Introduction

Pakistan has faced a succession of economic crises in recent years, driven by mounting external liabilities, political instability, and natural disasters. A worsening balance of payment crisis, exacerbated by global inflationary pressures and supply-chain disruptions post-COVID-19, have left Pakistan on the verge of default. Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities stem from structural weaknesses that successive governments have failed to address, including a chronically narrow tax base, low productivity in agriculture and industry, heavy dependence on imported energy, weak regulatory oversight, lack of institutional transparency, and a bloated public sector. Chronic fiscal mismanagement, an undiversified export base, and energy sector inefficiencies have perpetuated a boom-and-bust cycle.

With foreign reserves plummeting and import restrictions disrupting industries, the government had little choice but to seek an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout in 2024. In September 2024, the IMF approved a US$7-billion loan for Pakistan, marking its 24^th bailout programme for the country since 1958.^[1] The immediate disbursement of US$1 billion provided short-term relief to the economy, which was then teetering on the brink of collapse. However, the financial package had stringent conditionalities, including tax hikes, energy tariff reforms, and comprehensive governance overhauls.

While the economy has since shown signs of modest recovery, with growth rebounding to 2.4 percent from a contraction of -0.6 percent in 2023 and consumer price index (CPI) inflation falling to single digits from a peak of 38 percent in May 2023,^[2],[3] the structural roots of Pakistan’s economic crises remain unaddressed.^[4] This brief examines the long-term socioeconomic impacts of IMF interventions, their influence on governance, and whether Pakistan can escape its recurring debt trap amidst escalating security and geopolitical challenges.

Table 1: IMF Lending Commitments to Pakistan 

Facility	Date of Arrangement	Expiration Date	Amount Drawn ('000s SDR)
Rapid Financing Instrument	16 April 2020	20 April 2020	1,015,500
Extended Fund Facility	3 July 2019	30 June 2023	3,038,000
Extended Fund Facility	4 September 2013	30 September 2016	4,393,000
Standby Arrangement	24 November 2008	30 September 2011	4,936,035
Extended Credit Facility	6 December 2001	5 December 2004	861,420
Standby Arrangement	29 November 2000	30 September 2001	465,000
Extended Fund Facility	20 October 1997	19 October 2000	113,740
Extended Credit Facility	20 October 1997	20 October 1997	265,370
Standby Arrangement	13 December 1995	30 September 1997	294,690
Extended Credit Facility	22 February 1994	13 December 1995	172,200
Extended Fund Facility	22 February 1994	4 December 1995	123,200
Standby Arrangement	16 September 1993	22 February 1994	88,000
Structural Adjustment Facility Commitment	28 December 1988	27 December 1991	382,410
Standby Arrangement	28 December 1988	30 November 1990	194,480
Extended Credit Facility	2 December 1981	23 November 1983	730,000
Extended Fund Facility	24 November 1980	1 December 1981	349,000
Standby Arrangement	9 March 1977	8 March 1978	80,000
Extended Credit Facility	11 November 1974	10 November 1975	75,000
Standby Arrangement	11 August 1973	10 August 1974	75,000
Standby Arrangement	18 May 1972	17 May 1973	84,000
Standby Arrangement	17 October 1968	16 October 1969	75,000
Standby Arrangement	16 March 1965	15 March 1966	37,500
Standby Arrangement	8 December 1958	22 September 1959	0
Total Amount Drawn			17,848,545

Source: International Monetary Fund^[5]

A Long History of Reliance on the IMF

Pakistan’s relationship with the IMF has spanned seven decades and is characterised by cyclical debt accumulation, geopolitical shocks, and persistent policy inertia. The initial phase of this dependence emerged in the aftermath of Partition, as the nascent state grappled with economic fragility, compounded by its wars with India in 1947, 1965, and 1971 and the subsequent loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). These events entrenched reliance on IMF support, with the first bailout in 1958 setting a precedent for conditional lending that would shape Pakistan’s economic trajectory for decades to come.^[6]

During the structural adjustment era from the 1980s to the 2000s, successive military and civilian governments turned to the IMF for financial assistance. The IMF’s programmes during this period emphasised privatisation, austerity measures, and fiscal discipline. However, these initiatives were often poorly implemented or undermined by corruption and mismanagement. Consequently, Pakistan’s external debt ballooned from US$10 billion in 1980 to US$43 billion by 2007.^[7] Much of this debt was driven by mismanagement and increased security spending as the country navigated its complex geopolitical role in the region, particularly during the Afghan-Soviet war of 1985 and the subsequent war on terror.

Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities have only deepened since the 2010s. External debt had surged to US$130 billion by 2024, with nearly 22 percent owed to China, mainly for projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).^[8] The 2022 floods in Pakistan caused losses estimated at US$30 billion, further straining the economy. In 2023, with persistent political instability and global inflationary pressures exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and supply-chain disruptions, Pakistan was pushed to the brink of default, necessitating the most recent IMF intervention.^[9]

Socioeconomic Impacts: Austerity, Poverty, and Inequality

The conditionalities attached to IMF programmes have often exacerbated poverty and inequality in Pakistan. Successive governments have failed to use the programmes to address the systemic issues in the economy. Austerity measures, particularly the reduction of subsidies and the imposition of higher taxes, have disproportionately affected low-income households. For instance, energy tariff hikes—which surged by up to 50 percent in 2024—and increases in General Sales Tax (GST) have made basic utilities and essential goods unaffordable for many.^[10] Although inflation, which peaked at 38 percent in 2023,^[11] has since moderated, food insecurity remains a pressing issue. According to the World Food Programme, Pakistan ranks 109^th out of 127 countries in the 2024 Global Hunger Index, with 82 percent of the population unable to afford a healthy diet.^[12] Furthermore, the World Bank estimates, the poverty rate increased from 40.2 percent in FY2023 to 40.5 percent in FY2024, leaving millions struggling to afford essential commodities.^[13] While IMF programmes aim to stabilise macroeconomic fundamentals and encourage reforms, their success ultimately depends on the political will and implementation capacity of the recipient country’s leadership.

Social spending constraints have compounded these challenges. Public expenditure on health and education remains inadequate, consistently falling below 3 percent of GDP. This underinvestment has ledto deteriorating human development indices, with over 40 percent of Pakistan’s population living below the poverty line.^[14] The lack of investment in these critical sectors hampers individual well-being and stifles human capital development, undermining the country’s long-term economic prospects.

Tax reforms, a cornerstone of IMF programmes, have aimed to broaden the tax base by targeting previously exempt sectors such as retail and agriculture. However, the implementation of these reforms has been uneven and largely ineffective. Systematic tax evasion continues to be rampant, particularly among the highest income quintile of the population, who hold significant economic and political power. In 2024, only about 2.5 percent of the Pakistani population filed tax returns^[15]—a low figure that underscores pervasive fiscal non-compliance. While this points to broader administrative weaknesses and informal economic structures, the problem is further exacerbated by elite capture. High-income groups and politically connected classes often leverage their influence to evade taxes, resist structural reforms, and secure preferential treatment, thereby undermining the goals of equitable taxation and sustainable fiscal consolidation.

The failure to implement progressive tax policies has led to an over-reliance on indirect taxation, disproportionately burdening the lower- and middle-income groups while allowing the wealthiest to evade financial accountability. Moreover, politically connected industries continue to receive preferential treatment, undermining competition and discouraging foreign investment. This systematic resistance to reform has resulted in every IMF programme being a stopgap rather than enacting a transformative shift towards sustainable economic stability.

The labour market has also suffered from austerity measures; job creation has stagnated, and youth unemployment surged to 9.7 percent as of 2023.^[16] The lack of employment opportunities and rising living costs have fuelled widespread discontent that has frequently led to protests, particularly among public-sector workers. These demonstrations reflect the growing frustration with IMF-mandated reforms, which are often perceived as benefiting the wealthy while exacerbating poverty for the larger population.

There has been a consequent rise in both legal and illegal emigration from Pakistan. In 2022, approximately 800,000 Pakistanis migrated for overseas employment through official channels.^[17] Furthermore, nearly 40 percent of Pakistanis expressed a desire to emigrate, citing factors such as economic difficulties, political instability, lack of educational opportunities, unemployment, inflation, and terrorism.^[18] The scale of illegal migration has also risen sharply; by mid-2023, Pakistan became the fifth largest country for illegal migration to Europe, with 13,000 Pakistanis reaching Europe in the first half of the year via routes through Dubai, Egypt, and Libya.^[19] This trend underscores a deepening crisis of confidence among Pakistan’s population, who increasingly view migration—often at great personal risk—as a necessary avenue for economic security and improved living conditions.

Governance and Policymaking Under IMF Conditionalities

IMF programmes have pushed for structural reforms in Pakistan to enhance fiscal discipline and governance. However, these efforts have frequently encountered entrenched resistance from powerful interest groups and institutional inertia. A pressing issue is the overhaul of the energy sector. Despite repeated attempts to address the burgeoning circular debt,^[a] which now exceeds US$20.49 trillion, progress has been stymied by delayed tariff adjustments and opaque agreements with Chinese firms involved in CPEC projects.^[20] These challenges highlight the difficulties in implementing transparent and effective reforms in sectors plagued by vested interests and corruption.

Pakistan’s import-driven energy policy has strained foreign exchange reserves, fuelled inflation, and deepened external debt dependence, making the economy highly vulnerable to global oil price shocks. Of the previous 23 IMF programmes, 15 were sought during times of oil crisis, including the episodes in the 1970s as well as in 1980, 2008, 2013, and 2019, when surging import costs widened the current account deficit and depleted reserves.^[21] Donor-driven energy reforms in the 1990s prioritised imported furnace-oil-based power generation over domestic alternatives like Thar coal (discovered in 1991),^[b] which resulted in increased reliance on costly Independent Power Producers (IPPs). As import bills rise, production costs escalate, eroding industrial competitiveness, leading to lower exports, slower growth, and frequent balance-of-payments crises—ultimately forcing another IMF bailout.

Figure 1: Oil Prices vs Pakistan-IMF Programmes

Source: Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry^[22]

The push for privatisation has yielded mixed results. While the privatisation of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) has met with relative success, efforts to reform other sectors, such as steel and aviation, have been marred by cronyism and inefficiency. The failure to establish transparent and competitive processes has often resulted in public assets being transferred to politically connected entities, undermining the intended efficiency gains and eroding public trust.

Anti-corruption measures have been a central focus of IMF programmes. The 2025 Governance Diagnostic Mission was tasked explicitly with assessing fiscal transparency and anti-money laundering frameworks. It is part of the broader US$7-billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) aimed at addressing governance and corruption vulnerabilities in Pakistan.^[23] The IMF technical mission conducted a week-long examination of six key governance-related sectors and institutions, including fiscal governance, central bank operations, financial sector oversight, market regulation, rule of law, anti-money laundering, and efforts at countering terror financing. The IMF team engaged with various institutions, including the Finance Division, the Federal Board of Revenue, the State Bank of Pakistan, the Auditor General of Pakistan, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, the Election Commission of Pakistan, and the Ministry of Law and Justice. The mission also included consultations with judiciary members and leadership from financial, revenue, and election bodies to review their processes and integrity measures.

As part of its commitments to the IMF, in October 2024, Pakistan agreed to strengthen institutional capacities to fight corruption, support inclusive growth, and provide a level playing field for businesses and investments.^[24] A structural benchmark has been set to publish a comprehensive report on the Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment (GCDA) by July 2025.^[25] The GCDA report is expected to recommend targeted actions to address corruption vulnerabilities and strengthen transparency, institutional capacity, and inclusive economic growth. While Pakistan had initially committed to publishing the full UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) review report upon completion of the process, recent developments suggest a possible reversal. In March 2025, the government constituted a seven-member Cabinet Committee to deliberate whether to publish the full GCDA report or limit public disclosure to a summary version, raising concerns about transparency and the credibility of reform efforts.^[26]

In line with these governance reforms, the government is considering legislative amendments to the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance to strengthen the NAB’s independence and effectiveness. This includes empowering provincial Anti-Corruption Establishments to investigate money laundering related to corruption offences within their jurisdictions, with the ability to request and receive financial intelligence from the Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) under the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Act. These bodies will also have sufficient resources and training to conduct parallel financial investigations. Furthermore, under a structural benchmark for February 2025, the government is required to amend the Civil Servants Act of 1973 to ensure that asset declarations of high-level public officials (BPS 17-22),^[27] including their domestic and foreign assets, are digitally filed and publicly accessible. This measure aims to enhance transparency while safeguarding data protection and the privacy of personal information.

Despite governance reform commitments under IMF oversight, Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities persist, and short-term financial injections offer limited relief. In January 2025, the World Bank approved a US$20-billion, 10-year lending package to stabilise Pakistan’s economy and support key sectors such as energy, education, and infrastructure.^[28] This move follows continued fiscal imbalances and external debt repayments, which remain a concern as Pakistan struggles to meet its US$30-billion debt servicing obligations for FY2025.

At the same time, the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) surged by 87 percent in early 2025, attracting speculative foreign inflows and signalling a short-term boost in investor confidence, especially in the pharmaceuticals and transport sectors.^[29] However, this rally is concentrated within a few dominant business groups, reflecting structural weaknesses in Pakistan’s financial markets rather than a broad-based economic recovery. While inflation has moderated, exports remain stagnant, and Foreign Direct Investment remains weak due to persistent political instability, security concerns, and unpredictable regulatory policies. The energy sector’s inefficiencies, including unresolved circular debt and transmission losses, continue to undermine industrial productivity, further limiting economic growth. These structural constraints highlight the persisting fragility of Pakistan’s economic recovery, reinforcing the continued risk of financial dependence on external sources.

The IMF must reassess its engagement with Pakistan in light of the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam attack, the deadliest one on Indian civilians since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.^[30] In the incident, members of The Resistance Front, a proxy of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, killed 26 tourists in Kashmir’s Baisaran Valley. The act underscores Pakistan’s longstanding strategy of leveraging terrorism as a tool of statecraft, with its military and intelligence services, notably the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), historically supporting groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. For the IMF, continued financial assistance without stringent conditionalities addressing Pakistan's support for terrorism risks undermining the very objectives of economic stability and reform. Integrating counterterrorism measures and accountability mechanisms into IMF programmes is imperative to ensure that financial aid does not inadvertently subsidise activities that threaten regional and global security.

Political Instability and Future Prospects

The political ramifications of IMF interventions are profound, influencing public trust and the broader stability of the state. While Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government celebrated the 2024 loan as a necessary step towards economic stabilisation, public scepticism remains high. A Gallup poll conducted in 2024 revealed that only 17 percent of Pakistanis rated the country’s national assembly performance as ‘good’ in 2024,^[31] reflecting widespread disillusionment with the government’s ability to manage the economy effectively and equitably.

The nexus between security and the economy further complicates the situation. The IMF’s focus on macroeconomic stabilisation often overlooks these security-linked fiscal pressures, risking undermining stabilisation efforts. The threats of terrorism and internal conflict strain the national budget and deter foreign investment, in turn stifling economic growth.

Civil-military dynamics add another layer of complexity to Pakistan’s economic governance. The military’s dominant role in overseeing major economic projects, particularly those linked to CPEC, complicates the implementation of IMF-mandated governance reforms. This intertwining of military and civilian authority creates a “hybrid regime” scenario in which democratic institutions are weakened and accountability is diluted. The military’s economic influence often results in strategic interests being prioritised over fiscal prudence, further entrenching the country’s financial challenges.

Pakistan’s future economic prospects are uncertain. The country faces debt sustainability challenges, with US$100 billion in repayments due by 2027, including US$30 billion in FY2025 alone.^[32] With debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 60 percent,^[33] the fiscal space is severely constrained, making further IMF engagement almost inevitable. Without reforms, Pakistan risks falling into a perpetual cycle of bailouts and austerity, each round worsening economic vulnerabilities.

Climate change also poses an existential threat to the country. Despite contributing minimally to global greenhouse gas emissions, Pakistan faces severe climate-induced challenges, including glacial melting, erratic rainfall patterns, and increased frequency of extreme weather events. The German think tank Germanwatch ranked Pakistan as the country most affected by extreme weather events in 2022, primarily due to the devastating floods that year,^[34] which affected over 33 million people, resulted in more than 1,700 fatalities, and caused economic losses exceeding US$30 billion.^[35] Furthermore, projections indicate that Pakistan’s GDP could decrease by 18-20 percent by 2050 due to severe climate-related occurrences, environmental degradation, and air pollution.^[36] Without investments in climate adaptation and resilience-building measures, Pakistan remains highly susceptible to environmental disasters that can swiftly undermine economic progress.

Geopolitical risks also complicate Pakistan’s economic outlook. Balancing relations with China—which holds a substantial share of Pakistan’s external debt—and Western financial institutions remains a delicate task. The World Bank’s withdrawal of a US$500-million clean-energy loan in 2024 over terms related to CPEC projects highlighted existing tensions.^[37] Navigating these geopolitical complexities requires careful diplomacy and strategic economic planning—areas where Pakistan’s track record has been inconsistent.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s dependency on the IMF reflects a broader paradox: While bailouts can stabilise macroeconomic indicators in the short term, they often entrench structural inequities and fail to address the underlying causes of economic instability. To break the cycle, Pakistan must prioritise inclusive growth by expanding social safety nets, such as the Benazir Income Support Program, to cushion the impacts of austerity measures. Combatting elite capture through enforcing progressive taxation and increased transparency in projects like CPEC is essential to creating a more equitable economic landscape. Moreover, reimagining security spending by redirecting military budgets towards human capital development and climate adaptation could foster a more sustainable and resilient economy.

Without dismantling elite-driven economic decision-making and enforcing equitable fiscal policies, Pakistan will remain trapped in a cycle of bailouts, where short-term stabilisation efforts, such as the 24^th IMF programme, merely delay deeper economic crises. As the 2025 governance assessment unfolds, Pakistan stands at a critical crossroads: Will it pursue meaningful reform or continue to relapse into fiscal mismanagement and dependency? The choices that are made in the coming years will determine whether Pakistan can achieve lasting economic stability or remain trapped in a cycle of crisis and bailout.

Soumya Bhowmick is Fellow and Lead, World Economies and Sustainability, Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED), ORF.

(The author acknowledges ORF intern Manish Vaidya for his research assistance.)

Endnotes

^[a] ‘Circular debt’ refers to the accumulation of unpaid bills within the energy supply chain, where distribution companies fail to recover full costs from consumers, leading to non-payment to power producers who, in turn, owe money to fuel suppliers.

^[b] The Thar Coalfield, is located in the Thaparkar District of Sindh Province in Pakistan, and is one of the world’s largest lignite coal reserves- spanning over 9,000 sq km, with almost 175 billion tonnes of reserves.

^[1] Mint Editorial Board, “Mint Quick Edit: Pakistan’s IMF Bailout No. 24 and Loan Addiction,” Mint, September 27, 2024, https://www.livemint.com/opinion/quick-edit/mint-quick-edit-pakistan-imf-bailout-gdp-growth-unemployment-inflation-lending-fiscal-deficit-11727368911044.html.

^[2] “Pakistan’s Economy Contracts by 0.6% in FY23, Expected to Rebound to 1.7% in FY24: WB,” Profit by Pakistan Today, October 3, 2023, https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2023/10/03/pakistans-economy-contracts-by-0-6pc-in-fy23-expected-to-rebound-to-1-7pc-in-fy24-wb/.

^[3] Mahira Sarfraz, “2024: Pakistan’s Year of (Dis)Inflation,” Dawn, December 30, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1881451.

^[4] Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, State of Pakistan’s Economy – Half Yearly Report FY2025 (Islamabad: Economic Adviser’s Wing, January 2025), https://www.finance.gov.pk/economic/State_of_Pakistan_Economy_2025.pdf

^[5] International Monetary Fund, “Financial Position in the Fund for Pakistan,” April 18, 2025, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKey1=760&date1key=2022-09-30.

^[6] European Foundation for South Asian Studies, “Bailout Politics: Pakistan’s Economy and the IMF,” EFSAS, May 2024, https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/pakistan-economy-and-imf-may-2024/.

^[7] Macrotrends, “Pakistan External Debt 1970–2025,” April 18, 2025, https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/PAK/pakistan/external-debt-stock.

^[8] “China Still Pakistan’s Top Bilateral Creditor, Share Down to 22% from 25% Last Year: WB,” The Times of India, December 5, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international-business/china-still-pakistans-top-bilateral-creditor-share-down-to-22-from-25-last-year-wb/articleshow/115989075.cms.

^[9] Mahira Sarfraz, “A Diary of (Near) Default — Pakistan’s Journey to Avoid Insolvency in 2023,” Dawn, December 30, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1800599.​

^[10] Khaleeq Kiani, “Another Major Power Tariff Hike Looms for Consumers,” Dawn, July 5, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1843869?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[11] Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Pakistan Economic Survey 2023–24: Chapter 7 – Inflation (Islamabad: Economic Adviser’s Wing, 2024), https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_24/7_inflation.pdf.pdf

^[12] World Food Programme, “Pakistan,” https://www.wfp.org/countries/pakistan.

^[13] World Bank, “Pakistan: Reform Implementation Remains Critical for Continued Economic Recovery and Poverty Reduction,” October 9, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/10/09/-pakistan-reform-implementation-remains-critical-for-continued-economic-recovery-and-poverty-reduction-says-world-bank.

^[14] World Bank, “Pakistan Overview,” March 25, 2025, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview.

^[15] Sohail Sarfraz, “Tax Year 2024: FBR Receives 4.436m Income Tax Returns,” Business Recorder, October 15, 2024, https://www.brecorder.com/news/40327109.

^[16] Aaron O'Neill, “Youth Unemployment Rate in Pakistan from 2004 to 2023,” Statista, November 4, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/812897/youth-unemployment-rate-in-pakistan/.​

^[17] United Nations Pakistan, “Media Update: United Nations Pakistan, 6 November 2023,” November 8, 2023, https://pakistan.un.org/en/252186-media-update-united-nations-pakistan-6-november-2023.

^[18] National Commission for Human Rights, Perilous Journeys: Unravelling Irregular Migration from Pakistan (Islamabad: NCHR, May 2024), https://nchr.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Perilous-Journeys.pdf.

^[19] Kashif Hussain, “Nearly 40% Pakistanis Want to Leave Country,” The Express Tribune, November 15, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2509712/nearly-40-pakistanis-want-to-leave-country.​

^[20] Shahbaz Rana, “Circular Debt Reaches Rs5.73tr,” The Express Tribune, January 16, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2453386/circular-debt-reaches-rs573tr.

^[21] Mohammad Younus Dagha and Usama Ehsan Khan, Impact of IMF Programs: A Context of Pakistan (Karachi: Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry, June 2023), https://fpcci.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Impact-of-IMF-Programs-A-Context-of-Pakistan.pdf.

^[22] Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry, Impact of IMF Programs.

^[23] “Pakistan Says IMF Mission Will Visit to Assess Governance, Corruption Risks,” Reuters, February 9, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-says-imf-mission-will-visit-assess-governance-corruption-risks-2025-02-09/.

^[24] “IMF Mission to Inspect Regulatory, Judicial System in Country: Pak Govt,” Business Standard, February 10, 2025, https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/imf-mission-to-inspect-regulatory-judicial-system-in-country-pak-govt-125021000522_1.html.

^[25] Saima Shabbir, “Islamabad Says IMF Team in Pakistan for Governance Review, Not Judicial Oversight,” Arab News, February 10, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2589680/pakistan.

^[26] Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan Rethinks Full Disclosure of Graft Report,” The Express Tribune, March 4, 2025, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2532191/pakistan-rethinks-full-disclosure-of-graft-report.

^[27]Government of Pakistan, The Civil Servants Act, 1973 (Islamabad: Establishment Division), https://www.establishment.gov.pk/SiteImage/Misc/files/Civil%20Servants%20Act%2C%201973(1).pdf.

^[28] “World Bank Approves 10-Year $20bn Pakistan Lending Package,” Financial Times, January 15, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/6a823c82-9f38-4459-b017-0ca798a2b39c.

^[29] Hasaan Ali Khan, “Pakistan’s Stock Market Gained 87% during 2024 with Transport, Pharmaceuticals Top-Performing Sectors — Report,” Arab News, January 1, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2584961/pakistan.​

^[30] Jyotsna Singh, Krishn Kaushik, and John Reed, “Grief, Anger and a Tourist Exodus Follow Mass Slaughter in Kashmir,” Financial Times, April 23, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/14f792d4-5807-419f-be9f-5680771b0a18.

^[31] Gallup Pakistan, “National Assembly Approval Plummets: Only 17% of Pakistanis Rate Performance as Good,” Gallup Pakistan, November 2024, https://gallup.com.pk/post/37623.​

^[32] “Pakistan to Repay Over $30 Billion Debt in FY25, Says Central Bank,” The Times of India, October 14, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-to-repay-over-30-billion-debt-in-fy25-says-central-bank/articleshow/114208042.cms.

^[33] Shahid Iqbal, “Debt-to-GDP Ratio Drops to 65.7pc in September,” Dawn, November 12, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1871844.​

^[34] Lina Adil et al., Climate Risk Index 2025 – Summary: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2022 and 1993 to 2022, Bonn, Germanwatch, February 12, 2025, https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/Climate%20Risk%20Index%202025%20Summary%20EN.pdf.

^[35] Syed Muhammad Abubakar, “Pakistan Ranked Most Vulnerable to Climate Change in 2022: Germanwatch,” Dawn, February 12, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1891272.​

^[36]“Climate Change to Incur up to 20-Pct Loss to Pakistan’s GDP by 2050: World Bank,” Xinhua News Agency, December 2, 2023, https://english.news.cn/20231202/ee48cdb66d2048468dacaee896fad0b1/c.html.

^[37] “Why World Bank Cancelled $500 Million Loan to Pakistan,” The Times of India, December 14, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/why-world-bank-cancelled-500-million-loan-to-pakistan/articleshow/116316976.cms.

• Neighbourhood
• Economic Reforms
• India
• Pakistan
• imf aid to pakistan
• imf assistance to pakistan
• imf bailout to pakistan
• imf loan to pakistan
• imf loan to pakistan 2025
• imf loan tranche
• imf loan tranche to pakistan
• imf pakistan package
• imf resilience and sustainability facility
• pakistan dependence on imf

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.