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Manish Vaidya, “Policy Pathways to Enhance the Global Mobility of Indian Emigrants,” ORF Issue Brief No. 855, Observer Research Foundation, January 2026.
Between 2011 and 2024, some 2 million Indian nationals emigrated and gave up their citizenship.[1] Every year too, many of the new entrants to India’s workforce look abroad for better-paying jobs.[2] This emigration demand[a] contributes to brain drain,[3] reducing the quantity and quality of India’s human capital. According to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), as of 2025, 15.85 million Indians lived abroad and worked across various skill levels.[4]
To be sure, emigration has benefits: strengthening India’s global diaspora and soft power, boosting remittance inflows, fostering skill acquisition and entrepreneurship, and easing the pressures on the domestic labour market. However, it also has drawbacks, such as the continued loss of skilled talent that undermines India’s developmental potential, an increased dependence on remittances, higher risks of labour exploitation, social strains such as family separation, and a potential decline in foreign wages for natives and the Indian diaspora due to a surplus of immigrant labour. Sustained emigration also risks weakening India’s comparative advantage in key labour-export sectors such as information technology (ICT) and software services, engineering and other technical professions, and business process management, as saturation spreads beyond specialised roles into other segments like platform work, startup migration, generic service-sector roles (retails, customer support, sales), and low-end professional services.
, a decline in the quality of labour exports also has broader implications for India’s overall emigration potential and soft power. Persistent global mobility frictions, reflected in India’s relatively low passport ranking (83rd),[5] further underscore the structural constraints limiting its full emigration potential.
Global accessibility is a crucial factor in emigration. Many individuals seeking to emigrate encounter hurdles, including lengthy visa wait times, difficulties obtaining approvals, and extensive documentation requirements, while experiencing financial constraints. For instance, in 2024 alone, Indian nationals lost nearly INR 1,360 million (US$14.96 million) in non-refundable fees due to over 165,000 rejected Schengen visa applications.[6] Mobility frictions, as reflected in passport rankings, are closely associated with a country’s macroeconomic fundamentals. Per capita income is inversely related to passport rankings—an improvement in a country's rank is associated with an increase in per capita income (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Passport Ranking vs. Per Capita GDP
Source: Author’s own, using data from Henley Index[7] and IMF, 2025.[8] Created using Matplotlib.
Although this relationship may appear straightforward, per capita income can also be understood as a proxy for deeper structural characteristics like inequality, the strength of institutions, labour market dynamics, and overall socioeconomic well-being. As these factors improve over time, passport power and global accessibility improve, albeit gradually, through sustained growth and institutional reforms. Given these dynamics, reducing frictions and improving global labour mobility will require stronger migration management and emigration governance, supported by deeper cooperation through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Evidence suggests that labour-sending countries that actively regulate and monitor emigration processes experience lower frictions with host countries, alongside improved protection and outcomes for migrant workers.[9]
Many developing countries with significant labour outflows implement measures to monitor and protect their workforce, prevent irregular migration, and safeguard the interests of their diaspora. India lacks a comprehensive emigration policy, resulting in a largely market-driven migration management system prone to persistent frictions in global mobility. At present, much of India’s migration policy remains reactive rather than strategic. To leverage the demographic dividend and improve the quality of both labour and non-labour mobility, India must establish a comprehensive emigration policy, assuming external factors such as destination-country economies and institutional settings remain constant. Strengthening domestic measures to ensure the quality and integrity of labour exports could also improve India’s passport ranking by reducing irregular migration, enhancing verification mechanisms, signalling reliability to destination countries, smoothing repatriation schemes, protecting diaspora interests, improving safety standards, and enabling more efficient workforce mobility.
The total stock of Indian migrants has increased from 6.5 million in 1990 to 18.5 million by 2024 (see Figure 2),[10] reflecting structurally high emigration demand that aligns with typical developing-to-developed country migration patterns. Most current new outflows are driven by student migrants,[11] with outbound student flows growing by 192 percent between 2000 and 2024.
Figure 2: Indian-Origin Migrants Abroad
Source: Author’s own, based on data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.[12]
Studies find an inverse relationship between emigration demand and income per capita across low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers. In other words, migration from developing to developed countries declines as per capita income rises in the source country.[13] In principle, this implies that during periods of rapid economic growth, the incentive to migrate abroad should decline since more local opportunities become available. However, this has not been the case for India. Despite strong consumption-led growth, the benefits have not translated evenly across society. Domestic wages and labour markets remain uneven,[14] while broader factors such as infrastructure,[15] sanitation, hygiene, and the overall quality of life[16] continue to lag. At the same time, the prospect of faster upward mobility abroad remains a strong determinant for potential migrants.
India is the world’s largest country of origin of emigrants,[17] whose decision is driven by push and pull factors.[18] Pull factors include higher wages, improved living conditions, stronger institutions, better labour market opportunities, and greater prospects for both social and economic upward mobility. Push factors include unemployment,[19] crumbling infrastructure,[20] intense competition for education[21] and jobs, corruption, and prevailing societal or interpersonal preferences. One survey found that Indian students' decision to migrate abroad is influenced by a balance between family obligations and career-related aspirations: strong family ties and cultural expectations often act as constraints, while pursuing higher education, professional advancement, and better career prospects abroad serve as motivators.[22]
Students from Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Gujarat make up the largest share of student migrants (in 2021; see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Student Migrants, by State (2021)
Source: Author’s own, based on data from the ILO India Employment Report 2024.[23]
In 2025, 1.8 million Indian students were pursuing education in foreign countries, predominantly in the Global North but also in countries in Central and Southeast Asia.[24],[25],[26] These trends highlight two dynamics: (i) a broadening of the push–pull factors shaping student migration, accompanied by a rising overall emigration sentiment, and (ii) the continued dominance of states with established diasporas, strong migration histories, and relatively higher socioeconomic standing in driving outward student flows.
Migration from India is a key example of the movement of people from the Global South to the Global North (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Top Migration Destinations for Indians (2024)
Source: Author’s own, based on data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.[27]
Note: The estimated 1.6 million migrants in Pakistan largely reflect Indian-born populations who migrated during and immediately after the 1947 Partition, rather than contemporary post-1990s labour- or education-driven emigration flows.
India also supplies labour to regions that face structural labour shortages. India exhibits a dual migration pattern: low- and semi-skilled workers primarily move to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, whereas medium- and high-skilled professionals increasingly migrate to advanced economies in the Global North. Unlike emigration from lower-income South Asian countries, which is concentrated in low-skilled segments, India’s labour outflows span the entire skills spectrum, reflecting its highly diversified emigration profile.
Tourist emigration demand, meanwhile, is driven by geography, the presence of diaspora and familial networks, and the appeal of destinations. The United Arab Emirates was the top destination for Indian tourists in 2024, followed by Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Thailand (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: India’s Top Outbound Tourist Destinations (2024)
Source: Author’s own, based on data from the Ministry of Tourism, Government of India.[28]
These trends showcase that India’s emigration demand remains strong, driven by a wider set of destinations, evolving push–pull factors, and its large demographic base. However, labour-market protectionism[29] and anti-immigrant sentiments in the Global North[30] are narrowing opportunities. At the same time, irregular migration,[31],[32] visa overstays, weak adherence to civic rules by migrants,[33],[34] and the misuse of foreign migration systems[35],[36] are eroding diaspora credibility in several countries.
Visa issuance and mobility barriers can be understood as the outcome of information failure or asymmetric information.[37] Destination countries impose these restrictions to protect local interests, demographics, labour markets, and cultural factors.[38] Since these countries have limited information about a potential applicant, the burden falls on the applicant to disclose additional details. This helps the host country avoid admitting individuals who may enter with the intent to violate immigration rules and reduce the risk of individuals changing their intentions after arrival. This is why applicants are often required to demonstrate “strong ties” to their home country as evidence that they will return. These requirements are particularly significant for tourism- and education-related migration.
Global mobility frictions can manifest in several ways (see Table 1), often hampering the smooth movement of people across borders. This is particularly true of migration from developing to developed countries.[39] Frictions include prolonged wait times for visa processing, excessive documentation requirements even for short-term visitor visas,[40] increasing uncertainty regarding approvals, and rising rejections.[41],[42] Diaspora perceptions in certain host countries can further complicate mobility,[43] as governments may adopt more restrictive immigration measures or impose additional scrutiny on applicants.[44] Such frictions not only deter potential migrants but also disrupt short-term travel for business, education, or tourism. Over time, worsening frictions can undermine bilateral relations, limit labour market complementarities, and reduce trust between the source and destination countries. For newer emigrants, the personal consequences are significant: higher financial costs, emotional stress, and lost opportunities. For countries like India, where emigration is a critical component of economic and social ties abroad, addressing these mobility frictions is vital to safeguarding diaspora interests and enhancing global integration.
A valuable tool for understanding global mobility frictions, soft power, and evolving global ties is the passport index.[45] From 2014 to 2025, India’s passport ranking has remained largely stagnant, hovering between 74th and 83rd,[46] reflecting limited gains in global mobility access. Explanations for such shifts in passport rankings are many, ranging from country-level diplomatic and trade arrangements that ease mobility to broader economic fundamentals and global governance dynamics. In the case of India, two drivers stand out: stronger bilateral and trade agreements, and robust, time-variant growth fundamentals that shape the country’s global mobility profile. Such global mobility is shaped by factors commonly grouped into three: economic, global governance, and country-level.
Economic factors include per capita income, income inequality, household consumption expenditure, government budgets, and overall fiscal health. Global governance factors reflect a country’s role in international organisations and global governance frameworks, which, together, shape its passport power. Country-level factors reflect a nation’s geopolitical standing, international influence, and the strength of bilateral agreements and collaborations. India’s recent progress in mobility can be largely attributed to improvements in these country-level factors.
Much of India’s emigration policy management is focused on country-level coordination and agreements, which guide and facilitate the movement of both labourers and visitors (see Table 1). Indian nationals constitute the largest diaspora group in many countries and are amongst the most successful emigrant communities relative to other nationalities.
Table 1: India’s Migration-Related Agreements with Other Countries
| Partner Country | Agreement Type | Particulars |
| United Arab Emirates | MoU on labour (2006)[47] | Institutionalising the recruitment of workers and worker protection |
| Kuwait | MoU on labour (2007)[48] | Labour, employment, and workforce development |
| Oman | MoU on workforce recruitment (2008)[49] | Facilitating recruitment into the Omani labour market |
| Malaysia | MoU on recruitment (2009)[50] | Facilitating employment and skill development |
| Bahrain | MoU on labour and workforce development (2009)[51] | Recruitment regulation |
| Jordan | MoU on workforce recruitment (1988)[52] | Recruitment regulation |
| Qatar | MoU on employment of Indian workers (1985)[53] | Workforce management |
| Saudi Arabia | Labour cooperation agreement (2014)[54] | Protecting rights and recruitment regulations |
| Taiwan | MoU on migration and mobility (2024)[55] | Enhanced labour market access for Indian workers |
| Germany | Comprehensive agreement on migration and mobility (2022) | Enhancing student, worker, and researcher mobility |
| United Kingdom | Ongoing mutual recognition agreement[56] | Recognition of certification and qualifications |
| Australia | Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement,[57] and agreement on migration and mobility (2018)[58] | Facilitating cross movements of workers, professionals and students |
Source: Author’s own
The overall picture is not entirely positive. In recent years, rising anti-immigration sentiments (for instance, in Australia[59]), the erosion of the diaspora image through negative social media narratives,[60] concerns over labour market dominance,[61] and pressures on host-country employment, civic transgressions, and visa violations have reinforced adverse perceptions of Indian emigrants. Political developments, migration-related violations, and stricter scrutiny by host governments have further complicated mobility and weakened India’s ability to project credibility abroad.
To improve global mobility, India needs to advance on two policy fronts to strengthen the power and credibility of its passport. First, the emigration discipline must be institutionalised and domestic obstacles to mobility addressed, especially the ‘strong ties’ requirement. Second, migration governance must be approached with a strategic rather than a reactive mindset, through forward-looking policies that advance long-term national interests. Given this, India can focus on developing mechanisms for emigration governance to encourage healthy migration.
Despite India’s large labour force, its demographic dividend, and its position as the world’s largest labour exporter with multilevel skill exports, the country still lacks a comprehensive and strategic migration policy. Current migration management has largely been reactive, relying on case-specific, context-driven, and country-specific agreements (see Table 2). Such measures are prudent but remain ad hoc and lack a forward-looking, strategic orientation.
The Emigration Act, 1983,[62] regulates the employment of Indian citizens abroad, with a focus on protecting workers in the Gulf states. This framework remains narrow and outdated. The proposed Emigration Bill, 2021[63] (under consideration at the time of writing), aims to enhance and strategise migration governance. Beyond streamlining procedures and strengthening safety nets, the bill emphasises welfare and accountability. It mandates the registration and compliance of recruitment agents, holds foreign employers liable for contract violations, empowers a centralised authority to monitor and investigate infractions, imposes fines or imprisonment for fraudulent or unsafe practices by recruitment firms and employers, and establishes grievance mechanisms for emigrants. More recently, the Overseas Mobility Bill, 2025,[64] has been introduced as a policy step to enhance the welfare, safety, and support systems available to Indian emigrants in their destination countries.
The Philippines offers a useful model for emigration governance. Its policies not only safeguard citizens abroad but also integrate migrant welfare considerations into domestic policymaking, as reflected in recent efforts to standardise minimum wages for domestic workers.[65] The country is widely regarded as a global benchmark for managing overseas labour mobility,[66] supported by a well-designed institutional architecture built on: (i) a unified migration authority, with the Department of Migrant Workers consolidating all major migration-related functions; (ii) a mandatory welfare fund, which ensures that all legally deployed migrant workers are covered by insurance, repatriation support, and welfare benefits; (iii) strong recruitment regulation, enforced through strict licensing, compliance audits, host-country deployment criteria, and the presence of labour attachés in key destinations; and (iv) comprehensive reintegration pathways, including livelihood assistance, skills recognition, financial support, and targeted returnee programmes.
While the Philippine model may not directly apply to India’s scale and diversity, the central lesson remains highly relevant: a remittance-driven country with millions of citizens overseas must anchor emigrant welfare within its national policy systems.
For India, this requires moving beyond the limited scope of the Emigration Act and building a forward-looking governance framework that aligns with its position as the world’s largest source of international labour. Strengthening this framework will depend on a set of targeted and actionable measures, including:
These reforms will help India protect its workers, negotiate stronger mobility partnerships, and use overseas employment as a strategic economic lever.
Beyond economic and trade-related collaboration, a country’s oversight of its emigrants abroad, particularly in cases of visa overstays and violations, is critical in shaping its international reputation. Effective and responsible migration governance not only mitigates potential frictions with destination states but also sends signals that can enhance a country’s soft power, including the perceived strength of its passport. Proactive interventions by the MEA, such as facilitating the return of illegal Indian migrants in the US[67] and the coordinated repatriation of undocumented nationals,[68] signal a commitment to structured migration management while reinforcing the state’s credibility and reliability in the eyes of host countries.
Effective emigration management and regulatory discipline are essential, as excessive or poorly managed migration into saturated labour markets can further suppress wages, strain bilateral relations, and invite increased scrutiny from host countries.
To strengthen India’s position and encourage legal migration pathways, India can consider the following targeted actions:
Together, these measures can reinforce India’s reputation as a responsible labour-sending country, safeguard its migrants, and enhance long-term diplomatic goodwill.
India’s growth fundamentals remain strong, but its external engagement has yet to realise this potential fully. As more Indians pursue opportunities abroad for work, education, and travel, and as more countries compete to attract its rising middle class, emigration policymaking and discourse must be accorded greater attention. Effective emigration management, including coordinated repatriation, welfare support, enhanced vetting, and the promotion of transparent migration pathways, is essential to safeguard migrants, strengthen India’s soft power, and advance the ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ vision of becoming a developed country.
However, emigration management is only the first step toward improving mobility, ensuring migration discipline, and shaping diaspora perceptions. External factors such as trade shocks, geopolitical shifts, and political transitions in destination countries remain largely exogenous and require separate, focused analysis. This brief has focused on internal measures, highlighting key starting points for embedding an active, strategic emigration policy within India’s broader migration framework, moving beyond the current reactive, case-by-case approach.
Experiences from other labour-exporting countries in the Global South, such as the Philippines, show that strong emigration can promote safe and legal migration, support remittance flows, and penalise illegal recruitment practices. Future studies could focus on micro-founded macroeconomic modelling of emigration demand from India to analyse its trajectory, assess its relationship with broader economic growth, and explore country-level dynamics. Such research could also address critical questions related to brain drain, the potential reversal of globalisation, and other structural shifts in international labour mobility.
Manish Vaidya is Research Assistant, Observer Research Foundation.
The author acknowledges the research assistance provided by Amritha Biju, Research Intern at ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] ‘Emigration demand’ refers to individuals' desire to move abroad, whether for short-term travel, education, employment, or long-term relocation. In quantitative terms, it can be understood as the demand schedule for the number of individuals seeking to emigrate or who have already emigrated.
[b] An insurance scheme for Indian emigrant workers travelling abroad for employment, especially those in the ‘Emigration Check Required’ category (a passport category that aims to safeguard unskilled/semi-skilled workers from exploitation).
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[68] Anushree Jonko, “India Agrees to Take Back 18,000 Nationals from US. Is There a Strategy?,” NDTV, January 21, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/india-agrees-to-take-back-18-000-nationals-from-us-is-there-a-strategy-7527477.
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Manish Vaidya is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Centre for New Economic Diplomacy. His work centres on research and active engagement in applied economics, with a ...
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