensions with China and North Korea have heightened Japan’s security concerns. Second, Japan seeks a more prominent international role and greater autonomy in defence, even while maintaining its US alliance. Third, religious groups and conservative politicians have gained influence, advocating a stronger military stance. Fourth, Japan’s commitment to securing global trade routes has bolstered its strategic initiatives. Fifth, Japan’s historical pacifist identity has evolved to accommodate a more proactive defence strategy. Presently, Japan’s strategic culture balances historical pacifism with contemporary security imperatives, reflecting a pragmatic and increasingly assertive approach to defence and international engagement.[37]
India’s strategic culture is a dynamic mosaic, deeply rooted in its millennia-old traditions while evolving through historical encounters and modern challenges. Unlike many nation-states, it retains continuity with pre-modern Indian state systems, drawing from Vedic civilisation. This cultural foundation, reinforced by Hindu values, has endured external influences—from Mughal rule to European colonisation and the British imposition of modern political structures. India’s assimilative culture integrated elements of modernity during the nationalist movement, shaping its post-1947 strategic outlook.[38]
India’s maritime strategic culture is shaped by its historical legacy and contemporary geopolitical realities. Historically a prominent maritime power with extensive Indian Ocean trade networks, India’s naval presence declined due to continental priorities. With growing economic and security interests, India has reoriented its maritime focus. The doctrine emphasises securing the coastline, protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and ensuring regional stability in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Under the SAGAR vision, it promotes naval modernisation, maritime domain awareness, and strategic partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.
The principle of “knowledge as power” has shaped India's approach to nuclear technology and economic strategy. India’s nuclear policy reflects its historical, cultural, and philosophical traditions, symbolised by the dual nature of nuclear energy—creation and destruction—akin to Brahma and Shiva.[39] Early nuclear efforts prioritised peaceful uses, aligning with India’s moral stance and its aspiration to lead global disarmament.
However, strategic ambiguity became central after China’s nuclear test in 1964, as India sought to maintain autonomy. This was evident in its refusal to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and the 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion”, signalling India’s entry into nuclear deterrence without overt declarations.[40] The 1998 nuclear tests solidified India’s status as a nuclear power, further underscoring its strategic culture of resilience and autonomy.
India’s strategic culture also influenced its economic policies. Early centralised, socialist-oriented strategies emphasised self-reliance and scepticism of capitalism but resulted in stagnation—the so-called “Hindu rate of growth”.[41] The 1991 financial crisis catalysed economic liberalisation, enabling India to leverage global technological advancements, particularly in IT. This pragmatic shift aligned with India’s cultural emphasis on intellectual achievement, reinforcing its global stature. Sanctions and embargoes have frequently tested India’s strategic autonomy. Notable instances include:
These measures disrupt supply chains, slow economic growth, and strain diplomatic relations. Sanctions also highlight strategic vulnerabilities in India's reliance on foreign technologies, exposing it to security risks. To counter these challenges, India must pursue a proactive, multilateral diplomatic approach while strengthening its strategic autonomy. Diversifying partnerships, building resilience, and embracing sustainable, growth-oriented policies are crucial to safeguarding sovereignty, fostering global leadership, and ensuring long-term prosperity. Balancing its deep-rooted cultural identity with the demands of globalisation will remain central to India’s strategic evolution.
The challenge becomes more difficult as India’s security challenges—as they are for the world—extend beyond military threats to encompass a wide range of non-traditional security threats, including cybersecurity, climate change, pandemics, and transnational crime. Cyber threats, such as hacking and data breaches, pose risks to India's national security, economic stability, and social cohesion. The cyber-attack on the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant highlights the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, underscoring the need for robust cybersecurity measures.[42]
The impacts of climate change, including extreme weather events and environmental degradation, threaten food security, water resources, and public health. The Chennai water crisis and the degradation of the Sundarbans mangrove forest illustrate the urgency of addressing climate change as a security imperative. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed severe strains on India's public health infrastructure and socio-economic stability,[43] reinforcing the need for strong preparedness, response, and resilience strategies. Cross-border crime, including drug and human trafficking, undermines state authority and fuels violence.
The 2008 Mumbai attacks demonstrated the persistent threats of cross-border terrorism. Food insecurity and price volatility, worsened by climate change and market fluctuations, pose threats to social cohesion and economic stability. Incidents like the food riots of 2007-2008 highlight the vulnerability of populations to food shortages and the social unrest they can cause.
Addressing these non-traditional security threats requires a holistic approach that integrates environmental sustainability, social equity, and economic resilience into India's national security strategies. By adopting proactive policies, India can enhance its security and stability in an increasingly complex and uncertain world environment. The symbolic ideology, epitomised by the philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (“the world is one family”), often overshadows the operational ideology needed to realise India's national vision fully.
A number of issues hinder the realisation of a unified strategic approach in India:
Unlike China’s timeline-driven strategy, India's foreign policy has been criticised for lacking long-term planning and rigorous research. The national vision aspires to regional and global leadership, but implementation has not always aligned with these ambitions.
The ‘Operation Sindoor’ in May marked a shift in India’s strategic culture—from a traditionally reactive posture to one that is more assertive, anticipatory, and values-driven. Conducted in a volatile West Asian environment, the non-combatant evacuation operation showcased India’s ability to act decisively while upholding its civilisational ethos. The mission safeguarded Indian nationals and extended humanitarian aid to foreign citizens, demonstrating a calibrated blend of moral responsibility, military readiness, and rapid decision-making.
Strategically, Operation Sindoor highlighted India’s growing comfort with deploying military assets across regions aligned with its geopolitical goals—particularly in West Asia, home to critical diaspora as well as energy security and diplomatic stakes. By harmonising compassion with realpolitik, India illustrated that humanitarianism, deterrence, and prestige can coexist. The operation reflects a maturing doctrinal shift where military power is used not only to deter and defend, but also to reassure, rescue, and reinforce India’s global identity as a civilisational state with strategic clarity and capability.
India’s pluralistic yet fragmented society is anchored by a strong democracy, which enables peaceful leadership transitions through a robust legal framework. This empowers citizens with a sense of ownership over governance and supports progressive outcomes. Its culture, being deeply rooted in a proud heritage and evolved traditions, serves as the foundation for balanced, growth-oriented strategies aligned with national interests.
As India aspires to become a developed power by 2047, it is imperative to leverage its strategic culture not only as a historical resource but also as a practical guide for navigating contemporary global intricacies. India's strategic culture has historically emphasised intellectual rigour, long-term vision, and the integration of diverse influences into a cohesive framework. From its ancient treatises like the Arthashastra under Kautilya to modern policy formulations, India has demonstrated a unique ability to adapt traditional wisdom to contemporary challenges. This adaptability is crucial as the country confronts evolving geopolitical scenarios, such as the rise of multipolarity, the resurgence of great-power competition, the increasing importance of technology, and economic resilience in global power dynamics.
As India strives for developed-economy status, it must focus on key areas: technological self-reliance, enhanced defence capabilities, sustainable development, and strategic alliances. A dedicated centre for strategic culture could enable the country to align these efforts with its core values and long-term goals. It would also provide a forum for addressing ethical dilemmas, such as balancing national interests with global responsibilities, thereby ensuring that India emerges not just as a powerful nation but also as a responsible global actor.
In conclusion, an institutionalised approach to studying and leveraging strategic culture is vital for achieving the nation's 2047 vision. The concept of Atmanirbharta is central to this vision, rooted in self-reliance and economic independence. It is primarily a driving force behind India’s quest for strategic autonomy, having influence on the national policies with an inexorable quest for self-sufficiency, which is paramount to grasping India’s current and future trajectory in the realm of international affairs.
Lt Gen (Dr) S.K. Gadeock, AVSM (Retd), holds a doctorate in Defence and Strategic Studies from the University of Madras. He is author of From War to Peace: Wisdom and Leadership – Ex-Serviceman’s Role in Good Governance and Rural Development (Pentagon Press, 2023).
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] The term ‘strategy’ stems from the Greek word strategos, or “an elected general”. It was chiefly associated with military leaders bestowed with collective political and military authority. As strategy is the relationship between means and ends, the term has applications beyond war. Though it is in the field of armed conflict that strategy assumes its most complex forms. See: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/MR-75th-Anniversary/75th-Lykke/
[b] Defined as a distinctive vision of security and military priorities, ‘strategic culture’ embodies a state’s traditions, values, attitudes, symbols, and behaviour regarding the use or threat of force.
[c] ‘Proactive pacifism’ refers to a foreign and security policy approach in which a nation takes an active role in promoting and sustaining international peace, rather than merely avoiding war. The strategy highlights preventive and responsive measures to address potential threats to global stability.
[d] The Chola dynasty of Tamil Nadu and the reign of Barpukhan and Rudra Singha in Assam provide historical examples of India's strategic vision and capabilities, which were more expansive and assertive in nature. The Chola dynasty is noted for its strategic seaward vision and military conquests, which extended its influence over the Indian Ocean Region and Southeast Asia, demonstrating a historical precedent for strategic assertiveness. See: https://doi.org/10.18843/RWJASC/V11I1/06. Barpukhan and Rudra Singha of Assam exemplified regional power and strategic acumen, contributing to the rich tapestry of India's historical strategic culture. See: https://esciencepress.net/journals/index.php/JSAS/article/download/1324/717. This pattern of responding with restraint and seeking reconciliation has been evident throughout history, from pardoning invaders to opportunities for strategic advantage in the 1971 and Kargil conflicts that were approached with caution and moderation.
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[2] Kanti Bajpai, “Pakistan and China in Indian Strategic Thought,” International Journal 62, no. 4 (2007): 805–824, https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200706200406.
[3] Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Force Structure 2025,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/indias-nuclear-force-structure-2025?lang=en.
[4] Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Force Structure 2025.”
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[7] Hughes and Koutsoukis, “Clausewitz First, and Last, and Always: War, Strategy and Intelligence in the Twenty-first Century.”
[8] Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Allandale Publishing, 1910).
[9] Lionel Giles, trans., The Art of War, by Sun Tzu (Britain: Allendale Publishing House, 2019), https://www.utoledo.edu/rotc/pdfs/the_art_of_war.pdf.
[10] Giles, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu
[11] Carl von Clauzwitz, On War (Britain: Princeton University Press, Reprinted 1989).
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[15] HMK Wolters et al., “Insights to Assess, Develop, and Retain Army Strategic Thinkers,”
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[16] Amber Brittain-Hale, “Clausewitzian Theory of War in the Age of Cognitive Warfare,” The Defence Horizon Journal (2023), https://tdhj.org/blog/post/clausewitz-cognitive-warfare/.
[17] “Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History: Securing International Markets in the 1890s,” Office of the Historian, (N.D.), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/mahan.
[18] Raymond Adams, “The Gallipoli Campaign: Learning from a Mismatch of Strategic Ends and Means,” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (2015), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/621138/the-gallipoli-campaign-learning-from-a-mismatch-of-strategic-ends-and-means/.
[19] “World War II: D-Day, The Invasion of Normandy,” Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, (N.D.), https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/world-war-ii-d-day-invasion-normandy.
[20] Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2, no. 4 (1978): 65–83, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538458.
[21] Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast,” in Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast (N.D), https://dkiapcss.edu/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach10.pdf.
[22] Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (U.K.: Routledge Revivals, 1979). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315769738.
[23] Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism
[24] Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 49–69, https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/14965922.pdf.
[25] Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 339–359, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26298963.
[26] Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no.4 (1995): 32–64, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119.
[27] Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture.”
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Lt Gen (Dr) S.K. Gadeock, AVSM (Retd), holds a doctorate in Defence and Strategic Studies from the University of Madras. He is author of From ...
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