Introduction

In a constantly evolving landscape of international conflict, certain tactics are replacing or, in some cases, supplementing conventional wars and kinetic engagements—these comprise what is often referred to as Grey-Zone Warfare (GZW). This brief uses the term ‘grey-zone warfare’ to refer to the space between peace and open war where states pursue strategic objectives through ambiguous and deniable means, deliberately avoiding thresholds that could provoke conventional military responses. It operates in the ‘twilight space’, employing strategies such as cyberattacks, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and lawfare to achieve objectives without triggering a full-scale military response.^[1] These tactics allow states to operate ambiguously, leveraging non-military tools to exert influence, destabilise adversaries, and reshape geopolitical realities. These strategies often span cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, proxy militancy, and the weaponisation of migration, trade, or lawfare.

The concept of ‘grey zone’ has roots in Indian strategic philosophy, particularly in the Arthashastra, Kautilya’s 4th-century BCE treatise on statecraft, which articulates a form of warfare known as ‘Tushnim Yuddha’, meaning ‘silent war’. Unlike traditional warfare (Prakash Yuddha), Tushnim Yuddha is carried out subtly through espionage, deception, economic sabotage, and misinformation. Kautilya encouraged such tactics as practical tools to weaken a nation’s enemies without engaging in direct conflict.^[2]

Understanding grey-zone warfare through this lens helps India contextualise contemporary threats and formulate strategic and diplomatic responses that balance restraint with covert deterrence, and resilience with calibrated offensives. This brief will discuss the growing significance of grey-zone warfare across key domains, including defence, economy, public opinion, and digital infrastructure, with a particular focus on the collusion of Pakistan and China against Indian security infrastructure. It undertakes a critical assessment of India’s existing strategies in managing this evolving threat and identifies gaps. The brief offers policy recommendations to bolster India’s approach to countering the rising challenge of grey-zone warfare, leveraging technological advancements in the cyber, space, electronics, and information fields that reflect both national will and international legitimacy.

The Strategic Appeal of Grey-Zone Warfare

In the post-Cold War era, geopolitical conflicts have moved from the battlefield to the sub-threshold domain—an ambiguous space between peace and war. Many modern states are showing a preference for grey-zone warfare, not due to a lack of military strength, but for the broader utility it offers across strategic dimensions. Its success depends on the fact that it exploits the moral and legal frameworks that democratic countries like India desire to uphold, and takes advantage of their flaws while escalating. For states like Pakistan and China, grey-zone warfare is a doctrine calibrated to attain strategic goals without prompting consequences.

Grey-zone warfare is characterised by the following:

1. Deniability and Ambiguity

The most attractive feature of grey-zone warfare is conceivable deniability.^[3] States can initiate cyberattacks, support proxies, conduct disinformation campaigns, or use economic coercion, and subsequently deny accountability. This defuses potential retaliation by the victim state.

Pakistan’s funding and support of groups like The Resistance Front (TRF) and Kashmir Tigers in Kashmir, or Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, to inflict damage to India while disengaging itself from direct connection, is a pertinent example.^[4] Similarly, Chinese cyber operations and support for regional information manipulation often go untraceable, keeping Beijing diplomatically shielded from any retaliation.^[5] Deniability enables states to achieve their geopolitical objectives without crossing red-lines or drawing international scrutiny.

2. Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Asymmetry

Kinetic wars are economically overwhelming, particularly for states with weak conventional capabilities. Grey-zone tactics do not require significant investments.^[6] Cyber tools, for instance, will cost less compared to missile strikes, but they can compromise critical infrastructure. For example, the low-cost drones used by Pakistan for transporting weapons into Punjab and Kashmir validate how even rudimentary technologies can deliver a strategic impact.^[7] Additionally, China’s use of fishing militias or paramilitary units in the South China Sea enables it to assert its maritime claims without deploying its navy, thereby avoiding escalation.^[8]

3. Plausible Legitimacy and Legal Grey Areas

Grey-zone operations often exploit opacities in legal instruments and international norms, making retaliation or sanctions more diplomatically complex. Cyber invasions and disinformation campaigns are difficult to attribute convincingly, and most international laws lag behind these technological and informational tactics.^[9]

Propaganda and narrative control, particularly through information warfare and social media management, enable actors to represent themselves as victims or legitimate stakeholders. A disinformation drive that seeks to destabilise India’s Kashmir policy, for example, may be masked under the guise of ‘human rights advocacy’, obscuring India's response in international forums.^[10]

4. Psychological Warfare and Erosion from Within

Grey-zone means are also intended to erode self-esteem, legality, and peace within the target country. By using internal divisions—ethnic, religious, or ideological—an adversary can cause fragmentation in a society and delegitimise its government without committing an act of violence.^[11] This is relevant in India’s diverse socio-political fabric, where adversaries have often sought to exploit internal fault lines by disseminating misinformation and fake news, and selectively amplifying dissent.^[12]

Grey-Zone Warfare Between India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan share one of the most volatile borders in the world. Conventional wars have largely given way to covert, ambiguous, and sub-conventional conflicts. Grey-zone warfare in the India–Pakistan conflict is not sporadic but structural. Pakistan’s hybrid strategy is a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic pressure, challenging India’s conventional prowess. Pakistan, in particular, has mastered the art of utilising non-state actors, disinformation, asymmetric warfare, and low-cost technologies to undermine Indian security without invoking full-scale war.

The following are some of the tactics used by adversaries in the GZW:

1. Terrorism as a Strategic Tool: For decades, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has weaponised terrorism as an instrument of state policy. By funding Kashmiri insurgent groups, cross-border intrusions, and urban terror cells, it endures a relentless grey-zone offensive. This strategy reflects Kautilya's concept of “enemy weakening through proxy” in modern times. For example, during the Balakot and Uri incidents,^[a] Pakistan’s reactive aerial engagement, followed by controlled de-escalation, accentuated the use of grey-zone tactics to achieve escalation dominance.^[13] Strategically, Pakistan leverages these tactics to create persistent disruption, assert moral narratives through conceivable deniability, and alleviate international diplomatic costs.

1. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare: Pakistan has employed state and proxy media to proliferate anti-India narratives. Twitter handles, YouTube channels, and fake websites produce content recurrently intended to influence India’s positive image in Kashmir by spreading fake news claiming human rights violations and intensifying domestic dissent. For example, at the time of the abrogation of Article 370 (2019), Pakistan initiated digital campaigns through bots, influencers, and diaspora platforms, magnifying the sporadic and limited protests in Kashmir.^[14] Some other ways in which Pakistan has adopted GZW are by propagating deepfake videos to fuel angry post-encounters, covert narratives accusing Indian forces of atrocities, and online jihadist recruitment campaigns.^[15]

3. Drone Warfare: India has been witnessing a spike in drone infiltrations along the Punjab, Jammu, and Bangladesh borders since 2020. These Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)—launched from Pakistan—drop counterfeit currencies, arms, explosives, and even narcotics. Unlike artillery shelling, drones offer stealth, precision, and deniability, and are low-cost.^[16] In June 2021, two IEDs were dropped onto an Indian Air Force station in Jammu using drones—the first such attack on a military base.^[17] Over 300 drone sightings were recorded along the border in 2022 alone, according to BSF, many of which carried Chinese-origin components.^[18]

This convergence of Pakistan's intent and China's tech support typifies grey-zone collusion.

The China–Pakistan Nexus in Grey-Zone Warfare

The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has evolved from traditional military and diplomatic support into a full-spectrum collusive grey-zone threat to India, one that deliberately operates below the threshold of open warfare while achieving strategic disruption. This partnership has aged beyond traditional military ties into a multi-domain collusion that encourages ambiguity, deniability, and layered coercion.^[19]

Both China and Pakistan are attempting to reshape the subcontinental security environment with incremental coercion intended to exhaust, distract, and destabilise India. The two countries are not limited to high-profile infrastructure projects like the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); their cooperation now covers intelligence sharing, cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, dual-use space and surveillance technologies, and coordinated diplomatic posturing.^[20]

While Pakistan is a regional peace disruptor, China is a technological and financial enabler, together creating a synchronised twin-threat matrix which restrains its actions just before the possibility of the conventional war threshold. The expanding strategic partnership between the two is escalating GZW against India, leveraging cyber warfare, digital influence operations, and coordinated disinformation campaigns to destabilise Indian democracy and security.^[21] It also aims to have a psychological influence on ordinary citizens as well as soldiers in the armed forces through the content generated by their propaganda machinery, such as the Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR).^[22]

This collusive framework fuses shared intelligence, synchronised cyber intrusions, electromagnetic disruptions, and AI-driven disinformation, forcing India into a reactive stance while stretching its defensive capabilities. The 2024 breaches of India’s power grids and banking networks exemplify this strategy, where China-backed cyber units and Pakistan-based intelligence networks exploit digital vulnerabilities to undermine critical infrastructure.^[23]

Beyond cyber warfare, AI-powered deepfake technology, social media manipulation, and propaganda websites are being deployed to twist narratives on India's elections, economic policies, and military capabilities.^[24] These efforts sway global perceptions, fuel internal divisions, and weaken public trust in the country’s institutions. Additionally, China's control over Pakistan’s digital infrastructure, including satellite communication (PAKSAT-MM1 and MM2) and fibre-optic networks along the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),^[25] further embeds Chinese surveillance and cyber dominance in the region.^[26]

Table 1. Capability Comparison Between India-China-Pakistan 

Capabilities	India	Pakistan	China
Cyber Warfare	CERT-in, NTRO, Limited Offensive Cyber Ops	Mid-Level Cyber Capabilities, APT 36	Advanced, APT 41 APTA Unit 61398
Space/Satellite Ops	Satellites For ISR, Recent ASAT Test	Support from China	Extensive Military Space Capabilities
Information Warfare	PsyOps, Media Outreach	Disinformation networks, Trolling, Hashtagging	Coordinated disinformation and Social Media weaponisation
Proxy/Militant Groups		Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad	PLA Affiliates
Drones/UAVs	Attack and Surveillance Drones	Armed drones and Cross-border infiltration	Chinese-origin drone swarms

Source: Author’s own

This coordinated hybrid warfare strategy marks a long-term strategic shift where state actors increasingly rely on multi-domain assaults—encompassing cyber offensives, disinformation campaigns, and electronic warfare—to achieve their geopolitical objectives. Some of the examples are:

1. Strategic Framework of Collusion: The collusion is not episodic—it is institutionalised, coordinated, and multi-domain. The two countries participate in regular joint military exercises, cyber-espionage alliances, and share real-time intelligence.^[27] China views Pakistan as a proxy to engage Indian forces on the western front, thereby aiding Beijing to dominate in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Indian agencies have reported joint cyber intrusions originating from Chinese and Pakistani servers.^[28] China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system—an alternative to GPS—provides Pakistan with secure PNT (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing) data, giving it an advantage in UAV targeting and border operations.^[29] Furthermore, China has trained Pakistani hackers who have launched several cyberattacks on Indian think tanks like the MP-IDSA (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) and media houses, apart from the army schools and housing offices.^[30]

2. Cyber and Space Collaboration: Cyber warfare has become a shared front, while space cooperation, via satellites like PakTES-1A, supports coordinated ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) efforts along Indian borders.^[31] Some of the key takeaways from the joint progress of the two nations include working on the details of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Pakistan Navy Engineering College (PNEC), the National University of Science and Technology (NUST), and Beihang University in China. The MoU aims to facilitate advanced research in Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, autonomous systems, cybersecurity, and space technology, thereby enhancing Pakistan’s electronic intelligence (ELINT), cyber warfare, and information operations infrastructure with direct Chinese support.^[32]
   
   Furthermore, in 2024, Pakistan acquired a Portable Manpack UAV Drone Detection System from China. This system will enhance counter-drone operations and electronic surveillance capabilities, areas that are increasingly relevant in asymmetric and grey zone warfare.^[33]
   
   In 2024, the PAKSAT-MM1 satellite was launched from China’s Xichang Satellite Launch Centre. Analysts widely acknowledge its dual-use potential, enhancing Pakistan’s military communications, strategic surveillance, and signal intelligence gathering.^[34] A Joint Working Group Meeting, further institutionalising bilateral cooperation in cyber warfare, technical intelligence exchange, and joint development programmes.^[35] These initiatives collectively demonstrate an evolving and systematically integrated cyberspace partnership, enabling Pakistan to conduct persistent grey zone operations with technological and strategic depth. China is to finalise contracts for CH-4 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) payloads.^[36] This marks a clear Chinese role in developing Pakistan’s cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

3. PsyOps and Information Warfare: Information Warfare (IW) has become a core element of GZW. In an era where conflicts have shifted to the digital and cognitive domains, information warfare is a key component of national security, economic stability, and public trust.^[37] With states aggressively deploying cyber capabilities, disinformation campaigns, and sophisticated electronic countermeasures, the lines between physical and digital conflict are forcing policymakers to reassess the security paradigms of the 21^st
   
   The cultural and psychological collaboration between China and Pakistan is expanding through joint research projects and soft power initiatives. Tsinghua University’s Pakistani Culture and Communication Studies Department conducted a China-Pakistan Joint Expedition in 2024, covering Hunza, Gilgit, Yasin, and Swat.^[38] The expedition is strategically significant due to its location in sensitive areas near the India-Pakistan border and the CPEC routes. This aligns with China’s broader strategy of using cultural diplomacy as a grey-zone tool to shape narratives and perceptions in Pakistan.^[39]
   
   Further, China and Pakistan run real-time propaganda operations targeting Indian democracy, Kashmir policy, and global perception using digital manipulation and NGO proxies. AI-powered deepfake technology, social media manipulation, and propaganda websites are being deployed to twist narratives on India's elections, economic policies, and military capabilities.^[40] These efforts sway global perceptions, fuel internal divisions, and weaken public trust in democratic institutions. 

Table 2: Disinformation and Misinformation Propaganda Against India (2024)

Country	Fake News Articles	Deepfake Videos	Misinformation Ads	Main Themes
China	12,000	3,500	2,500	Economic Instability, Border Disputes, Political Unrest
Pakistan	8,000	5,000	4,000	Kashmir Conflict, Military Disinformation, Religious Polarisation

Source: Information Campaign^[41]

4. Proxy Support and Dual-Use Technologies: China, by outsourcing disruptive technologies to Pakistan, seeks to sustain constant pressure on India. Beijing enables asymmetric warfare by supplying dual-use technology, such as drones, jammers, and SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) tools.^[42] Further, it has been observed through OSINT (open-source intelligence) that Chinese-origin weapons, technology (satellite phones), and applications have been found in the hands of Pakistani proxy groups in Kashmir, explaining the deliberate channelling of asymmetric tools.^[43]
   
   In 2024, Pakistan signed an agreement with China to establish itself as a regional hub for internet connectivity, allowing Chinese-controlled internet traffic to pass through the country.^[44] The establishment of the Pakistan Internet Exchange (PIE), powered by DE-CIX, will increase China’s digital influence in South Asia, potentially allowing Chinese-controlled data filtering and surveillance mechanisms in Pakistan’s cyberspace.^[45]
   
   Furthermore, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) has laid 110,000 km of Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) across Pakistan with significant segments along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) route.^[46] The OFC network links China and Pakistan through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) at Khunjerab, extending to Gwadar and Karachi, thereby creating an alternative internet connectivity route for China that bypasses the existing global internet infrastructure. Huawei's completion of the 820-km Khunjerab-Rawalpindi optical fibre cable (OFC) project in 2018 laid the foundation for China’s deeper integration into Pakistan’s digital ecosystem.^[47] The project provides an alternative and secure digital communication route for Chinese military and intelligence operations in the region.

5. Expansion of Chinese-Controlled Mobile and Digital Services in Pakistan:
   
   China has been systematically increasing its control over Pakistan’s telecommunications infrastructure, further strengthening its ability to influence digital communications. The New Generation Mobile Services (NGMS) project under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with an estimated cost of US$10.3 million (PKR 2.9 billion), aims to expand cellular networks in the Pakistan-occupied Gilgit Baltistan (PoGB) and provide seamless 3G/4G connectivity along the Karakoram Highway (KKH).^[48] China Mobile Pakistan (CMPak), a wholly owned subsidiary of China Mobile Communications Corporation, holds an 11.2 MHz 4G spectrum allocation in the PoK and PoGB, further consolidating China’s digital control over Pakistan’s mobile and broadband networks.^[49]

6. Diplomatic Synchronisation and Legal Subversion: China and Pakistan frequently align their diplomatic statements to amplify grey zone pressure;^[50] they also exploit international legal forums to entrap India in a lawfare over border policies and trade policies. The nations lobby to prevent India’s entry into the UNSC,^[51] with China sometimes supporting Pakistan's false narrative on Kashmiri human rights, and the CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) and NRC (National Register of Citizens) issues of the Northeast of India.^[52]

India’s Grey Zone Capabilities

India’s engagement with grey-zone warfare has evolved from traditional restraint to an active pursuit of non-kinetic and asymmetric capabilities. Historically grounded in conventional doctrines shaped by wars, India now recognises the need for cyber deterrence, information dominance, and covert influence. Although the transformation is ongoing, India is steadily developing a multi-domain grey zone posture designed to address modern security threats.

Institutions such as the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), and the Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA) are responsible for national response, surveillance, and military cyber operations, respectively. India’s space assets now support both military and scientific goals. Electronic warfare (EW) capabilities are growing, although they are still relatively nascent compared to those of India’s rivals.^[53]

In information and influence operations, India is developing its ability to shape narratives and counter disinformation. Recognising the increasing threat of disinformation and propaganda, India introduced the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, to regulate social media platforms and digital content.^[54] India also partners with fact-checking organisations to combat misinformation targeting political stability, elections, and economic narratives. The armed forces' ADGPI (Additional Directorate General of Public Information) has established specialised information warfare units dedicated to countering psychological operations, counter-propaganda, and strategic communication, ensuring a proactive defence against adversarial information manipulation.

Doctrinal ambiguity also weakens India’s deterrence. The Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD-2018) incorporated cyber and electronic warfare (EW) into military operations, emphasising both offensive and defensive capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and enhance operational security.^[55] The Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations (JDCO-2024) marked a shift from reactive to proactive cyber strategies, focusing on threat anticipation, mitigation, and inter-agency collaboration to fortify India’s cyber resilience.^[56] Meanwhile, the Kelkar Committee Report highlighted the need for advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities,^[57] particularly in countering guided missile threats and surveillance systems, underscoring the increasing role of electronic warfare in national defence.

Offensive cyber capacity is another shortfall. India's cyber posture is mainly reactive with limited transparency. Unlike China’s cyber militias or Pakistan’s APT36, India lacks a unified cyber warfare strategy. The DCyA is constrained by staffing and legal ambiguities, and there is no doctrine integrating cyber with military planning. The National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP-2013) was India’s first comprehensive effort to build a secure and resilient cyber ecosystem, advocating for the training of 500,000 cybersecurity professionals.^[58] However, with the rise of AI-driven cyber threats and quantum computing risks, the policy is now outdated and in need of revision.

India’s critical infrastructure remains vulnerable. Border surveillance is patchy, with inadequate detection and jamming tools for drones. India also trails China in space surveillance and counter-space tech.^[59] On the narrative front, India struggles to match adversaries in psychological ops. Its digital influence campaigns lack linguistic and cultural depth, while official media is too formal to counter slick adversary narratives. Weak enforcement against disinformation leaves India exposed in the cognitive domain.

Indeed, India’s grey zone preparedness remains fragmented and reactive. Grey-zone conflict demands speed, flexibility, and cohesion—traits hindered by India’s legacy-bound strategic culture and slow institutional reform. The lack of a unified command or doctrine for grey zone operations limits synergy. Tri-service reforms are ongoing, but India lacks an integrated force akin to China’s SSF or Pakistan’s ISI-led hybrid units.^[60]

In summary, without improved integration, effective offensive planning, and doctrinal clarity, India risks remaining reactive while adversaries exploit ambiguity and asymmetry to erode its security.

Recommendations: Strengthening India’s Resilience to Grey-Zone Warfare

India needs to adopt a multi-domain counter-grey-zone approach, especially in the context of collusive tactics employed by China and Pakistan. India’s grey zone resilience depends on transitioning from a reactive posture to a proactive strategic stance. By institutionalising reforms, strengthening technological capabilities, and leading normative frameworks, India can raise the cost of grey zone aggression and reinforce its strategic autonomy.

1. Establish a Unified Grey Zone Warfare Command: India must create a dedicated Grey Zone Warfare Command or task force that integrates cyber, space, intelligence, psychological warfare, and electronic warfare capabilities under a single operational framework.^[61]
2. Unified Grey Zone Doctrine: A formal grey zone doctrine should be published and implemented, clearly defining red lines, retaliation protocols, and integrated deterrence strategies across cyber, space, and psychological domains. This doctrine must be institutionally embedded.
3. Create an Information Warfare Unit: India should establish a dedicated cyber warfare unit within its armed forces, similar to the US Cyber Command and Israel’s cyber divisions. Intelligence agencies, such as RAW, NTRO, and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), must be equipped with AI-driven analytics to monitor foreign disinformation efforts in real-time.
4. Expanding International Cyber Cooperation: India must raise awareness about the China–Pakistan collusion in international forums such as the United Nations, the Financial Action Task Force, and the QUAD. The intelligence machinery must also highlight the use of proxy actors, disinformation, and grey zone tactics as violations of international norms and threats to global security.

Figure 1. Short-term and Long-term Goals for India to Counter Collusive Threat

Source: Author’s own

Conclusion

India’s security landscape is undergoing a tectonic shift, shaped not by conventional wars, but by unrelenting grey-zone conflict—a space defined by ambiguity, deniability, and sub-threshold aggression. From the ideological anchoring in Kautilya’s Tushnim Yuddha, India’s recognition of silent warfare is deeply rooted, yet its operational manifestation in the modern strategic realm is still evolving.

Pakistan’s persistent proxy warfare and China’s high-tech enablers form a collusive hybrid threat that aims to exploit India’s openness, democratic systems, and ethnic diversity. The grey zone is their battlefield—leveraging terror, cyber, drones, propaganda, and covert operations—all designed to keep India in a state of strategic distraction and attrition.

However, with its growing investments in cyber defence, electronic warfare, space technologies, and covert intelligence, India is laying the foundation of a credible deterrence posture. Though mere capability is not enough, India must develop a coherent grey zone doctrine, institutional integration, and pre-emptive strategic culture to respond with agility and strength.

Ultimately, India’s success in this domain hinges on transforming from a reactive power to a shaper of the grey zone environment—one that imposes costs on adversaries, secures national interests below the war threshold, and leads the global conversation on sub-conventional conflict norms. Grey-zone warfare may be fought in silence, but India’s response must be clear, calculated, and resolute.

Endnotes

^[a] The Balakot airstrike was carried out in 2016 by Indian warplanes against the alleged terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), inside Balakot, Pakistan. A surgical strike was carried out by the Indian Army in 2019 in PoK to destroy the terrorist launchpad inside PoK, in response to a terrorist attack on the army base camp in Uri, J&K.

^[1] Mathew Funaiole, Joseph Bermudez and Brian Hart, “China is Ramping up its Electronic Warfare and Communications Capabilities near the South China Sea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 17, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-ramping-its-electronic-warfare-and-communications-capabilities-near-south-china-sea.

^[2] Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” The Journal of Military History 67, no. 1 (January 2003), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/40432#REF84

^[3] Rakesh Bhatia, “Grey Zone Warfare: India’s Ongoing Strategic Challenge,” ETV Bharat, March 26, 2025, https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!opinion/grey-zone-warfare-indias-ongoing-strategic-challenge-enn25032603500

^[4] Mir Fareed, “Why Pakistan Terror Groups Are Using Shadow Outfits for Attacks in J&K,” India Today, July 18, 2024, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/jammu-and-kashmir-terror-attacks-doda-kathua-jaish-e-mohammad-kashmir-tigers-2568476-2024-07-18

^[5] Dan Gunderman, “Experts Outline Chinese Cyberwarfare Tactics, Motivations,” Bank Info Security, February 17, 2022, https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/experts-outline-chinese-cyberwarfare-tactics-motivations-a-18537?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[6] Ignacio Nieto, “Electromagnetic Operation in ‘Grey Zone’ Conflicts,” The Journal of the JAPCC, February 2021, https://www.japcc.org/articles/electromagnetic-operations-in-grey-zone-conflicts/

^[7] Soumya Awasthi, “Securing India’s Skies: Countering the Threat of GPS Spoofing and Hybrid Warfare,” Observer Research Foundation, April 17, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/securing-india-s-skies-countering-the-threat-of-gps-spoofing-and-hybrid-warfare

^[8] Masaaki Yatsuzuka, “How China’s Maritime Militia Takes Advantage of the Grey Zone,” The Strategist, January 16, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone/.

^[9] Mitt Regan and Aurel Sari, Hybrid Threats and Grey Zone Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2024).

^[10]  Nandini Bhatnagar, “In a War of Perception, Disinformation Strikes Deep,” Deccan Herald, May 12, 2025, https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/in-a-war-of-perception-disinformation-strikes-deep-3535758

^[11] Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Grey Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” PRISM 7, no. 4, November 8, 2018, https:// ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1983462/examining-complex-forms-of-conflict-gray-zone-and-hybrid-challenges/

^[12] Brijesh Singh, “The Machinery of Deception: How Disinformation Campaigns Target India,” India Defence News, March 16, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/the-machinery-of-deception-how-disinformation-campaigns-target-india

^[13] Ashley J. Tellis, “A Smoldering Volcano: Pakistan and Terrorism after Balakot,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 14, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/03/a-smoldering-volcano-pakistan-and-terrorism-after-balakot?lang=en#:~:text=While%20the%20air%20engagements%20certainly,a%20major%20conventional%20conflict%2C%20much

^[14] Shashank Shekhar, “Pakistan Bots Wage Cyber Warfare,” India Today, August 12, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/pakistan-bots-wage-cyber-warfare-1579860-2019-08-12

^[15] Soumya Awasthi, “Weaponising the Narrative: Social Media Propaganda Post-Pahalgam Attack,” Observer Research Foundation, May 13, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/weaponising-the-narrative-social-media-propaganda-post-pahalgam-attack

^[16] Suchet Vir Singh, “Pakistani Drones Nearly Double at Punjab Border-Drugs, Arms, Explosives. BSF ups its Counter,” The Print, December 26, 2022, https://theprint.in/defence/pakistani-drones-nearly-double-at-punjab-border-drugs-arms-explosives-bsf-ups-its-counter/1280847/

^[17] Fayaz Wani, “In a First, Terror Attack by Drone on Jammu IAF Base,” The New Indian Express, June 28, 2021, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2021/Jun/28/in-a-first-terror-attack-by-drone-on-jammu-iaf-base-2322363.html

^[18] Sameer Patil and Raj Arora, “Countering Hostile Drone Activity on the India-Pakistan Border,” Observer Research Foundation, May 8, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/countering-hostile-drone-activity-on-the-india-pakistan-border

^[19] Irum Javid and Muhmmad Ali, “Historical Evolution of Military Cooperation between China and Pakistan: From Strategic Partnerships to All-Weather Friendship,” Pakistan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 12, no. 1 (2024): 771-776, https://journals.internationalrasd.org/index.php/pjhss

^[20] Kartik Bommakanti, “The Collusive Threat: Chinese and Pakistani Cooperation in Strategic Capabilities,” Observer Research Foundation, June 13, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-collusive-threat

^[21] Sameer Patil, “Pakistan Emerges as China’s Proxy Against India,” Observer Research Foundation, February 15, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/pakistan-emerges-as-chinas-proxy-against-india

^[22] Jiten Jain and Saroj Rath, “Information Warfare: Why India Needs to Give Pak Propaganda Machinery a Taste of its own Medicine,” Daily O, August 24, 2020, https://www.dailyo.in/politics/india-pakistan-information-warfare-open-source-intelligence-ispr-isi-raw-33542

^[23]  Ministry of Power, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2043154#:~:text=ensure%20protection%20of%20critical%20information,the%20past%20five%20years%20viz.%2C, (2024).

^[24] Ali Swenson and Kelvin Chan, “Elections Disinformation Takes a Big Leap with AI Being Used to Deceive Worldwide,” AP News, March 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/artificial-intelligence-elections-disinformation-chatgpt-bc283e7426402f0b4baa7df280a4c3fd

^[25] Talal Raza, “The CPEC Plan for Pakistan’s Digital Future,” Digital Rights Monitor, October 13, 2017, https://digitalrightsmonitor.pk/exclusive-the-cpec-plan-for-pakistans-digital-future/

^[26] Deng Xiaoci, “China Delivers Advanced Communication Satellite to Pakistan Following Successful Launch,” Global Times, May 30, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202405/1313341.shtml

^[27] Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan, “The China Pakistan Partnership Continues to Deepen,” Observer Research Foundation, July 10, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-china-pakistan-partnership-continues-to-deepen#:~:text=These%20exercises%20were%20meant%20to%20%E2%80%9Cpromote%20the,Kefei%2C%20a%20spokesperson%20for%20China's%20Ministry%20of

^[28] Sameer Patil, “Operation Sindoor and India’s Cyber Threat Landscape,” Observer Research Foundation, May 28, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/operation-sindoor-and-india-s-cyber-threat-landscape

^[29] Mohieth Nh, “BeiDou: China’s Space Flight to Global Dominance,” The Peninsula Foundation, November 15, 2020, https://www.thepeninsula.org.in/2020/11/15/beidou-chinas-space-flight-to-global-dominance/#:~:text=One%20such%20example%20of%20countries,end%20to%20the%20GPS%20hegemony.

^[30] Soumya Awasthi and Abhishek Sharma, “Rethinking India’s Cyber Readiness in the Age of Information Warfare,” Observer Research Foundation, May 17, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/rethinking-india-s-cyber-readiness-in-the-age-of-information-warfare

^[31] “China Successfully Launches Two Remote-Sensing Satellites for Pakistan,” Business Standard, July 9, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-successfully-launches-two-remote-sensing-satellites-for-pakistan-118070900408_1.html

^[32] “NUST, Beihang University China Ink MoU,” The Express Tribune, May 19, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1413366/nust-beihang-university-china-ink-mou

^[33] Jitendra Bahadur Singh, “Chinese Killer Drones, Launchers: Pakistan Ramps up Arms Shopping with China, Turkey,” Business Today, May 26, 2025, https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/chinese-killer-drones-launchers-pakistan-ramps-up-arms-shopping-with-china-turkey-477753-2025-05-26

^[34] Ajay Lele, “Space Bonhomie: China Launches Satellite for Pakistan,” Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, June 8, 2024, https://www.sspconline.org/opinion-analysis/space-bonhomie-china-launches-satellite-pakistan#:~:text=On%20May%2030%2C%202024%2C%20China%20successfully%20deployed,slated%20to%20commence%20operations%20by%20August%202024.

^[35] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202410/t20241016_11508330.html, 2024.

^[36] Vinayak Bhat, “China Exported UAV CH4 to the World, but Its Drones Keep Falling From the Skies,” India Today, June 28, 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/china-exported-uav-ch4-falling-from-the-skies-1694834-2020-06-28

^[37] Seth Jones, “The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition,” CSIS Brief,  January 30, 2025, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-01/250130_Jones_Irregular_Warfare.pdf?VersionId=pf3AQZdT2C2zEovp.Y28T1Xgtyt3ukgG

^[38] “New Office of Pakistan Center for Cultural, Communication Studies inaugurated at Tsinghua University,” Newswire International, March 16, 2024, https://www.newswire.com.pk/2024/03/16/pakistan-1900/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[39] Saifur Rahman, “China’s Foreign Policy and its Choice for Cultural Soft Power: The Tools,” Social Change Review19 (2024): 90-115,   https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/scr-2019-0003

^[40] Soumya Awasthi and Abhishek Sharma, “Rethinking India’s Cyber Readiness in the Age of Information Warfare,” Observer Research Foundation, May 17, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/rethinking-india-s-cyber-readiness-in-the-age-of-information-warfare

^[41]  G.U. Maheshwari, "Changing the Narrative: Information Campaigns, Strategy and Crisis Escalation in the Digital Age," Strategic Analysis 48, no. 2 (2024), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09700161.2024.2339575

^[42] National Security, “Inside China’s Hidden OSNIT Network Shaping the Future of Intelligence Warfare,” Karve, April 29, 2025, https://www.karveinternational.com/insights/inside-chinas-hidden-osint-networks

^[43] Seong Hyeon Choi, “Chinese Weapons Power Pakistan in Kashmir Conflict, But Doubts Remain,” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3309909/kashmir-conflict-reveals-power-pakistans-chinese-weapons-doubts-remain

^[44] Khurshid Ahmed, “China, Pakistan Sign Agreement to Route Internet Traffic Through Pakistan, Generate $400 Million Revenue,” Arab News, January 30, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2450631/pakistan

^[45] Ahmed, “China, Pakistan Sign Agreement to Route Internet Traffic Through Pakistan, Generate $400 Million Revenue”

^[46] Abdul Rauf, “Pak-China Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) Project- Opportunities and Challenges,” National University of Sciences and Technology, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332932485_Pak-China_Optical_Fibre_Cable_OFC_Project_-_Opportunities_and_Challenges

^[47] China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, “Cross Border Optical Fibre Cable (Khunjerab-Rawalpindi),” https://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/40.

^[48] APP, “Over Rs 400 Million allocated to IT and Telecom Services for CPEC,” Arab News, May 7, 2018, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1297986/business-economy

^[49] Pranay Upadhyay, “Chinese Telecom Company to Provide 4G in PoK and Gilgit Baltistan Region,” ABP News, September 29, 2021, https://news.abplive.com/news/india/china-telecom-company-cmpak-4g-zhong-4g-pok-gilgit-balistan-contract-price-of-rs-114-18-crore-1485009

^[50] Rahul Mishra, “China’s Flawed Narrative on India’s Indus Water Treaty Abeyance,” Asia Times, May 22, 2025, https://asiatimes.com/2025/05/chinas-flawed-narrative-on-indias-indus-water-treaty-abeyance/

^[51] Dhananjay Tripathi, “4 Obstacles to India Joining the UN Security Council,” The Diplomat, September 20, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/4-obstacles-to-india-joining-the-un-security-council/

^[52] Rahul Karan Reddy, “China’s Media Coverage of India-Pakistan Conflict,” Organisation for Research on China and Asia, May 13, 2025, https://orcasia.org/article/1173/chinas-media-coverage-of-india-pakistan-conflict#:~:text=The%20coverage%20of%20the%20India%2DPakistan%20conflict%20in,attack%20in%20Pahalgam%20on%2022%20April%202025.&text=In%20its%20reportage%20and%20commentary%20on%20the,from%20publishing%20unverified%20claims%20made%20by%20Pakistan

^[53]Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents

^[54] Ministry of Electronics and IT, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1700749

^[55] Ashu Mann, “Cyber and Electronic Warfare: The Indian Army’s Digital Battlefield,” One India, February 20, 2025, https://www.oneindia.com/india/cyber-electronic-warfare-the-indian-armys-digital-battlefield-4076197.html

^[56] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2026240#:~:text=This%20doctrine%20lays%20emphasis%20on%20understanding%20military,awareness%20in%20our%20warfighters%20at%20all%20levels (2024).

^[57] Satya Narayan Misra, “Proposed Reforms for DRDO: Challenges and the Way Forward,” Defence and Diplomacy Journal 13, no. 3, (2024), https://capsindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Satya-Narayan-Misra.pdf

^[58] “The National Cyber Security Policy of India 2013,” Chase Academy, August 13, 2024, https://chaseacademy.in/the-national-cyber-security-policy-of-india-2013-ncsp-2013/#:~:text=2013%20(NCSP%202013)-,The%20National%20Cyber%20Security%20Policy%20of%20India%202013%20(NCSP%202013,regulations%2C%20and%20strengthening%20enforcement%20mechanisms.

^[59] Indrajaal, “Why your Border Security Strategy is Incomplete without Drone Defence,” Redefining Drone Infrastructure, August 6, 2024, https://indrajaal.in/insights/why-your-border-security-strategy-is-incomplete-without-drone-defence/#:~:text=Traditional%20methods%20of%20border%20security,countermeasure%2C%20can%20disrupt%20essential%20communications.

^[60] A K Dhingra, “Special Operations- A Capability Roadmap for India,” Synergy, August 2021, https://cenjows.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/13-Maj-Gen-AK-Dhingra.pdf

^[61] Congressional Research Service, “Defence Primer: Electronic Warfare,” November 14, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11118

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• Pakistan
• china Pakistan relations
• china pakistan strategic nexus
• grey zone warfare
• pakistan china military cooperation
• pakistan china strategic relations
• proxy war pakistan

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