Introduction

The internet has established itself as the primary medium for global communication and lies at the foundation of the world as we know it today. It relies on transmitting data in the form of digital signals or bits (0’s and 1’s). The security of this data transfer is dependent on encryption protocols such as the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) encryption algorithm, most of which can be broken by quantum computers once they are practically viable (i.e. when they have sufficient qubits with enough coherence time). The solution to this problem comes in the form of quantum communication (QComm) and cryptography, which constitutes one of the three pillars of quantum technology (QT), alongside quantum computing (QC) and quantum sensors.

QComm is a diverse field encompassing multiple facets, with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) being most significant. Due to its dual-use nature,^[a] a number of nations around the world, including India, are actively pursuing QComm. However, the development of this technology presents technical hurdles that will require deft and strategic decision-making on India’s part to fructify its ambitions of establishing itself as a global leader in QT.

To appreciate the importance of developing QComm in India, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of how both QKD and PQC work, while also assessing the pros and cons of pursuing each. Analysing the strategy and accomplishments of global leaders in QComm, like China and the US, will also aid India in accelerating its own pursuit of QComm via the National Quantum Mission. This paper investigates these facets and provides recommendations that could bolster India’s attempts at effectively harnessing this critical technology in the future.

Quantum Communication: How it Works

QComm exploits the fundamental properties of nature via the laws of quantum physics to transmit information and protect it. To understand how QComm works, it is necessary to understand certain principles of quantum mechanics such as quantum superposition, quantum entanglement, and quantum teleportation.

Quantum State

A quantum state is the fundamental quantity which contains all the information regarding the quantum system under consideration, such as energy, momentum, and spin. The system can be a single particle, like an electron, or even multiple particles.

Quantum Bit or Qubits

Classical computers use bits as carriers of information which can have a value of a 0 or a 1. On the other hand, quantum computers use qubits, which are microscopic particles such as electrons, photons (particles of light), protons, and ions.

Quantum Superposition

Similar to bits in traditional data transfer, quantum communication utilises qubits, which can be a 0 or 1 or a combination (more precisely, a linear combination) of both.^[1] These qubits are usually photons, though they can also be other microscopic particles like electrons. Regardless of their exact nature, they are quantum particles, and they can exist in multiple states (which can be infinite) at the same time. This property is known as the ‘superposition principle’ in quantum mechanics.^[2]

Measurement in Quantum Theory     

Measurement in quantum physics is a more complex and sophisticated process in comparison with that of the macroscopic world typically observed. In general, a quantum particle such as a photon or electron can exist in a superposition of an infinite number of states.  It needs to be measured to determine its exact state. Doing so ’collapses’ it to one of the states, which in the case of a qubit, can be either a 0 or a 1.

Quantum Entanglement and Teleportation

Consider a particle called ‘P’. Assume that it is an unstable particle which decays into two particles, 1 and 2, one of which can be red, while the other can be blue. Once it disintegrates into its two constituent particles, assume that particle 1 goes up and 2 goes down. As soon as this occurs, it is impossible to say which particle is red and which is blue. The particle going up can be red, while the one going down can be blue, or vice versa.  In other words, both particles are in a state of superposition.

Figure 1: Understanding Quantum Entanglement

Source: Medium^[3]

The only way to find out is to perform a measurement on one of the particles. Suppose we perform a measurement on the particle going up and discover that it is red—this immediately implies that the particle going down is blue. Conversely, if we find that the particle is blue, it implies that the one going down is red. Therefore, both particles collapse to a correlated state after measurement. (In this case, it seems that the particles are in a definite state, say the upper one is red and the lower one is blue, and the uncertainty is due to the observer's lack of knowledge about the state of particles. However, in entangled particles, both particles live in a state of superposition. This means that they do not have a fixed state prior to measurement. The measurement of one causes the collapse of both to a correlated state­.) While this may not seem unusual, the paradox here is that the information has travelled instantaneously from one particle to the other, even if they are separated by a large (or even infinite) distance.

In light of Einstein’s special theory of relativity, which states that no information can travel faster than the speed of light, this constitutes an anomaly known as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen or EPR Paradox.^[4] This phenomenon of one particle’s state being dependent on that of the other is known as ‘quantum entanglement’. In technical terms, ‘entanglement’ refers to this property of a pair of particles wherein they cannot be expressed separately (as a product state) but only as a joint state. The aforementioned ability to transmit information using quantum entanglement instantaneously is used for ‘quantum state teleportation.’

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

Classical Encryption

Traditional data transmission involves sending it over channels like fibre-optic cables in the form of bits, which can be 0’s or 1’s, sent in the form of electrical or optical pulses. Classical encryption involves taking this data in the form of these bits called plain text, running it through an encryption algorithm that is based on certain complex mathematical problems, and converting it into a new bit string called ciphertext, which is an undecipherable piece of data. This process is known as ‘translation.’^[5] This is done using a ‘key’, which is required to decrypt the data as well.

There are two types of cryptography: symmetric and asymmetric. The former utilises one private key to encrypt and decrypt the information, while the latter uses two keys: one public and one private for each user.^[6] Symmetric encryption is the one which is most commonly used online for general and bulk applications.^[7] The Advanced Encryption System (AES) (which can be 128, 192, or 256-bit) is the most widely used symmetric encryption scheme. Asymmetric encryption is considered  more secure due to the employment of two keys and is more appropriate when speed alone is not of primary importance.^[8] For example, it is used in secure email communication and digital signatures for document authentication. RSA, Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are some commonly used asymmetric encryption schemes.

Quantum Encryption

In QKD, the encrypted data is transmitted in the form of classical bits while the keys used for data encryption are shared as qubits, which can be sent through traditional fibre-optic cables or  free-space communication via satellites.^[9]  Take, for example, two individuals: Alice and Bob, who wish to share a certain piece of data securely. They share a random bit string using qubits through a fibre-optic cable. Both parties extract keys by performing measurements on the qubits, followed by classical communication. This process is known as ‘key sifting’,^[10] and the extracted key is called a ‘sifted key.’

As the qubits traverse through the cable, they suffer from noise.^[11] Quantum particles like photons are incredibly susceptible to the external environment, such as temperature fluctuations and electromagnetic interactions. This causes the information they carry to decay over time. In general, it is impossible to clone a state. Therefore, any attempt at eavesdropping introduces an error between the sifted keys. The legitimate parties find the quantum bit error rate (QBER) associated with the sifted keys.^[12] If the observed QBER is higher than the expected threshold QBER due to noise, they can infer that transmission has been tampered with, and subsequently discard the key and start a fresh round of key generation again. Once they are confident the key has been safely transmitted, they can use it safely to decrypt the data.

There are several QKD schemes, with BB84 being the most popular.^[13] Though QKD is more secure than classical encryption, it still has several underlying issues, such as source authentication and side-channel attacks.

Entanglement Distribution

QKD constitutes what is known as the ‘first generation’ of quantum communication. The ’second generation’ is exemplified by entanglement distribution.^[14] In this case, pairs of entangled qubits are created, with one being sent to the sender and the other to the receiver. The qubits can, in principle, be separated by an infinite distance, though practical limitations would likely place a certain threshold on their separation. When the sender receives their entangled qubit, they can let it interact with a ‘memory qubit’ holding the required data.^[15] As soon as this takes place, the data will be transmitted to the receiver through quantum teleportation. This ensures that the transmitted data is essentially immune to hacking since the process is instantaneous and independent of the transmission channel.^[16] Therefore, even though entanglement distribution has the potential to completely transform the cybersecurity landscape, it is still in its infancy. Several practical and technical hurdles must be overcome before the technology reaches maturity, making it practically feasible. This has also given rise to the idea of the ‘quantum internet’, a hypothetical future large-scale network of devices connected by quantum communications links.^[17]

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

Despite the incredible potential held by quantum computers, they also pose an enormous threat to the current cybersecurity landscape. This is  because a large-scale quantum computer can break most current encryption protocols in a matter of seconds by utilising a quantum algorithm developed by Peter Shor in 1994.^[18] Though this may seem like a distant threat as  practical quantum computers are likely decades away, it nevertheless raises a major cybersecurity threat in the form of ‘ store now, decrypt later,’ where hackers can infiltrate databases and steal encrypted information, only to decode them years later when quantum computers become viable.^[19] A precedent for this kind of  ‘store now, decrypt later’ operation has already been set by the US’s Venona project, which was launched in 1943.^[20] It was a 37-year-long effort to decipher Soviet diplomatic communications collected by the Americans during and after the Second World War. US codebreakers, aided by allies, were able to decrypt more than 2,900 cables from thousands of messages sent by Soviet intelligence agencies between 1940 and 1948.^[21]

The solution to this ensuing threat comes in the form of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) or Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic (QRC) algorithms. All encryption algorithms are based on certain complex mathematical problems, which are incredibly complex to solve, even for the most powerful computers. For instance, the commonly used RSA encryption scheme is based on the well-known problem of prime factorisation, which is particularly difficult to solve, given that the number of bits in the keys is large.^[22] This, however, is a simple task for quantum computers using Shor’s algorithm. PQC algorithms are based on mathematical problems which are complex even for quantum computers. The most common one is based on lattice cryptography.^[23]

Applications

QKD

As mentioned earlier, QKD can, in principle, provide secure transmission of information since any eavesdropping can be easily detected. QKD has important implications for the military since it inherently requires secure communication. Similarly, it can also be incredibly useful for other sectors which have similar security requirements, such as government databases, critical infrastructure, and financial and banking operations.

Distributed Quantum Computing

It uses entanglement distribution across multiple quantum information processors or computers for quantum computation.^[24] At short distances (device or lab-scale), quantum networks are needed to connect modular quantum processors to create larger-scale quantum computers. This approach to quantum computing offers a path to overcome potential architectural constraints that would limit the number of qubits in a single quantum processor. At long distances, quantum networking has vastly different requirements than shorter length scale quantum networks—namely, the requirement of quantum repeaters.^[25] Connecting quantum computers across large distances through quantum networks may potentially enable joint quantum computation using remote quantum computers when sufficient capacity is not available locally.

Distributed Quantum Sensing

This uses quantum entanglement shared across separate quantum sensors to achieve measurements with a sensitivity and/or precision beyond the classical or single quantum sensor limit.^[26] For example, one envisioned application utilises entanglement distribution for very long baseline interferometry for improved astronomical observations. Another application may be entangled atomic clocks to enable precise geodesy measurements for scientific, industrial, or civil engineering applications.^[27] As with distributed quantum computing, practical challenges will require further technological advancements. Additionally, because quantum sensors are poised to offer near-term impacts, networked quantum sensors could serve as an earlier-term demonstrator for quantum networking.

PQC

Cybersecurity faces a looming threat in the form of quantum computers in the future. However, it also needs to contend with the current threat of ‘harvest now, decrypt later’. While QKD and the quantum internet can counter these threats, it will likely take decades before they are practically feasible. Consequently, the migration to PQC will ensure continued and robust cybersecurity in the near future.

QKD vs. PQC

While QKD is based on hardware implementation, PQC is exclusively reliant on software implementation. As such, the former presents a long-term goal while the latter is gaining acceptance more as a short-term endeavour. However, both present their own share of challenges.

Though QKD and subsequently, the quantum internet offers virtually air-tight secure communication, several practical hurdles must be overcome before it becomes viable on a commercial scale. The biggest obstacle faced by most quantum technologies, and QComm in particular, is due to the phenomenon of quantum decoherence, particularly when it comes to entanglement distribution.^[28] The decoherence of a quantum state is due to interaction with the environment. It cannot be fully eliminated, but only minimised. This is done using ‘quantum error correction.’^[29] Though there have been persistent efforts in this field and some progress has been achieved, it will likely take a long time before efficient error correction becomes a practical reality.

Additionally, QComm systems require extremely sophisticated hardware and possess stringent performance requirements. This includes components such as dilution refrigerators, photon detectors, quantum repeaters and quantum memories, most of which are in their nascent stages of development and consequently, do not have well-established supply chains, making them prohibitively expensive.^[30] As such, large-scale implementation of QComm will require massive investment and research and correspondingly, a significant amount of time for universal establishment, which may not even be practically feasible. For example, according to one estimate, developing  quantum internet will require an investment of over US$1 billion and  involve a timeline ranging from 10 to 15 years.^[31]

Export control restrictions present another significant challenge to global collaboration and the seamless exchange of knowledge in QComm, particularly in the transfer of technology and hardware components. Nations around the world, including the US, China, the UK, and multiple European Union (EU) member-states like France, Spain and the Netherlands, have enacted export control regulations on QT.^[32] The primary reason for this stems from the potential military application of QComm and quantum sensors, which subjects exports to heightened government scrutiny and regulation.

Developing and manufacturing QComm hardware often requires rare and exotic raw materials which are limited in supply. These include critical minerals like semiconductors and rare earth metals—silicon, germanium, cobalt, lithium and indium.^[33] The necessity of these materials presents severe supply chain constraints for QCom hardware since these minerals are found only in select locations around the world. Furthermore, China processes around 80 percent of the world’s rare earth metals.^[34] QComm requires niche materials like high-quality periodically poled nonlinear crystals such as KTP and LiNbO3, which are only produced in technologically advanced nations like China.^[35] It also requires components like superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors, which are produced only in a handful of countries like Germany, Japan, the US and Russia.^[36]

Meanwhile, the migration to PQC is more practical, at least in the short term, though it comes with its own set of challenges. The first issue is the diversity of PQC algorithms and their standardisation. There are multiple cryptography schemes available, with no clear consensus on which one is the most efficient. Likewise, there is no consensus on standardisation either, with most countries developing their own standards. Secondly, there is no guarantee that current PQC algorithms are unbreakable. Current encryption schemes, such as RSA encryption are based on well-understood and established mathematical problems such as prime factorisation. Most PQC algorithms are based on lattice encryption, which is relatively new. Though it has not been broken as of now, there is no guarantee that it will continue to be the case in the future. One possible way to address this is to employ hybrid encryption schemes, which could  come at the cost of possibly increasing the attack surface^[b] due to the employment of multiple schemes.

Migrating to PQC also involves technical challenges. For instance, PQC algorithms require more computing resources, such as memory usage and CPU cycles. Therefore, they can also potentially lead to slower performance. Compatibility with current software and applications will also need to be ensured. Mitigating side-channel attacks also appears to be more challenging with PQC algorithms. Migration to PQC will also require a larger investment while upskilling existing professionals and training new ones.

Global Scenario: An Overview of US and Chinese Initiatives

The United States

The US government has been pursuing quantum technologies, including QComm, through its National Quantum Initiative (NQI) Act, passed in December 2018.^[37] Since the passage of the NQI Act, it has invested about US$500 million in quantum networking R&D to date.^[38] Various agencies have been conducting research in QComm under the NQI, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).^[39] For instance, the DOE conducts quantum networking research and quantum communication projects focusing on entanglement generation and distribution, quantum state teleportation, classical-quantum communication coexistence, networking of quantum sensors, and the development of quantum networking architectures, protocols, components, and applications.^[40]

The DOD service labs (AFRL, ARL, and NRL) have efforts in heterogeneous quantum networking R&D, including photonic, atomic/ionic, and superconducting technologies, as well as efforts in algorithms, transduction, and joint designs of integrated ionic and photonic components.^[41] Beyond internal data routing for a quantum computer, there may yet be broader external opportunities for quantum networks, such as those being explored by DARPA’s Quantum Augmented Network (QuANET) program. In addition, DOD quantum networking testbeds include the Starfire Optical Range 1-Mile site, AFRL Distributed Quantum Networking Test Bed, and service-lab participation in the Washington Metropolitan Quantum Network Research Consortium (DC-QNet).^[42] Other programmes include  Army Research Office - Multidisciplinary University Research Initiatives (ARO MURIs) on Quantum Network Science and Entanglement, Free-space Atmospheric Link for Quantum Optical Networks (FALQON), and an Office of Naval Research- Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (ONR MURI) on Fundamental Limits of Distributed Entangled Quantum Sensing.^[43] NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) is engaged in cross-government quantum networking research and experiments with seven agencies as a member of the DC-QNet Consortium. NASA-supported research topics span quantum augmented network model adaptations, free-space quantum networking studies, link-modelling, and fibre stabilisation.^[44]

In terms of notable achievements, the US launched a fibre-optic quantum network spanning 26 miles in 2020, connecting the DOE’s Argonne National Laboratory and Batavia, Illinois.^[45] In 2022, it was further extended by 35 miles, connecting it with southern Chicago, making it one of the largest quantum networks in the country.^[46] In December 2024, a research group at Northwestern University announced that it had successfully achieved quantum teleportation over a 30 km-long fibre-optic cable carrying traditional internet traffic.^[47] This can have significant ramifications for the future of quantum networks since it can allow the secure transfer of quantum information over long distances.

In the domain of PQC, the NIST has played a pivotal role in laying the foundation for encryption standards. In 2016, it initiated the ‘Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project’, where it invited the submission of candidate PQC algorithms.^[48] Of the 69 eligible submissions, eventually, four were selected for standardisation by the NIST i.e., CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, SPHINCS+ and FALCON. In August 2024, it finalised and released the first three of these after renaming them Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 203, FIPS 204 and FIPS 205, respectively.^[49] The NIST is also in the process of evaluating two further sets of algorithms to potentially serve as backup standards in the future. The US government also issued an executive order, National Security Memorandum 10, in April 2024, requiring it to migrate to PQC, including a rough timeline and strategy for migration.^[50] The NSA released the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite Version 2.0 in 2022, which lays out the future requirements for PQC algorithms for National Security Systems.^[51]

China

China’s national strategy on quantum technology differs from that of most nations, including the US. Rather than focusing on the long-term potential of quantum computing, China is focusing more on the security benefits offered by QComm. The reason for this most likely stems from the fact that President Xi Jinping grew particularly conscious of China’s potential communication vulnerabilities post the Edward Snowden leaks in 2013.^[52] Consequently, China prioritised QComm in its 13^th Five-Year Plan and has been working to establish itself as a leader in the field ever since.

China has embedded QT in its national strategy through the 13^th and 14^th Five-Year Plans, positioning QComm as vital to its long-term objectives. The 13^th Five-Year Plan launched a ‘megaproject’ aimed at securing breakthroughs in quantum communications and computing by 2030, including the expansion of national quantum infrastructure, the development of a quantum computer prototype, and the construction of a quantum simulator.^[53] The creation of the National Laboratory for Quantum Information Sciences, backed by over US$1 billion, alongside a separate US$10 billion investment in key projects such as the Micius satellite and the Beijing–Shanghai backbone, underscores China’s ambition to dominate quantum technology.^[54] In 2020, the Chinese president was reported to have urged the nation to accelerate its efforts in quantum technology, emphasising the need for rapid commercialisation to gain a competitive edge on the global stage. Speaking at a study session of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, local reports noted that he “called for efforts to foster strategic emerging industries such as quantum communications to gain an upper hand in international competition and build new advantages for development.”^[55]

Building on the momentum from the 13th Five-Year Plan, the 14th Plan intensifies China’s focus on quantum technology by laying out more specific and ambitious goals. It calls for the establishment of national laboratories dedicated to quantum information, a move designed to consolidate China’s leadership in this critical field.^[56] The plan prioritises the development of advanced QComm technologies across intra-city, inter-city, and free-space environments.

In terms of accomplishments, China has been solidifying its lead in the global race for secure communications, particularly in QKD, rather than focusing on PQC. It has ground-based systems that use both fibre-optic cables to securely transmit data across cities, and satellite-based systems that can connect secure communications across much longer distances.^[57] China has the most ambitious demonstration of this technology, namely through what is called the Beijing-Shanghai backbone, which is the longest QKD network in the world and stretches over 1,200 miles using fibre-optic cables.^[58] To extend the secure communication even further, China has integrated satellite links into this network. These satellite links allow data to be securely transmitted between locations that are too far apart to be connected directly by fibre optics, such as between different continents, maintaining secure quantum communication far beyond what is possible with ground-based systems alone.

China’s QKD ambitions took a step forward with the launch of the Micius satellite in 2016, a project that pushed beyond the impressive achievements of the Beijing-Shanghai backbone.^[59] Led by Pan Jianwei and his team at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), in collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Micius became the world’s first quantum science satellite. It pioneered secure quantum communication over thousands of miles, successfully transmitting quantum keys between Asia and Europe, a feat that involved collaboration with research teams in Austria. By enabling quantum key exchange across continents, Micius demonstrated the potential to build a global quantum internet.^[60] It proved that quantum communication could span the globe, moving beyond local networks to create a secure, interconnected world, far surpassing the Beijing-Shanghai backbone and marking China as a leader in the future of global secure communications.

The Indian Scenario

The Government of India approved the National Quantum Mission (NQM) on 19 April 2023 with a budget of INR6,003 crore from 2023-24 to 2030-31, aiming to seed, nurture and scale up scientific and industrial R&D, and create a vibrant and innovative ecosystem in QT.^[61] It has declared quantum computing, quantum communication, quantum sensing & metrology,  quantum materials and  devices as its four main pillars. In QComm, the NQM envisions developing satellite-based secure quantum communications between ground stations over a range of 2,000 km within India, long-distance secure quantum communications with other countries, inter-city quantum key distribution over 2,000 km, as well as multi-node quantum networks with quantum memories as some of the deliverables of the mission.^[62]

 To implement the mission, four Thematic Hubs (T – Hubs) are being set up at premiere institutions across the country, namely - Indian Institute of Science (IISc) Bengaluru for QC, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras along with Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT) New Delhi for QComm, IIT Bombay for quantum sensing and metrology, and IIT Delhi for quantum materials and devices.^[63] The T – Hubs comprise  14 Technical Groups (17 Project Teams) across 17 states and two Union Territories. They will bring together a total of 152 researchers from 43 institutions, including 31 Institutes of National Importance, eight  research laboratories, one university and  three private institutes.^[64] They are registered as Section 8 companies to provide them with greater freedom and flexibility compared to conventional funding models.^[65] The goal of each hub is to coordinate and consolidate all required activities to achieve the targets set out in the Detailed Project Report (DPR) of the mission. Additionally, the hubs will carry out translational research, incubate start-ups, create links with industries, foster international collaboration, run an outreach programme, and develop a comprehensive Human Resource Development programme to create the workforce to execute the mission.

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has made strides in QKD by successfully implementing the inter-building free space single-photon and entanglement-based QKD over a distance of 300 meters within the ISRO’s Space Applications Centre (SAC) campus.^[66] In 2022, in India, a joint team of experts from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and IIT Delhi demonstrated a 100-km fibre-based QKD link with key rates up to 10 kbps using commercial-grade underground dark optical fibre.^[67] Furthermore, in 2023, researchers at IIT-Delhi achieved a trusted-node-free QKD up to 380 km in standard telecom fibre with a very low quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 1.48 percent.^[68] In November 2024, the DRDO Industry Academia–Centre of Excellence (DIA-CoE), IIT Delhi demonstrated entanglement distribution and QKD over a 50 km fiber link in the laboratory.^[69] A separate field test has demonstrated entanglement distribution and QKD over 8 km of optical fibre in the IIT Delhi campus. Free-space entanglement distribution was demonstrated using the BBM-92 protocol between two tables separated by 20 meters in the lab and 80m in open space. Hybrid entanglement has been demonstrated in a free-space environment, achieving a QBER of around 6 percent over a distance of 10m in the lab.

C-DOT has deployed its fibre-based QKD solution between two government offices (Sanchar Bhawan, Department of Telecommunications and National Informatics Centre (NIC) Headquarters in New Delhi.^[70] The traffic between these two offices is encrypted using keys generated by the C-DOT QKD link, and the traffic has been operational since February 2023. In 2023, MAQAN (Metro Area Quantum Access Network), a collaborative effort between IIT Madras, Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), SETS, and Education and Research Network (ERNET), successfully demonstrated India’s first quantum network testbed connecting laboratories at IIT-Madras, ERNET, and SETS in a (1x2) star topology.^[71]

In the domain of PQC, C-DOT has indigenously developed two PQC products: Quantum-safe IP Encryptor and Video IP Phone, which support PQC key exchange (Crystals Kyber) and signature (Crystals Dilithium) algorithms.^[72] Successful proof-of-concept trials for both the PQC products have been conducted at various government offices/ministries like the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Cabinet Secretariat and Department of Telecommunications. Moreover, to find vulnerabilities, if any, in QKD & PQC solutions developed by C-DOT and address the same, C-DOT devised the  C-DOT Quantum Hackathon (CQuHACK 2023) with a prize money of INR 1 million for each successful break (extract a 256-bit key) for each QKD & PQC system.^[73] Furthermore, the Telecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC), an entity within the Department of Telecommunications of the Government of India, developed comprehensive Generic Requirements (GR) documents for Quantum Key Distribution Systems (TEC GR91000:2022) in 2022 ,  Quantum-Safe (PQC) and Classical Cryptographic Systems (TEC GR91010:2023) in 2023.^[74] These documents resulted from extensive consultation with multiple stakeholders and aimed to ensure the deployment of robust QKD & PQC solutions through thorough testing processes. The standard evolution process involved representatives from important academic organisations, start-ups, research and development centres, and industries in India.

Recommendations for India

1. Quantum technologies are still in their early stages of development. They require heavy investment, particularly when it comes to developing hardware. This has been further exacerbated by limited market understanding of the technology, and has led to a hesitance by startups to invest in it, specifically when it comes to QComm. Globally, there were fewer than 100 startups in QComm as of 2023, with only two hailing from India.^[75] Due to the cost-intensive nature of QComm, startups with limited resources looking to enter the field can focus on PQC rather than QKD and quantum networks.
2. QKD is more relevant for defence establishments and critical infrastructure at the moment, and it is in these sectors that it can pay the most dividends.  Therefore, this is where the focal point for the proliferation of the technology should lie, and government-backed investments and programmes like the NQM should be honed accordingly.
3. In the realm of PQC, the biggest issue stems from the fact that there are no current universal standards, making it difficult to create a long-term plan or roadmap for the migration to PQC. This is a dilemma which requires international collaboration since no country can decide a standard in isolation. The NIST standards released recently can serve as a good starting point for India till such a consensus is reached. Additionally, the Quad can offer a solid foundation for laying the groundwork and establishing a future roadmap for the migration to PQC, particularly through initiatives such as its Critical and Emerging Technology Forum and Senior Cyber Group.
4. Harmonisation between export control regulations across different nations will be key to developing QComm hardware. Encouraging initiatives like the United States–India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) and the CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors) Act will also be essential in strengthening supply chains. Organisations like the Quantum Economic Development Consortium (QED-C) and the Quantum Ecosystems Technology Council of India (QETCI) will continue to be important in coordinating efforts across multiple nations. The establishment of similar entities would be extremely useful in diminishing some of the barriers. Encouraging joint research and development (R&D) and publications across multiple nations through initiatives like the Quad would also be fruitful towards furthering collaboration.
5. The importance of QComm for military applications prompts cooperation of the NQM’s T–Hubs with the Indian military. Integration of initiatives such as the DRDO’s Technology Development Fund (TDF) and the Innovations for Defence Excellence (IDEX) programme with the NQM would be extremely beneficial.  For instance, the Indian Navy and RRI, one of the institutions involved in the aforementioned T-Hubs, have already signed an MoU to develop secure maritime communications via the use of QCom.^[76] Further combined initiatives along these lines stand to greatly benefit India’s military establishments.
6. There is a severe global lack of talent in the field of quantum technology, including in India. QComm lies at the intersection of different disciplines such as quantum mechanics, computer science engineering and cryptography. Therefore, it requires highly qualified instructors and curricula specifically designed for it. There is also limited awareness and visibility of career options in QComm. Consequently, creating a skilled workforce in the sector will be challenging.

Only a handful of institutions, such as the IITs and IISC offer courses in QComm. Creating online courses through initiatives such as NPTEL can help in this regard. Collaboration with international institutions which are established in this domain will also be beneficial. The NQM can also work on increasing fellowships and grants specifically for research in QComm. India can also leverage its position in international organisations such as the Quad to further provide research grants for Indian students through initiatives such as the Quad STEM Fellowship.

1. Technology translation is another key area for QComm. The conversion of theory to practice and commercial applications is one of the primary reasons for the lack of investment by the private sector and startups. India can learn from established precedents set by other nations in this area. For instance, the US has set up the NSF National Quantum Virtual Laboratory (NQVL) to facilitate the translation from basic science and engineering to resultant technology, while at the same time emphasising and advancing its scientific and technical value.^[77] Canada’s Quantum Valley Investments is also an endeavour seeking to commercialise QComm.^[78] India can set up a similar venture aimed specifically at the translation of QTs. The Quantum Valley Project announced by the Andhra Pradesh Government in March 2025 can play a pioneering role in this regard.^[79]
2. The sophisticated nature of QComm hardware and the intricate nature of its operation involved therein prompts the creation of QComm testbeds which are capable of handling it. A testbed enables a team of cross-disciplinary researchers to study and iteratively improve the performance of a system composed of a combination of technologies through replicable, comparative testing of different technologies, protocols, and system configurations to learn how best to implement a robust system. Establishing these testbeds will require pooling resources domestically, as well as international support. The recent announcement by the Department of Telecommunications to establish ‘Quantum Standardization and Testing Labs’ is a good step in this direction and needs to be built upon further.^[80]

Conclusion

Quantum technologies like QComm are poised to become a foundational technology in the future, similar to what semiconductors have become today. To establish a foundation in QT, India needs to act with haste, ensuring that it does not suffer the consequences of a convoluted supply chain as the world has witnessed in the case of semiconductor technology. Doing so will require gratuitous investment, planning, collaboration with international partners and geopolitical manoeuvring in a complex global technological landscape.

This is necessary for a groundbreaking technology like QComm which has the potential to alter the landscape of communication and information exchange as we know it today. Innovation and collaboration need to go hand-in-hand for nascent technologies like QComm. India is still a developing country and the NQM needs to ensure that it develops these critical technological capabilities without compromising on the country’s needs in other essential domains that require more urgent attention.

Endnotes

• Digital Inclusion
• Connectivity
• China
• India
• USA and Canada
• data security
• India
• National Quantum Mission
• post-quantum cryptography
• quantum communication
• quantum computing
• quantum cryptography
• quantum key distribution
• quantum technology
• RSA encryption

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