Facts on the ground suggest that Army Chief, Qamar Javed Bajwa, and his army are interested only in the formal trappings of democracy.
Within a few weeks of the restoration of democracy in Pakistan in 2008, the veneer of civilian supremacy had started to peel off. The de facto government run by the men in khaki uniforms — Pakistan Army — had skilfully engineered the virtual capitulation of the PPP-led civilian government. There were hopes that the first-ever political transition in Pakistan from one civilian-elected government to another, which paved the way for the return of Nawaz Sharif to the helm in 2013, would strengthen democracy in that country. But it became clear in a matter of a few months that the army was pretty much continuing to call the shots and the civilian government could violate the army’s red-lines at its own peril. Once the military establishment had established its dominance, it started drawing up new red lines and steadily expanding its sphere of influence into areas that were until then seen as being the preserve of the de jure government led by the civilians.
By the time the military orchestrated the ouster of Nawaz Sharif using the judiciary as its executioner, the broad outlines of the army’s gameplan could be discerned. But the picture that appeared to be forming was largely based on an analysis of events and developments that were unfolding. Part of it was also based on rumours (or if you will, premature facts) and gossip in the corridors of power, hints thrown by politicians, and oblique references in TV talk shows, newspaper columns and public meetings.
There was also a surfeit of allegations and insinuations based on circumstantial evidence that gave some shape to the picture. But a report published in the Daily Times newspaper of a meeting that the current generalissimo, Qamar Javed Bajwa, held with some newsmen has confirmed the worst suspicions about the new political power play unfolding in Pakistan. If this report is anything to go by, it is a virtual manifesto of the military in Pakistan and lays out the roadmap of politics in the foreseeable future. Interestingly, it is not just what Bajwa is reported to have said but also what he left unsaid that makes for an extremely interesting analysis.
The most critical, and in some ways worrisome, dimension of this new template is that the army has all but decided to take over without formally taking over the reins of power. Pakistan is, in a sense, entering the phase of ‘dictated’, or as some call it ‘guided’, democracy. In the words of Bajwa, the army “cannot allow internal political strife to disrupt Pakistan’s present upward trajectory.” Although even during the democratic interregnums, the army’s role has always been very intrusive in Pakistan, it has now taken political engineering to an altogether different level. What is more, it has now crafted new instruments to achieve its political objectives. While both the judiciary and the media have always been handmaidens of the military, facilitating and spinning things the way the army wanted, today they are both the initiators and executors of the military’s game plan and not just the guys who clean up after the military has taken action.
In addition, the corruption watchdog, National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which is headed by a former Supreme Court judge with a very dubious reputation, has become hyperactive in either convincing people to switch sides, or else ousts them from office, or even to keep a sword hanging over some heads so that they don’t step out of line.
The unprecedented level of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring has more or less obviated the need for a direct intervention by the army. By using the judiciary to distort, mutilate and innovatively (some would say disingenuously and self-servingly) reinterpret the constitutional and legal provisions, the ‘deep state’ has emasculated the political space available to civilians. In the process, it has started to not just make and break governments and political parties, or fiddle with the electoral process and decide representation in Parliament and provincial assemblies, but also influence how the country is administered, using the tool of the judiciary.
According to the report, Bajwa said: “salvation lies in protecting and preserving the integrity of all state institutions (Parliament, judiciary and military) as much as in upholding the rule of law (read: accountability) on the way to free and fair elections.” It is surely a strange way to protect the integrity of Parliament when the military uses intimidation, blackmail and bribery to not just carry out a legislative coup against a sitting government in Balochistan but also to make legislators vote for the army’s chosen candidates for the Senate elections. Add to this the cobbling together of an opposition coalition — the new Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), only this time to cut Nawaz Sharif to size — to ensure that Sharif’s party cannot win the election for the Chairman of the Senate. Rule of law is, of course, limited to accountability, but only of the guys the army doesn’t like. This means that to maintain a semblance of fair play some old cases against retired generals will open, but the major focus will be on the inconvenient or undesirable (to the army) politicians.
The rule of law, of course, doesn’t apply to the ‘deep state’ which has been busy kidnapping voices of dissent and bludgeoning them into submission. Bajwa let this be known in no uncertain terms when he said: “national security far outweighs individuals’ interests.” That the army couldn’t countenance an independent media was apparent from the comment: “officers and soldiers are pained to see the frustrating negative narratives in the media.” This explains the stacking of media panels with handpicked retired generals to build a political narrative and steer the national discourse in a direction that suited the army. At the very least, the military-mandated media has been instructed to not press too hard on any issue that questions the acts of omission and commission of the army, both in the making of policy, as well as in the execution of policy.
While it has long been evident that the judiciary had become the military’s cats-paw not just to fix politicians but also tilt the political tables in favour of its favourites and tweak the legal and constitutional framework to deliver whatever the army wanted, there was an acknowledgment by Bajwa that the army is at the back of the judges who are clearly running amok. According to the report, Bajwa was adamant that “subversion of the judiciary or its rulings…will not be allowed,” because “the country will descend into chaos if we let the Supreme Court be humiliated by those who don’t like its decisions.”
Although Bajwa projected himself as a saviour and supporter of democracy, and insisted that the army is “sensitive to the criticality of the democracy order,” the facts on ground suggest that the general and his army are interested in only the formal trappings of democracy, and not so much in all the other stuff that goes into the making of a democracy. He gave a hint on what to expect in the future when he said, “Parliament is supposed to revisit laws such as the 1861 Police Act and the 18th Amendment to correct the course of governance and capacity. In this world, everything, except the Holy Quran is open to review as societies evolve and face newer challenges.” If Parliament doesn’t deliver, then all it will take is a writ petition, or even a suo moto notice by the Chief Justice to make the necessary legal and constitutional changes.
While Bajwa, who has been trying to live down rumours of being an Ahmadi, reaffirmed his Muslimness by adding for good measure that the Quran is not open to review, how a society that increasingly seeks solutions to 21st century problems from a 6th century text will evolve and face newer challenges isn’t entirely clear. Be that as it may, Bajwa gave insights into the army’s thinking on politics. He declared that “political leaders like Altaf Hussein are history. All Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) followers should realise that ‘Altaf, violence and extortion’ are not acceptable at all…Everybody is free to indulge in politics, but not at the cost of the Constitution and the law of Pakistan.”
The way the army has gone about dismantling the MQM and splitting Pakistan's fourth largest political party into four stands is testimony to the political engineering project of the ‘deep state’. It is not just limited to parties such as MQM but also other ‘nationalist’ parties like the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party and National Party in Balochistan. If the developments in Balochistan are anything to go by, then all hues of ethnic nationalism are no longer acceptable to the ‘deep state’ which will slowly but surely try to whittle down their influence and snuff out their political relevance.
Therefore, when Bajwa talks of freedom in politics, this freedom is circumscribed by what is allowed by the army and what it feels comfortable with. Anything beyond that is an invitation for the same treatment that has been meted out to MQM and is now also being administered to Nawaz Sharif’s party and its allies. The freedom to indulge in politics at the cost of the Constitution and law is, however, available to the judges who have assumed the role of both administrators as well as legislators, and of course to the generals who make and break parties (including those of jihadist terror groups like the Milli Muslim League of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Tehrik-e-Labbaik), cobble alliances between parties and politicians, and determine the outcome of elections.
It has long been known that the army wasn’t impressed with the former finance minister Ishaq Dar. This was confirmed by Bajwa who accused Dar of “dragging his feet on a number of much-needed reforms related to money laundering and terror financing laws” and called him “an utter disaster for this country.” The manner in which Dar was roped in on the cases that led to Nawaz Sharif’s ouster suddenly falls in place. Dar was accused of possessing disproportionate assets — no one has ever asked the army’s favourites to explain their assets and their lifestyles and tax returns — and has been hounded to a point where he has had to escape from the country. The unkindest cut of it all was Bajwa blaming the civilians for failure to implement the National Action Plan which he claimed led to Pakistan's grey-listing by the Financial Action Task Force. The fact that the FATF has grey-listed Pakistan for failure to act against the army’s favourite terrorist group — Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa — has been conveniently glossed over, as has been the fact that the civilians were simply not allowed to crack down on these ‘holy warriors’ who act as auxiliaries of the army.
From what Bajwa is reported to have said, it appears that there is very little change in the convoluted thinking that guides the Pakistani approach to terrorism and security threats. The paranoia of the Pakistani state is evident from Bajwa saying that “security of the country is supreme, and prevention of subversion is the primary duty of the armed forces.”
Read this with some of his other statements given above and it is clear that the Pakistan Army remains wedded to the idea of Pakistan being a national security state in which everything else must conform to and kowtow to the imperatives of national security as defined by the army. While Bajwa argued that “monopoly over violence shall have to unequivocally rest with the state…Non-state actors are neither acceptable anymore nor relevant to the ideals of a functional, law-based democratic order.” This needs to be taken with a healthy dose of salt.
The bit about monopoly over violence really includes proxies which work under the command, control and direction of the state. In fact, the entire ‘anti-terror’ campaign of the Pakistan Army wasn’t to get rid of these private militias, but to bring them back under control. Those who accepted the authority of the Pakistan Army have been rehabilitated and put back into the business of jihad in places like Kashmir; those who went rogue (or independent) have been ruthlessly eliminated. As for the bit about non-state actors, this term too refers to terror groups that operate autonomously and not to those who work in conjunction and under the supervision and direction of the state. This means that groups like LeT/JuD and Jais-e-Mohammad which work as proxies are not non-state actors.
Finally, on terror groups such as the Taliban and their associates such as the Haqqani Network, there is little change in the stand of the Pakistan Army. Bajwa confirms the suspicions of many of us that the Taliban offer of talks with the US was made under the guidance and instruction from Pakistan.
This was done to ward off the mounting pressure — a standard operating procedure when things get too hot. Other than this, everything else remains the same — “we certainly don’t have a 100 percent control over the Taliban or the Haqqanis. We have our leverages but will carefully deploy them because we can’t afford to burn our fingers all over,” or that “we will sequence all counter-terror actions according to our own timeline and considerations,” or even that “we will deal with all Afghan militants in a non-kinetic way to avoid a boomerang effect on our soil.” All of this is pretty standard stuff which successive Pakistani Army chiefs have been uttering over the last decade and a half and means pretty much nothing in concrete terms.
By all accounts then it seems that Pakistan is now entering a new phase of ‘democratic’ politics, one in which the civilian façade will be maintained but the strings will be pulled by the military either directly or through the judiciary. This means a sort of judicial martial law with a civilian face, or, in other words, democracy with Pakistani characteristics. The interesting thing about this new form of martial law is that it is institutionally run and not individually run, something that makes it more enduring than the normal, mundane sort of military dictators the Pakistanis are so used to.
This commentary originally appeared in Newslaundry.
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Sushant Sareen is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation. His published works include: Balochistan: Forgotten War, Forsaken People (Monograph, 2017) Corridor Calculus: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor & China’s comprador ...
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