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Soumya Awasthi, “Pakistan’s Information Warfare: Strategic Implications and India's Response,” ORF Issue Brief No. 839, Observer Research Foundation, October 2025.
In an era where perception often matters more than reality, information has emerged as a decisive vector of strategic influence. The battlefield is no longer confined to the physical realm; it is now deeply embedded in digital spheres, algorithmic influence, and, eventually, hearts and minds. An example of such an effort to manipulate perception is the way a Pakistani school history textbook—a page from which is shown in Figure 1—describes the country’s clash with India in May 2025.
Figure 1: School History Book Recounts Pakistan’s ‘Operation Bunyan-Um-Marsoos’ (2025)
Source: This image was shared with the author by an Indian Army.
Information Warfare (IW), once a peripheral component of military doctrine, has now assumed a central role in shaping state narratives, international legitimacy, and domestic political cohesion.[1]
The contemporary doctrine of statecraft, particularly in strategic studies, is frequently looked at through the Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) paradigm. In classical strategic planning, the ‘Military’ and ‘Economic’ elements enjoyed prominence. But in this age of digital interconnectivity, it is ‘Information’ that binds, amplifies, or undermines all the other elements;[2] it has emerged as the new strategic currency of power. Unlike conventional warfare, IW does not seek territorial gains; instead, it aims to erode societal cohesion in the adversary’s country, manipulate public opinion, and delegitimise its state apparatus.[3]
This brief seeks to contextualise IW, map the trajectory of India-Pakistan information dynamics, and examine how India can build a pre-emptive and robust policy framework to respond to this challenge.
In the current geopolitical climate, especially after the Indian air strikes on terror camps in Balakot in February 2019 in retaliation for the terrorist attack in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which killed 46 paramilitary personnel, Pakistan has elevated information warfare to a pillar of state policy. Institutions like the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the Pakistani military public relations wing (set up in 1949), and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s secret service (started in 1948), coordinate to execute long-term perception campaigns across multiple platforms,[4] leveraging social media disinformation and psychological operations.
India, in contrast, has historically under-prioritised ‘Information’, treating IW more as a reactive media strategy than a proactive instrument of statecraft.[5] Only recently, especially after the Galwan clash with China in June 2020 and the Balakot incident, have Indian defence and policy establishments begun to recognise the urgency of institutionalising a comprehensive IW doctrine. However, frequency, consistency, and strategic integration remain areas of concern.
India’s evolving approach to IW is informed by its classical strategic tradition,[6] particularly the realist philosophy of Kautilya’s Arthashastra. No doubt this ancient text looked at information not merely as a support function but as a core instrument of power—one rooted in deception, perception management, and psychological manipulation—but modern warfare calls for more.[7] Kautilya’s legacy continues to shape modern Indian strategic thinking, which increasingly acknowledges that control over narratives is essential to national security.
However, in contrast to Western or other authoritarian models, India is crafting a doctrine of ethical realism, a synthesis of civilisational narrative projection, democratic resilience, and strategic clarity. While India’s strategy exists, it is mostly fragmented, disconnected and not as impactful as that of its adversaries. India aspires to assert narrative sovereignty through responsible information stewardship, blending technological capability with ideological coherence.[8] Pakistan, meanwhile, has operationalised a de-facto IW doctrine, conducting coordinated disinformation campaigns and psychological operations.[9] This apparatus has been active in every India-Pakistan conflict since 1947, evolving from radio broadcasts and print media to digital propaganda and diaspora-driven influence campaigns. Through consistent deployment of narrative warfare, especially during crises like Pulwama-Balakot or indeed, the entire Kashmir unrest since 1989, Pakistan has demonstrated an institutionalised approach to IW.
There is thus a strategic asymmetry: where India seeks long-term narrative resilience, Pakistan pursues short-cycle perception disruption and global opinion shaping as key tenets of its hybrid warfare toolkit.[10]
Table 1: Pakistan vs. India: Contrasting Methodologies in Information Operations
| Aspect | Pakistan | India |
| Value System | State-directed, militarised information, fictional narratives, strategic deception. | Democratic and decentralised; information policy lacks an overall strategy. |
| Execution Mechanism | Centralised under ISPR and ISI; long-term perception operations. | Ad-hoc through the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Press Information Bureau (PIB), and some defence PR units; minimal coordination. |
| Narrative Control | Dominant narrative producer; utilises media manipulation, bot armies. | Relatively passive; reliant on credibility and formal diplomacy. |
| Frequency of Operations | High, continuous dissemination, targeting India and its government’s domestic legitimacy. | Sporadic, primarily event-driven |
| Intensity | Psychological, emotional, with communal overtones, often state-sponsored. | Defensive, legality-conscious, and cautious in tone. |
| Global Audience Reach | Engages diaspora, journalists, and influencers to craft sympathetic angles. | Often limited to official spokespersons and traditional diplomatic personnel. |
Source: Compiled and interpreted by the author
This disparity in the use of information reveals that Pakistan has institutionalised IW, embedding it into its DIME strategy. Pakistan maintains a constant presence in the perception battle-space.[11] In contrast, India’s strategic communication is often fragmented and reactive, lacking a unified doctrine.[12] It has yet to elevate IW as a core strategic domain, remaining largely reactive and often late in the race to provide a narrative contest.
This asymmetry in informational posture presents a critical vulnerability for India, as Pakistan’s coherent, offensive information strategy enables it to shape narratives disproportionately, even when its military or economic leverage may be limited.[13] India’s reactive and legally cautious approach, although normatively superior, falls short of matching the frequency, coherence, and intensity of Pakistan’s campaigns, particularly in the volatile realm of global public perception.[14]
From its inception in 1947, Pakistan has weaponised information as an instrument of state policy, targeting India not just through conventional means but through a sustained and evolving propaganda ecosystem. Hinged on portraying J&K as the ‘unfinished business of Partition’, Pakistan uses this ideological perspective to justify its persistent India-bashing through mass communication tools.
Although India and Pakistan reached an agreement in 1948 to avoid hostile propaganda against each other through the press, other publications, the radio, and cinema,[15] Pakistan has flagrantly violated it from the outset. For instance, leveraging control over three radio stations post-Partition, it rapidly developed Radio Pakistan, which became a propaganda powerhouse.
Radio Pakistan’s primary goals were twofold: (1) to promote Urdu as a unifying national language, and (2) to propagate an Islamic identity that aligned with Pakistan’s ideological self-definition. This ideological broadcasting, often laced with religious rhetoric and nationalistic fervour, served as a strategic tool to arouse religious sentiments in Kashmir and sustain unrest. Although Pakistan does not have a state policy of IW, it is the de facto framework on which it functions against India.
Radio Pakistan’s broadcasts were not limited to cultural programmes. During the 1947–49 Kashmir conflict, as noted in Prithvi Nath Kaul Bamzai’s Culture and Political History of Kashmir (Volume 3), all through 1948, when intruders entered Kashmir, they were provided coded signals by Pakistan’s military via Radio Pakistan between songs.
Over time, the Radio Pakistan model expanded to include Radio Azad Kashmir in Tararkhel (PoK) and additional stations in Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Bhimber, and Rawalakot. All of them transmitted emotionally charged content in Pahari, Gojri, Kashmiri, and Urdu, such as religious recitations (Tilawat-e-Quran), theological commentary (Hayya alal Falah), and story formats like Garoor ki Khudai and Katrein Imaarat, to forge psychological connections with Muslim communities across the India-Pakistan Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.[16]
Several factors made J&K particularly vulnerable to Pakistani information warfare:
The propaganda machine intensified under General Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled from July 1977 to August 1988, with Operation Topac, a plan to wage psychological war against India, formalised towards the end of his tenure. Zia’s regime used radio to instruct Kashmiris to disregard Indian announcements for Eid or namaz, replacing them with Pakistani religious guidance. Slogans like “Islam is our goal; Quran is our Constitution; jihad is our path,” and “Beware of India,” became common at the time, seeking to legitimise religious militancy and undermine India’s authority.
In 1992, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation’s Star TV aired footage plagiarised from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) of alleged Indian atrocities in Kashmir, but in such distorted fashion that the BBC lodged a formal protest with it.[17]
The shift to the digital age further empowered Pakistan’s IW. Following incidents such as the Pulwama massacre followed by the Balakot strike, or the April 2025 Pahalgam attack followed by Operation Sindoor the following month, Pakistan deployed AI-generated content, bot networks, and hashtag campaigns like #IndianFalseFlag to amplify anti-India narratives. The coordination and identical framing are indicative of a centralised strategy rather than organic activism. These campaigns increasingly targeted Indian Muslims, especially during the protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act and National Register of Citizens (CAA-NRC) in 2019[a] and the Galwan faceoff with China, to exacerbate internal divisions.
A pillar of dissemination of this doctrine is the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), which functions as Pakistan’s central narrative warfare command. Closely aligned with the ISI, it trains cyber volunteers, funds propaganda content,[18] and engages diaspora media in the Persian Gulf and the United Kingdom to further its outreach. FM stations such as Rose FM 90, Voice of Kashmir 105, and Radio Buraq, operating in proximity to the LoC, broadcast a combination of religious messaging and Bollywood-related entertainment such as Hindi songs and Hindi movie reviews to attract Indian listeners and subtly normalise Pakistani ideological narratives.[19] Though open-source mapping is limited, defence analysts note this as part of Pakistan's ongoing narrative warfare.[20]
These programmes can be heard in J&K, Punjab, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and some areas near the Nepal border. Pakistan also provides five-minute ‘Kashmir updates’ in both English and Urdu from all these stations at regular intervals.[21]
Table 2: State-run Radio Stations in Pakistan
| Station | Locations | Programme Name | Content |
| Radio Pakistan | Mirpur, Rawalpindi, Muzaffarabad, Bhimber, Rawalakot | Zarb-e-Kaleem (Strike of the Moses Staff) | News with an anti-India slant |
| Azad Kashmir Radio | Tararkhal, PoK | Dol Ka Pol (Hollow Claims) | Pakistani patriotic songs maligning India. |
| Akwal-e-Zareen (Quotable Quotes) | Provokes religious sentiments of Kashmiri Muslims; provides fake/distorted news exaggerating India’s caste and communal divide | ||
| Garoor ki Khudai (Height of Arrogance) | Dialogues/conversations making fun of India. | ||
| Katrein Imaarat (House of Clay) | Fake/distorted news, intended to aggravate Kashmiri feelings of victimhood. | ||
| Islamabad | Aina (Mirror) | Adverse commentary of India’s internal matters |
Source: Compiled by the author (with Rajesh Bhat, Radio Kashmir).
Figure 2: Pakistan Radio Station Locations
Source: Author’s own, using map from Maps of India.[22]
Table 3: Private Radio Stations and Channels in Pakistan
| Radio Station and Channels | Location | Programme Name | Content |
| Radio Buraq (Pakistan’s first community radio) | Sialkot (can be accessed in Jammu, RS Pura) | Similar across all channels; theology-oriented, but also using Bollywood film music to lure Indian listeners | |
| Rose FM 90 | Mirpur, Bhimber (can be accessed in Poonch, Rajouri, Haveli, Mandi, Mendhar, Surankot belt of Poonch, Majakote, Kalakote, Budhal, Sunderbani, Nowshera and Thana Mandi) | ||
| Voice of Kashmir (105 FM) | Dhirkot, Rawalkote (PoK) | ||
| Geo Kashmir | Kotli, PoK | Broadcasts in Gojri and Pahari as well as Urdu. | |
| FM 93 | Mirpur, PoK | ||
| FM 101 | Sialkot | ||
| Mast FM 103 | Gujranwala | ||
| Radio Buraq | Sialkot | ||
| Voice of Kashmir 95.8 | |||
| Radio Swat Network 100 FM | |||
| Radio Buraq FM 104-105 MHz | Peshawar |
Source: Compiled by the author (with Rajesh Bhat, Radio Kashmir).
Figure 3: Private Pakistani Radio Stations Broadcasting to India
Source: Author’s own, using map from Maps of India.[23]
Pakistan’s is a multi-pronged propaganda attack. Though their exact number is not known, reports claim that there are about 15 stations operating in J&K, (including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)) spreading anti-India propaganda.[24] On February 5 every year starting in the 1990s, Pakistan has been celebrating a ‘Kashmir Solidarity Day’[25] as part of its broader information strategy, designed to not only galvanise domestic support, but also to project a fictional parallel reality globally. The Pakistani Army’s Signal Corps has been violating Article 45 of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) protocols[26] to send messages to militants near the LoC;[27] the Pakistani High Commission[28] in New Delhi has been using social media influencers. The state’s propaganda network has extended well beyond physical media into psychological, digital, and diaspora spaces.
In sum, Pakistan’s IW is not an ad hoc activity but a calibrated, institutionalised strategy that spans traditional, digital, psychological, and theological fronts. It is designed to blur fact and fiction, weaponise emotion, and undermine India’s unity.
The use of ‘digital jihad’[29] in Pakistan’s IW marks a shift from analogue propaganda to digitally synchronised narrative warfare, designed not only to target India externally but also to retain domestic legitimacy amid rising internal dysfunction. This transformation, led primarily by the ISPR and its associated cyber arms, has enabled Pakistan to institutionalise the weaponisation of social media.[30]
Pakistani media outlets and bot-driven troll farms circulate manipulated visuals for anti-India propaganda,[31] with the ISPR coordinating these efforts, aided by diaspora influencers,[32] various Chinese social media accounts and Turkey’s public broadcaster, TRT World. Pro-Pakistani media outlets such as Qatar’s Al Jazeera network and Turkey’s Anadolu also provide support.[33]
The Pakistani response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack on 22 April 2025, which left 26 civilians dead, was a textbook example of artificial intelligence (AI)-powered, multi-platform disinformation. Within hours, Pakistani-affiliated X accounts began flooding the platform with hashtags such as #IndianFalseFlag, #PahalgamDramaExposed, and #ModiExposed, suggesting that the Indian government had orchestrated the attack for electoral gain.[34] Within 16 hours, almost 14,000 posts under the hashtag #IndianFalseFlag trended globally, 75 percent of these posts originating from Pakistan, according to an India Today report.[35]
Deepfake videos surfaced of a fabricated confession by an Indian General, accusing Indian agencies of staging the attack.[36] Open-source intelligence groups traced the origin of all such material to Pakistan-linked AI labs, which had used facial mimicry and voice synthesis tools to create the illusion of legitimacy.[37]
Many of these narratives were amplified by coordinated botnets operating in Pakistan, Nepal, China, and the Gulf nations, where the Pakistani diaspora played a key role. The bot density and reposting frequency suggested usage of paid engagement networks, mirroring techniques observed earlier in Russian and Iranian disinformation playbooks.[38]
Pakistan’s IW against India is rooted not only in its inherent antagonism but also seeks to deflect attention from the country’s own domestic crisis. Figures released by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2024) offers a compelling rationale for its aggressive narrative redirection: over 22.8 million children are out of school,[39] national unemployment stands at 6.3 percent, and more than 10 million lack safe drinking water.[40] The Global Hunger Index 2024 ranked Pakistan 109 out of 127, highlighting the extent of its socio-economic distress.[41]
In this environment, ISPR’s disinformation warfare supports internal pacification. Victory narratives, especially after Operation Sindoor concluded, were reinforced through state-sponsored hoardings, billboards, and street propaganda across major cities, declaring ‘Victory in Kashmir’ or ‘India Defeated.’[42] Senior Pakistan army officials reportedly visited at least 12 university and eight college campuses across Punjab and Sindh to deliver lectures celebrating a Pakistani ‘victory’ in Kashmir, while the government actively suppressed independent media from reporting otherwise.
Table 4: Pakistan Army’s Citizen Outreach Post-Operation Sindoor
| Date | Event | Key Participants | Location / Audience | Key Content |
| 1 May 2025 | Press conference | Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Chaudhry | Islamabad | Warned India against escalation; accused New Delhi of supporting terrorism in Pakistan. |
| 20 May 2025 | Civil-military interaction | DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry; Maj Gen Abid Mazhar (IG FC, Balochistan North) | Islamabad; teachers & students | Warned against misinformation by hostile forces; held workshop for journalists and influencers. |
| 23 May 2025 | Meeting | DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry | Peshawar; mainly students of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal districts | Highlighted Pakistan Army’s efforts; claimed escalation by India. |
| 26 May 2025 | Interaction with students | DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry | Rawalpindi; over 2,500 students from KPK universities. | Blamed India for terrorism in Pakistan; discussed recent India-Pak escalation. |
| 3 June 2025 | Pak Army Civil-Military Interaction | DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry | Islamabad; civil society members | Blamed India for ‘aggression’ in Balochistan |
| 4 June 2025 | Pak Army Civil-Military Interaction | Lt Gen Fayyaz Hussain Shah, GOC 4 Corps | Punjab University, Lahore; civil society members, students, teachers | Discussed ‘Op Bunyaan-un-Marsos’; stressed the need for discipline and national unity; emphasised the role of youth in the struggle. |
| 20 June 2025 | Interaction with Academia | Lt Gen Fayyaz Hussain Shah, GOC 4 Corps | Forman Christian College University, Lahore; teachers and students | Blamed India for sponsoring terrorism; discussed the national role young people could play. |
| 23 June 2025 | Civil Outreach | DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry | Karachi; Religious and social community representatives | Blamed India for terrorism; claimed only the state can declare jihad; held a similar session at Sayani IT College earlier. |
| June-July 2025 | Hilal Talks 2025 | DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry | Interaction with academia across 10 locations; 1,950 senior faculty members participated from across 82 universities, 81 colleges and 24 schools | . Echoed the propaganda of calling India an epicentre of destabilisation. |
Source: Interviews with Army Officials, Udhampur, J&K
This coordinated narrative engineering has extended into popular culture. ISPR-supported TV serials ranging from the 1998 Alpha, Bravo, Charlie to the 2021 Sinf-e-Aahan (Women of Steel),[43] and military-themed anthems like "Har Ghari Tayyar Kamran Hai," (Every Moment Ready, Victorious)[44] have sought to marry patriotic sentiment[45] with anti-India hostility.[46] Magazines such as Hilal for Kids[47] and Hamdard Naunehal,[48] both funded by the military, try to embed militarised worldviews into school-age reading content. Digital content creators on TikTok and Instagram have collaborated with ISPR on ‘short patriotic reels’ celebrating martyrdom while vilifying Indian soldiers.
Naturally, during Operation Sindoor, the Indian and Pakistani print media reflected sharply contrasting narratives. Most Indian publications took the line exemplified by, say, Hindustan Times, which celebrated Op Sindoor as a precise, strategic move with potent messaging, reinforcing national pride. In contrast, Dawn critiqued the Hindu religious symbolism of the term ‘sindoor’ and suggested it was aimed at domestic emotional manipulation. On Op Bunyas al Marsoos, it portrayed Pakistan’s actions as restrained while calling India's response exaggerated, laced with theatrics and misinformation. Hindustan Times offered limited coverage of Pakistan’s operation, avoiding direct engagement. Overall, the Indian media leaned towards nationalistic pride, while the Pakistani media questioned the intent and authenticity of India’s framing.
Pakistan’s digital jihad is not merely an offensive tactic but a defensive necessity, a means to preserve internal cohesion in a country riddled with inflation, corruption, IMF conditionalities, and governance erosion. By creating the illusion of an external threat and internal strength, ISPR ensures the Pakistani military remains the sole credible institution in the public psyche.
This brief makes the following recommendations:
A key reason for ISPR’s perceived effectiveness lies in its unified and centralised command over Pakistan’s strategic messaging. ISPR acts as a single narrative voice—synchronising the army’s position with political messaging, cultural productions, digital propaganda, and even international diplomacy. Whether it is a press conference, a military anthem, a university lecture, or a viral TikTok reel, the messaging is consistent, emotive, and aligned with its military’s values.
In contrast, India’s information environment is pluralistic and decentralised, a natural outcome of democratic vibrancy but often a liability in high-stakes perception warfare. Multiple actors—from ministries and think tanks to media outlets and individual influencers—compete to shape narratives, frequently without coordination or strategic oversight. The result is fragmented messaging, delayed responses, and mixed signalling.
Ironically, while ISPR is the dominant external voice shaping India's image abroad, it is not the sole internal cognitive force within Pakistan. Internally, the army competes with populist politicians, religious clerics, journalists, and civil society actors, each pulling in different directions. This divergence dilutes domestic narrative control, making internal cohesion harder to maintain—hence the need for repetitive propaganda cycles to sustain illusions of unity. Its impact is asymmetrical: sharp and effective in projecting power externally, but internally reliant on constant reinforcement and suppression due to competing domestic voices and deep structural dysfunction.
To sum up, India must urgently institutionalise IW as a core component of its national security policy. A comprehensive response ranging from military narrative command centres and diaspora engagement to cognitive inoculation programmes and AI surveillance is essential. Game-theoretic models and psychological warfare simulations must guide strategic planning. Equally, cultural and linguistic diversity must be leveraged to create authentic counter-narratives across India’s vast demographic.
In an age of digital and algorithmic influence, victory will no longer be determined solely on the battlefield, but in the minds of citizens and the timelines of global perception. India must prepare accordingly with clarity, unity, and strategic foresight.
Soumya Awasthi is Fellow, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] The Citizenship Amendment Act, amending the Citizenship Act of 1987 which barred citizenship to all illegal immigrants into India, allows non-Muslim religious communities from neighbouring countries to gain citizenship after due process while Muslims are excluded.
The proposed National Register of Citizens aims – as the name makes clear – is intended to compile a list of people who have documents to prove their Indian citizenship, thereby weeding out illegal immigrants. But the process, carried out so far in only one Indian state, Assam, has thrown up many cases of misuse and harassment.
[b] Woodpecker strategy here equates to how birds do consistent, powerful and repetitive pecking of thoughts.
[1] V.K. Ahluwalia, “Psychological Warfare: Call Out Adversaries’ Designs,” CLAWS Journal, 2020, https://media.neliti.com/media/publications/330718-psychological-warfare-call-out-adversari-9b954e54.pdf
[2] R. Abbasi and M.S. Uzzaman, Changing Patterns of Warfare Between India and Pakistan: Navigating the Impact of New and Disruptive Technologies (Routledge, 2023), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003340171
[3] T. Muneeb and M. Owais, “New Age Militancy: A Case Study of Kashmir (2010–20)” (MPhil Thesis, University of Management and Technology, 2020), 10.13140/RG.2.2.15786.94402
[4] Z. Yousaf, S. Iqbal, and M.H. Sarwar, “Analysis of Pakistani and Indian Media towards Warfare,” Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2022, https://ojs.aiou.edu.pk/index.php/jssh/article/download/384/334
[5] M.D. Hanes, A Most Dangerous Place: Investigating Pakistan’s Irregular Warfare Campaign in Kashmir Under the Nuclear Shadow, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1126916.pdf
[6] Pramod Kumar, “The Evolution of Information Warfare: From Propaganda to Cyberattacks,” International Journal of Emerging Knowledge Studies, April 30, 2024, https://ijeks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/IJEKS-3-04-002.pdf
[7]Neerja and Mahendra, “Kautilya’s Concept of Internal Security and Its Relevance in Counterinsurgency,” International Journal of Advanced Research in Science, Communication and Technology 5, no. 9, March 2025, https://www.ijarsct.co.in/Paper24675.pdf#:~:text=His%20(%20Kautilya%20)%20doctrine%20emphasized%20the,maintain%20sovereignty%20and%20stability%20within%20the%20kingdom.
[8]Nabarun Roy, “Realism in the Study of International Relations in India,” Observer Research Foundation, August 3, 2023, https://www-orfonline-org.webpkgcache.com/doc/-/s/www.orfonline.org/research/realism-in-the-study-of-international-relations-in-india
[9]Ashish Singh, “Inside Pakistan Military’s Elaborate Misinformation Machinery,” The Sunday Guardian, March 4, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/inside-pakistan-militarys-elaborate-misinformation-machinery
[10] Rajesh Bhat, Radio Kashmir: Times of Peace and War (Delhi: Stellar Publishers, 2018)
[11] A. Makhlaiuk, “Constructing the Image of the Pakistan Armed Forces in the 21st Century,” 2023, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/constructing-the-image-of-the-pakistan-armed-forces-in-the-21st-century
[12] A. Shukla, “Theoretical Underpinnings of India–Pakistan Relations,” India Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2020), 152–165, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0974928420917785
[13] F. Rasool, A. Ahmed and Z. Zaighum, “Media, War, and Peace: A Post Pulwama Comparative Study of India and Pakistan. Journal of Peace,” Development and Communication 5, no. 1 (2021), https://www.pdfpk.net/ojs/index.php/jpdc/article/download/195/107
[14] I. Ali and J.S. Sidhu, "Strategic Dynamics of Crisis Stability in South Asia," Journal of Asian and African Studies 57, no. 5 (2022): 1153–1172, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00219096211054396
[15]Archives, Agreements between India and Pakistan reached at Inter-dominion Conference held at New Delhi in December 1948, Archives.org, https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.35519/2015.35519.Agreements-Between-India-And-Pakistan-Reached-At-Inter-dominion-Conferences-Held-At-New-Delhi-In--December-1948-Calcutta-In-April-1948-And-Karachi-In-May-1948-And-Some-Related-Documents_djvu.txt#:~:text=%28ii%29%20An%20Inter,review%20the%20activities%20of%20%E2%80%94
[16] Bhat, Radio Kashmir: Times of Peace and War
[17] Bhat, Radio Kashmir: Times of Peace and War
[18]Jitin Jain and Saroj Rath, “Information Warfare: Why India Needs to Give Pakistan Propaganda Machinery a Taste of its Own Medicine,” Daily O, August 24, 2020, https://www.dailyo.in/politics/india-pakistan-information-warfare-open-source-intelligence-ispr-isi-raw-33542
[19] Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, Annual Report (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), https://mib.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-08/annual_report_2001-2002.pdf
[20]Bhat, Radio Kashmir: Times of Peace and War
[21]Bhat, Radio Kashmir: Times of Peace and War
[22] Maps of India, "Map of Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir," August 5, 2019, https://www.mapsofindia.com/my-india/india/map-of-indian-state-of-jammu-and-kashmir-august-5-2019/attachment/jammu-kashmir-as-it-is
[23] Maps of India, "Map of Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir"
[24]“15 Pakistani FM Stations Active in Jammu and Kashmir, Spreading Lies About India,” Early Times, June 14, 2019, https://www.earlytimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=265915#:~:text=15%20Pakistani%20FM%20stations%20active,lies%20about%20India%20%2D%20Early%20Times&text=Jammu%20:%20India%20and%20Pakistan%20have,also%20operating%20through%20terrorist%20organisations.&text=2014%20floods%20in%20Kashmir:%20What%20happened%20to%20the%20money?
[25]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, https://mofa.gov.pk/commemoration-of-kashmir-solidarity-day
[26]International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “Regulation of Satellite Systems,” https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/backgrounders/Pages/Regulation-of-Satellite-Systems.aspx
[27] “Pakistan Army Using Codes via FM Transmission to Contact J&K Militants,” National Herald, 2019, https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/national/pakistan-army-using-codes-via-fm-transmission-to-contact-jandk-militants
[28] “Espionage Network Exposed: Ex-Pakistani Sub Inspector Turned YouTuber Nasir Acts as key ISI Handler, Grooming Indian Influencers for Spying and Propaganda,” Times of India, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/spy-ring-ex-pak-cop-a-youtuber-a-key-handler/articleshow/121683491.cms
[29]SK Jha, “Digital Jihad: Global Trends, Architecture and Footprints in Kashmir,” Manekshaw Papers, 2020, https://claws.co.in/digital-jihad-global-trends-architecture-and-footprints-in-kashmir/?utm_campaign=Claws&utm_medium=whatsapp&utm_source=im
[30]“Operation Sindoor: How Pakistani Media is Twisting the Truth,” Doordarshan, May 9, 2025, https://ddnews.gov.in/en/operation-sindoor-how-pakistani-media-is-twisting-the-truth/
[31] Marcos Bastos, “Visual Identities in Troll Farms: The Twitter Moderation Research Consortium,” Social Media+ Society, March 24, 2025, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/20563051251323652
[32]“Pakistan's Digital Narratives and Cross-border Disinformation,” BBC, 2022, bbc.com/monitoring
[33] Amit Shukla, “How Turkish Broadcaster TRT Peddled Anti-India, Pro-Pakistan Propaganda,” CNN News 18, May 14, 2025, https://www.news18.com/india/trts-propaganda-push-india-flags-turkish-broadcaster-for-anti-india-pro-pakistan-narratives-ws-kl-9336514.html
[34]Soumya Awasthi , “Weaponising the Narrative: Social Media Propaganda post-Pahalgam Attack, Raisina Debates,” Observer Research Foundation, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/weaponising-the-narrative-social-media-propaganda-post-pahalgam-attack
[35]Brijesh Singh, “Digital Jihad: Inside Pakistan’s Information Warfare Playbook,” The Sunday Guardian, June 1, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/digital-jihad-inside-pakistans-information-warfare-playbook#
[36]Singh, “Digital Jihad: Inside Pakistan’s Information Warfare Playbook”
[37] Singh, “Digital Jihad: Inside Pakistan’s Information Warfare Playbook”
[38]Sarthak Ahuja, “India’s Two Front Information War’, Young Voices,” Observer Research Foundation, 2023, https://www-orfonline-org.webpkgcache.com/doc/-/s/www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-two-front-information-war
[39]Abdus Sattar, “Economic Progress and Investment in Human Capital, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,” 2020, https://pide.org.pk/research/state-of-education-in-pakistan/
[40] “More than 10 Million People, Including Children, Living in Pakistan’s Flood-affected Areas Still Lack Access to Safe Drinking Water,” UNICEF, March 21, 2023, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/more-10-million-people-including-children-living-pakistans-flood-affected-areas#:~:text=ISLAMABAD%2C%2021%20March%202023%20%2D%20Six%20months,to%20drink%20and%20use%20potentially%20disease%2Dridden%20water.&text=Unsafe%20water%20and%20poor%20sanitation%20are%20key%20underlying%20causes%20of%20malnutrition.
[41]Global Hunger Index 2024: Pakistan, https://www.globalhungerindex.org/pdf/en/2024/Pakistan.pdf
[42]X, May 18, 2025, Imtiaz Mahmood, https://x.com/imtiazmadmood/status/1923976020475916312?s=48&t=8tHFEx_w9-i12Rei8ex0lA
[43]M. Mahmood, “Sinf-e-Aahan: ISPR’s Experiment in Soft Power,” The Friday Times, January 31, 2022, https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2022/01/30/sinf-e-aahan-isprs-experiment-in-soft-power/
[44] Kaleem Bukhari et al., “Patriotic Songs: A Strategic Tool in Hybrid Warfare,” Hamdard Islamicus, May 2021, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351835523_Patriotic_songs_A_strategic_tool_in_hybrid_warfare
[45] Song by Atif Aslam, https://www.instagram.com/p/DHqKZLpot9S/
[46]Morung Express, “The Propaganda Apparatus: ISPR and the Military Narrative Building in Pakistan,” Morung Express, March 23, 2025, https://morungexpress.com/the-propaganda-apparatus-ispr-and-the-military-narrative-building-in-pakistan
[47] Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan, Hilal for Kids, https://hilal.gov.pk/eng-article-detail/NDIyMg==.html
[48]Hamdard Naunehal Magazine – Defence Day Special Editions, https://hamdard.com.pk/hamdard-naunehal/
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Dr Soumya Awasthi is Fellow, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation. Her work focuses on the intersection of technology and national ...
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