Introduction

In the summer of 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang, marking a notable policy shift by the Kremlin, the first after more than 20 years. Since then, Russia-North Korea relations have dramatically improved. A key factor behind this shift is Moscow’s growing contestation with the collective West, which has created space for improving ties with Pyongyang—particularly to import arms and ammunition. This recalibration can be traced to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, following which relations with North Korea have further strengthened. Pyongyang’s vote against a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the invasion, along with Moscow’s large-scale imports from North Korea, signalled deepening cooperation. An increasing number of bilateral working-level visits have further strengthened their ties. Putin’s June 2024 visit built on this momentum, with both sides signing a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty covering military, economic, trade, counter-terrorism, and cybersecurity cooperation.

The growing bonhomie has raised threat perceptions in Northeast Asia, particularly for the United States (US) and its key allies in the region. However, US President Donald Trump’s return to office and the reversal of Washington’s stance on the conflict raise questions about the future trajectory of Russia-North Korea ties. This paper examines the core drivers of their bilateral partnership and explores its likely evolution in light of these developments.

The Rationale for Russia-North Korea Cooperation

European security crisis; efforts to prevent a shift in the balance of power against Moscow in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia; and resistance to international sanctions.

^[1] However, the dynamics differ from the Cold War era. The ideological binding force in that period is today largely absent. The current partnership—as exemplified through the signed treaty, follow-up actions, and high-level statements made by North Korean leaders—is characterised more by strategic intent than tactical. It reflects strategic pragmatism, shaped by evolving regional alignments, especially the improving ties between South Korea and Japan. Considering these shifts, Pyongyang sees value in closer cooperation with Russia and China. As a result, the second phase of Moscow–Pyongyang ties has progressed far more rapidly than anticipated, despite the risks to internal stability—such as the deployment of North Korean troops to the Russia–Ukraine war front.

North Korea has always had few ideological allies. During the Cold War, it was China and the USSR that bankrolled and sustained the regime. However, with US-China relations improving following Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and Beijing moving towards economic reform by the mid-1970s, the ideological alignment weakened. Similarly, after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Moscow saw little strategic incentive to continue supporting Pyongyang, and the treaty was not extended after 2000. These steps forced Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un to adapt to evolving geopolitical and economic challenges. The experience also instilled a sense of realism in the regime that there are no permanent friends nor enemies. Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic engagements with Trump reflected this learning.

Building on lessons from its 2018-2019 engagement with the US under Trump, and in response to strengthening US alliances with South Korea and Japan, Kim Jong Un realised the importance of having reliable partners to support the regime. Three imperatives shaped this shift: to strengthen and upgrade its ageing military, to consolidate support for the domestic reforms, and to enhance the regime’s ability to circumvent sanctions. Since the signing of the treaty between Russia and North Korea, progress has been observed on all three fronts. While the level of cooperation has improved between the militaries of both countries, its second- and third-order effects have contributed to economic benefits for the regime, showing that North Korea has benefited from this relationship. Beyond strengthening its conventional capabilities, North Korea sees Russia as a critical partner in maintaining its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

The number of high-level political visits between the two countries signifies the importance of Russia for North Korea, and vice versa. This started in July 2023, during the Ukraine war, when Russia turned to North Korea for materiel support. In that context, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang. During the visit, both sides discussed strengthening “strategic and traditional DPRK-Russia relations suited to the new century,” and “deepening collaboration in national defence and security to address the evolving regional and international security environment.”^[2]

In June, a National Security Council delegation led by Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang to brief North Korean counterparts on US-Russia negotiations, the ceasefire, the conflict, and regional security.^[3] These increasing government exchanges, particularly in the strategic realm, symbolise the two parties' close political and security relationship. While their defence ties may appear focused on addressing Russia’s immediate security concerns, North Korea sees Russia as a critical security partner with advanced defence manufacturing and innovation capabilities. Kim Jong Un is seeking Russian support, particularly in developing North Korea’s shipbuilding, space, and cyber sectors.

For Russia, its alliance-like relationship with North Korea is driven by deteriorating ties with the West. Restoring cooperation with the DPRK expands Russia’s influence in Northeast Asia and serves as strategic posturing toward East Asian countries that distanced themselves from Moscow following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s rationale is that as East Asian countries become proactively engaged in European security matters, Moscow seeks to simultaneously bolster its presence in the East. This has altered threat perceptions in the region. Along with international isolation, Russia has enhanced ties with North Korea, gaining relative influence and seeking to counterbalance China’s presence in the region. While the latter is a close ally of Russia, North Korea, being completely under the shadow of China, goes against Russia’s interests.

North Korea-Russia Military Ties

During the Cold War, North Korea developed a robust defence manufacturing ecosystem with Soviet assistance, later strengthened by Kim Jong Il’s Songun (military-first) policy, which prioritised military modernisation over economic development. The ecosystem thrived due to export demand from ideological allies. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent breakdown of defence ties with communist states, its industrial ecosystem slowly started degrading as orders from outside plummeted. Getting cut off from the international defence manufacturing supply chains further harmed its domestic defence technological innovation and development, such as in space and nuclear submarines. With renewed defence ties with Russia, North Korea is now aiming to revive its defence industry—both to support Russia’s war efforts and to build strategic capacity in priority sectors such as shipbuilding,^[4] space, and surveillance (with UAVs and drones).^[5] In all three sectors, North Korea sees the cooperation with Russia as critical for modernising the North Korean defence manufacturing ecosystem. Kim Jong Un, particularly under his watch, has ordered Korean defence companies to “drastically boost” their manufacturing capacity.^[6]

The scale of North Korea’s materiel support to Russia during the war is substantial. Estimates suggest that more than half of Moscow’s weapons demand for artillery was fulfilled by North Korea. For instance, as per Ukraine, almost 60 percent of the 122 mm and 152 mm artillery ammunition used by Russia comes from North Korea.^[7]  Other North Korean weapons used on the battlefield include artillery shells, long-range artillery, anti-tank missiles, and short-range missiles. Notably, transfers have included 100 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles,^[8] 220 units of 170 mm self-propelled howitzers and rocket launchers,^[9] and 9.4 million 152 mm artillery shells. North Korea has also provided Russia with D-20/D-30 Howitzers, M-30/M-46 Howitzers, D-74 Cannons, and Bulsae-4 anti-tank missiles.^[10]

The exact number of North Korean soldiers deployed in Russia remains unclear, but South Korean intelligence estimates it at around 10,000. The initial deployment of approximately 3,000 soldiers occurred in October 2024,^[11] followed by another 3,000 soldiers in January, February, and March 2025—indicating a steadily growing military partnership.^[12] Following Sergei Shoigu’s visit in June this year, North Korea is expected to send around 1,000 combat engineers and 5,000 military builders to restore the Kursk region.^[13] Based on Korean and American media reports, North Korea is receiving technological and materiel support from Russia in the abovementioned sectors. Talks of deploying troops from North Korea began in August 2024 after Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region. Initially, the Kremlin neither confirmed nor denied the presence of North Korean troops in Russia. However, various sources indicated that the participation of North Korean troops was exclusively in the Kursk theatre, which was technically in agreement with entry four of the comprehensive strategic treaty, which calls for mutual military assistance in case of aggression. After the successful missions in Kursk, both countries acknowledged the deployment. The rationale behind sending North Korean troops appears twofold: to symbolically affirm the alliance and to provide North Korean forces with battlefield experience.

The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT),^[a] in a report released in May 2025, examined the list of military equipment Russia provided to North Korea in exchange for its assistance during the war. The report said Russia has transferred short-range air defence systems and advanced electronic warfare equipment, including jamming systems.^[14] Besides the transfer of equipment, Russia has also facilitated exchanges between the two militaries. In 2024, a North Korean delegation led by Kim Kum-chol—President of Kim Il Sung Military University, a training institute for senior military officials of the Korean People’s Army (KPA)—visited Russia.^[15] The visit aimed to deepen the military cooperation amid rising regional tensions and aligned with Article 8 of the treaty, which emphasises^[16] that “the two sides shall provide mechanisms for taking joint measures to strengthen the defense capabilities for preventing war and ensuring regional and global peace and security.”

The Economic Levers of Russia-North Korea Relations

One of North Korea’s longstanding challenges has been balancing resource allocation between modernising its military and improving the economy—a dilemma often framed as the dichotomy between “guns and butter”. Although this problem has existed since the early 1990s, it became acute in the mid-2000s as economic sanctions, backed by Russia and China, took effect, further constraining the state’s capacity to allocate resources for the well-being of its people. In response, Kim Jong Un devised a revised version of his grandfather’s Byungjin policy in 2013.^[17] Nonetheless, the policy faltered due to stringent sanctions compliance by Russia and China. In 2021, at the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), Kim acknowledged the shortcomings of his economic policies. The Korean media quoted him as saying, “The five-year strategic implementation period [2016-2020] for national economic development ended last year, but we fell far short of the goals that were put forward in almost all sectors.”^[18] The economic distress became severe during the COVID-19 pandemic, as North Korea isolated itself from the world, shutting down all borders with China and Russia.

Since 2022, following the outbreak of the Ukraine war, North Korea’s military economy has undergone a transformation. The changing Russia-North Korea military ties have positively impacted the economic relations between the two countries, driven largely by Russia’s growing demand for munitions. Given the overlap between North Korea’s military and civilian sectors, the broader economy has benefited as well. Arms exports have had a notable impact, particularly since the military sector constitutes about 50 percent of the economy, compared to 10 percent for the special economy and 5 percent for the local economy.^[19] According to South Korea’s defense minister, while most arms factories typically operate at 30 percent capacity due to shortages of raw materials and electricity, those producing weapons and artillery shells for Russia are running at full capacity.^[20] Based on satellite evidence, some munition factories have expanded, catering to the increasing demand.^[21]

Much of the revenue from arms exports goes directly into building the second economy, also known as the military economy, under the supervision of the Second Economic Commission (SEC), working under the Munitions Industry Department of the WPK.^[22] Expanding and strengthening the military economy brings more job opportunities and better living standards for its citizens. The turn towards the military economy appears strategic, following the failure of earlier attempts to boost the civilian economy post-2017, as Kim emphasised socialist economic development. This is reflected in the Bank of Korea estimates of annual growth: -4.1 percent in 2018, 0.4 percent in 2019, –4.5 percent in 2020, –0.1 percent in 2021, –0.2 percent in 2022, and 3.0 percent in 2023.^[23]

Another important source of revenue comes from North Koreans working in Russia. Amid Russia’s labour shortages, North Korean workers have become a preferred choice, particularly in construction. Their numbers are believed to have increased dramatically. As reported by Radio Free Asia (RFA), citing the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, around 13,000 North Koreans were working in Russia in 2024—12 times higher than the previous year.^[24] The last comparable figure was approximately 21,000 before the COVID-19 pandemic. These workers reportedly earn around US$800 per month, supplementing the regime’s income alongside the estimated US$1,200 it earns from each soldier deployed abroad.^[25]

Some reports suggest a rise in the number of North Korean students migrating to Russia, with figures reaching around 3,700 in the third quarter of 2024—up from 332 in the previous quarter and just 32 in the first quarter. This is a North Korean tactic to obfuscate the identity of North Korean workers as students to collect more financial resources from abroad.^[26] Besides, North Korea has received humanitarian aid and food assistance from Russia, including an estimated 600,000-700,000 tonnes of rice.^[27] As a goodwill gesture, Russia also has sent elite livestock to breed goats in the country.^[28] Since November 2022, about 2,200 live animals, including horses and cows, have reportedly been sent. With increased food supplies and fossil fuel imports from Moscow, bilateral trade in 2024 reached a record US$34 million, growing tenfold since 2022. Further, the bilateral cooperation on circumventing sanctions has improved. For instance, with North Korea being allowed to import only 500,000 barrels of crude oil, the country imports additional volumes of crude oil from Russia using the port of Vostochny in Vladivostok.

Entry ten of the Comprehensive Strategic Treaty outlines the framework for economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea, promoting expanded collaboration in trade, investment, and scientific and technological cooperation. The new treaty expands the definition of cooperation from the 1961 treaty. Today, the primary platform for bilateral economic engagement is the Russia-DPRK Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, established in 1991. Following President Putin’s landmark visit to Pyongyang, the 11th iteration of the commission was chaired in Vladivostok in November 2024. Following the meeting, Russia undertook several infrastructure projects to improve economic trade between the two countries. In May 2025, Russia and North Korea began constructing a car bridge over the Tumen River, a project valued at US$111 million and expected to be completed in 2027. Interestingly, the eastern mouth of the Tumen River forms a tri-junction between Russia, North Korea, and China, currently limiting China’s access to the Sea of Japan. Since the invasion of Ukraine, some commentators have speculated that China could be granted access through the river, given its growing economic leverage over Moscow. However, the extent of China’s current access remains unclear.

North Korea’s growing economic convergence with Russia gives Pyongyang the flexibility to engage more strongly with partners apart from China. A counterfactual emerges in this context: if North Korea’s economic situation were to improve and the regime became more receptive to foreign investment, the country could potentially integrate into Russia’s transport and logistics corridors—such as the Primorsky International Transport Corridor—and broader frameworks like Greater Eurasian cooperation. However, at present, both sides have not acknowledged the possibility or even voiced interest. Yet, the growing convergence and improving geopolitical climate in Northeast Asia could see the socialisation of North Korea with the outside world.

Payments between Russia and North Korea are made through the barter of food, military goods, and technology. Meanwhile, North Korea’s trade with China reached US$2.3 billion, reflecting Moscow’s limited economic presence. Structural challenges also hinder bilateral cooperation. For instance, 98 percent of North Korea’s railway network is single-track, with average speeds of 15-20 km per hour and frequent electricity shortages. Despite the political impetus, investors are sceptical due to the poor infrastructure. The political elite in North Korea wants to shift the burden to the investor in infrastructure building; in other words, Russian firms would have to revamp the country’s infrastructure as they did in the Cold War. With a possible end to the Ukraine conflict, it is unlikely that Russian firms will give up their economic interests. However, the impetus to undertake projects with lower yields has diminished. Other issues also remain, particularly regarding the North Korean state allowing Russian nationals (i.e., employees) to remain in the country for extended periods. This deepens economic cooperation between the two nations.

Despite its ambitions, the Rason Free Economic Zone, which was established to become North Korea’s version of Shenzhen, has yielded low returns over its 35-year existence. Aside from a few Chinese and Russian investments in the hospitality and consumer sectors, progress has been limited. 

Figure 1: Russia-North Korea Bilateral Trade (2014-2023)

Source: UN Comtrade^[29]

Note: Trade volumes are unavailable for 2021 and 2022, two years of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Other Sectors

Beyond economic and military ties, North Korea and Russia are also exploring cooperation in new sectors. During a meeting between Sergei Shoigu and Kim Jong Un in June this year, the two leaders discussed “developing the special and firm comprehensive strategic partnership between the DPRK and Russia and items of mutual cooperation in different fields.”^[30] According to news reports, these sectors include tourism, education, health, agriculture,^[31] industry, and natural resources.^[32]

For instance, Russian firms are drawing tourists to North Korea’s Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Resort,^[33] with each tour estimated to cost around US$1,400 in Russian rubles.^[34] To expand tourism further, the two countries plan to increase the number of charter flights between major cities, as 70 percent of tourists travel by air. They have also resumed bi-monthly passenger train services between Moscow and Pyongyang after 2020, covering 10,000 km, beginning mid-June.^[35] Given that North Korea has not allowed tourism for foreign tourists of other nationalities, this development reflects the trust between the two countries.^[36]

Meanwhile, health partnerships are also increasing. Russia has allowed North Korean doctors to intern at Moscow hospitals and also agreed to help North Korea in modernising its pharmaceuticals, particularly in modern antibiotic production.^[37] Collaborative efforts are also underway to address infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV.^[38] Educational ties have also resumed, with the first batch of five students from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in North Korea, marking the end of a four-year gap.^[39] In agriculture, Russia is helping North Korea tackle persistent challenges. This year, it exported wheat flour, sugar, sunflower oil, soybeans, pork, and frozen fish.^[40] Cooperation also extends to grain research and broader efforts to improve agricultural productivity.^[41]

After the treaty, Russia has emerged as a new market for North Korean goods, which were previously exported to the Chinese market. As per reports by NK News, Russian firms have teamed up with North Korean entities to sell items such as ginseng tea, peanuts, and herbal medicine.^[42]

Crafting a Strategy for the New World Order

North Korea is situated in a geographical space most prone to great-power contestation. On one side are China and Russia; on the other, the US and its allies. Surrounded by powerful nations with vast military and economic capacities, Pyongyang understands that it cannot pursue a policy of self-reliance for a long time. While the self-reliance policy, also known as Juche, has been practised by all its leaders, from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Un, given the changing regional dynamics, it cannot continue to depend on it in the future. Even the days of hedging between Beijing and Moscow are over, given their close ties. In this context, Kim sees value in forging close working ties with neighbouring powers, particularly Russia and China.

Though Kim had long sought close ties with Beijing, he received little reciprocity after 2017. The Ukraine war presented a timely opportunity to rebuild and deepen ties with Moscow. This time, Russia desperately needed military support from its partners, to which Kim Jong Un responded in kind. For North Korea, the strategic aspect of the bilateral ties pertains to developing a quasi-alliance with Russia that it had enjoyed before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. While the foundation of the earlier alliance was shaped by common ideology (1961 DPRK-Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance), this new ‘quasi-alliance’, as Kim Jong describes the 2024 Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, is shaped by converging regional interests.^[43]

The treaty marks a first step toward internal and external balancing. The next step will involve leveraging this partnership to enhance its military strength and economic resilience. While various scholars and experts interpret this treaty as a tactical adjustment for Russia, for North Korea, it represents strategic insurance—complementing its longstanding pact with China, last renewed in 2021.^[44] As mentioned earlier, Kim plans to systematically expand cooperation with Russia across sectors that he deems vital. This strategic partnership addresses two critical changes: upgrading North Korea’s domestic capabilities across sectors and maintaining a balance of power in Northeast Asia. Preserving this regional equilibrium is central to Pyongyang’s efforts to maximise the regime’s long-term security.

From Moscow’s perspective, its outreach to North Korea serves as a form of complex signalling—a calibrated probe directed at the West. President Putin has expressed intent to arm Pyongyang with high-precision weapons in response to Western military support for Ukraine. Further, the departure from Russia’s earlier support for the denuclearisation of North Korea is another instance, reflecting the changing realities in Russia-East Asia relations—similarly, even the use of North Korean troops in combat.

With the ongoing US-Russia talks, the trajectory of Russia-North Korea relations remains uncertain, and it would be premature to make a fair assessment. The likelihood of the Russian-North Korean relations developing further in the strategic realm appears low, as Moscow has gained little in economic and security space. However, Moscow will continue to pursue its interests in the Northeast Asian region. The war is also an important indicator for this assessment, as de-escalating tensions will result in Russia importing fewer munitions and labour from North Korea. The latter comes considering the global economic slowdown leading to reduced economic activity in Russia.

That said, it is unlikely that the trajectory of Russia-North Korea relations will revert to that of the previous decade; Moscow will maintain its ties and interests and continue cooperation in the economy, science and technology, education, cyberspace, and partially in the military realm. Going forward, geostrategic compulsions will influence the nature and pace of ties, independent of other variables.

Another factor that remains underdeveloped is China’s position on the growing North Korea-Russia relationship. Till now, Beijing has maintained a neutral position on the deepening ties between its neighbours. However, if China perceives that the US and its regional allies are crossing its strategic red-lines, it may shift to actively supporting closer ties between the two countries, even supporting a trilateral mechanism to keep South Korea and Japan in check.

Conclusion

The trajectory of North Korea-Russia relations raises many questions about their impact on regional geopolitics, the effectiveness of the UN Security Council sanctions mechanism, prospects of denuclearisation, and the larger viability of the US and its allies’ diplomatic approach towards North Korea. While many of these questions can be addressed tactically—based on the current scope of Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation—their long-term strategic implications remain uncertain.

In a post-Ukraine scenario, the prospects of Russia-North Korea ties and North Korea’s strategic importance for Russia in Northeast Asia are yet to be tested. For North Korea, the Russian factor is acting as a key to unlocking the Western pressure for now and building its military and economic capabilities. Yet, how long it will be able to use the key remains a huge question, even if its wishes for this continue. Similarly, for Russia, ascertaining the strategic benefits of this dyad in a post-Ukraine scenario could impact its relations with North Korea.

Russia’s engagement with North Korea in this century is due to its deteriorating ties with the West. If Russia’s relations with the US improve and the war in Ukraine ends, Moscow’s need for military cooperation with North Korea will be reduced after Russia replenishes its reserves. North Korea’s strategic value to Russia will remain.

A key variable in assessing the depth of this partnership will be the pace of implementation of jointly agreed projects and the timely delivery of military platforms. Any delays on Moscow’s part could signal a waning interest in deepening ties—echoing the disengagement seen in the early 2000s. Still, even if Russia’s relations with the West improve, it is unlikely to abandon its interests in North Korea, as restoring Russia’s relations with the West will take a considerable amount of time.

Simultaneously, North Korea’s military modernisation is proceeding incrementally. If this process accelerates, it could heighten threat perceptions and shift the strategic balance in Northeast Asia. In short, with new realities in the relations between Russia and North Korea, the strategic future of the partners is not insulated from the changing calculus of Russia’s relations with the West. However, it is likely that Russia will not leverage its long-term interests in North Korea, and both sides will continue to find areas of convergence to keep the partnership relevant.

Abhishek Sharma is Research Assistant, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF. 

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is Research Assistant, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF. 

The authors thank Aadityavikram Rana for his research assistance.

Endnotes

^[a] The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team is a mechanism that was created by a group of 11 countries in October 2024 to oversee the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea after the veto of UN Panel of Experts Committee by Russia in April 2024. See: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20241016/s-korea-10-other-nations-form-north-korea-sanctions-monitoring-body.

^[1] Ivan Timofeev, “Russia-North Korea: The Useless Threat of Sanctions,” Russia International Affairs Council, October 30, 2024, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-north-korea-the-useless-threat-of-sanctions/?sphrase_id=198619481

^[2]  “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Meets Secretary of Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu,” Korea Central News Agency, June 5, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/d6956a1a327129692244c7170f890c54.kcmsf

^[3] “General Secretary Kim Jong Un Meets Russian Defence Minister,” KCNA Watch, July 27, 2023, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1690441867-359531063/general-secretary-kim-jong-un-meets-russian-defence-minister/

^[4] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Major Shipyards to Learn about Warship Building and Advance Strategic Policy for Epochal Development of Shipbuilding Industry,” Korea Central News Agency, March 8, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/fb32f8726ec92869e7f30be7bddf570a.kcmsf

^[5] “North Korea Orders ‘Mass Production’ of Attack Drones, Raising Concerns over Russia Alliance,” France24, November 15, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20241115-north-korea-drones

^[6] “N Korea’s Kim Orders ‘Drastic Boost’ in Production of Missiles, Shells,” Aljazeera, August 14, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/14/n-koreas-kim-orders-drastic-boost-in-production-of-missiles-shells

^[7] Lee Minji, “N. Korean Artillery Shells Supplied to Russia Appear to Be 'Poor' in Quality: Report,” Yonhap News Agency, October 29, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241029008900315

^[8] Lee Minji, “N. Korea Sent 100 Ballistic Missiles, Military Specialists to Russia: Kyiv,” Yonhap News Agency, November 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241126004700315

^[9] Lee Minji, “N. Korea Presumed to Send At Least 3,000 More Troops to Russia: JCS,” Yonhap News Agency, March 27, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250327002251315

^[10] “Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia,” Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, May 29, 2025, https://msmt.info/Publications/detail/MSMT%20Report/4195

^[11] Kim Seung-yeon, “First unit of N. Korean Troops Deployed to Front Lines in Western Russia: Reports,” Yonhap News Agency, October 25, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241025001300315

^[12] Lee Minji, “N. Korea Sent 200 Long-Range Artillery Pieces to Russia; Additional Supply Likely: Seoul,” Yonhap News Agency, February 11, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250211007600315

^[13] “North Korea to Send 1,000 Combat Engineers, 5,000 Workers to Rebuild Kursk Region-Shoigu,” TASS, June 17, 2025, https://tass.com/politics/1974469

^[14] “Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia”

^[15] “Elite North Korea Military Trainees Visit Russia amid Deepening Ties,” Reuters, July 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/elite-north-korea-military-trainees-visit-russia-amid-deepening-ties-2024-07-09/

^[16] Ji Da-gyum, “NK Military Delegation in Russia after Putin-Kim Pact,” The Korea Herald, July 9, 2024,  https://m.koreaherald.com/article/3431604

^[17] Tak Sung Han and Jeon Kyung Joo, “Can North Korea Catch Two Rabbits at Once: Nuke and Economy? One Year of the Byungjin Line in North Korea and Its Future,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, no. 2 (2014), https://kiss.kstudy.com/Detail/Ar?key=3246005

^[18] Do Je-hae, “Kim Jong-un’s Admission of Failure Shows Serious Economic Situation in North Korea,” The Korea Times, January 6, 2021, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20210106/kim-jong-uns-admission-of-failure-shows-serious-economic-situation-in-north-korea

^[19] Lee Jungho, “Bukan Gyeongje Jungsimui Gukbanggongeop Yeongu” [A Study on the Economic Structure Centered on the North Korean Defense Industry] (PhD diss., Kyonggi University, 2020), pp 18.

^[20] Yoonjung Seo and Helen Regan, “North Korean Factories Making Arms for Russia Are ‘Operating at Full Capacity,’ South Korea Says,” CNN, February 28, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/28/asia/north-korea-munitions-factories-shipments-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html

^[21] Idrees Ali, Phil Stewart, and Josh Smith, “North Korea Expands Plant Making Missile Russia in Ukraine, Researchers Say,” Reuters, November 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/satellite-images-suggest-north-korea-expanding-missile-plant-researchers-say-2024-11-25/;Jean Mackenzie, “North Korean Weapons Are Killing Ukrainians. The Implications Are Far Bigger,” BBC, May 5, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68933778

^[22] Kyung-Joo Jeon, and Sung-Jun Bae, “North Korean Munitions Factories: The Other Side of Arms Transfers to Russia,” 38 North, June 24, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/06/north-korean-munitions-factories-the-other-side-of-arms-transfers-to-russia/

^[23] “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2023,” Bank of Korea, July 26, 2024,  https://www.bok.or.kr/eng/bbs/E0000634/view.do?nttId=10086116&menuNo=400423&relate=Y&depth=400423&programType=newsDataEng#:~:text=North%20Korean%20real%20annual%20GDP%20increased%20by%203.1%25%20in%202023.

^[24] Seo Ji-eun, “North Koreans Entering Russia Surge to 13,000 Suggests Labor Deal amid Ukraine War,” Korea JoongAng Daily, February 5, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-02-05/national/northKorea/North-Koreans-entering-Russia-surge-to-13000-suggests-labor-deal-amid-Ukraine-war-/2235761;Chae Yun-hwan, “Thousands of N.K. Laborers Sent to Work in Russia in 2024: S. Korea’s Spy Agency,” Yonhap News Agency, February 9, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk

^[25] Kim Arin, “$200m a Year, 700,000 Tons of Rice, Space Tech: The Deal for North Korea in Joining Russia’s War,” The Korea Herald, November 13, 2024, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3845784

^[26] “Over 3,700 North Koreans Visited Russia in Q3 for ‘Studies’: Report,” Korea JoongAng Daily, November 10, 2024, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-11-09/national/northKorea/Over-3700-North-Koreans-visited-Russia-in-Q3-for-studies-report/2174255; Yojana Sharma, “More Students to Be Sent to Russia – But Is It a Ploy?,” University World News, April 18, 2024, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20240418083544694

^[27] “$263m a Year, 700,000 Tonnes of Rice, Space Tech: The Deal for North Korea Joining Russia’s War,” The Straits Times, November 4, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/us200m-a-year-700000-tonnes-of-rice-space-tech-the-deal-for-north-korea-joining-russias-war

^[28] “Russia Sends 100 ‘Elite Goats’ to North Korea,” Newsweek, December 10, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-sends-north-korea-elite-goats-1998315

^[29] UN Comtrade Database, “Free Access to Detailed Global Trade Data,” United Nations, https://comtradeplus.un.org.

^[30] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Meets Secretary of Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu”

^[31] “Russia, North Korea to Hold Intergovernmental Commission’s Meeting Soon,” TASS, November 5, 2024, https://tass.com/politics/1867263

^[32] Anton Sokolin, “North Korea, Russia Reach Deals on Expanding Ties In Tourism, Education and More,” NK News, November 20, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/north-korea-russia-reach-deals-on-expanding-ties-in-tourism-education-and-more/

^[33] “Russian Firm Begins Attracting Tourists to N. Korea’s New Kalma Tourist Zone,” The Korea Times, January 24, 2025, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20250124/russian-firm-begins-bringing-tourists-to-north-koreas-kalma-tourist-zone

^[34] “Russian Firm Begins Attracting Tourists to N. Korea’s New Kalma Tourist Zone”

^[35] “Train Service between Moscow and North Korea’s Pyongyang to Resume This Month, Says Russia,” Reuters, June 9, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/train-service-between-moscow-north-koreas-pyongyang-resume-this-month-says-2025-06-09/

^[36] Xinyi Wu, “As Pyongyang Marathon Returns, North Korea’s Tourism Remains Frozen amid Russian Pivot,” South China Morning Post, May 5, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3308928/pyongyang-marathon-returns-north-koreas-tourism-remains-frozen-amid-russian-pivot

^[37] “Russia Agrees to NK doctors’ Internships in Moscow Hospitals, Pharmaceuticals Modernization,” The Korea Times, March 25, 2025, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20250325/russia-agrees-to-north-korea-doctors-internships-in-moscow-hospitals-pharmaceuticals-modernization

^[38] Taejun Kang, “Russia, North Korea Sign Deal to Fight Infectious Diseases,” Radio Free Asia, August 6, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/russia-north-korea-medical-cooperation-08062024231835.html

^[39] Anton Sokolin, “Russian Students from Elite University Arrive in North Korea for Exchange,” NK News, August 23, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/08/russian-students-from-elite-university-arrive-in-north-korea-for-exchange/

^[40] Anton Sokolin, “Russia Expands Agriculture Exports to North Korea in 2024 amid Burgeoning Ties,” NK News, April 8, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/russian-expands-agriculture-exports-in-2024-to-north-korea-amid-burgeoning-ties/

^[41] “Top N. Korean Agriculture Official Departs for Russia,” The Korea Times, April 21, 2024,  https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20240421/top-north-korean-agriculture-official-departs-for-russia

^[42] Anton Sokolin, “Sanctioned Peanuts and Other North Korea Goods Set to Enter Russia: Records,” NK News, May 26, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/sanctioned-peanuts-and-other-north-korean-goods-set-to-enter-russia-records/

^[43] Abhishek Sharma and Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash, “Russia, North Korea and the East Asian Security Order,” Observer Research Foundation, July 8, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russia-north-korea-sign-a-new-treaty

^[44] Khang Vu, “Why China and North Korea Decided to Renew a 60-Year-Old Treaty,” The Interpreter, July 30, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-north-korea-decided-renew-60-year-old-treaty

Annexure

• International Affairs
• Russia and Eurasia
• East Asia
• arms imports
• cybersecurity
• military cooperation
• Northeast Asia security
• Putin Pyongyang visit
• Russia-North Korea ties
• strategic partnership
• Ukraine invasion
• UN resolution
• US policy shift

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.