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Mohammed Sinan Siyech and Ambar Khawaja, “Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Ties: Explaining the Shifts in Proximity,” ORF Issue Brief No. 848, Observer Research Foundation, November 2025.
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has maintained a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia. This alliance has allowed Pakistan to access Saudi Arabia’s vast oil reserves and financial assistance, while providing the Kingdom with Pakistani manpower and military expertise.
In the 1960s, Pakistan’s military helped establish the Royal Saudi Air Force and trained the Kingdom’s fighter pilots.[1] During the 1969 Al-Wadiah conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen,[2] Pakistani combat pilots supported the country by flying fighter jets.[3] The relationship deepened in the 1970s during the oil boom in the Middle East, when Pakistan’s prime minister at the time, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, liberalised Pakistan’s passport policy to facilitate labour migration to the region.[4] This wave of migration created generations of Pakistani expatriates in Saudi Arabia, which became Pakistan’s largest source of remittances.[5]
In 1982, the two nations signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement under which Pakistan committed to supporting Saudi Arabia in military training, defence production, and joint military exercises.[6] As a result, nearly 15,000 Pakistani troops were posted in the Kingdom throughout the 1980s.[7] Saudi Arabia’s close ties with Pakistan’s military were further evident when it granted asylum to former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999, allowing his return in 2007.[8]
Saudi Arabia has long taken a keen interest in Pakistan’s nuclear programme, hoping Islamabad might extend its nuclear capabilities to the Kingdom in a crisis. To maintain close ties, Saudi Arabia has provided extensive aid in Pakistan’s infrastructure, energy, and agriculture sectors, helping the country avoid deeper international debt scrutiny. When the United States (US) imposed sanctions following Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests, Saudi Arabia supplied the latter with crude oil to offset the impact.[9] Pakistan also sent fighters to Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, which strengthened its cooperation with both Saudi Arabia and the US—two of the main opponents of Soviet expansion and principal funders of the Afghan resistance.
Saudi Arabia has historically followed an aid-based rather than investment-based model in Pakistan, providing financial bailouts, deferred oil payments, and direct aid. Since the 1960s, the Kingdom has provided more assistance to Pakistan than to any other non-Arab country and has repeatedly come to its aid during humanitarian crises. In 2005, following the Balochistan earthquake, the Kingdom contributed US$10 million in humanitarian aid. After the devastating floods in 2010 and 2011, it provided US$170 million for relief efforts.[10]
Beyond military and economic cooperation, shared religious ties have also bound the two nations. KSA hosts over 2.5 million Pakistanis and remains a major destination for Muslims worldwide.[11] Home to Islam’s holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, the Kingdom welcomes hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis each year for the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages.[12]
Decades of military cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—along with the UAE, whose foreign policy often mirrored Riyadh’s—were disrupted in 2015 when Saudi Arabia began bombing Houthi positions in Yemen. Following its established pattern of military collaboration, Riyadh sought Islamabad’s support in the campaign. However, citing fears of domestic Sunni–Shia tensions and possible Iranian retaliation, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif refused to participate, straining relations with the KSA. Much of Riyadh’s displeasure was reflected in its gradual withdrawal of economic engagements with Pakistan.[13]
Additionally, growing concerns over unskilled Pakistani labour and related security issues further strained relations. For instance, between 2015 and 2020, then Foreign Affairs Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi stated that Saudi Arabia had deported over 300,000 Pakistanis for visa overstays, involvement in vagrancy networks, criminal activities, and poor integration into the Saudi population.[14] The problem persists, prompting the Pakistani government to impose strict measures against those travelling to Saudi Arabia for vagrancy.[15] Although these developments may not have been a direct retaliation for Pakistan’s refusal to support Saudi Arabia in Yemen, they nevertheless contributed to tensions between the two countries.
While not a direct consequence of the 2015 Saudi-Pakistan rupture, this period also saw Saudi Arabia’s growing engagement with India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, building on his predecessor’s efforts and India’s expanding economic profile, deepened the country’s ties with Saudi Arabia.[16] Over time, Saudi Arabia became one of India’s top trading partners, while India emerged as a destination for Saudi investment—a trend that had been developing since the 2000s.[17]
This growing proximity alarmed Pakistan, particularly as Saudi Arabia appeared indifferent to India’s actions in Kashmir, which Islamabad viewed as violations of Kashmiri rights.[18] Despite Pakistan’s repeated calls for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)—founded and headquartered in Saudi Arabia—to convene a session on Kashmir, Riyadh blocked these efforts, reportedly in retaliation for Pakistan’s refusal to support its Yemen campaign. Pakistan’s attempts to form separate coalitions on the issue were further undermined when KSA demanded early repayment of loans in 2020.[19] These demands eventually forced Pakistan to mute some of its demands on Kashmir within the OIC, evident in the body’s November 2020 meeting that omitted any reference to the issue.[20] Together, these developments underscored Pakistan’s economic dependency on Gulf aid and other nations to prop up its economy.
In summary, the 2015 flashpoint between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan marked a turning point in their relationship. While Pakistan’s refusal to engage in Yemen was the biggest issue, other problems including labour and a shifting regional and global dynamic led to further problems for Pakistan. Indeed, during this period, Saudi Arabia decoupling its relations between India and Pakistan became more pronounced.
Despite fluctuations since 2015, two key developments have marked the 2024–2025 period. On the financial front, Saudi Arabia began signing new investment agreements with Pakistan in 2024, signalling a rapprochement between the two nations. This engagement aligns with ‘Saudi Vision 2030’, as Pakistan’s natural resources and rare-earth minerals offer potential support for the Kingdom’s diversification and economic expansion goals. In 2018, Saudi Arabia began talks for a preferential trade deal with Pakistan to discuss tariff and non-tariff trade barriers as well as investment in the agricultural and energy sectors.[21]
In December 2023, the Saudi Fund for Development pledged US$150 million to support minerals development in Balochistan.[22] It has also discussed acquiring a 15-percent stake valued at US$540 million in Pakistan’s Reko Diq mine, one of the world’s largest copper and gold reserves. While the value of gold is well-known, the demand for copper is rising due to its use in electric vehicles, renewable energy, and technology industries.[23] Furthermore, the Kingdom plans to expand Aramco’s presence in Pakistan through a partnership with Pakistan’s Gas & Oil (GO), in which Aramco acquired a 40-percent equity stake in 2023.[24] Additionally, Saudi Arabia extended a US$2-billion loan in July 2023 to stabilise Pakistan’s economy.[25] Bilateral trade between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia also increased by 80 percent, rising from US$3 billion in 2019 to US$5.4 billion in 2024, reflecting the impact of multiple MoUs signed over the past decade.[26]
In 2023, Saudi Arabia invested US$10 billion to build Pakistan’s largest oil refinery in Gwadar, to be executed by Aramco.[27] This investment aligns with Saudi Vision 2030 as it is expected to help reduce the Kingdom’s dependence on oil exports, shorten its trade routes to Asia, and diversify its economy.
In addition to these financial agreements, Saudi Arabia also signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SDMA) with Pakistan in September 2025. The pact states that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both,” effectively binding the two countries in a NATO-like arrangement.[28] Riyadh signed the agreement a week after Israel launched missile strikes on Doha on 9 September 2025, and the US declined to penalise Israel despite issuing statements of condemnation.
Analysts view the Saudi–Pakistan pact as a hedging strategy that allows Riyadh to secure additional strategic cover. It does not signal an attempt to replace the US as a security provider but rather to add another layer of protection. The agreement also elevated Pakistan’s strategic standing in Saudi Arabia’s view.
Several factors explain Saudi Arabia’s growing investment ties with Pakistan over the past decade. As the Kingdom advances towards its Vision 2030 goals, it seeks to drive economic transformation through strategic diversification.[29] Over this period, the Kingdom has shifted from an aid-based to an investment-based approach, aiming for higher returns.[30] Pakistan’s fertile agricultural land and abundant mineral resources present attractive opportunities for sectoral expansion and collaboration.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is consolidating its influence in Pakistan’s energy sector and positioning itself strategically within the Asia-Middle East corridor. Its investments help stabilise Pakistan’s fragile economy, reinforcing regional stability and ensuring that Pakistan—as a nuclear power—remains a reliable ally. By embedding itself in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia ensures that the South Asian state remains within its sphere of influence, preventing its drift towards competing powers such as Türkiye or Iran.
Saudi Arabia is also adapting to the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. Historically, it prioritised ties with Pakistan over India to maintain regional balance. However, Riyadh has since learnt to de-link its relations with the two, pursuing independent relations with each country for different benefits.[31] This plays into Saudi Arabia recognising India as a regional power and economic opportunity.
From a defence perspective, Israel’s reported attack on a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nation without repercussions disrupted a decades-long understanding within the Middle East: that as long as the GCC nations engaged financially with the US, they would be protected by the latter in times of attack. There was also an implicit understanding that Israel would not attack countries like Qatar, which is a close military ally of the US, hosting its largest air base in the region. This propelled Riyadh to cooperate more closely with Islamabad, leading to the signing of the SMDA.
Lastly, Riyadh also acknowledges China’s role as a global power, with its presence in Asia and the Middle East continuing to expand, especially in the aftermath of the deal that it brokered between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.[32] Saudi efforts to get a foothold in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by investing in the Gwadar Port would bring mutual economic benefits.
An immediate question that Saudi-Pakistan relations present is its impact on India. Until the 1990s, India’s non-alignment policy limited engagement with Saudi Arabia, but the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and India’s subsequent alignment with the US—and by extension, its ally, Saudi Arabia—transformed the relationship. Trade-wise, India is the second-largest trading partner for Saudi Arabia, while the kingdom is India’s fourth-largest. Bilateral trade, valued at about US$45 billion, has remained relatively steady since 2014—around nine times greater than Saudi–Pakistan trade as of 2024, demonstrating the huge gap between India’s and Pakistan’s relations with the Arab nation.[33]
India has also deepened defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia through joint military exercises and enhanced counterterrorism collaboration. Over the last decade, the number of Indians arrested on terrorism charges in the KSA and deported to India increased. The two nations also share intelligence and cooperate on cybersecurity initiatives.[34]
A key shift resulting from Saudi Arabia’s alignment with India has been its more neutral stance on political issues such as Kashmir—a long-standing flashpoint between India and Pakistan. After India revoked Article 370 in 2019,[a] Riyadh refrained from condemning the move, despite then-Prime Minister Imran Khan’s attempts to rally Saudi support. Since then, Riyadh has maintained that it will not interfere in India’s internal matters.[35]
India’s response to the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact has been measured. While New Delhi has stated that it will continue monitoring developments, analysts note that the pact introduces a degree of uncertainty for India.[36] Given the heightened India-Pakistan tensions in 2025, the clause declaring that aggression against either signatory would be treated as aggression against both could affect India’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Others, however, have pointed out that this pact is simply a continuation of previous alliances between Riyadh and Islamabad and does not necessarily mean problems for India on the military front.[37]
Saudi Arabia is likely to maintain a neutral stance between India and Pakistan. Guided by Vision 2030, Riyadh has adopted pragmatic calculations and diplomatic moves to balance complex relationships, including those between countries such as India and Pakistan. Especially amidst US President Donald Trump’s erratic trade policies, India, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan may have begun losing confidence in the US and other Western powers, prompting efforts to strengthen ties with non-Western nations—a trend exemplified by the recently signed Saudi–Pakistan defence pact.
Saudi Arabia’s ties with India and Pakistan should therefore be viewed not as a zero-sum game, but as a balancing act through which Riyadh seeks to extract strategic and economic benefits from both. The Kingdom’s wealth also enables both India and Pakistan to overlook its growing engagement with their respective rivals.
Table 1: Trade Volumes, India–Saudi Arabia and Pakistan–Saudi Arabia
| Bilateral Trade (US$) | 2014 | 2024 |
| India – Saudi Arabia | 45.77 billion[38] | 43.36 billion[39] |
| Pakistan – Saudi Arabia | 3.44 billion[40] | 5.2 billion[41] |
Sources: As cited.
As some analysts have argued, Pakistan’s dependency on the Gulf (including Saudi Arabia and the UAE) has led to it creating an attitude of external reliance, and in extreme cases, a sort of debt trap.[42] In the case of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Pakistan’s past actions had its limitations and consequence as seen in the Yemen conflict.
However, despite what was seen as a difficult situation between the two, these relations have been on the rise again, lending credence to the maxim that politics is the art of the possible. Although Pakistan is struggling financially, it is still a military and nuclear powerhouse and has geostrategic significance for Saudi Arabia. Moreover, recognising the shortcomings of its previous modes of engagement with Pakistan, KSA has recalibrated its approach by moving from an aid to an investment model to ensure returns on its financial largesse.
This approach aligns with KSA’s Vision 2030, which prioritises economic diversification. As argued above, this shift is unlikely to affect Riyadh’s relationship with India, as the Kingdom aims to maximise trade with both South Asian partners. Over the next few years, it is possible to see such partnerships and agreements between the three nations mature, although it is still an open question as to whether Pakistan will manage to increase its self-sufficiency through these investments over time.
Mohammed Sinan Siyech is Non–Resident Associate Fellow, ORF; and lecturer, International Relations and South Asian politics, University of Wolverhampton, UK.
Ambar Khawaja is a political analyst and writer. She holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration from the London School of Economics and Political Science.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] Article 370 was a special provision in the Indian Constitution allowing for Jammu and Kashmir to have its own laws and limit how much India could apply its laws in the region. This was revoked in 2019 by PM Modi, a move that was decried by rights groups and Kashmiris who argued that this was a betrayal of their trust. Pakistan tried to use this event to rally support against India but Saudi Arabia kept silent on the issue.
[1] Pervez Hoodbhoy, “The Bomb Iran Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,” The Express Tribune, January 22, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/325571/the-bomb-iran-saudi-arabia-and-pakistan.
[2] Adeela Naureen and Waqar K Kauravi, “The Deep Rooted Ties with Saudi Arabia,” The Express Tribune, January 17, 2023, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2396198/the-deep-rooted-ties-with-saudi-arabia.
[3] Naureen and Kauravi, “The Deep Rooted Ties with Saudi Arabia.”
[4]Abdul Samad Nizamani, “The History of Remittances in Pakistan,” The News International, October 30, 2022, https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/1004720-the-history-of-remittances-in-pakistan.
[5] “Saudi Arabia Remains Top Contributor to Pakistan’s Remittances during Current Fiscal Year,” Arab News, February 12, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2458726/business-economy.
[6] Umer Karim, “New Economic Ties Deepen the Saudi-Pakistani Strategic Partnership,” The Washington Institute, February 28, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-economic-ties-deepen-saudi-pakistani-strategic-partnership.
[7] “مركز المستقبل - General Raheel Sharif as the Head of IMAFT,” Futureuae, August 24, 2017, https://futureuae.com/ar/Mainpage/Item/3178/pakistani-viewpoint-general-raheel-sharif-as-the-head-of-imaft.
[8] Yoel Guzansky, “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: How Special Are the ‘Special Relations’?,” Inss, February 16, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/pakistan-and-saudi-arabia-how-special-are-the-special-relations/.
[9] Guzansky, “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: How Special Are the ‘Special Relations’?”
[10] Kamal Alam and Ibrahim Al-Othaimin, “Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: Moving from the Personal to the Strategic Domain,” RUSI, June 18, 2018, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/saudi-arabia-and-pakistan-moving-personal-strategic-domain.
[11] “PM Underscores Significance of Pak-KSA Durable Bilateral Relations,” Associated Press of Pakistan, December 17, 2024, https://www.app.com.pk/national/pm-underscores-significance-of-pak-ksa-durable-bilateral-relations/.
[12] Saima Shabbir, “Pakistan Tops List of Most Umrah Pilgrims in 2019,” Arab News, December 28, 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1605221/pakistan.
[13] Mohammad Mukashaf, “Pakistan Declines Saudi Call for Armed Support in Yemen Fight,” Reuters, April 10, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/pakistan-declines-saudi-call-for-armed-support-in-yemen-fight-idUSKBN0N10LO/.
[14] “Saudi Arabia Deported 285,980 Pakistanis in Last Five Years, Senate Told,” Dawn, January 31, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1531682.
[15] “Pakistan Issues Measures to Combat Beggars Traveling to Saudi Arabia under Umrah Visas,” Middle East Monitor, November 19, 2024, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241119-pakistan-issues-measures-to-combat-beggars-traveling-to-saudi-arabia-under-umrah-visas/.
[16] Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, “India and Saudi Arabia: A Thriving Partnership Towards a Promising Future,” ORF Middle East, February 23, 2024, https://orfme.org/expert-speak/india-and-saudi-arabia-a-thriving-partnership-towards-a-promising-future/
[17] “India-Saudi Arabia Trade,” India Brand Equity Fund, February 2025, https://www.ibef.org/indian-exports/india-saudi-arabia-trade
[18] Saad Hasan, “Why Pakistan Blames Saudi Arabia and the OIC for Kashmir Setback,” TRT World, January 2020, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-pakistan-blames-saudi-arabia-and-the-oic-for-kashmir-setback-38727
[19] Dipankar Roy Chowdhury, “Saudi Arabia ends a loan and associated oil supply to Pakistan following threats to split OIC,” Economic Times, August 14, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/saudi-arabia-ends-a-loan-and-associated-oil-supply-to-pakistan-following-threats-to-split-oic/articleshow/77499372.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
[20] Vinod Janardhan, “Pakistan tries to brush off OIC snub on not discussing Kashmir issue,” Hindustan Times, November 26, 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-tries-to-brush-off-oic-snub-on-not-discussing-kashmir-issue/story-12Cn49kDWOvM1VsiX9E0bK.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[21] Mubarak Zeb Khan, “Preferential Trade Deal with Saudi Arabia,” Dawn, January 15, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1382883.
[22] Ahmad Ahmadani, “Cabinet Approves Sale of 15% Stake in Reko Diq to Saudi Arabia,” Profit by Pakistan Today, December 30, 2024, https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2024/12/30/cabinet-approves-sale-of-15-stake-in-reko-diq-to-saudi-arabia-for-540-million/.
[23] Joseph Szczesny, “Not Enough Copper to Support EV Transition, Study Says,” Wards Auto, July 8, 2024, https://www.wardsauto.com/industry/not-enough-copper-to-support-ev-transition-study-says.
[24] “Aramco Completes Acquisition of Stake in Gas and Oil Pakistan,” Aramco, May 31, 2024, http://aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2024/aramco-completes-acquisition-of-stake-in-gas-and-oil-pakistan.
[25] “Saudi Arabia Sends Pakistan $2 billion in Financial Support,” Gulf News, July 11, 2023, https://gulfnews.com/business/banking/saudi-arabia-sends-pakistan-2-billion-in-financial-support-1.96896862
[26] Saima Shabbir, “Pakistani Experts Stress Transforming Pak-Saudi Ties into stronger economic partnership,” Arab News, December 5, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2581858/pakistan
[27] “Saudi Arabia Invests USD 10 Billion to Build Pakistan’s Largest Oil Refinery in Gwadar,” The Economic Times, July 28, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-invests-usd-10-billion-to-build-pakistans-largest-oil-refinery-in-gwadar/articleshow/102199558.cms?from=mdr.
[28] Rida Ali, “Pakistan-Saudi Defense Pact: Turbulence in the Middle East Reshaping Regional Geopolitics,” IRReview, October 26, 2025, https://www.irreview.org/articles/2025/10/26/pakistan-saudi-defense-pact-turbulence-in-the-middle-east-reshaping-regional-geopolitics
[29] Amine Mati and Sidra Rehman, “Saudi Arabia’s Economy Grows as It Diversifies,” International Monetary Fund, February 28, 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/28/cf-saudi-arabias-economy-grows-as-it-diversifies.
[30] Neil Halligan, “Saudi Development Fund Might Invest $100m in Pakistan Mining,” AGBI, January 16, 2025, https://www.agbi.com/mining/2025/01/saudi-development-fund-might-invest-100m-in-pakistan-mining/.
[31] Sudha Ramachandran, “Did Saudi Arabia Signal Willingness to De-Hyphenate India and Pakistan in Its South Asia Policy?,” The Diplomat, September 16, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/did-saudi-arabia-signal-willingness-to-de-hyphenate-india-and-pakistan-in-its-south-asia-policy/.
[32] Adam Gallagher, Sarhang Hamasaeed and Garrett Nada, “What You Need to Know about China’s Saudi-Iran Deal,” United States Institute of Peace, March 16, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal.
[33] Zeenat Fatma and Mohd Firdos Ahmad, “An Analysis of India’s Trade Relations with Saudi Arabia,” Journal of Emerging Technology and Innovative Research, 2022, Volume 9 (9) https://www.jetir.org/papers/JETIR2209535.pdf
[34] Tanuja Varua, “Counter-Terrorism: India-Saudi Partnership,” Defense Research and Studies, September 3, 2024, https://dras.in/counter-terrorism-india-saudi-partnership/
[35] Nayanima Basu, “Saudi Arabia ‘backs India’ against Pakistan on Kashmir and Article 370,” The Print, October 31, 2019, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/saudi-arabia-backs-india-against-pakistan-on-kashmir-and-article-370/313677/
[36] “India reacts to Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact, says ‘govt remains committed to protecting national interests’,” Livemint, September 18, 2025, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-reacts-to-saudi-arabia-pakistan-defence-pact-says-govt-remains-committed-to-protecting-national-interests-11758170569902.html#google_vignette
[37] Soutik Biswas, ‘Why the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence pact is unsettling India’, BBC, September 22, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c147gkxyyrmo
[38] “India Trade Summary 2014,” World Bank, 2025, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/IND/Year/2014/Summarytext.
[39] “Exploring India Saudi Arabia Trade and Economic Relations,” 2025, India Brand Equity Foundation, February 2025, https://www.ibef.org/indian-exports/india-saudi-arabia-trade.
[40] “Economic and Trade Relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,” The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 2021, https://fpcci.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Report-Trade_and_Economic_Relations_Between_Pakistan_and_Saudi_Arabia1.pdf.
[41] “Pakistani Experts Stress Transforming Pak-Saudi Ties into Stronger Economic Partnership,” Arab News, December 5, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2581858/pakistan.
[42] Mahjoob Zweiri and Thomas Bonnie James, “Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Relations: An Age of Uncertainty or Decline?,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8 (4): https://doi.org/10.1177/23477989211031793.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Dr. Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Non – Resident Associate Fellow working with Professor Harsh Pant in the Strategic Studies Programme. He works on Conflict ...
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Ambar Khawaja is a Master’s student studying Public Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has a background in international development ...
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