History, Geography and the Trump-Munir Equation is Driving Islamabad's New Role
When General Asim Munir landed in Tehran on Wednesday armed with an American truce offer, he was following up on the weekend’s 21 hours of direct US-Iran negotiations held in Islamabad — the most substantive bilateral engagement between Washington and Tehran since the severing of diplomatic relations in 1979. That Pakistan provided both the venue and the diplomatic channel for this extraordinary encounter should not come as a total surprise.
A ceasefire deadline falls on April 22, a naval blockade adds to the pressure, and Trump’s art of the deal circa 2026 appears to be about softening the adversary with a few military punches before getting the best negotiated agreement. Whether the war ends with a US-Israel ‘final blow’ in Iran by the next week or a peace deal, it is unlikely to extend beyond month end when Trump receives King Charles in Washington. Beyond that, Trump’s calendar is full as he goes to China in to seek tactical accommodation along with a ‘big fat hug’ from Xi. And then, Cuba needs to be conquered.
But for now, Munir is Trump’s chosen channel for the Iran endgame.
Pakistan’s role is driven by an unlikely bond that developed between him and Trump. The origins are instructive. The Pakistan army grew alarmed when overseas PTI networks lobbyied the Trump campaign to pressure Islamabad on Imran Khan's release from prison. The response was swift: the engagement of Washington lobbying firms and the cultivation of bilateral deals spanning cryptocurrency, critical minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation under the CENTCOM framework. This transactional foundation was reinforced by flattery- nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize and repeatedly crediting him with saving millions in last summer's India-Pakistan confrontation. Pakistan also advocated for Vice President Vance to lead the American delegation, amplifying Iranian distrust of the earlier Witkoff-Kushner channel. Pakistan's civilian leadership was co-opted later, following domestic criticism that PM Shehbaz Sharif remained a bystander.
The cosying up between US presidents and Pakistan’s dictators is not new. Ayub Khan endeared himself to Eisenhower by offering a secret airbase in 1958, and enthusiastic participation in US-led anti-communist blocs like CENTO and SEATO. In 1971, Kissinger chose Rawalpindi to feign a Delhi belly to land in Beijing instead of Murree for a deal with the Chinese. Zia ul-Haq served as Washington's instrument for the Afghan jihad after 1979 and assisted with the Iranian hostage crisis in 1981. Pakistan maintained Iran's interest section in Washington until 2015.
General Munir, now possessed of untrammelled power and an effectively indefinite tenure, operates squarely within this tradition — updated for the currencies and coalitions of the current moment.
Pakistan's role was shaped as much by the refusal of other regional players to get involved. Qatar's trusted mediating function was compromised when Israeli strikes targeted Doha during talks in 2025. Oman's Geneva efforts this February similarly ended with mid-talk strikes. The US pulled in Pakistan into this vacuum, supported by an emerging regional quad with Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Egypt.
Earlier, the Israeli strikes on Qatar catalysed a Saudi-Pakistan defence pact, a hedge Riyadh required against threats from both Iran and Israel, even as questions mounted about the reliability of the American security umbrella. Elements in Pakistan's strategic community went further, invoking the Islamic bomb and Pakistan as a net security guarantor for the broader Islamic world, a framing that carries serious escalatory risks.
Pakistan's facilitating role is, however, riddled with tensions that impose real limits on its effectiveness. Israel questions Pakistani intentions. The UAE, aggrieved by Islamabad's engagement with Tehran, has called in outstanding loans, compelling Pakistan to seek emergency support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Pakistan's own relationship with Iran is hardly stable: in January 2024, the militant group Jaish-al-Adl conducted cross-border attacks from Pakistani soil; Iran responded with airstrikes in Balochistan; Pakistan retaliated in Iran's Sistan province — a reminder that none of Pakistan’s neighbours are insulated from the militancy it nurtures.
Pakistan simultaneously serves three global patrons — the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia — each holding conflicting equities in the crisis. Reports that Pakistan served as a conduit for Chinese arms to Iran, and that Chinese satellite intelligence was employed for Gulf target acquisition, sit in direct tension with its positioning as Washington's trusted interlocutor. Pakistan remains on its twenty-fourth IMF programme, hoping that good behaviour will sustain financial support from all three patrons. Whether diplomatic capital converts reliably into assistance is far from assured.
Pakistan's domestic context is important. Two raging insurgencies- by the Baloch and Pashtuns- coalesce in the west with attacks by the TTP and serious war with Afghanistan. The most popular political leader remains in jail, public disaffection with the army-led government is pronounced and the treasury is drained. In this environment, a high-profile international role serves clear regime interests, projecting national purpose and providing the military establishment with a legitimising narrative — not unlike the temporary consolidation of support that last summer's confrontation with India briefly delivered.
A legitimate question to ask is whether Pakistan’s role as peacenik will make it pause in the strategy of using terrorism against neighbours due to the global spotlight, or double down on the policy given global support. But for India, the more pressing consideration is that peace in west Asia bears directly on India's energy supply chains, its large Gulf diaspora, and its regional connectivity interests. A negotiated settlement advances Indian interests irrespective of the channel through which it is achieved. For the present, Indian and Pakistani interests converge on a diplomatic resolution. That convergence is narrow and contingent — but in statecraft, that should be sufficient to support the peace process.
This commentary originally appeared in Times of India.
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Ajay Bisaria is a Distinguished Fellow at ORF. He is also a strategic consultant and commentator on international affairs. He has had a distinguished diplomatic ...
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