Introduction

Biotechnology is emerging as the next frontier in strategic technology competition. With applications in drug and vaccine development, precision medicine, biodefence, and the production of bio-based materials across multiple sectors, it holds a central role in providing health security and can potentially reshape global power dynamics.^[1] The global biotechnology market was estimated at US$1.55 trillion in 2023.^[2] Recognising the strategic importance of biotechnology, the Quad countries—the United States (US), Australia, India, and Japan—have taken measures to integrate it into their national strategies. A key challenge to advancing biotechnology is finding the balance between technological sovereignty and cooperation. Quad countries can use science diplomacy to strengthen both their own technological independence and their shared resilience against global challenges. This can be done collaboratively by shaping global norms on emerging aspects of biotechnology, co-developing technologies, and building mutually beneficial and transparent partnerships.

Biotechnology cooperation under the Quad is a powerful instrument of science diplomacy that can enable countries to leverage their strengths and capabilities to achieve gains in health security, innovation, and economic growth.

This paper examines what cooperation in biotechnology—to advance health security—under the Quad diplomatic framework can look like. Rapid advances in biological sciences, particularly since 2019, with the development of gene-edited technologies, mRNA vaccines, personalised medicine, synthetic biology, and most recently, AI-driven drug discovery, have had considerable implications for health security. It enables the surveillance of pathogens for outbreaks, the development of diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, and an understanding of the drivers of contemporary health issues. By identifying defined areas of biotechnology cooperation, the region’s interests can be advanced. Tapping into its potential within the minilateral framework can help address mounting transnational health challenges while navigating growing global uncertainties.

Setting the Context

The Indo-Pacific has evolved as a theatre of both economic interdependence and competition, where countries converge over mutual interests, often to a limited agenda, to pursue policy solutions.^[3] Accordingly, the Quad reflects the 21^st-century need for regional governance to address contemporary challenges. The Indo-Pacific, owing to its vastness and geographic diversity, faces a multitude of health challenges and climate change-induced crises.^[4] The prevention and mitigation of health threats in the Indo-Pacific region is one of the objectives of the Quad.

Towards this end, the grouping has introduced the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Fellowship to nurture the next generation of experts in these domains.^[5] The four countries engaged in vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic by supplying 400 million doses to countries in the Indo-Pacific and almost 800 million globally under COVAX. Additionally, the Quad countries contributed US$5.6 billion to COVAX Advance Market Commitment, the vaccine procurement and distribution system coordinated by Gavi.^[6] In 2023, the group announced the Quad Health Security Partnership, while last year’s Wilmington Declaration^[a] outlined plans to address equitable access to mpox vaccines and steps to improve vaccine manufacturing capacity in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). It also saw the launch of the Quad Cancer Moonshot programme to facilitate collaborations on cancer prevention and management.^[7] In addition, BioExplore, an initiative aimed at harnessing the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in biological systems for innovative applications, was also announced.

In continuation of its health-focused cooperation, the Quad has advanced new initiatives to strengthen pandemic preparedness and regional resilience. New Delhi hosted a pandemic prevention and preparedness workshop in March 2025,^[8] which emphasised strengthening regional surveillance measures against possible future pandemics through simulation exercises, leveraging technologies to improve healthcare, and promoting engagement amongst the scientific community. Further, the 2025 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting reaffirmed its commitment to emergency health responsiveness within the Indo-Pacific and its intent to harness biotechnology.^[9]

Since the start of US President Donald Trump’s second term, concern has grown over the Quad’s ability to deliver tangible benefits more effectively than other diplomatic frameworks.^[10] Trump’s return to the White House signalled a renewed preference for the Quad, while also displaying an aversion to multilateral institution-led global health diplomacy.^[11] The US’s departure from the World Health Organization (WHO) has given China an opportunity to exert more influence as a global health actor.^[12] China increased its mandatory contributions to WHO as well as its health diplomacy activities in the Indo-Pacific.^[13]

Amidst these developments, there is a unique opportunity for the imperative of health security to prompt political action and policy change. A clearly defined, goal-oriented agenda would ensure resilience in the Indo-Pacific’s health security architecture while configuring the collective stance on the event of China’s rise in the health diplomacy sphere.

China: A Catalyst for Quad Cooperation on Biotechnology

China’s growing capabilities in biotechnology are pushing the Quad to collaboratively engage in the sector. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) Critical Technology Tracker,^[b] China and the US are embroiled in an intense competition in biotechnology.^[14] The bipartisan US National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB), in a report early this year, concluded that the US will soon forfeit its global leadership in biotech to China unless it invests at least US$15 billion into the sector over the next five years.^[15] Owing to the dual-use nature of biotechnology, a large part of current policy discourse is premised around biosecurity concerns vis-à-vis China. The country’s alleged biotechnology-enabled warfare activities—through gene-editing techniques for population enhancement and advancing biological weapons development—pose a global threat.^[16]

Analyses of Chinese military texts indicate a preference for using biotechnology in the military domain, while studies report on the use by the military and a biotech company of genomic data to “enhance population quality”.^[17],[18] A May 2025 US Presidential Executive Order announced steps to “end Federal funding of dangerous gain-of-function research conducted by foreign entities in countries of concern”—i.e., China.^[19] While these discussions are critical, they dissuade policymakers from visualising biotechnology as a tool to boost scientific and economic endeavours and provide solutions to global health challenges.

China’s advancements in biotechnology signify its recognition of the sector as a national priority, facilitating long-term strategic investments. Dating back to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘opening up and reform’ policies,^[c] China now houses a robust biotechnology innovation ecosystem with superior know-how in other emerging technologies like AI, a strong clinical research infrastructure, a large talent pool, and dedicated research and development (R&D) parks and industry clusters.^[20] Holistic policies that govern innovation in science and technology (S&T) through to commercialisation have made China a contender in other critical and emerging technologies like electric vehicles, AI, and space technology—perhaps indicating that its ‘DeepSeek moment’^[d] in biotechnology may not be far away.^[21] Applying the same leverage as with critical minerals to exert geopolitical influence, its growing heft in biotechnology supply chains—covering raw materials, reagents, and genetic databases—poses parallel risks. If left unaddressed, these dependencies could constrain Quad members’ ability to respond swiftly to health crises in the same way that bottlenecks in the supply of critical minerals have hampered clean-tech transitions.^[22] To remain competitive and shape global norms, the Quad must harness its members’ collective capabilities to promote health security and build resilient biotechnology supply chains.

Further, China’s Health Silk Road (HSR)^[e] initiatives have delivered tangible benefits for many partner countries, including strengthening healthcare infrastructure and health system capacity, in addition to expanding access to essential services.^[23] Concurrently, however, the HSR raises concerns over the lack of transparency in implementation, China’s growing geopolitical influence, and questions of debt sustainability. Taking this into consideration, the Indo-Pacific requires a credible alternative that combines the tangible benefits of improved health systems with transparency, equity, and sustainability—an area where the Quad is well-positioned to provide a trusted framework for regional health security.

Lessons in Sustaining Health Security Initiatives

“History teaches by analogy,” as the adage goes. For the Quad to endure, it must be mindful of its previous policy decisions and address the failures of its COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy.^[24] Cooperation amongst Quad members intensifies on perceiving a threat from China and wanes when this perception fades, leaving the region without a defined long-term strategy to address health crises.^[25] The Quad’s vaccine diplomacy initiative was launched in response to China’s outreach in the region. The country viewed vaccine diplomacy with a commercial approach and employed technology transfer, in contrast to the Quad’s donation-based system. It utilised its HSR for transporting medical supplies and healthcare assistance.^[26] Under the Quad, the US financed vaccine production, India manufactured the doses, and Australia and Japan took part in distribution.^[27] However, it failed to deliver its pledge of 1 billion doses, while individual members’ bilateral arrangements fared better. This was primarily due to India’s devastating second COVID-19 wave in 2021, which triggered national vaccine export bans.

Compounding the challenge were issues in vaccine choice: the Quad had agreed to finance, manufacture, and distribute Johnson & Johnson’s (J&J) vaccine and Biological E’s Corbevax. A potential side effect—blood clots—prompted the US Food and Drug Administration (USFDA) to restrict the J&J vaccine. India refused to sign a liability waiver that would protect J&J from legal action over the vaccine’s potential side effects. The resultant shift to produce Corbevax ran into delays as it was an experimental vaccine that did not have WHO authorisation. As a result, the gap in the Indo-Pacific’s vaccine supply in the first half of 2021 was filled by China.

This underscores how the Quad failed to adapt to the dynamics associated with health threats and lacked a long-term vision in executing its diplomatic efforts.^[28] First, any health preparedness effort needs to take cognisance of national interests and political considerations, as evidenced by India’s prioritising its domestic population in the face of an unexpected deadly COVID-19 wave. Second, the Quad should have shown a preference for a vaccine that had already received WHO approval; India was producing Covishield at the time, and this could have been incorporated into the Quad’s ambit.

Further, recognising the Quad-China geopolitical rivalry and strategic objectives of vaccine diplomacy, some recipients of vaccine diplomacy (which included countries of the ASEAN) practised their agency over the procurement of vaccines.^[29] They showed their preferences for where to purchase their vaccines from (bilaterally or from private corporations) and chose diverse sources (a combination of donations and purchases) over donation-based mechanisms (bilaterally or through multilateral initiatives, including the Quad).

In a similar vein, the Quad could have conducted technology sharing, as China had done, and this would have addressed recipient countries’ deficiencies and improved existing capabilities, enabling recipient states to exert more autonomy. For instance, bottlenecks in vaccine production could have been alleviated if the Quad countries had invested in scaling up production, addressing the infrastructural needs of the Indo-Pacific countries that would have enabled cold storage of mRNA vaccines, or carried out technology transfers to boost the existing capabilities of recipient countries.

Lingering Contentious Issues

Challenges to Underlying Bilateral Ties

Despite these promising avenues for cooperation, the Quad will need to navigate underlying bilateral tensions that threaten to destabilise its mandate.^[30] Originally planned for this year, the Quad summit in New Delhi is likely to be convened in the first quarter of 2026 instead. This delay is attributed to the tensions between the US and other Quad members.

First, the weaponisation of trade by President Trump will have an impact on the way Quad members engage with the US. Washington had also threatened to impose tariffs on pharmaceutical imports—as high as 250 percent over the next 18 months—pending the outcome of a Section 232 investigation^[f] launched to assess the national security risk posed by certain imports. In late September, Trump announced plans to impose 100 percent tariffs on patented and branded pharmaceuticals unless the drug manufacturer was actively engaged in manufacturing on American shores.^[31],[32]

While these plans appear stalled, uncertainty over pharmaceutical tariffs has weighed heavily on Quad partners, which export products to the US. Meanwhile, at the time of writing, AUKUS^[g] is under formal review by the Trump administration. Tokyo cancelled the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue between the US and Japan in response to Washington’s demand for an increase in the former’s defence spending.^[33] India-US ties are strained with the ongoing trade negotiations, where the US doubled tariffs on Indian imports as a penalty for purchasing Russian oil, placing the total tariffs at 50 percent, and applied sanctions on Indian firms trading with Iranian oil and petroleum products.^[34]

Despite these turbulent times, India and the US, in September 2025, held their largest military exercise in Alaska. India, Japan and the US reaffirmed their commitment to the Quad during the 15^th India-Japan Annual Summit and the India-US 2+2 Intersessional Dialogue, respectively.^[35] Amidst frequent commentary by analysts and the media on the “collapse” of the Quad, the need for the coalition to realign and merge its priorities to balance China remains true.^[36]

Further, despite the US decoupling its supply chains from China through economic measures and its Biosecure Act,^[h] China has deepened its engagement with Japan in the biopharmaceutical space—a strategic contradiction with the Quad.^[37] A China-Japan Health Industry Development Cooperation Demonstration Zone has been set up in China, while Japan’s Takeda Pharmaceuticals partnered with China in digital healthcare innovation, demonstrating that the two countries are utilising biotechnology to overcome their historical tensions and are manoeuvring through the growing unpredictability under Trump 2.0.^[38] This divergence underscores the strategic imperative for the Quad to address underlying bilateral frictions if it is to function as a cohesive and effective partnership.

Further, the sudden US withdrawal from WHO and the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a key development actor, have dramatically affected the Indo-Pacific region.^[39] Data-sharing between the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and WHO has ceased, impacting surveillance of health threats, while over 100 USAID projects, including those for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, are feeling the ripple effects of Trump’s order. The region’s health security is in a vulnerable position, and the Quad is in a position to reinforce collaboration in responding to health challenges.

The Quad’s Institutional Flexibility  

The Quad’s low level of institutionalisation,^[i] whilst enabling flexibility in its conduct, hampers its progress.^[40] It consists of six leadership-level working groups, including those on health security and critical and emerging technologies, and several sub-working groups.^[41] The Trump administration has signalled^[j] that it intends to work on fewer priorities. One approach would be to merge health security and biotechnology under a single working group with defined objectives. The Quad’s statements reflect its shared principles, values, and ideals, but deepened engagement can accelerate its deployment of actionable health solutions. India will host the next Quad Summit: a critical juncture where the country can mould the specific activities of the grouping. A departure from an ad-hoc partnership into a coalition with a defined agenda to address cooperation over biotechnology is needed.

The further institutionalisation of the Quad by defining concrete areas of cooperation in biotechnology, harnessing existing R&D partnerships, identifying possible commercial partners, engaging in strategic communications for public-private partnerships (PPPs), and securing data-sharing and technology transfer pathways can shape this cooperation. This will ensure regional health security and position the Quad as a contender to China’s growing prowess in the sector.^[42]

Recommendations

For the Quad to play a more meaningful role in health security in the Indo-Pacific, it needs to cease being ad-hoc. Robust governance, financing, equity, and intelligence-sharing mechanisms are essential to lend a sense of direction and durability to its biotechnology cooperation. These structural enablers form the foundation on which sectoral partnerships can succeed.

Table 1: Building Durable Frameworks for Quad Biotechnology Cooperation

Structural Enabler	Purpose	Key Functions
Quad Biotechnology Task Force	Governance and Coordination	1. Develop a joint Quad biotechnology roadmap with rolling priorities.  2. Lead regulatory convergence in licensing, clinical trials, and intellectual property (IP) administration.  3. Serve as the coordinating hub to track progress and adapt to future health challenges.
Quad Health Security Fund	Financing and investment	1. Support collaborative vaccine R&D, infectious disease monitoring, and pandemic preparedness. 2. Mobilise private sector participation across all four countries for PPPs and other partnership models. 3. Ensure sustained funding for long-term health cooperation.
Technology Transfer and IP Sharing Platform	Equity and Access	1. Create adjusted patent-sharing arrangements or temporary IP waivers during emergencies.  2. Support contextual technology adaptation with regional partners.
Joint Health Surveillance and Data-Sharing	Intelligence and Early Warning Systems	1. Establish a cross-border health surveillance system for real-time outbreak detection. 2. Integrate surveillance with clinical trial and R&D data systems.  3. Prioritise open-data infrastructure to enable early intervention, especially in high-density populations.

Source: Author’s own.

Building on this architecture, Quad members can channel their collective capacities into concrete areas of biotechnology collaboration. Four sectoral priorities stand out, where comparative advantages align with pressing regional health needs:

1. Shared Research Infrastructure 

Establish India as the Quad’s vaccine biomanufacturing hub.

The next pandemic is likely to be caused by a respiratory-borne virus like influenza, indicating that the threat of an unprecedented need for vaccines remains stark.^[43] This provides ample incentive to bolster biomanufacturing capacity for vaccines, as immunisation is critical to health and well-being. The COVID-19 pandemic, characterised by the high demand and low supply of vaccines, demonstrated that biomanufacturing and supply chain infrastructures are critical to health security.^[44]

Biomanufacturing under the Quad requires consideration of the region’s manufacturing capabilities. India supplies 60 percent of the world’s vaccine needs^[45] and is well-positioned to establish a Quad vaccine biomanufacturing hub. The Serum Institute of India (SII)—the world’s largest manufacturer of vaccines by volume—currently sells 1.5 billion vaccines annually and has joined the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation’s (CEPI) 100-day mission to develop vaccines in response to known or emerging threats.^[46] India is a major supplier to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; in June 2020 SII entered into an agreement with Gavi and Unicef to supply 10 million doses of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine^[k] to Gavi-supported countries for the next decade.^[47] To reduce the global malaria burden, two cost-effective malaria candidates, R21/Matrix M and RTS,S, developed by Indian manufacturers, are currently distributed by Gavi. The R21/Matrix-M vaccine, also for malaria, was developed by the SII and Oxford University, while the RTS,S vaccine was developed by GlaxoSmithKline, Bharat Biotech, and the Programme for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH).^[48]

India’s experience in vaccine manufacturing offers valuable insights for framing Quad cooperation in biotechnology.^[49] Production hinges on a well-developed bioscience infrastructure, a highly skilled workforce, and strategic investments from the private sector. Vaccine manufacturing stands in contrast to the ‘fail-fast’ paradigm that is typically associated with the technology sector, wherein initiatives that do not produce immediate positive results are often discontinued. A strong biotechnology industry that displayed a CAGR (Compounded Annual Growth Rate) of 17.9 percent over the past four years is instrumental in facilitating this.^[50] In 2024, India introduced new policies—BioE3^[l] and Bio-RIDE^[m]—to expand the bioeconomy to US$300 billion by 2030 and transform into a global bio-powerhouse.

In a similar vein, Japan, Australia, and the US recognise the potential benefits of biotechnology in improving health, driving economic growth, and providing security, and have taken steps to embed the technology into their national bioeconomy strategies. To establish India as the Quad’s biomanufacturing hub, the grouping will need to invest in strengthening physical infrastructure, providing access to cutting-edge technologies, harmonising regulatory and data-sharing pathways, and encouraging workforce training facilities that focus on translating research into commercially viable products to ensure global competitiveness.^[51] The Quad can proactively engage with development partners like Gavi and vaccine manufacturers on ensuring market access and commercial viability, particularly by developing protocols to sustain routine immunisation efforts to respond to demand for mass production during epidemics or pandemics, and to introduce price subsidies during limited outbreaks where vaccine prices soar.^[52]

2. Science Diplomacy-Driven Partnerships

Strengthen Quad partnerships through IVI and ASEAN. 

To ensure vaccine R&D, the Quad can collaborate with the International Vaccine Institute (IVI), a non-profit based in South Korea, to develop select vaccine technologies. India is the only formal member of IVI among the Quad, although Australia’s Murdoch Children’s Research Institute, Japan’s Takeda Pharmaceutical Company, and the US National Institutes of Health hold partnerships with IVI on specific research agendas.^[53] These can be extended to other players who can contribute to the development of vaccines and the conducting of clinical trials for diseases like malaria, tuberculosis (TB), chikungunya, and streptococcus.^[54] The IVI can facilitate Quad engagement with ASEAN through the ASEAN Vaccine Security and Self-Reliance initiative (AVSSR).^[55] AVSSR builds on ASEAN’s intent to increase its vaccine research, development and production capabilities, and facilitates regional stockpiling mechanisms as part of pandemic preparedness.

‘One Health’ as driver of science diplomacy. 

The interconnectedness of humans, animals, plants, and the environment is recognised as the One Health approach, a multi-disciplinary method that aims to optimise health outcomes for all. The Indo-Pacific region uniquely faces a multitude of public health challenges, including an infectious disease burden, rising zoonotic spillovers, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and climate-change-induced health system vulnerabilities.^[56] The Quad has the unique opportunity to embed One Health as a pillar of its science diplomacy agenda. In contrast to a short-lived crisis response, this approach offers the grouping an opportunity to tackle health issues through a long-term strategy.

Further, it enables cross-sectoral collaboration by integrating public health, veterinary science, agriculture, environmental management, and social sciences, facilitating policy alignment, trust-building, and mutual scientific advancement. For example, during India’s 2018 and 2023 Nipah virus outbreaks, the Government of Australia (through the Queensland Department of Health) supplied the country with vital monoclonal antibodies on compassionate grounds.^[57] This extension of goodwill demonstrates how science-based partnerships founded on One Health principles can serve broad diplomatic goals and promote health security.

3. Capacity-Building Elements 

Ramp up regional infrastructure. 

Capacity-building is essential for self-reliance in vaccine manufacturing in LMICs.^[58] In countries like Indonesia and Vietnam, which hold existing vaccine manufacturing infrastructure and fall under WHO’s mRNA vaccine technology hub,^[n] efforts could be directed to supporting scaling up of manufacturing, modernisation, improving quality control and regulatory systems, and workforce training.^[59]

In countries where there is limited infrastructure or where full-scale manufacturing is not feasible owing to disaster-related risks, efforts could be directed to improving storage facilities, laboratory research for vaccine R&D, and digital health data management.^[60] Context-sensitive capacity-building approaches through meaningful Quad engagement will ensure that the region is prepared for future health emergencies.

Leverage the Quad framework to facilitate technology adaptation. 

Existing partnerships can be leveraged not only to facilitate technology transfer but also to adapt technologies that suit the Indo-Pacific region. Vector control methods for addressing dengue infections are pertinent examples. The World Mosquito Program (WMP)—a consortium of non-profit companies owned by Monash University—works on Wolbachia-mediated dengue control^[o] with ongoing projects in Indonesia, Kiribati, and Timor-Leste.^[61] The collaboration between the Indian Council of Medical Research’s (ICMR) Vector Control Research Centre (VCRC) and WMP illustrates how technologies can be adapted to suit local environmental conditions. The trials in India assessed the feasibility of Wolbachia mosquitoes under warmer temperatures, climate variability, rural and urban settings, and dense population conditions—factors that vary greatly from other regions.^[62]

This contextual adaptation to the technology ensures effectiveness, community participation, and sustainability. Similar partnerships that support technology localisation in the Indo-Pacific can be implemented through the Quad. The minilateral grouping has committed to emphasising the need for industry-led, consensus-driven, multi-stakeholder processes to create global standards that ensure interoperability, compatibility, and inclusivity for critical and emerging technologies, including biotechnology.^[63]

Advance technical expertise. 

Taking into consideration the highly specialised demand for life sciences research, Quad members could implement training and knowledge-sharing programmes that enable personnel to adapt to different technologies, ecosystems, and disease burdens. Personnel-centric training exchanges facilitate immersive, hands-on training that cannot be offered through traditional learning methods and will strengthen collaboration in addressing shared challenges. For instance, fostering One Health awareness through targeted training programmes can strengthen workforce capacity in early threat detection, improve sensitivity to the socioeconomic determinants of disease, and support community engagement strategies to address vaccine hesitancy.^[64]

In July 2025, India approved the entry of foreign universities, including Australia’s Western Sydney University (WSU), Victoria University, and La Trobe University, to establish higher education institutes in the country, which will provide other avenues for fostering S&T cooperation. Brain-gain policies in S&T research are some other pathways that can be leveraged by the Quad.

4. Strengthening the Clinical Trial Ecosystem 

Create a coordinated clinical trial network.

The Quad can strengthen the clinical trial ecosystem in alignment with WHO’s Global Action Plan by linking early-stage R&D with clinical development, enhancing clinical trial infrastructure, and increasing the number of trials conducted across the region.^[65] This integrated approach can help reduce bureaucratic delays, harmonise regulatory frameworks, foster PPPs, and ensure that clinical research aligns with local disease burdens and health priorities. Australia holds one of the most efficient regulatory environments globally that offers streamlined governance processes.

India, meanwhile, provides a genetically diverse and large patient population, which is essential for studying disease variability and treatment efficacy. Similarly, Japan’s advanced regulatory science capacity and the US’s leadership in clinical trial design can contribute to building a sustainable, regionally coordinated, and globally competitive clinical trial network. Integration with health systems will support emergency trials during outbreaks, facilitate data-sharing agreements, and build trust within communities, enabling the region to become a hub for ethically sound, inclusive, and efficient clinical research that responds to global health security needs.^[66]

Conclusion

In the face of tumultuous underlying bilateral relations, the Quad is facing an imminent endurance test. The grouping will need to ground its objectives in integrating technology development with foreign policy and its impact on international relations and development. Cooperation in the defined areas of an emerging technology will aid in overcoming dynamic geopolitical conditions.

Biotechnology holds the power to transform industries, boost national competitiveness, and accelerate the transition to a sustainable future. The grouping signals its continued recognition of health security for economic and security purposes and is well-positioned to coordinate the overall health security of the Indo-Pacific. By leveraging each Quad member’s strengths in biotechnology, the group can adopt well-defined measures, keep pace with China’s advancements, and shape global norms in biotechnology R&D.

---

Lakshmy Ramakrishnan is Associate Fellow, Health Initiative, Observer Research Foundation.

---

All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

• Healthcare
• European Union
• India
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• biotechnology cooperation
• biotechnology enabled warfare activities
• biotechnology in warfare
• Quad
• quad biotechnology task force
• quad cooperation in biotech
• quad countries
• quad members
• quad nations

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.