Introduction

There is no single definition of the term ‘Eurasia’. The first and least contentious interpretation is that of ‘Eurasia’ as a geographical term, referring to the Eurasian landmass. However, the geographical contours of Eurasia as a supercontinent or a combination of the continents of Europe and Asia align neither with geopolitical concepts nor with the economic and integration initiatives advanced by different countries. Consequently, the obvious interconnections between Europe and Asia are often obscured by geopolitical divergences or the ideologisation of the Eurasian space.^[1]

The second concept is that of “Eurasianism”, a largely Russia-centric ideology that asserts a distinction between a “unique Eurasian identity” and “Western civilisation”. The Soviet Union’s eventual dissolution led to the emergence of the concept of a “post-Soviet Eurasia”. The homogeneity of this space is questionable, particularly given growing tensions in Russia’s relations with the independent states in its neighbourhood. Yet in academic studies, the post-Soviet space is often synonymous with Eurasia due to the intensive economic and cultural links between the states.^[2] This seems to be the case in American universities, for example, where programmes often cover the vast space from Central Europe to Central Asia under the name of ‘Russian, Eurasian and East European Studies’.^a Similarly, several branches of American executive power group ‘Europe’ and ‘Eurasia’ together in their organisational structure—for example, the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State. Although Central Asia is part of another bureau, countries of the region are also included in the remit of the Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, as part of  the “17 states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.”^[3]

Recognising the vast geographic scope of Eurasia and the varying interpretations of the regional space, the paper focuses on American approaches to Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus.

The Transatlantic Alliance

For over seven decades, the transatlantic alliance, which emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, served as a bulwark of the rules-based liberal international order and the West’s collective security and prosperity. However, this partnership, which is rooted in the rule of law, democracy and interdependence, is currently at its breaking point. While the disruptive and reckless style of Trump’s second presidency has caused anxieties across the globe, nowhere are its repercussions more pronounced than in Europe, given the sheer depth of the transatlantic partnership.

Just a few months into the new Trump administration, intense policy tensions with Europe have erupted in areas ranging from defence and security to trade, technology, climate, multilateralism, and even domestic European politics. These were evident in Trump’s threats to annex European territory and withdraw support for Ukraine, his endorsement of the European far-right, and the imposition of wide-ranging tariffs on European exports. After weathering Trump’s first term from 2017-2021, which was perceived as “more bark than bite”,^[4] his return to the White House has been almost catastrophic for transatlantic relations, testing Europe’s resilience and ability to respond at every juncture.

The fraying of transatlantic ties has been most evident in the defence and security domain, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at its core. Trump has threatened to scale back US commitments to NATO and questioned the treaty’s collective defence principle enshrined in Article 5, which has only been invoked once in the alliance’s history after the 11 September attacks on the US.^[5]

The American president has sought sharp increases in European defence spending towards NATO, raising the target from the 2-percent-of-GDP goal agreed upon in 2014 to a seemingly unrealistic 5 percent, which is “1.7 percent more than what the US spends itself.”^[6] At the NATO summit at The Hague in June 2025, allies agreed to boost defence spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035, including 3.5 percent for core military expenditure and 1.5 percent for broader security investments such as military mobility and critical infrastructure.^[7] The US has often expressed frustration with Europe’s lack of burden-sharing, which has in recent years happened in parallel to the former’s shift in focus towards the Indo-Pacific.

The renewed European commitments, driven by Trumpian pressures and the Russian threat, resulted in a concise and focused communiqué^[8] prioritising increased defence spending—amid NATO leaders including the US reaffirming their “ironclad” commitment to Article 5—while naming Russia as the key security threat. Whether NATO members can effectively coordinate resources and deliver on these pledges by mobilising the required US$1.9 trillion in additional annual spending to reach the 5 percent target across NATO remains to be seen.^[9]

In July, Trump appeared to reverse course on Russia based on the latter’s resistance to a ceasefire, and decided to sell military equipment to European countries looking to supply to Ukraine. He simultaneously issued ultimatums to President Vladimir Putin to end the war or be slammed with tariff rates of 100 percent—a threat that extended to other countries that continue to purchase Russian energy resources.^[10] This was a far cry from Trump’s early days in office, when he often articulated Kremlin talking points, such as blaming Kyiv for the war, and subsequently holding peace talks with Russia while excluding European countries, leading to fears of the war ending on terms favourable to Moscow and emboldening its expansionist tactics beyond Ukraine.^[11]

While Europeans have welcomed this changed approach, the ad-hoc nature of Trump’s policy towards the war continues to raise broader questions around American commitments to European security and the country’s overall military posture, including the status of troop deployments on the continent. The US currently has over 84,000 personnel stationed in Europe,^[12] and there have been reports of an intent to withdraw from the Polish town of Jasionka,^[13] which has been at the centre of delivering military support to Kyiv. This ambiguity has also drawn concerns regarding the credibility of the US’s extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, amid discussions of a UK-France alternative nuclear umbrella.

During the Alaska summit in mid-August where Trump laid out the red carpet for Putin, the former omitted the necessity of a ceasefire preceding a peace deal and talked of “land swaps” and Ukrainian territorial concessions, while Russia insisted on taking over all of the strategically important territory of the Donbas.^[14] Ukraine President Volodymyr  Zelenskyy and a coalition of Europe’s top leaders arrived at the White House just days later to discuss post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. While the outcomes of the summit remained unclear, Trump’s transactional and wavering attitude and an overall shift in priorities indicate that the security of Europe is no longer top-of-mind for the US. This predicament comes with profound ramifications for the post-Second World War security order.

Trade, Tech and the Green Transition

Trade has been another key area of divergence between the EU (European Union) and Trump, who referred to the former as having been created “to screw the US” and being “nastier than China”.^[15] Trump’s grievances revolve around the EU’s trade surplus of 157 billion euros in goods with the US, without accounting for the US trade surplus of 109 billion euros with the EU in services. This results in the overall trade deficit being only 3 percent.^[16]

On 2 April, Trump imposed tariffs of 25 percent on European exports of metals and automobiles and 20 percent reciprocal tariffs on all other products. This was followed by a White House U-turn to pause the tariffs and allow negotiations. In mid-July, while the Europeans thought they were closer to clinching a deal, a letter declaring tariffs of 30 percent on European products took the continent by surprise. Following months of tense exchanges, the US and EU arrived at a trade deal on 27 July,^[17] though largely perceived as imbalanced and favouring American interests. It imposes a 15 percent baseline tariff rate on most European exports, coupled with a lack of clarity on critical sectors such as alcohol and pharmaceuticals. In exchange for reduced tariffs, the EU pledged purchases of US energy worth US$750 billion and additional investments of US$600 billion into the US.^[18] While trade negotiations are likely to continue, Trump’s actions have undermined and destabilised the world’s largest trading relationship, which accounts for 43 percent of global GDP and 30 percent of global trade, and serves a combined population of 800 million.^[19] In 2024, the total volume of transatlantic trade was valued 1.6 trillion euros.^[20]

Trump has also lashed out against the bloc’s digital regulations, such as the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act, that have spurred investigations into American Big Tech companies such as Meta and Apple.^[21] The president’s threats to retaliate against the EU’s digital services tax during his first term formed the basis for the EU’s anti-coercion instrument of 2023.^[22]

In April, the EU fined Meta 200 million euros over alleged failures to tackle disinformation in the lead-up to the European Parliament elections of 2024. Trump referred to these penalties as “overseas extortion” and a targeted attack on American companies.^[23] Apple, Amazon, and Google have also faced fines and antitrust lawsuits. These divergences continue as part of the Trump administration’s trade disputes with the EU, highlighting the increasing transatlantic tensions in the digital sector and Europe’s need to strengthen its ‘digital sovereignty’ by reducing its dependence on American Big Tech.^[24] Vice President JD Vance went so far as to condition American participation in NATO on the resolution of regulatory disputes.^[25]

Meanwhile, the EU and US are at odds on climate and energy policy, with the EU focused heavily on transitioning to renewables. Trump, on the other hand, has pledged to boost fuel production and curb green projects. In a similar vein to withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement, this move has negative implications for global climate action.

Competing Visions of the World Order

Trump’s worldview challenges the very tenets of liberalism, transnationalism and cooperation that are at the heart of EU integration and the transatlantic alliance. His inherent distrust of multilateral structures, as evident in withdrawals from the World Health Organization (WHO), scrapping USAID funding, and threatening to boycott G20 meetings during South Africa’s current presidency, and his preference for unilateralism, bilateralism, and nationalism over transnationalism put him fundamentally at odds with the EU. His threats to annex Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal have raised concerns within Europe and drawn parallels with Putin’s revisionism.^[26]

At the Munich Security Conference in February, Vice President Vance stunned European allies when he attacked them for eroding Western values and undermining democracy through their firewall against the far-right. Rather than Russia and China, he alluded to “the threat from within” being the greatest threat to European security.^[27] Vance and other officials, such as former Trump ally Elon Musk, have actively supported far-right parties in Europe, including the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Vox in Spain and Italy’s League, that share Trump’s contempt for liberal elites and are keen on dismantling the European project. Empowered by Trump’s re-election, a new kind of transatlantic alliance underpinned by a very different set of values is emerging amongst populist revisionists on both sides of the Atlantic. Common rhetoric around anti-migration, anti-establishment and anti-climate action, ideological affinities, and a sense of victimisation are shaping the course of this transformation.^[28] Thus, the once joint transatlantic effort to defend a liberal democratic order is now being replaced by differing and competing world visions.

Détente to Contention: Trump’s Implications for Russia

News of Trump’s return to the White House was bittersweet for Russia. On the one hand, the prospects of a potential retrenchment of the US position towards Russia lingered, influenced by Trump’s campaign objectives, which included bringing an immediate end to the hostilities in Ukraine. On the other hand, there was deep scepticism that Trump might renege on his campaign promises, as was the case in his previous term.^[29]

The first six months of the Republican administration have mostly been favourable for Moscow. In contrast to the Biden era, when the two countries were balancing on the brink of a direct military incident over Ukraine, high-level diplomatic contact has resumed, with both heads of state engaging in regular interactions.^[30] As top-ranking US  officials resort to rhetoric that falls short of accusing Russia of occupying Ukrainian territories and have conditionally accepted several of Russia’s preconditions for the endgame in Ukraine, Moscow has become more amenable to negotiations as it senses an opportunity to resolve the conflict on its own terms. Apart from ending the war in Ukraine, the US-Russia conversation has also revolved around recalibrating economic relations, cooperation in the Arctic, and even on issues such as climate change.^[31]

From Ukraine to Broader Strategic Issues 

Since January 2025, Trump and Putin have interacted multiple times, agreeing to move forward on a number of issues ranging from bilateral matters and Ukraine to other geopolitical flashpoints such as the Middle East.

The shift in the US position on Ukraine and European security at large has been a lucky strike for Moscow. In a significant move, the Trump administration ruled out, albeit informally, Ukraine’s membership of NATO as “an unrealistic outcome” and acknowledged Russia’s concerns about the alliance’s eastward expansion as “fair.”^[32] As part of the Russia-Ukraine war settlement, Washington has also proposed to revive the NATO-Russia Council,^[33] which was officially suspended in 2021. The idea of the Council is far-fetched in itself, given the level of hostilities between Russia and European members. Furthermore, Trump strong-armed Kyiv into directly negotiating with Russia by temporarily suspending American aid and insisting that in this conflict, the Ukrainian leadership has “no cards.”^[34]

Washington’s interest in slowing down the growing Moscow-Beijing partnership and its recent refocusing of attention from Europe to the Indo-Pacific to confront China is a major driver behind the US buying into Russia’s talking points.^[35] This objective seems to stem from the perception of structural divergences in Russia-China relations, including Moscow’s unwillingness to become overly beholden to Beijing. Yet a considerable evolution of ties between Moscow and Beijing, driven by shared strategic concerns regarding the West, expanding trade networks and ideological convergence, suggests that reversing their nexus would be highly challenging.

Trump’s intention to end the war within 100 days of his taking office was far removed from reality. Although the US’s efforts resulted in the Russian and Ukrainian delegations reconvening in Istanbul in May 2025 – three years after the first failed attempt to end the war^[36] – the talks did not yield any substantial results, and a ceasefire remains far off. Yet even as Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to clash, some key outcomes have been attained, such as the cessation of attacks on maritime traffic in the Black Sea.^[37] Notably, avenues for humanitarian cooperation, such as prisoner-of-war (POWs) exchanges, have increased. However, the pace of these negotiations has been rather sluggish, prompting Trump to voice his dismay over the deadlock in talks on multiple occasions.

The search for a diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine has provided hope for an improvement in US-Russia bilateral dialogue, including on security. In May 2025, for the first time in several years, US representatives^[38] took part in the International Forum of National Security Advisers in Moscow, where Putin reiterated his vision for the global security architecture. The increased interactions, however, do not translate into convergences or common approaches on strategic issues. Although the New START Treaty is due to expire in February 2026,^[39] Moscow and Washington have yet to begin talks on the subject and remain far apart on their respective views. Russia believes that bilateral dialogue on strategic stability is “paralysed” based on divergences.^[40] While the US is increasingly preoccupied with Chinese nuclear capabilities and keen to bring Beijing on board for a new agreement, Russia concerns itself with “the overall nuclear potential of NATO countries”^[41] such as France and the United Kingdom (UK). Moreover, Moscow is concerned about the US intention to create a multi-layer missile defence system called “Golden Dome”, which has a space component and a declared goal of pre-launch interception of aerial targets. In Russia's view, the actual purpose of the proposed system may be more about ensuring “secure second-strike capability” than defending American citizens.^[42]

Russia and the US have also jointly discussed the situation in the Middle East, particularly the Iran nuclear deal and the Israel-Iran conflict. Trump seemingly views Moscow as a player capable of exerting influence over Iran, based on Russia’s support in initiating talks with Tehran regarding its nuclear programme.^[43] Moscow’s mediation efforts, however, did not dissuade the US from supporting Israel in its 12-day war against Iran, which included the bombardment of three Iranian nuclear facilities by the US B-2 stealth bombers. The rapid collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024, coupled with the Israel-Iran war, has cast doubt over Moscow’s influence in the Middle East, given its failure to protect its allies. With that said, the unstable situation across the region leaves ample room for diplomatic contact between the US and Russia regarding issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme, the crisis in Syria, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. 

Economic Opportunities but Unclear Prospects 

Since the US-Russia talks in February 2025 in Riyadh, the impetus to restore economic cooperation has been high. Washington has expressed interest in investing in the Russian energy and minerals sector, particularly in the Russian Arctic, including the development of trade routes. The growing Chinese footprint in the Russian Arctic^[44] may be a driving rationale for the US to increase its presence in this region. US businessman Stephen Lynch has reportedly paid off the debts of the Nord Stream 2^[45] operator, a subsidiary of the Russian gas giant Gazprom, and is keen to buy out the project. Gauging Trump’s fixation with critical minerals, Putin offered US companies joint work in developing the rare earth industry, including “in the new regions”,^[46] implying the areas of Donbas currently under Russian control. However, this offer has not progressed, since the mineral reserves in these territories are either closer to the battlefield or in the grey zone.

It is estimated that US-Russia bilateral trade in 2025 could increase by almost twofold to US$6-8 billion.^[47] Business dialogue is gradually resuming, with the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum featuring a Russia-US panel discussion focusing on finding ways for “implementing promising projects even in conditions of limited political dialogue.”^[48]

The enhancement of economic cooperation with the US is a carrot for Moscow, as it comes with prospects of sanctions relief. In what has been seen as a positive signal by Moscow, Washington has put on hold the imposition of new sanctions against Russia. While the US restrictions introduced until 20 January 2025 are still in place–some of which were extended by Trump’s presidential order in March–the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced no new sanctions against Russia, marking a significant shift from previous US policy and contrasting with other Western allies.^[49]

With that said, Washington has reiterated that the removal of sanctions would be conditional on a ceasefire in Ukraine. Even with the possibility of attaining a ceasefire, the outlook is currently grim. Moscow has adopted a pragmatic approach to the negotiations. For instance, even after a salvo of Ukrainian drone attacks on 1 June 2025, damaging strategic aviation that is part of the Russian nuclear triad and costing billions of dollars,^[50] Moscow did not call off the talks.

Further prospects of US-Russia economic engagement are intertwined with the outcome in Ukraine and the issue of sanctions. Emphasising trust building, the two countries expressed willingness to restore diplomatic ties by re-staffing their respective diplomatic missions and resolving visa issues. Progress on this track is being held back by the US’s hesitation to resume direct flights, which would effectively ease restrictions on Russian civil aviation.

Even if Moscow and Kyiv were to conclude a ceasefire, it would not be easy to revoke sanctions. First, the lifting of a large part of sanctions on Russia would not be at the whim of Trump alone, but would require the approval of the US Congress, which favours a bipartisan consensus on maintaining a hard line on Russia policy. In April 2025, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham proposed legislation titled the ‘Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025,’^[51] which has gathered support from 84 other US Congress members. In addition to proposing increased duties on mineral resources imported into the US from Russia, the bill outlines a mechanism to impose 500 per cent duties on countries that “knowingly” purchase, supply or transfer Russian-origin oil, uranium, natural gas, petroleum or petrochemical products.^[52] This could impact Russia’s closest partners, including India and China, which together account for nearly 85 per cent of Russian crude oil imports.^[53] Second, Trump has also expressed frustration at the lack of progress in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, threatening to impose “secondary tariffs”^[54] on Russia unless it stops the war. Similar to the legislation in question, Trump’s threat implies additional duties on countries that continue to purchase Russian energy resources. Therefore, adopting new sanctions against Russia is a likely scenario, either in the form of an executive order or a law adopted by the US Congress and signed by the president.^[55]

Furthermore, the EU is less receptive to the idea of revoking sanctions against Russia, and has also doubled down on its efforts to push Moscow for concessions in Ukraine. This is evident in its 18^th package of sanctions, which focuses on reducing Russia’s energy revenues, targeting its banking sector, weakening its military-industrial complex, and strengthening anti-circumvention measures.^[56] While the US has been reluctant to heed European calls to reduce the price cap on Russian crude aimed at hitting the Russian economy, some restrictions, such as reconnecting Russian banks to SWIFT, hinge on an EU decision and would ultimately require a transatlantic consensus.

Central Asia and the South Caucasus

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has not only impacted the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia but also compelled Central Asian countries to reevaluate their foreign policies. Since 2021, the South Caucasus has gained greater salience due to regional conflicts, the decline of Russian influence, and its growing geostrategic and geoeconomic importance for Eurasia. This shift is particularly notable with the rising demand for alternative and more resilient connectivity corridors, such as the Middle Corridor. As Trump began his second term, regional leaders from Central Asia and the South Caucasus congratulated him,^[57] hoping to strengthen bilateral relations.

Historically, US foreign policy towards the region has been shaped by security concerns, counterterrorism efforts, and strategic competition with Russia and China. US policy effectively supported Central Asian nations in asserting their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, but the region subsequently fell under the cooperative influence of China and Russia. As part of their hegemony, both countries collaborated but with distinct roles.^[58] While faced with economic strife in the post-Soviet era, Russia led in security and political influence. China, on the other hand, focused on investment and infrastructure development.^[59] However, due to the unpredictable nature of foreign policy under Trump, there is considerable scepticism about the US within the region.

The Broader Geopolitical Chessboard  

In 2015, the Obama administration initiated a diplomatic forum in the C5+1 format that remained a standard tool for US engagement with the region; however, this engagement remained inconsistent.^[60] During his first term, Trump adopted a cautious approach to the region, and in 2020, introduced the United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity.^[61] In February 2022, Russia initiated a war against Ukraine, which, like Central Asia and the South Caucasus, was once part of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, both the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries saw intra-regional disputes, boundary demarcation issues, and political instability. The strains in the relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia intensified during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2023, in which thousands of ethnic Armenians fled to Armenia.^[62]  At the same time, Western sanctions on Russia prompted both regions to seek alternative export routes to international markets.

Countries across Eurasia are seeking alternative and more resilient connectivity corridors to establish new trade routes and sustainable transportation methods. The Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR), represents a strategic and economic shift in the current fragile geopolitical landscape and is vital for improving connectivity between Asia and Europe. ^[63]Furthermore, the corridor is essential for the US and the EU in maintaining regional influence to counteract the cooperative dominance of China and Russia in Central Asia.

Russia’s focus on Ukraine and China’s economic slowdown created opportunities for the US to reassess its approach and commence engagements at the highest level, given the geostrategic and economic significance of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Biden pressed for “continued investment in and development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, or the so-called Middle Corridor”, while pledging to use the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) to promote investments in the region.^[64] He also declared that the US will enhance “counterterrorism collaboration, US security investments in Central Asia, and regional economic ties”.^[65]

Trump and the South Caucasus  

The strategy and foreign policy of a second Trump administration will be decisively inward-looking, centred around ‘Make America Great Again’. This policy adopted can provide opportunities for regional powers, such as China, Iran, and Türkiye, to influence the region's geopolitical dynamics, given Russia’s weakened position and shifts in US policy towards Eurasia. The Russian war has already shaped the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, with increasing political turmoil in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.^[66] Trump has prioritised peace in the South Caucasus due to the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. On 11 July, the US Ambassador to Türkiye, Tom Barrack, confirmed media reports about Washington’s proposal to lease and manage the strategic corridor for 100 years as a solution to the longstanding deadlock between Yerevan and Baku.^[67]

The leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a historic peace agreement at the White House in the presence of Trump on 8 August. As part of the deal, the US will establish a corridor called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), linking Nakhichevan, the Azerbaijani enclave bordering Türkiye, to Azerbaijan via the Zangezur Corridor. The Zangezur Corridor is a direct overland multimodal route connecting mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through southern Armenia.^[68] Amid rising geopolitical tensions, the 43-km corridor in Armenia will become a crucial geostrategic and geoeconomic asset for the US, particularly concerning Tehran, Moscow, and even Beijing, across Eurasia. If developed, the corridor could fill the power vacuum in the historically Russian-dominated region and reshape regional geopolitics. However, it is likely to remain highly contentious and could provoke strong reactions from Moscow and Tehran, thereby risking further regional tensions and exacerbating existing fault lines.

Tariffs, Aid and Critical Minerals

Starting 1 August 2025, Trump announced the imposition of 25 percent tariffs on all imported products from Kazakhstan. He stated that these tariffs could be avoided if the Kazakh government chose to develop its manufacturing sector within the US.^[69] Currently, the latter has not implemented any retaliatory tariffs and is instead waiting for further negotiations with the US. In response to Trump’s statement, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev emphasised his government’s commitment to maintaining fair and predictable trade relations with the US and expressed readiness to engage in constructive discussions to resolve the trade dispute.^[70]

It is worth noting that Kazakhstan primarily exports hydrocarbons and rare-earth elements to the US, as the Central Asia region is rich in these resources. Due to its extensive reserves, Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, is emerging as a competitor and influential player in the rare-earth supply market. The country alone holds over 5,000 deposits valued at more than US$46 trillion.^[71] The Kazakh government has been declassifying Soviet-era geological records to make data available to potential investors in a move to attract investments. In 2024, the first C5+1 Critical Mineral Dialogue was held, focusing on US investments in the mining sector and the minerals it produces. In 2024, a US-Kazakh venture, Cove Capital, initiated geological exploration in Kazakhstan’s Kostanay Region.^[72]

As global competition for rare-earth metals intensifies, Beijing is strengthening its alliances in Central Asia. New US tariffs on Kazakh exports are drawing the region closer to China, inadvertently enabling Beijing to dominate rare-earth supply chains and extend its influence across Eurasia. Instead of shifting trade in Washington’s favour, this situation risks deepening China’s strategic advantage. In 2023 and 2024, nearly all Central Asian rare-earth exports were sent to China, with little to no supply reaching the US.^[73]

Given the growing export restrictions on rare-earth minerals by China, the second Trump administration will be forced to consider both regions in terms of economic practicality and selective involvement in mining sectors for geoeconomic and geopolitical purposes. Although these regions may not be at the heart of US foreign policy, their substantial reserves of rare-earth minerals, including uranium, cobalt, and lithium, will compel the US to intensify its efforts to secure critical minerals, thereby reducing its reliance on China for rare-earths. In this context, US businesses should be encouraged to invest in the region's mining sector. Yet it appears that in Trump's foreign policy, these regions remain largely invisible and do not serve as a key battleground for any of his policies. To create new trade opportunities, the administration should strive to eliminate the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which has prevented the US from establishing permanent trade relations with Central Asia.

The Trump administration has made significant cuts to US Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes worldwide, including those in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This decision could have a serious impact on US soft policy in the region. For instance, in 2023, Central Asian countries received approximately US$162 million in aid for health programmes, economic development, peace and security, democracy, and human rights education.^[74]  The reduction in aid could push the most impoverished countries in the region into China's geopolitical sphere, which may obstruct any future attempts at regional integration since the area is split between resource-rich and resource-poor nations. It could also exacerbate the regional security challenges.

The countries of the Central Asian and Caucasus region prioritise a multi-vector foreign policy to balance relations with major powers for economic investments, security, and political support. This approach enables them to navigate the complex global geopolitical landscape and engage constructively with various powers to ensure their security and economic development. Both regions view the US as an essential player and would be willing to work with the second Trump Administration.

Opportunities in Disruption

The Trump administration’s new policy towards Eurasia is defined by setting new terms of cooperation with Europe, disengaging from the Russia-Ukraine war amidst a somewhat conciliatory position favouring Russia, and largely neglecting the Central Asian and South Caucasus regions.

The transatlantic alliance is under immense strain, underpinned by a profound erosion of trust. At the same time, a more conditional, balanced and equal transatlantic partnership, focused on areas of convergence and interests but less rooted in shared norms and values, may be evolving. Irrespective of the course of future American administrations, a less dependent and strategically autonomous Europe is in the continent’s long-term interest, not least given the definitive shift in Washington’s priorities towards the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s navigation of the ruptures in the transatlantic alliance will have implications for its economy, security and democracy. If the continent emerges stronger, it will serve as yet another testament to EU founding father Jean Monnet’s words, “Europe will be forged in crisis.”

In the Russian scenario, a more nuanced perception has emerged with fresh openings for an agreement on Ukraine and the restoration of diplomatic ties with Washington under Trump. However, early gestures of goodwill should not be misinterpreted as a reinvigorated partnership between the US and Russia. Although it might appear that the relationship is moving towards normalisation, particularly in terms of diplomatic and business ties, many hurdles remain. The reset of US policy toward Russia has enabled high-level channels of communication between the presidents and at the delegation level. However, the trajectory of the US-Russia relationship remains uncertain, with slim prospects for long-term cooperation and alignment on strategic issues.

Given Russia’s involvement in other regions and the US’s unpredictability in its policy stance, Central Asian and the Caucasus nations are likely to seek partnerships elsewhere, particularly with China and the European Union. A key factor shaping US policy in the region is its strategic rivalry with China. If Trump intensifies geostrategic efforts to counter Beijing, the area may develop into a stage for renewed geopolitical competition and become a subject of increased American attention.

---

All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

• International Affairs
• Russia and Eurasia
• USA and Canada
• eurasia political landscape
• russia china relations
• start treaty
• ukraine war
• us eurasian relations
• US foreign policy
• US foreign policy under Trump
• us russia bilateral trade
• us russia relations

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.