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Kartik Bommakanti, Ed., “Operation Sindoor: Military Performance and Effectiveness,” ORF Special Report No. 299, Observer Research Foundation, March 2026.
Operation Sindoor, launched in response to Pakistan’s terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians at the tourist resort of Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, was a watershed event in the history of the Indian subcontinent. While it did not test the full spectrum of integration, operational synergy, and combined-arms cooperation among the Indian armed services, it offered a brief but important demonstration of how the services performed between 7 and 10 May 2025.
In theory, advanced and superior military capabilities should be decisive in determining military outcomes.[1] However, in practice, this is not always the case in modern and contemporary combat as there are several factors other than capabilities that play an equally important role. Intra- and inter-service combined-arms cooperation, logistical cooperation, information management, doctrinal and tactical adaptation, and recovery after tactical and operational surprises and setbacks are indispensable for effective operational performance.[2] Coordinated action across service arms is essential to military effectiveness.
Operation Sindoor partially revealed that pre-planned or pre-established synergy among combat arms can yield operational gains during hostilities. It showed both the strengths and weaknesses of these variables that undergird the conduct of military operations by the Indian armed services.
This report covers issues around the operation, from the employment of airpower to disinformation. It has two limitations. First, this examination of the Indian and Pakistani militaries during Operation Sindoor excludes the Indian Navy (IN)’s operational role during the hostilities. Given the short duration of the May 2025 conflict, the IN’s role was confined to the mobilisation and deployment of an entire Carrier Battle Group (CBG) close to Pakistan’s coast, restricting the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) movement.[3] The IN did not participate directly in active combat.
Second, the report offers only a snapshot of how effectively the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Army (IA) performed. Thus, extrapolating definitive lessons from Operation Sindoor may be unreasonable and erroneous. What the operation did provide is a glimpse into the exercise of military power by the Indian armed services and the response of the Indian government. Therefore, limited lessons can be gleaned, and the analyses that follow capture them in an insightful manner.
In the first article, AVM (Retd.) Arjun Subramaniam analyses how and why the IAF doctrinally and operationally transitioned from No-War-No-Peace (NWNP) to Short-of-War (SoW). The piece covers three themes: the IAF’s expeditious adaptation following initial setbacks; its shift to offensive action; and the lessons it must draw for conducting multidomain air operations.
Operation Sindoor witnessed significant use of air and missile defences. In his article, Prateek Tripathi argues that the operation marked a departure from the established pattern of India-Pakistan confrontations, shifting from a primarily terrestrial conflict to an aerial one.
In her contribution, Anushka Saxena examines the dense employment of drones during Operation Sindoor and maps out the success of India’s drone strategy relative to Pakistan’s. Notwithstanding the effective use of drones by India, the operation, Saxena writes, has intensified both Indian and Pakistani efforts to bolster their respective drone capabilities in anticipation of a future confrontation.
Chaitanya Giri’s analysis demonstrates Turkish-Pakistan collusion in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) during Operation Sindoor. He argues that Pakistan served as a testing ground for Turkish-made ISR technologies, as ISR cooperation between Ankara and Rawalpindi has reportedly deepened since the operation.
In his article, Major General (Retd.) Alok Deb examines the importance of Ground-Based Air Defences (GBADs) in countering the speed, lethality, and precision of airborne missile attacks. Operation Sindoor proved that GBADs were effective in blunting Pakistan’s use of drones and air-launched missiles.
Rahul Rawat then analyses how jointness played out during Operation Sindoor. The analysis shows that jointness is the product of a “whole-of-nation” effort. The operation, he contends, exposed both the strengths and the limits of jointness.
The report closes with a piece by Soumya Awasthi and Kalpit A. Mankikar, which evaluates India’s perception management during the operation. Although the operation was largely a success, there were also glaring weaknesses in New Delhi’s failure to integrate intelligence, execute counter-messaging effectively through digital media, and conduct public diplomacy.
Read the report here.
Kartik Bommakanti is Senior Fellow, Defence and National Security, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[1] Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining a Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2016), pp. 66-67.
[2] Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 7.
[3] Keshav Padmanabhan, “Op Sindoor Hit Pakistan’s Economy Hard, We Forced Their Navy Stay Restricted to Ports – Navy Chief,” ThePrint, December 2, 2025, https://theprint.in/defence/op-sindoor-hit-pakistans-economy-hard-we-forced-their-navy-to-stay-restricted-to-ports-navy-chief/2796379/.
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Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
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