Introduction

Economic development can be achieved through exports, which create jobs, improve foreign exchange reserves, and boost industrial and infrastructural development. In the fiscal year 2024-25, India achieved total merchandise and service exports of US$820.93 billion, of which merchandise exports accounted for US$437.42 billion.^[1] One of India’s largest trade relationships is with the United States (US).

In 2025, India exported US$86.5 billion worth of goods to the US, primarily electronics, gems and jewellery, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, and textiles.^[2] This relationship has emerged as India’s largest bilateral trade partnership. As depicted in Table 1, India’s exports to the US increased from US$49.3 billion in 2020 to US$86.5 billion in 2025, while imports rose from US$26.6 billion to US$45.3 billion.

Table 1: India-US Trade Balance

Year	India's Exports to the US (US$ Billion)	India's Imports from the US (US$ Billion)	Trade Balance (Exports - Imports)
2020	49.3	26.6	22.7
2021	71.5	41.4	30.1
2022	80.2	51.8	28.4
2023	75.8	42.1	33.7
2024	79.4	39	40.4
2025	86.5	45.3	41.2

Source: Trading Economics and Ministry of Commerce and Industry^[3],[4]

This growth now faces a serious threat following a sudden hike in tariffs imposed by the US on Indian exports. Government sources estimate that exports worth US$48.2 billion will be subject to a steep 50 percent tariff.^[5]

The recent wave of tariffs against India and other emerging economies like Brazil and Vietnam does not arise in isolation; it reflects a mix of economic, strategic, and political motives. The US has long-run trade deficits with countries like India, Mexico, China, and Vietnam, which have generated political pressure to protect domestic manufacturing and associated jobs.^[6] The electrical and engineering goods imported from India (like machinery parts, auto parts, and steel components) are targeted because these goods are directly competing with US domestic manufacturers. These tariffs should be understood in the new context of an evolving interpretation of the ‘Gravity Model of International Trade’, which traditionally explains trade flows based on economic size and geographic distance. While larger and proximate economies tend to trade more due to lower transport costs, reduced logistics risks, and less information asymmetry, the post-COVID-19 and increasingly fragmented global economy has expanded this framework to include non-economic factors such as political alignment, strategic trust, and supply chain resilience.

The pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in globalised supply chains, while geopolitical conflicts—including the trade war between the US and China, and the war between Russia and Ukraine—highlighted the risks of over-relying on a small number of strategic trade partners. In response, the US and other leading economies have shifted towards friend-shoring and near-shoring, prioritising resilience and political certainty over cost and scale efficiencies, and marking a move away from global optimisation in trade and investment policies.

In this context, the tariffs imposed on exports from countries like India, Vietnam, and other emerging economies should not be interpreted as a short-term protectionist measure or cyclical trade barriers. Instead, they reflect a broader reconfiguration of global trade architecture, in which trade policy is used to shape supply chain geography and industrial location. The US tariff strategy seeks to incentivise domestic production, redirect supply chains towards allied nations, and reduce exposure to external shocks, particularly in strategically sensitive sectors like engineering goods, electronics, and critical manufacturing inputs. Tariffs thus function as a tool to shift production either back to the US or to allied economies. Strategic competition with China, and its spillover effects on other countries, has also contributed to higher tariffs; while the original trade war targeted China, its ripple effects have extended to other exporters, including India, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

The US often argues that countries like India offer production-linked incentives (PLI), tax rebates, and export subsidies that distort fair competition, and that tariffs are therefore justified to level the playing field under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) countervailing measures. US trade officials have claimed that India’s PLI schemes for electronics and electric vehicles (EVs), for example, confer an unfair cost advantage on Indian exporters. US trade policy is also deeply political, with tariffs often deployed during election cycles to appeal to manufacturing and labour constituencies. As a fast-growing exporter, India has increasingly featured in the domestic US narrative of protecting American industry.

Higher tariff levels are likely to have a substantial impact on export-oriented industries such as chemicals, gems and jewellery, textiles, and electronic goods. These sectors are particularly vulnerable due to their heavy dependence on the international market. In turn, Indian banks face increased financial risk, as a significant share of their portfolio is linked to export working capital facilities, including invoice discounting, post-shipment loans, and packaging credit. For heavy industries that rely substantially on US demand, a sudden slowdown in export orders could lengthen receivable days, trigger covenant violations, and potentially push certain loans into stress. Banks’ exposure is further heightened by volatility in currency markets, where tariff announcements often lead to sharp fluctuations in foreign exchange rates.

At the same time, however, there can be a substantial opportunity in this challenging scenario. Banks may use this disruption as a means for transformation. Trade agreements like the India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement signed on 2 April 2022 and the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed on 18 February 2022 can help the exporters expand into new markets by providing them with Export Credit Guarantee Scheme-backed credit lines, emergency capital rollers, supply chain finance for value-added manufacturing, foreign hedging and derivative products, advisory plus credit bundles, and green and digital export finance. The vision of ‘Viksit Bharat’ is to make India a developed, self-reliant economy by 2047, and this strategy aligns closely with that objective. It requires banks to move beyond their traditional role as lenders and act as growth enablers, financing the upcoming wave of export diversification, industrial innovation, and infrastructure-led competitiveness.

The Industry Impact: The Real Pain Points

Table 2 provides the macro-financial context for assessing the risks emanating from recent tariff-related trade disruptions. 

Table 2: Export Credit in the Context of Overall Bank Credit in India 

Indicator	Latest Available RBI Data (FY25 / mid-2025)	Interpretation
Non-Food Bank Credit (YoY Growth)	~9.5–10.0%	Indicates strong and broad-based credit expansion across the economy.
Credit to Industry (YoY Growth)	~6.0–7.0%	Moderate growth reflects cautious lending to manufacturing and export-linked sectors.
Credit to Services (YoY Growth)	~10.6–11%	Robust growth driven by domestic demand-oriented sectors.
Personal Loans (YoY Growth)	~12–13%	Major contributor to overall credit growth; largely insulated from trade shocks.
Export Credit (Priority Sector) – YoY Growth	~4.5–5.0%	Significantly slower than overall credit growth, it reflects tariff-related stress.
Export Credit as % of Non-Food Credit	<1%	Confirms export credit is a small, concentrated component of bank lending.
Banking System Capital Adequacy (CRAR)	>16%	Indicates strong shock-absorbing capacity at the system level.

Source: RBI, Department of Communication^[7]

Overall non-food bank credit in India continues to grow at a healthy double-digit pace, driven by domestic demand-oriented segments such as retail lending, services, and MSME credit.^[8] In contrast, export credit under the priority sector lending category has grown at a much slower rate. This divergence indicates that the slowdown is not reflective of the broad-based stress in the banking system but is instead concentrated in export-linked activities exposed to the external trade shocks. Notably, export credit constitutes less than one percent of the total non-food bank credit, contributing to a relatively small footprint in the bank’s aggregate balance sheet, which is limiting its potential for tariff-induced stress to evolve into a systemic banking concern. At the same time, despite its modest aggregate share, export credit remains critical for specific export-oriented sectors, particularly MSME-dominated sectors like textiles, gems and jewellery, engineering goods, and electronics segments, where working capital cycles, receivable realisation, and foreign exchange exposure are closely tied to bank financing. 

For many Indian enterprises—especially MSMEs that form the backbone of the economy—the US market is not just a customer but a primary partner. Business models, from raw material sourcing and labour hiring to production planning, are built around a steady flow of international orders. Now, with a sudden hike in tariffs, businesses are most likely to witness a major jolt. The products, which were competitively priced, are now more expensive than those from Vietnam or Mexico, prompting US buyers to slow Indian orders, seek cheaper alternatives, or pass higher costs on to the end customers, who may resist price increases. For Indian exporters, this situation may escalate into a crisis, where the steady flow of payments on which exporters rely to maintain their operations may gradually dry up. 

Table 3:  Contribution to India-US Export Value (FY25, by Sector)

Sector/Commodity	Export Value (US$ Billion)
Electrical Machinery & Equipment	15.89
Natural Pearls, Precious Stones, Metals & Articles	9.97
Pharmaceutical Products	9.78
Machinery & Mechanical Appliances	6.69
Mineral Fuels & Oils	4.2
Articles of Iron or Steel	3.11
Apparel & Textiles	~ 2.5 - 2.8
Organic Chemicals	~ 2.55
Vehicles & Auto Parts	~ 2.58
Others	~ 28.9 - 29.2

Source: IBEF and Ministry of Commerce and Industry^[9]

As presented in Table 3, the electrical and electronics sector, with exports valued at US$15.89 billion, is a high-growth sector in which India is competing with countries like Vietnam and Taiwan to become a global manufacturing hub. The tariff in this sector will erode the competitive edge; a smartphone assembly or a semiconductor component made in India will become unviable for an American tech giant. The dream of “Make in India for the world” suddenly faces a formidable wall.

The gems and jewellery sector, which exports around US$9.97 billion worth of products to the United States, is another pillar of India’s export economy. The industry employs over one million workers, ranging from diamond cutters in Surat to craftsmen in Jaipur. This workforce is reliant on US consumer demand, making it vulnerable to shifts in discretionary spending, economic recessions, and supply chain disruptions.

The impact is likely to be even more severe in MSME-dominated sectors such as the engineering goods and textiles. Limited financial buffers and constrained access to affordable credit leave these firms poorly positioned to absorb tariff shocks, increasing the risk of job losses, output contraction, and cash-flow stress.

The Risks in the Bank’s Portfolio

Exporters are the first to bear the impact of higher tariff charges. Increased tariffs raise product prices, reducing demand, and lead to lower sales, squeezed margins, and weaker cash flows. However, the ripple effect does not stop here; it directly reaches banks, as exports rely heavily on them for financing.

Figure 1: India-US Trade and Export Credit Linkages

Source: RBI Export Credit Statistics^[10]

As illustrated in Figure 1, credit provided by Indian banks to exporters operating in the India-US trade increased from INR 17,340 crore to INR 21,210 crore, a rise of 22 percent in five years. This growth in bank credit has lagged the expansion of India-US exports, suggesting cautious lending of banks after the global interest rate hikes. This also suggests that exporters are now relying heavily on non-banking financial institutions for credit. It may be concluded that the banks have become more risk-averse over the years due to volatile foreign markets. The highest growth in export credit of 9.3 percent was recorded for FY2021-22, possibly because of the reopening of global trade routes after the series of lockdowns. The moderate growth of 3-5 percent suggests that banks did not capitalise on the export growth momentum completely.

Table 4: Banking Products for Exporters

Product	Description	Typical Uses
Pre-Shipment Finance	Short-term working capital advance to cover raw materials, inputs, manufacturing and packing of goods for export before shipment.	To purchase or process goods intended for export.
Post-Shipment Finance	Finance is provided after shipment, to bridge the gap until the realisation of payment from the overseas buyer.	When goods have been shipped, but payment is pending.
Export Credit in Foreign Currency	Finance or advances in foreign currency to match export currency exposure.	Suitable for exporters invoicing in USD/EUR and seeking currency matching.
Export Receivables Discounting	Selling or discounting export receivables (invoices from a buyer abroad) to a bank to get cash earlier.	When receivables are outstanding and early liquidity is required.
Bank Guarantees	The bank provides a guarantee or bond to meet export contract obligations.	For bidding on export contracts or providing guarantees to foreign buyers.
Lines of Credit (LOC)	Financing for overseas buyers or exporters to supply.	In cases involving large export or project-based contracts.
Export Marketing, R&D, and Capital Equipment Finance	Term loans or credit facilities to help export-oriented units with product development, export infrastructure, machinery, and technology.	To support scaling up, developing new export products, or upgrading manufacturing facilities.

Source: Author’s own, using various open sources.

Banks play an important role in supporting international trade by offering customised financial products aligned with firms’ business models, scale of operations, and contract structures. These products are essential for managing working capital requirements, mitigating inherited risks, and scaling the business.

Banks are likely to face a range of financial and non-financial risks arising from the recent tariff-induced disruptions.^[11] Export portfolios are often concentrated in a few sectors and any slowdown in these sectors directly increases the risk of loan defaults. Sectors like jewellery and textiles are very vulnerable, as small exporters typically have limited cash buffers to absorb shocks. Exporters earn in dollars but pay in Indian rupees. Any new tariff announcements often cause USD-INR fluctuations, increasing repayment stress. A sudden fall in income from exports, combined with volatility in currency, may turn the performing loans into stressed accounts. This analysis argues that while the impact of recent tariffs is not systemic—given India’s adequately capitalised, diversified, and well-regulated economy—it is highly sector-specific and borrower-specific.  Export-oriented MSME clusters, in particular, face heightened vulnerability due to compressed margins and elongated working capital cycles.

In recent years, large export-oriented corporations have moved ahead of traditional bank credit. Business growth, increased retained earnings, and improved access to capital markets have enabled partial deleveraging and lower dependence on bank-funded working capital. During periods of global uncertainty, these firms also draw on internal accruals, supplier credit and Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) for short-term liquidity.

However, this trend is uneven across the sectors. Bank financing remains the backbone of operations in textiles, gems and jewellery, engineering goods, and electronic goods, where MSMEs dominate and operate with thin margins, limited cash buffers, and long receivable cycles. For these exporters, instruments such as pre- and post-shipment credit, export receivables discounting, and bank guarantees are critical for executing export contracts and sustaining operations.

It is essential to note that non-bank and market-based financing is more risk-sensitive and tends to contract sharply during external shocks such as sudden tariff hikes. In contrast, banks play a stabilising role by restructuring working capital, extending credit lines, and providing liquidity support, as they have the backing of regulatory frameworks and credit enhancement mechanisms such as Export Credit Guarantee Corporation (ECGC) guarantees.

Furthermore, firm-level data from CMIE’s Prowess IQ indicate that different sectors exhibit distinct financing patterns. Firms operating in the textile sector exhibit high working capital intensity, with short-term loans from banks forming a major portion of total liabilities. They have limited access to capital markets and internal funds. Similarly, exporters in the gems and jewellery sector show a strong reliance on bank credit for inventory funding.^[12]

Firms operating in pharmaceuticals and engineering goods, on the other hand, exhibit lower leverage and are more reliant on internal cash accruals. However, bank financing remains crucial, especially during demand volatility, for managing export receivables and foreign exchange exposure. Overall, CMIE data suggest that while capital structures are gradually evolving, bank credit still plays a pivotal role in managing the export-oriented businesses, especially during shocks such as tariff escalations.^[13]

Banking products like pre- and post-shipment financing, invoice discounting, and factoring are critical for managing working capital and cash flow during exports. However, payment delays due to tariff-related order issues can also result in liquidity mismatches. These ramifications can lead to covenant violations and get loans flagged as special mention accounts (SMAs) or non-performing assets (NPAs). Even modest declines in export demand can push accounts into stress, increasing provisioning requirements and capital consumption, and thereby weighing on banks’ profitability and capital positions.

From Risk to Opportunity

US tariff hikes pose clear challenges to economic relations; from India's perspective, however, they also present an opportunity to strengthen the economy for greater global competitiveness. India should reduce its over-reliance on a single market and encourage diversification of exports to the UAE, Australia, Africa, and the countries of Southeast Asia like Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. A shift towards the production of more value-added exports will enhance the resilience and global competitiveness of India’s exports, like promoting technical textiles, special and fine chemicals, semiconductors, and certain pharmaceuticals. Investment in logistics efficiency, warehousing, and cold-chain infrastructure, integrated with e-commerce export platforms, can support this transition. Increased research and development, automation-driven productivity gains, and digital adoption among MSMEs would reinforce these efforts. These expectations are within the framework of Viksit Bharat @2047, which outlines a developed, self-reliant, and globally integrated economy.^[14]

The Indian banking and financial sector can leverage this transition to strengthen client relationships, expand revenues, and support export resilience. Banks should continue to provide pre- and post-shipment credit, with dynamic sector-sensitive interest rates. Risk-based pricing would allow banks to protect margins while ensuring continued access to capital for exporters. Banks can also explore more risk management strategies, offering forward contracts, options, and swaps to exporters.

These risk management products can help businesses in hedging against exchange rate volatility and enable banks to earn a premium. In the current environment, these hedging tools can mitigate risk for enterprises and create opportunities for the banks on the revenue front. Banks can strengthen their risk management framework by partnering with the ECGC to insure loans against foreign buyer default. This collaboration would enable banks to lend more confidently to borrowers trying to explore alternative markets such as the UAE, Australia, and Africa. Banks and their bankers may utilise their expertise in international finance and risk management to offer a combination of advisory services, including compliance, certification, and trade facilitation. The adoption of AI-based monitoring system for tracking export accounts, receivables, and sectoral risks could support early intervention. Such proactive actions by Indian banks may reduce NPAs, improve portfolio quality and position the bank as a strategic partner for the exporters.

Lessons from Contemporary History

In the 1990s and 2000s, India’s shrimp exporters were severely affected by US anti-dumping duties. Instead of shrinking, India upgraded its aquaculture practices to meet international standards, shifted to high-value prices, and diversified into Japanese and European markets.^[15] Similarly, when Indian textiles faced US safeguard duties in the early 2000s, exporters leveraged the bank-supported working capital to expand into alternative markets, eventually strengthening India’s position as a top global exporter.^[16]

Globally, other nations have also shown similar resilience. When Brazil faced US steel and aluminium tariffs in 2018, it negotiated export quotas and rerouted shipments towards Europe and domestic infrastructure projects, supported by targeted bank credit to limit defaults.^[17] Turkey, subjected to a 50 percent US tariff in the same year, expanded exports to the Middle East, Africa, and the European Union, while domestic banks offered rediscounting facilities to maintain liquidity for the exporters.^[18] China, during the US-China cold war between 2018 and 2020, faced tariffs on over US$370 billion of goods, but it responded by diversifying exports to ASEAN, the EU, and countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).^[19] In all these cases, the countries leveraged the banking support, market diversification, and value addition to change the shocks into opportunities.

Conclusion

The recent tariff hike imposed by the United States on India and other countries has again highlighted the vulnerability of international trade due to policy shifts in major economies. Given India’s exports of nearly US$86.5 billion to the United States, and more than half of this trade potentially affected by higher tariffs, short-term disruptions are likely across key sectors such as electronics, textiles, chemicals, gems and jewellery, and engineering goods. However, India has faced such headwinds before as well and emerged stronger by adapting, innovating, and diversifying.

These disruptions also affect banks' lending portfolios, but they underscore the role Indian banks can play—not merely as lenders, but as the backbone of India’s trade resilience. Banks can support tariff-affected borrowers by expanding access to pre- and post-shipment credit, ECGC-backed export financing, supply chain credit lines, working capital rollovers, and FX (forex) hedging solutions. This situation also gives the opportunity to leverage Trade Receivables Discounting Platforms Systems (TReDs) to ensure liquidity even when the international demand slows.

The broader narrative extends beyond tariffs to structural transformation. India is already reducing its dependence on a limited set of markets by expanding exports under trade agreements such as the India-UAE ‘CEPA’ and the India-Australia ECTA. These agreements open alternative destinations for Indian exporters, enabling them to balance the risk of US tariffs with fresh opportunities in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

From a national perspective, this disruption aligns with the vision of Viksit Bharat @2047, which seeks to build a robust and resilient economy capable of withstanding external shocks. The government's emphasis on production-linked incentives (PLI), ‘Make in India’, and the development of logistics corridors reinforce the objectives of self-reliance and export diversification. For banks, integrating these policy priorities into credit strategies can help catalyse growth while preserving asset quality.

History shows how nations have turned the obstacles into opportunities. Like India leveraged the 1991 crisis to reform its economy and the 2020 pandemic to pursue a digitalisation agenda, combining resilience, innovation, and risk management with growth financing, India can withstand the ongoing tariff challenge and emerge a stronger, more diversified, and self-reliant economy.

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Ashutosh Kashyap is a Finance professional, who writes on topics related to banking and finance, and risk management.

Bimlesh Sah is a Risk Management professional, who writes on topics related to financial and non-financial risks.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

^[1] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2025, “The Cumulative Exports (Merchandise and Services) during FY 2024–25 (April–March) Is Estimated to Grow by 5.50% at US$ 820.93 Billion,” Press Information Bureau, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2122016.

^[2] TaxTMI, 2025, “Steep 50 pc Tariff on Indian Goods Entering US from Aug 27; to Impact Labour-Intensive Sectors,” TaxTMI, https://www.taxtmi.com/news?id=53591.

^[3] Trading Economics, 2024, “India Exports to United States,” Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/india/exports/united-states.

^[4] India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), 2025, “India–US Trade: Exports, Imports & Bilateral Economic Relations,” IBEF, https://www.ibef.org/indian-exports/india-us-trade.

^[5]Business Standard, 2025, “$48.2 Billion of India’s Goods Exports to US to Be Subject to 50% Tariffs: Government to Parliament,” Business Standard, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/48-2-bln-of-indias-goods-exports-to-us-to-be-subject-to-50-tariffs-govt-to-parliament/articleshow/123390769.cms.

^[6] The American Presidency Project, 2025, “White House Press Release: President Trump’s Tariffs Are a Necessary Solution,” University of California, Santa Barbara, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/white-house-press-release-president-trumps-tariffs-are-necessary-solution.

^[7] Reserve Bank of India, 2025, “Sectoral Deployment of Bank Credit – June 2025,” RBI Database, https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/Data_Sectoral_Deployment.aspx.

^[8] Reserve Bank of India, 2025, “Sectoral Deployment of Bank Credit,” Mumbai: RBI, https://docs.publicnow.com/viewDoc?filename=8151%5CEXT%5CD5446667E123428B64F869D22046DBF505B98C99_228FE3F1D4326B2774A35A2C3C1696E6AB09B64B.PDF.

^[9] “India–US Trade: Exports, Imports & Bilateral Economic Relations.”

^[10] Reserve Bank of India, 2025, “Database on Indian Economy,” Mumbai: RBI, https://data.rbi.org.in/DBIE/#/dbie/reports/Statistics/Financial%20Sector/Banking%20-%20Sectoral%20Statistics.

^[11] Goldman Sachs, 2025, “Tariff-Induced Recession Risks,” Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, https://www.goldmansachs.com/pdfs/insights/goldman-sachs-research/tariff-induced-recession-risk/tariff-induced-recession-risk.pdf.

^[12] Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), 2025, “Prowess IQ Database,” Mumbai: CMIE, https://prowess.cmie.com.

^[13] “Prowess IQ Database.”

^[14] Arvind Virmani, 2024, “Viksit Bharat: Unshackling Job Creators,” New Delhi: NITI Aayog.

^[15] B. Bhattacharyya, 2004, “The Indian Shrimp Industry Organizes to Fight the Threat of Anti-Dumping Action,” Geneva: World Trade Organization.

^[16] Ministry of Textiles, Government of India, 2002, “Textiles Ministry on Modernisation Path,” Press Information Bureau, October 11, 2002, https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/releases98/lyr2002/roct2002/11102002/r1110200221.html.

^[17] Agência Brasil, 2018, “Brazil Hopes US Lifts Curbs on Steel, Aluminum,” Agência Brasil, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/economia/noticia/2018-05/brazil-hopes-us-lifts-curbs-steel-aluminum.

^[18] The Straits Times, 2018, “Turkey Raises Tariffs on Some US Imports in Retaliation over Economy ‘Attacks’,” The Straits Times, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/turkey-doubles-tariffs-on-some-us-imports-over-economy-attacks.

^[19] China Briefing, 2019, “China Makes Up US Trade War Deficit by Buying from ASEAN, Belt and Road Countries,” China Briefing, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-makes-us-trade-war-trade-deficit-buying-asean-belt-road-countries/.

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