Introduction

How relevant is the Rajya Sabha, the Upper House of Parliament, to Indian parliamentary democracy? It is a question which has been debated repeatedly ever since the institution’s inception in 1952, with critics calling for the curtailment of its powers^[1] or even its outright abolition.^[2]

First, since the Lok Sabha (the Lower House) is the directly elected house that holds the central government accountable, the logic of having a Rajya Sabha with fewer powers as a counterweight often comes under question. Second, although the Rajya Sabha was envisaged as a house of “notables”, as a departure from the typically partisan electoral politics of the lower house, it has, over the years, witnessed disruptions and political logjams similar to those seen in the Lok Sabha,^[3] leading to delays in passing crucial legislation. Third, the Rajya Sabha has been critiqued for not fulfilling its mandate of adequately representing the interests of the states within India’s federal structure. Though the Constitution’s framers decided to constitute an upper house after much debate,^[4] its critics claim it is not adding any value to the legislative process and merely duplicates the work of the Lok Sabha.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, there are an equal number of voices^[5] who find the Upper House and its role extremely critical to preserving a balance in the country’s parliamentary democracy and that it remains an important platform of resistance to the majoritarianism of the Lok Sabha.^[6] Some analysts view it as a house of “revision” and a forum for the articulation of states’ rights.^[7] They argue that as the second and permanent chamber comprising diverse talent and expertise, it offers checks and balances and ensures greater executive accountability.^[8] In short, they maintain that bicameralism benefits a federal constitution to institutionalise the principles and mechanisms of power-sharing between the Centre and the states.

This paper assesses the dynamics in the functioning of the Rajya Sabha in the past seven decades, analyses its challenges, and suggests institutional reforms to strengthen its utility.

The Origins of Bicameralism in India

Nearly one-third of the world’s parliaments are bicameral in nature.^[9] Notable examples include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Apart from its function of oversight on the actions of the Lower House, the Upper House has the crucial role of representing regional or sub-national governments or provincial interests, especially in countries with a federal political system.^[10]

Many nations, either with or without a federal system, have opted for a second legislative chamber, often with its own unique characteristics and functions, to work alongside and counterbalance the primary chamber. Critics of bicameralism argue that, in certain situations, the existence of a second chamber leads to complications, delays, and additional expenses without offering significant advantages. Still, in India, with its diverse federal polity, the Rajya Sabha has evolved into a crucial body to represent state interests, with representatives from parties ruling in the states as a counterweight to the unilateral control of the central ruling party in the Lok Sabha.^[11]

Mandate Upon Inception

India was reasonably familiar with bicameralism even under colonial rule. The concept was introduced in the Indian Constitution Bill of 1895;^[a] it found further resonance in the Government of India Act, 1919. The Motilal Nehru Committee Report of 1928 also recommended a federal second chamber. Further proposals for setting up a second chamber were put forward in the Government of India Act, 1935.^[12]

The rationale for a second chamber came under greater scrutiny in the Constituent Assembly debates, where members passionately debated its necessity, nature and powers. While some prominent members charged that having a second chamber would only waste public resources and time as well,^[b] others reposed faith in it as a forum that would rein in “passions of the moment” in the popularly elected house by accommodating the concerns of the states.^[13] Assembly member A. Ayyangar remarked that the second chamber ought to be a reflective platform where “the genius of people may have full play”^[c] and could be a place for people “who may not be able to win a popular mandate”.^[14] Noting its importance in parliamentary democracy, member Loknath Misra, despite his initial scepticism, termed the idea of the second chamber as “(a) sobering House, a reviewing House, a House standing for quality, and the members will be exercising their right to be heard on the merits of what they say, for their sobriety and knowledge of special problems; quantity; that is, their number, is not much of moment.”^[15]

In short, despite the reservations of some members, the Constituent Assembly was clear on the need to have a second chamber. It formed the Union Constitution Committee, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru himself, to present an extensive report on what the design and operation of the future legislature should be. The report recommended establishing a two-chamber legislature, where the legislative entity known as the Council of States or Rajya Sabha was given the duty of uniting the nation. It was expected to achieve this by representing the interests of the states and union territories. B.R. Ambedkar, who chaired the drafting committee of the Constitution, underscored this role of the second chamber during a crucial discussion in the Constituent Assembly, acknowledging that the Council of States inherently “represented the States.”^[16]

Limitations of the Mandate

Even while reiterating the Upper House’s importance in the parliamentary system, those drafting the Constitution positioned the Lower House as the key chamber of democratic governance. Unlike the Lok Sabha members of Parliament (MPs), those of the Rajya Sabha are indirectly elected (by state legislators). Direct elections, of the kind some other federal countries such as the US, have adopted, were consciously avoided.

While the Rajya Sabha enjoys equal powers with respect to deliberative functions, bills related to financial issues can only be introduced in the Lok Sabha and cannot be rejected by the Rajya Sabha. At most, the Rajya Sabha can send such bills back to the Lok Sabha for reconsideration, which by implication means that the Rajya Sabha has an insignificant role in the country’s financial matters.

With all other bills, the Rajya Sabha enjoys equal powers as the Lok Sabha; it can veto their passage even after they have been passed by the latter. The Union Budget (including the Railway Budget which was a separate entity until it was merged with the Union Budget in 2019) has to be placed in both the houses of Parliament, and the Rajya Sabha members are included in key financial committees of Parliament, such as the Committee on Public Accounts and that on Public Undertakings.^[17]

What is more consequential in terms of the power inequity between the two houses is that the government or the executive branch is accountable solely to the Lok Sabha under Article 75(3). The Rajya Sabha does not possess any authority to form or dissolve the government.

Thus, the Upper House is a comparatively weaker body. However, the framers of the Constitution attempted for a balance and gave the Rajya Sabha a number of special powers. Unlike the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha is a permanent house that cannot be dissolved. One-third of its members retire every two years. This guarantees the uninterrupted functioning of Parliament even when the Lok Sabha is dissolved. It also encourages a blend of experienced and new members in the Rajya Sabha. A member elected to serve a full term maintains their membership for six years and is eligible for re-election. However, if a member fills a seat that has become vacant due to resignation or other reasons, they serve only for the remainder of the original term.

Nonetheless, the government is equally answerable to the Rajya Sabha, which becomes particularly significant when the ruling party lacks a majority in the Rajya Sabha. In such cases, it is possible for a deadlock to arise between the two houses. Coming to bills seeking to amend the Constitution, the Constitution mandates that they can only be passed if both houses do so, with the specific majority outlined in Article 368. Matters such as the impeachment of the President or the Vice-President, the indictment of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, approval of a declaration of emergency, and enactment of ordinances need to be approved by both houses of Parliament.^[18] The Rajya Sabha also has special powers to declare any state subject^[d] a matter of national importance for Parliament to legislate on it. It is also the house with the authority to sanction the setting up of new All India Services, crucial for the functioning of the bureaucracy, if the need arises.

Since it was constitutionally envisioned as a house to represent federal interests, the rest of the paper will review the Rajya Sabha’s role as a vanguard of the federal structure.

Expectations and Reality

A House of Deliberation and Revision

The Rajya Sabha, in its more than seven decades of existence, has seen both failures and successes. In legislative business, its track record in initiating legislative actions underscores that despite being the second chamber, it cannot be regarded as secondary to the popularly elected Lower House. On numerous occasions, the Rajya Sabha has suggested amendments to bills passed by the Lok Sabha, ultimately accepted, especially on matters that directly impact governance at the state level. These have included important bills such as the Income Tax (Amendment) Bill, 1961; the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Bill, 1971; the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976; the Government of Union Territories (Amendment) Bill, 1977; and the Delhi Administration (Amendment) Bill, 1977.

Often in the past, when ruling central governments lacked a majority in the Rajya Sabha and regional parties had greater representation, the Rajya Sabha truly acted as a forum for the states. For about 40 of the 76 years of Independence, including the last 32, ruling governments have not held a majority in the Upper House. In all these years, barring in a few cases, the Rajya Sabha has played an active role in strengthening the law-making process without being obstructionist. In 1970, for example, the Constitution (24^th Amendment) Bill, aimed at abolishing ‘privy purses’—the privileges and allowances of former princely rulers—was approved by the Lok Sabha but defeated in the Rajya Sabha.^[e]

The Rajya Sabha has also often asserted its influence beyond a mere reviewing role. In 1978, for instance, it sought changes in the Constitution (45^th Amendment) Bill, which were accepted by the Lok Sabha, and included in the resulting Constitution (44^th Amendment) Act, 1978.^[f] This was a crucial amendment, as it restored the fundamental rights taken away by the 42^nd amendment, passed in November 1976 when the internal Emergency (June 1975-March 1977) prevailed. Among other features, it also redefined fundamental rights, removing the right to property from the list of such rights, but at the same time reinforcing the right to life and liberty. It introduced safeguards against any future misuse of emergency provisions and ensured the media’s right to freely report on the proceedings of Parliament and state legislatures. Again, in 1989, the Rajya Sabha rejected both the Constitution (64^th Amendment) Bill and the Constitution (65^th Amendment) Bill, relating to panchayati raj (rural self-governing bodies) and nagar palikas (urban local bodies), respectively, which had been approved by the Lok Sabha.^[g] Similarly, in 2002, it declined to pass the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2001, in the form that had been approved by the Lok Sabha.^[h] In the recent years too, the Rajya Sabha has, on several occasions, used the veto when governments have sought to use their Lok Sabha majority to pass legislations without proper deliberation.

The most prominent example of this was the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2015, which the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government, which has ruled at the Centre since 2014, passed with full majority in the lower house. However, the strong reservations expressed against it in the Rajya Sabha led to the bill being withdrawn without being put to vote.^[i],[19] Similarly, the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Bill, 2014, and the Insurance Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2017, faced strong opposition and delays in the Upper House, though they were eventually passed.

Though bills are usually voted on in the Rajya Sabha only after they have been endorsed in the Lok Sabha, in certain instances, it has been the other way round. It was the Rajya Sabha, for instance, which first passed the bill outlawing ‘untouchability’ in 1954; the bill that established the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (1956); the bill that made giving and accepting dowry a criminal offence (1959); and the much discussed Right to Education bill (2009). The controversial Women’s Reservation bill,^[j] in legislative terms called the Constitution (108th Amendment) Bill, was also passed by the Rajya Sabha in 2010, though the uproar over its contentious clauses prevented it from even being introduced in the Lok Sabha. It was finally passed by the Lok Sabha in 2023.

How often has the Rajya Sabha employed the two special powers it has—that of allowing Parliament to legislate on subjects that are the states’ domain, and that of setting up new all India services? The first power is conferred under Article 249 and has been used on two occasions: in 1952 and 1986.  The first instance when this provision was exercised was in July 1952 empowering the Parliament to make laws on entries 26 and 27 of the State List. This led to the continuation of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Amendment Act, 1950 and the Supply and Prices of Goods Act, 1950. The Rajya Sabha adopted the second resolution in August 1986 permitting the Parliament to legislate on Entries 1, 2, 4, 64, 65 and 66 of the State List, but no law was enacted in pursuance of this resolution.^[20] The second is under Article 312, and resolutions passed under it in 1961 and 1965 led to the setting up of several new services, including the Indian Engineering Service, the Indian Forest Service, the Indian Medical and Health Service, the Indian Agricultural Service, and the Indian Educational Service.

A House of Obstruction and Disruption

Despite its largely positive record, the upper house has also at times been accused of being “obstructionist”, of delaying and sometimes blocking crucial bills passed by the lower house.^[21] Some of the Rajya Sabha’s interventions mentioned earlier in this paper, such as on the privy purses bill of 1970, the panchayati raj and nagar palika bills of 1989, or the anti-terrorism bill of 2002,^[22] have been deemed by its critics as obstructions to ‘progressive’ legislation. They also add the Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill, 1977, to the list.^[k]

The Rajya Sabha has also been found to be following in the footsteps of the Lok Sabha in terms of legislative disruptions. The Lok Sabha, which historically has seen standoffs between the ruling party and the opposition, leading to the latter walking out or boycotting the house, or has indulged in such unruly behaviour that the Speaker has had to adjourn the house early. The Rajya Sabha, up until the mid-1990s, exhibited much more sobriety, consistently utilising fully its scheduled sitting time, and sometimes even continuing overtime. It was in the last three decades, as the data suggests, that the upper house’s productivity has seen a sharp decline.^[23] From 1995 to 1997, it stood at 95 percent; between 1998 and 2003, at 90 percent; between 2004 and 2013, at about 80 percent. From 2014 to 2021, its productivity has been 74 percent, with the lowest being 40 percent in 2018. (However, the productivity of the last eight sessions (from the 249th to the 256th) has been notably higher than in the 2014-2021 period.)^[24]

Even so, this decline has a bearing on the Rajya Sabha’s role as a house of oversight and deliberation. The time it can devote to each of its functions gets reduced. From 1978 to 2004, for instance, the Rajya Sabha spent 39.50 percent of its total functioning time ensuring the accountability of the executive, but the figure fell to 21.99 percent during 2005-14 and lower further to 12.34 percent in 2015-19.^[25]

Structural Impediments to Rajya Sabha’s Effectiveness

Behind the steady decline of the upper house as a forum of oversight and deliberation lie a number of structural and procedural factors. The following paragraphs discuss the most crucial.

A ‘Parking Lot’ for Wealthy Candidates

Although the Rajya Sabha is often touted as the ‘house of elders’, there are no enabling provisions in the Constitution to ensure that only well-qualified members get elected to the chamber. In the absence of institutional norms, political parties choose nominees according to their own criteria, often selecting individuals without the requisite qualifications to become a lawmaker. As many as 36 percent of the current Rajya Sabha’s members have criminal antecedents.^[26]

There is also evidence that the selection of candidates is, in many cases, no more than the “auctioning” of Rajya Sabha seats in exchange of financing for the concerned political party.^[27] This has made financial muscle a key factor in selection, leading to dramatic changes in the composition and characteristics of Rajya Sabha members in the last few decades. Not surprisingly, the average worth of a Rajya Sabha member was INR 79.54 crore in 2024.^[28] Of the 226 sitting Rajya Sabha members (out of a total of 245) surveyed by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), as many as 197 (87 percent) were found to have assets of over INR 1 crore, with a substantial 12 percent being billionaires, who include real estate and mining barons.^[29]

Again, as per Article 80(3) of the Constitution, 12 members of the Rajya Sabha are directly nominated by the president, people with “special knowledge or practical experience” in “literature, science, art or social service”. The provision was expected to bring in a plurality of voices and expertise. In practice, however, the selection of such nominated members over the years has become largely political, with individuals being chosen for their proximity to the ruling party.^[30],[31] Should they want to, nominated members are allowed to align with a political party within the first six months of taking oath;^[32] in recent times, a growing number have been doing so.^[33]

The changing composition of membership and the politicisation of the nature of business in the upper house is, to a great extent, responsible for it mirroring the less savoury aspects of the Lok Sabha’s functioning—frequent stand-offs between the ruling party and opposition members, adjournments, and members resorting to behaviour unbecoming of legislators.^[34] Such practices have harmed the reputation of the Rajya Sabha as a ‘house of elders’ and seriously jeopardised its capacity to exclusively represent state interests.

Dilution of Domicile Rules

What has further worsened the quality of members of the upper house is the dilution of the domicile requirement. Since the Rajya Sabha was to represent the interests of states, Rajya Sabha members were required to be domiciled in the states they represent. In 2003, the government amended the Representation of People Act, 1951, to remove the domicile requirement. Though this was challenged, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)^[35] that it was not a federal principle that the Rajya Sabha representative of a state should be an “ordinary resident” of the state as well. It pointed out that in the Government of India Act, 1919, no such requirement had existed, nor in its successor, the Government of India Act, 1935. It ruled that the objective of the upper house was to “hold dignified debates on important issues and to share the experience of seasoned persons who were expected to participate in the debate with an amount of learning,” and thus domicile was not an essential criterion.

However, critics of the ruling argue that since Rajya Sabha members (barring the nominated ones) do represent particular states, they are unlikely to be conversant with its problems and issues unless they too reside in it.^[36] The removal of the domicile requirement has enabled political parties to accommodate their favourites—including those who may have lost elections to the Lok Sabha—in the Rajya Sabha, individuals who may have nothing to do with the state they are representing, and this in turn leads such members to prioritise their party above that state.^[37] In 2019, the Rajya Sabha had 41 members who did not meet the domicile requirement.^[38] The same amendment which diluted the domiciliary requirement also specified that voting in Rajya Sabha elections should be ‘open’—members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) of states had to show their party-appointed representative whom they were voting for before casting their vote, and any deviation from the party’s instructions could lead to disciplinary action against the MLA. These two changes have made the Rajya Sabha less a representative body of states and more of a jousting platform for political parties.

The ‘Money Bill’ Disadvantage

Article 110 of the Constitution defines the ambit of a ‘money bill’, setting out the specific financial matters that come within its scope. Article 109 gives the Lok Sabha considerably more authority in dealing with money bills than the Rajya Sabha—it specifies that such bills go to the latter only after they have been passed by the former, and while the Rajya Sabha can make suggestions relating to them, the Lok Sabha is under no obligation to accept them; even if the Rajya Sabha rejects a money bill, it will be deemed to have been passed by both houses.^[39]

Who decides whether a specific bill is a money bill or not? The authority rests solely with the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Rajya Sabha cannot challenge their decision. Over the years, there have been allegations that many bills which do not strictly fall within the scope of a ‘money bill’ have been declared as such by the Lok Sabha Speaker, thereby bypassing the Rajya Sabha, especially when the central government does not have a majority there.^[40],[41]

Some of the instances in which this advantage was employed in recent years to sidestep the Rajya Sabha were the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2017, and the Finance Bill 2018.^[42] While the Supreme Court has ruled that the Speaker’s decision can be challenged in court, no ruling has as yet been upturned by judicial scrutiny.^[43] However, a Supreme Court bench is currently considering the validity of certain legislations pushed through the money bill route.^[44]

Another issue is whether Rajya Sabha members should be subject to the anti-defection law,^[l] passed in 1985 to protect the stability of elected governments. However, the survival of a popularly elected government is decided on the basis of its support in the Lok Sabha (or in the case of the states, in their legislative assemblies) and not in the Rajya Sabha; even if the comparative numerical strength of different parties in the Rajya Sabha changes, it does not threaten the stability of the government. It has thus been argued that keeping upper house members within the bounds of the anti-defection law is unwarranted. One of its consequences is that it forces upper house MPs to vote the way their party chiefs dictate, compromising the role of the Rajya Sabha as a revisionary chamber. Institutional reform to liberate Rajya Sabha members from the shackles of the anti-defection law is thus much needed.

Recommendations

The Rajya Sabha’s role in Indian politics may have been limited and largely ceremonial during the first four decades after Independence, when the Congress party dominated the political landscape in India. In the coalition era, however, which began at the Centre from 1990—when no single party secured a majority in general elections and parties had to form alliances to run governments—it played an extremely critical role. The coalition era saw smaller, regional parties gaining clout, as their support or opposition could determine the fate of governments. This, in turn, marked the Rajya Sabha as a conduit between the Centre and the states, increasing its importance considerably. On numerous occasions, the upper house shaped legislation and policies that protected the interests of states.

However, with the re-emergence of one-party dominance since 2014—this time, of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—the Rajya Sabha is once again facing increasing challenge as a house of review. Although the BJP on its own remains in a minority in the upper house—with 98 seats out of the 245 at present—it has forged strong alliances with select regional parties (the National Democratic Alliance grouping) which enable it to get crucial bills passed without much difficulty. Enjoying comfortable majority in the Lok Sabha (from 2014 till at least the last general election of 2024), it has also been accused of using money bills to undercut the role of the Rajya Sabha.^[45]

Political considerations always guided the choice of Rajya Sabha candidates, but this has become much more blatant since the BJP acquired an absolute majority in the lower house.^[46] This increased politicisation, alongside the shrinking of the Rajya Sabha’s influence in the last decade, has led many analysts to call for its reform and further strengthening^[47] to check against majoritarian tendencies.

The Ranjit Singh Sarkaria Commission, set up to examine the relationship between the Centre and the states, made a number of recommendations in its 1987 report for improved Rajya Sabha functioning. Subsequently, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), which submitted its report in 2002, considered the specific question of removing the domiciliary requirement for Rajya Sabha candidates, and opposed it, calling it “inappropriate” as it “compromised the basic federal character of the body”.^[m],[48] Other review committees have also suggested reforms such as the adoption of secret ballot in Rajya Sabha elections, greater time allotment for debates and deliberations in the house, and an established procedure for choosing the nominated members.^[49] The Madan Mohan Punchhi Commission, tasked with re-examining Centre-state relations (given that much time had elapsed since the Sarkaria Commission’s report), delivered its own report in 2010, making a host of recommendations, among which it suggested that the electoral college which chooses Rajya Sabha members could be expanded to include panchayats and municipalities as well. It also advocated strengthening the functioning of the committees of the house.^[50]

A few of these numerous recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Rajya Sabha are highlighted in the following points.

Delimitation: Make the Upper House More Representative  

The existing system of representation based on population provides undue advantage to large states. While the most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, has 31 seats, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, Goa, and the union territory of Puducherry have just one seat each in the upper house. Given that the number of Lok Sabha seats from each state was fixed on the basis of population (by delimitation in 1971), thereby providing populous states a high number of seats, the Rajya Sabha needs to devise more equitable means to ensure fair representation from all the states. With a fresh delimitation exercise to increase the number of parliamentary seats being considered—tentatively scheduled for 2026—which will likely give the more populous states even more seats than they presently have,^[51] the Rajya Sabha could be made a forum where every state has equal representation irrespective of population, so as to partially make up for the fallout of the fresh delimitation exercise.^[n] Such a step might even reduce the political mudslinging that Rajya Sabha elections have witnessed in recent years. Also, as the Punchchi committee suggested, local self-governing bodies could be given a role in electing Rajya Sabha members, which would make the Rajya Sabha more representative of the states right down to the grassroots level of governance.^[52]

Although the Rajya Sabha is called the ‘permanent house’, since its members retire by rotation, in practice, it never meets when the Lok Sabha is not in session.^[o],[53] To underline the Rajya Sabha’s relevance as a ‘permanent or continuing house’, its sessions could be convened independent of the Lok Sabha.

Table 1: Current Seat Allotments in the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha (Frozen Since 1971)

State	% of Population	% of RS Seats	% of LS Seats
Uttar Pradesh	16.12	14.72	16.28
Maharashtra	9.20	8.23	8.62
Tamil Nadu	7.52	7.79	7.74
Karnataka	5.34	5.19	5.17
Punjab	2.47	3.03	2.49
Haryana	1.83	2.16	1.72
Puducherry	0.09	0.43	0.19

Reframe the Membership Rules

The domicile rule that prevailed before 2003 must be restored by amending Section 3 of the Representation of the People’s Act if the Rajya Sabha is to prevent further encroachment on the rights of states. Only those who belong to a particular state or at least have lived there for five years prior to the election should be considered eligible candidates.^[54] This will make elected MPs more accountable, leading them to raise more state-specific concerns in the house.^[55]

One vital, structural change can also be considered to reduce the excessive politicisation that the upper house has lately seen. It could be made statutory that half the members elected from each state should be persons of eminence, not directly affiliated to any political party, thereby striking a careful balance between professional politicians and concerned citizens. A simple amendment to Article 80 of the Constitution can bring this about.

Ensure Parity in Financial Powers

As Rajya Sabha MP from Bihar, Manoj Kumar Jha, recently noted in a newspaper column, a hindrance to the upper house’s legitimacy and effectiveness is lack of financial powers. To make it effective, money bills must be brought under its purview as well.^[56] This will lead to a better articulation of states’ concerns in the house and strengthen the premise of cooperative and competitive federalism. Lok Sabha members are usually preoccupied with immediate concerns relating to their parliamentary constituencies, and the need to get re-nominated and re-elected, that they have little time for nuanced discussions about the different concerns of states. Rajya Sabha MPs can take this up to a much greater extent than at present.

Repeal or Amend the Anti-Defection Law

The anti-defection law lays too much emphasis on party discipline and too little on MPs’ parliamentary privilege of free speech—this needs to be suitably amended. It should be made applicable—especially in the case of the Rajya Sabha—only when a member votes against the party whip on a no-confidence motion or a finance bill.

Strengthen the Rajya Sabha’s Effectiveness in Deliberating Federal Concerns

India’s post-Independence political history shows that even though the Rajya Sabha was constitutionally envisaged to be a council of states, the Centre has never used it to address Centre-state matters. The examples are many: during the 1999 Kargil war, for instance, when then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was seeking a politically united response to the Pakistani incursion, he reached out to opposition parties—many of them state-level regional parties—in different ways, but never through the aegis of the Rajya Sabha. Whenever the current government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi too, seeks a consensus with other parties on any important issue, it does so outside the purview of the Rajya Sabha.

With the Planning Commission abolished in 2014,^[p] and the Inter-State Council^[q] remaining a non-starter, the Rajya Sabha, with its galaxy of experienced lawmakers and experts, could be a crucial forum to mediate on contentious issues between the Centre and the states. One of the ways the government can use its vast pool of resources is by endorsing the role of parliamentary committees. Unfortunately, the recent years have seen a massive dip in the government referring crucial bills to parliamentary committees.^[r],[57]

Conclusion

Successful democracies have complex systems of checks and balances. Winning an election does not and should not give untrammelled power to the winning party or coalition that forms the government. As a house of constructive stability and reason, the Rajya Sabha’s role and legitimacy in a large and complex federal system needs to be strengthened—and not reduced as some members have occasionally suggested. At a time when Centre-state relations—wherever the state is ruled by an opposition party—have frayed, and there are sustained attacks on federalism, the Rajya Sabha’s envisaged role as a council of states needs to be further strengthened. This can happen only when certain structural and functional maladies impacting its performance are tackled.

Finally, the composition of the 18^th Lok Sabha elected last year might have a bearing on the functioning and political dynamics of the Rajya Sabha in the near future. In 2024, unlike in the 2014 and 2019 elections, the ruling party at the Centre was able to win only 240 seats out of 543 in the Lok Sabha, and thus did not get a majority on its own and formed the central government with the help of allies. This has meant a return to coalition politics, with possibly more space for regional parties to assert themselves. In the Rajya Sabha, with only 98 of the 245 seats, the ruling coalition might have to reach out to the smaller parties for support for passing key legislations. As a result, the Rajya Sabha may become an important institution as a forum of policy deliberation, consensus-building, and revision, and importantly, a key forum representing the interest of the states.

Though the shifting political dynamics in any given context might shape the role of the Rajya Sabha in fundamental ways, it is the structural reforms discussed in this paper that can usher in meaningful and lasting change in strengthening the role of the Upper House in Indian parliamentary discourse.

Endnotes

• Domestic Politics and Governance
• National Politics
• India

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