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Manish Thakre, “The Nagpur Metro: Finding Ways to Bridge Funding Gaps,” ORF Special Report No. 264, June 2025, Observer Research Foundation.
The Government of India has actively supported metro rail expansion in the country, as spelt out by the Metro Rail Policy, 2017.[1] Despite notable investments, however, metro rail systems across Indian cities have struggled to meet projected ridership levels,[2] resulting in underutilised capacity and financial shortfalls. As of January 2025, metro rail and rapid rail systems were operational or under construction in 29 Indian cities; they covered 1,010 km in 23 cities, with an additional 980 km under development. In 2024-25 alone, 62.7 km of metro rail became operational, with total daily ridership reaching 10.2 million.[3]
These transit systems have led to a reduction in vehicular emissions and road accidents, along with savings on travel time, vehicle operating costs, and infrastructure maintenance.[4] Since 2010, India has invested approximately INR 20 trillion (US$25 billion) in metro rail systems, largely financed through centre-state partnerships and concessional loans from development finance institutions. Approved metro rail projects till 2026 have a projected expenditure of INR 3 trillion (US$3.8 billion).[5] Given the high costs, reducing expenses and identifying alternative financing mechanisms are essential for the long-term sustainability of metro systems.
A challenge facing metro rail systems is low farebox revenue[a] due to lower-than-expected ridership, leading to financial strain on operations. The Metro Rail Policy 2017 aimed to address this by institutionalising measures to enhance financial sustainability, such as (a) finding alternative funding mechanisms, such as Value Capture Financing (VCF),[b] Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs),[c] and Transit-Oriented Development (TOD);[d] (b) carrying out comprehensive financial planning before approving metro projects; and (c) diversifying sources of non-farebox revenue, including advertising, commercial real estate development, and parking fees.
Nagpur, a Tier-2 city in Maharashtra, reflects these challenges. In the first year of its run, following its inauguration on 8 March 2019, its metro reported a ridership at just 3.85 percent of what the Detailed Project Report (DPR) had expected. Post-pandemic (October 2020-March 2021) ridership rose marginally, but only to 7.43 percent;[6] by 2023, it was still 69,863 a day, or 17 percent of the 410,000 projected by 2026 to render the metro viable.[7] The project designers were obviously overly optimistic; the big shift from private vehicles to metro transit they hoped for has yet to materialise in Nagpur. Undoubtedly, the Nagpur Metro is relatively young, with ridership patterns and behavioural adaptation still evolving, and achieving a significant shift in people’s travel habits takes time. Even so, strategic interventions should be made to enhance usage.
To become viable, the metro will need to tap diverse sources of non-farebox revenue – such as imposing a general tax on all citizens or introducing targeted levies on private vehicle users. All beneficiaries, including those who lead healthier lives today thanks to reduced congestion and pollution, should be made to pay. This study aims to (a) map the evolution of the Nagpur Metro, tracing its development, funding, and ridership trends, and (b) critically analyse its financial performance, identifying gaps in farebox and non-fare revenue streams. It proposes alternative funding mechanisms, reducing over-reliance on farebox income and ensuring long-term viability.
The report utilises a desk-based literature review to aid the analysis. To provide comparative insights, the revenues of the Delhi, Bengaluru, and Hyderabad metros of the last three to four years have also been examined.
The post-pandemic ridership and revenue data for the Nagpur Metro were gathered from various online news sources and the Maharashtra Metro Rail Corporation Limited (MMRCL) annual reports. However, MMRCL consolidates financial reporting for both the Nagpur and Pune metros, making it difficult to extract Nagpur-specific figures.
Nagpur is the second capital and third-largest city of Maharashtra.[e] While the Nagpur Municipal Corporation area is around 217 sq. km,[8] the larger Nagpur Metro Region encompasses 3,576 sq. km, with a population of 3.5 million. The Centre and the Maharashtra government jointly initiated the project in 2014.[9]
India’s metro rail systems have followed one of four models: entirely funded by the central government; entirely funded by the state government; 50:50 joint partnerships between the two; and PPPs.[10] The Nagpur Metro followed the third option, with the Centre and Maharashtra together setting up the Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited in February 2015. Later, in January 2017, having taken up the Pune Metro Rail project as well, it was renamed the Maharashtra Metro Rail Corporation Limited (MMRCL), and has been tasked with developing all of Maharashtra’s metro projects outside Mumbai.[11]
The Nagpur Metro currently consists of two corridors spanning a total of 38.48 km (33.08 km elevated, the remaining at ground level) with 38 stations. The project has so far cost INR 8,680 crore and includes 764 passenger capacity trains running 16 hours daily (6:00 am to 10:00 pm), with 19 feeder bus routes covering 160 km. It has generated direct employment for 1,700 people.[12] Though parts were still not operational at the time, the complete Phase 1 network – comprising the entire North-South (Automotive Square to Sitabuldi to Khapri) and East-West (Prajapati Nagar to Sitabuldi to Lokmanya Nagar) corridors – was inaugurated on 11 December 2022.[13] All 38 stations became fully operational only from 20 December 2024. The connectivity delays were primarily responsible for the low ridership and consequent low farebox revenue during the interim period.
Figure 1: Nagpur Metro Rail Phase-1
Source: DPR, 2013[14]
The Centre’s share of the total funding is 70 percent while Maharashtra is contributing 20 percent and two urban local bodies, the NIT and the Nagpur Municipal Corporation (NMC), the remaining 10 percent. Till March 2021, the total expenditure incurred was INR 7,886.11 crore, or 90.76 percent of the full cost. While the Centre has paid its share, INR 793.89 crore (or 9.15 percent of the total) is still due from the Maharashtra government, NIT and NMC (Table 1).
Table 1: Nagpur Metro Rail Funding (in INR crore)
| Stakeholder | Type of fund | Share as per GoI sanction order | Fund released up to March 2021 | Balance fund receivable |
| Govt of India | Equity | 1,114.00 | 1,114.00 | 0.00 |
| Subordinate Debt for Central Taxes | 441.00 | 441.00 | 0.00 | |
| Pass Through Assistance against loans from multilateral agencies AFD and KfW | 4,521.00 | 4,521.00 | 0.00 | |
| Total | 6,076.00 | 6,076.00 | 0.00 | |
| Maharashtra govt | Equity | 1114 | 937.86 | 176.14 |
| Subordinate Debt for Central Taxes | 441.00 | 441.00 | 0.00 | |
| Subordinate Debt for State Taxes | 181.00 | 105.80 | 75.20 | |
| Total | 1,736.00 | 1,484.66 | 251.34 | |
| NIT | Grant | 73.00 | 68.25 | 4.75 |
| NIT | Grant-State Tax | 78.00 | 0.00 | 73.00 |
| NMC | Grant | 73.00 | 0.00 | 73.00 |
| NIT | Land Contribution | 283.00 | 189.20 | 93.80 |
| NMC | Land Contribution | 361.00 | 68.00 | 293.00 |
| Total Grant from ULBs | 868.00 | 325.45 | 542.55 | |
| Grand Total | 8,680.00 | 7,886.11 | 793.89 | |
Despite the structured funding model, the Nagpur Metro faces financial sustainability issues due to its low farebox recovery and underperforming non-fare revenue streams, leading to revenue shortfalls. For all the planning that went into it, gaps remain due to weak first- and last-mile connectivity and limited monetising of its assets.
Even after six years of operations, it struggles to meet its revenue targets. A white paper by Infravision Foundation, a policy think tank on infrastructure, has noted that Nagpur Metro’s problem is part of a broader trend faced by smaller cities, where inaccurate demand forecasts, infrastructure misalignment with city needs, subsidies for private vehicles, and poor transit integration have contributed to putting financial strain on newly built mass transit systems.[16] Other studies have also highlighted challenges unique to the Nagpur Metro, such as the limited industrial activity in the city, the absence of major tourist attractions close by, and a dispersed population.[17]
Ensuring financially viable operations of metro rail systems are critical. The Centre, aware of this, has suggested various policy measures. The Metro Rail Policy 2017 emphasised a systems approach, recommending that cities adopt an integrated framework that combines land use, traffic, and transportation systems, which would enhance usage of public transport by commuters and encourage greater integration of different modes of transport. It also recommended setting up unified metropolitan transport authorities (UMTAs) in large cities–statutory bodies which would be responsible for effective coordination among transport agencies and managing of an urban transport fund (UTF). It acknowledged the capital-intensive nature of urban rail projects and stressed enhancing their financial viability through innovative revenue-generating mechanisms, such as a feeder system to and from metro stations (which Nagpur has introduced), TOD, VCF, and commercial property development at stations and other urban lands owned by MMRCL. The policy also stressed the generation of non-farebox revenues from advertisements, leasing of space, and the income drawn from fire clearances.[18]
India’s National Urban Transport Policy (2006) had also highlighted the importance of establishing UMTAs in all million-plus cities to enable coordinated planning and implementation of urban transport programmes. Operationalising UMTAs and setting up UTFs is crucial to coordinating and implementing the funding mechanisms needed for financially viable metro systems.[19]
The National TOD Policy 2017 also advocates leveraging TOD to enhance the value of land within a metro’s influence zone. By capturing this increased land value through mechanisms such as additional land taxes, one-time betterment levy, development charges, impact fees, transfer of development rights (TDRs), and increased Floor Area Ratio (FAR), the policy calls for enhancing land value and mixed-use development.[20],[21] These tools can support the financial sustainability of public transportation projects by generating additional revenue streams.
Further, the National VCF Policy Framework (2017) suggests that state governments should develop their own VCF policies. These should outline methods for assessing, levying, and collecting revenue from various value capture mechanisms. The policy recommendations include delineating the transit influence area, setting up revenue-sharing mechanisms with state governments, urban local bodies (ULBs) and other entities, and creating dedicated accounts for revenue generated through VCF tools.[22]
The Delhi Metro Rail, operational since 2002, now spans 395 km with 289 stations.[23] Run by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited (DMRC), a joint venture between the Centre and the government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, it has expanded through multiple phases: Phase I (65 km, 1996-2006), Phase II (124.93 km, 2006-2011), Phase III (160.75 km, 2011-2019) and Phase IV (103.93 km, expected to be complete by March 2026).[24]
Between 2021-22 and 2022-23, DMRC farebox revenue grew more than fourfold, from INR 632.45 crore to INR 3,088.37 crore, while non-fare and other income surged 11 times, from INR 265.67 crore to INR 3,556.68 crore, reflecting recovery to pre-COVID levels. Non-fare income has consistently accounted for over 50 percent of DMRC’s total revenue, underscoring its reliance on advertising, real estate, and external projects to maintain financial sustainability (Table 2).
| Years | Farebox Revenue | % of Total Revenue | Non-fare Revenues | % of Total Revenue | Total |
| 2018-19 | 3,11,902.15 | 48.27 | 3,34,250.06 | 51.73 | 6,46,152.21 |
| 2019-20 | 3,38,913.37 | 48.31 | 3,62,555.46 | 51.69 | 7,01,468.83 |
| 2020-21 | 63,245.75 | 19.23 | 2,65,674.09 | 80.77 | 3,28,919.84 |
| 2021-22 | 1,59,760.63 | 34.16 | 3,07,940.23 | 65.84 | 4,67,700.86 |
| 2022-23 | 3,08,837.58 | 46.48 | 3,55,668.74 | 53.52 | 6,64,506.32 |
Source: DMRC, Annual Report, 2022-23[25]
Delhi's TOD policy and VCF strategy have seen the rise of high-density, mixed-use developments near metro corridors, improving connectivity and encouraging sustainable growth. Over the years, increased accessibility has spurred private sector investments and reshaped land use, especially in urban and peri-urban areas. The Master Plan for Delhi 2041 further encourages this trend, integrating TOD principles, emphasising access for pedestrians, green spaces, and inclusive housing, with projects like the East Delhi Hub focused on sustainable, transit-oriented design.[26]
Bengaluru’s metro, operational since 2011, spans 77 km with 73 stations. Run by the Bengaluru Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL), a 50:50 joint venture between the Centre and the Karnataka government,[27] it has demonstrated strong post-COVID financial recovery. At its peak, till 9 February 2025, daily ridership averaged 8.2 lakh passengers, but with a fare hike since, it has fallen to 7.1 lakh.[28]
Between 2021-22 and 2023-24, its fare revenue grew threefold, from INR 163.33 crore to INR 573.91 crore, while non-fare revenue surged six-fold, from INR 65.43 crore to INR 416.11 crore,[29] highlighting the increasing contribution of non-fare income to its financial sustainability (Table 3).
| 2023-24 | % of Total | 2022-23 | % of Total | 2021-22 | % of Total | |
| Fare revenue | 573.91 | 57.97 | 422.61 | 53.87 | 163.33 | 71.40 |
| Non-fare and other | 416.11 | 42.03 | 361.94 | 46.13 | 65.43 | 28.60 |
| Total | 990.02 | 784.55 | 228.76 |
Source: BMRCL Annual Reports[30]
Non-fare revenue sources for Bengaluru Metro include royalties, advertisements, property development, event space rentals and sponsorships, with one-time fees recognised over the contract period. To enhance non-fare revenue, BMRCL has introduced several initiatives: advertisement placements on 1,844 metro pillars,[31] a commercial complex and hotel above the Majestic Metro station,[32] and cargo transport services through partnerships with logistics and e-commerce firms, inspired by Delhi Metro’s model.[33] This diversified revenue approach highlights the importance of alternative funding strategies for urban rail systems and provides valuable insights for improving Nagpur Metro’s financial sustainability through non-farebox revenue.
Hyderabad Metro Rail, operational since 2017, covers 69.2 km with 56 stations, and a daily ridership of over 4.75 lakh passengers.[34] It is the world's largest metro built through a PPP, which was signed between Larsen & Toubro and the government of undivided Andhra Pradesh in 2010. A special purpose vehicle called the L&T Metro Rail Hyderabad was set up to construct it on a Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Transfer (DBFOT) basis.[35] Of the total cost, 40 percent was shared equally between the Andhra government and the Centre, while the rest was private funding raised by L&T Metro Rail, supported by loans with a 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio.[36]
Hyderabad Metro’s revenue generation is diversified, with farebox revenue contributing 50 percent, real estate development 45 percent and advertising/parking fees the remainder. It cost a total of US$ 3.07 billion, of which US$ 0.41 billion was spent on real estate development along the metro corridors[37]–a model of TOD and long-term sustainability.
Post-COVID, Hyderabad Metro has recovered well, with fare revenue almost tripling from INR 201.39 crore in 2021-22 to INR 602.98 crore in 2023-24, and non-fare revenue surging fivefold to INR 796.33 crore. Non-fare revenue now accounts for 56.91 percent of total income, once again demonstrating the importance of diversified revenue streams for financial resilience (Table 4).
Table 4: Hyderabad Metro’s Revenue from Operations (in INR crore)
| 2023-24 | % of Total (A+B) | 2022-23 | % of Total (A+B) | 2021-22 | % of Total (A+B | |
| Fare revenue | 602.98 | 43.09 | 458. 20 | 67.13 | 201.39 | 56.39 |
| Rental income | 110.42 | 7.89 | 96.50 | 14.14 | 65.66 | 18.38 |
| Advertising | 81.06 | 5.79 | 67.28 | 9.86 | 17.81 | 4.99 |
| Consultancy and training | 0.18 | 0.01 | 0.44 | 0.06 | 6.93 | 1.94 |
| Income (net) on transfer of real estate undertaking* | 511.73 | 36.57 | - | - | - | - |
| Other revenue^ | 82.77 | 5.92 | 54.79 | 8.03 | 46.85 | 13.12 |
| Total revenue from operations (A) | 1,389.14 | 99.27 | 677.21 | 99.22 | 338.64 | 94.82 |
| Other income (interest income, Mutual funds (realised) Profit/ (Loss) of sale of Property, Plant & Equipment, Miscl.) (B) | 10.17 | 0.73 | 5.32 | 0.78 | 18.50 | 5.18 |
| Total income A +B | 1,399.31 | 682.53 | 357.14 |
Source: L&T Metro Rail Hyderabad, Annual Reports [38]
Note: Revenue in respect of common area maintenance services and reimbursement of utility charges
*Represents income (net) on transfer of real estate undertaking on slump sale basis as part of the company's inherent business model.
The integration of non-fare revenue, including real estate, advertising, and leasing, has been vital for the Hyderabad Metro’s sustainability. It has also collaborated with the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC) for bus connectivity[39] and private companies like EvZIP and Rapido for cabs, to improve last-mile connectivity, further boosting ridership.[40],[41]
The Nagpur Metro is facing massive financial challenges, with monthly operational losses of INR 2.5-3 crore and ridership levels well below projections.[42]
MMRCL has consistently been reporting net losses in its Nagpur operations, which rose from INR 2.90 crore in 2016-17 to INR 178.58 crore in 2020-21. While operating revenue showed a positive trend, increasing from INR 53.11 crore in 2016-17 to INR 413.43 crore in 2019-20, the growth was insufficient to offset rising operating costs and depreciation expenses. The COVID-19 lockdown exacerbated financial difficulties, causing a 30 percent decline in revenue from operations in 2020-21 compared to the previous year (Table 5).
Table 5: Income and Expenditure (in INR crore)
| Particulars | Financial year | ||||
| 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | 2019-20 | 2020-21 | |
| Income | |||||
| Revenue from Operations* | 44.82 | 132.39 | 217.12 | 317.62 | 222.39 |
| Other income | 8.29 | 36.09 | 51.47 | 95.80 | 68.58 |
| Total Income | 53.11 | 168.47 | 268.59 | 413.43 | 290.97 |
| Expenditure | |||||
| Operating Expenses | 43.88 | 128.86 | 211.92 | 313.21 | 245.85 |
| Employee benefits Expenses | 0.09 | 2.35 | 2.76 | 28.80 | 31.66 |
| Finance costs | - | 0.00 | 0.76 | 5.14 | 14.34 |
| Depreciation and Amortisation Expenses | 2.26 | 15.61 | 25.92 | 92.85 | 156.76 |
| Other Expenses | 9.77 | 34.76 | 34.34 | 40.53 | 21.13 |
| Total Expenditure | 56.01 | 181.59 | 275.70 | 480.53 | 469.54 |
| Profit/ (Loss) Before Tax | (2.90) | (13.12) | (7.11) | (67.10) | (178.58) |
Source: CAG[43]
*Includes revenue from external project works, consultancy services and farebox revenue from March 2019 onwards
Despite some improvements since then, financial sustainability remains a concern. In 2023-24, Nagpur Metro generated INR 64.40 crore from fare revenue (it is expected to have reached INR 84 crore in 2024-25), while non-fare revenue stood at INR 137.81 crore in 2023-24 (and was projected to reach INR 178 crore in 2024-25.)[44]
Nagpur Metro’s non-fare revenue streams, such as commercial leasing, advertising, and parking fees–areas that have been successfully leveraged by the metro systems of Delhi, Hyderabad, and Bengaluru–are still underutilised. Improving these streams will require strategic interventions, including expanding PPPs, increasing advertising revenue, and developing real estate near metro stations.
According to a working paper by the World Resources Institute (WRI), India and the Toyota Mobility Foundation, walking and shared modes of travel account for over 74 percent of last-mile trips in Delhi, Nagpur, and Bengaluru.[45] Thus, there is an urgent need to improve pedestrian infrastructure near Nagpur Metro stations and coordinate shared mobility services better. Nagpur Metro must strengthen its first- and last-mile connectivity. If it does not, it will continue to depend on government bailouts to survive.
It has been six years since the commencement of Nagpur Metro’s commercial operations.[46] Phase 1 of the project became fully operational on 20 December 2024, spanning 38.48 km with 38 operational stations.[47] The month-wise break up of ridership, way below DPR projections, is given below (Table 6).
Table 6: Ridership Trends (March 2019 to March 2021)
| Month | No. of operational stations | Monthly ridership | Projected ridership per day as per DPR | Average ridership actually achieved per day | Percentage of ridership achieved to projected ridership in DPR |
| Pre- COVID | |||||
| Mar 2019 | 5 | 55,000 | 52,965 | 2,750 | 5.19 |
| Apr 2019 | 5 | 28,152 | 52,965 | 1,126 | 2.13 |
| May 2019 | 5 | 31,972 | 52,965 | 1,184 | 2.24 |
| Jun 2019 | 5 | 31,503 | 52,965 | 1,212 | 2.29 |
| Jul 2019 | 5 | 31,545 | 52,965 | 1,213 | 2.29 |
| Aug 2019 | 5 | 25,266 | 52,965 | 1,330 | 2.51 |
| Sep 2019 | 5 | 24,406 | 52,965 | 939 | 1.77 |
| Oct 2019 | 5 | 44,944 | 52,965 | 1,450 | 2.74 |
| Nov 2019 | 6 | 54,847 | 54,993 | 1,828 | 3.32 |
| Dec 2019 | 6 | 1,13,625 | 54,993 | 3,665 | 6.67 |
| Jan 2020 | 11 | 1,23,563 | 1,11,283 | 3,986 | 3.58 |
| Feb 2020 | 11 | 2,16,943 | 1,11,283 | 7,481 | 6.72 |
| Mar 2020 | 11 | 1,02,968 | 1,11,283 | 4,903 | 4.41 |
| Average ridership for pre-COVID period | 67,139 | 2,587 | 3.85 | ||
| Metro services were halted during March 2020 to October 2020 | |||||
| Post COVID | |||||
| Oct 2020 | 15 | 36,719 | 1,31,219 | 2,295 | 1.75 |
| Nov 2020 | 15 | 1,91,887 | 1,31,219 | 6,396 | 4.87 |
| Dec 2020 | 17 | 3,25, 427 | 1,51,170 | 10,498 | 6.94 |
| Jan 2021 | 17 | 5,24, 581 | 1,51,170 | 16,922 | 11.19 |
| Feb 2021 | 17 | 4,84, 514 | 1,51,170 | 17,304 | 11.45 |
| Mar 2021 | 17 | 2,43, 848 | 1,51,170 | 7,866 | 5.20 |
| Average ridership for post-COVID period | 1, 45, 675 | 10,820 | 7.43 | ||
Source: CAG[48]
Table 7: Ridership trends 2021-22 to 2023-24
| Year | Total passenger journeys | Growth from previous FY | Average daily ridership |
| 2021-22 | 6.68 million (approx.) | - | 17, 209 |
| 2022-23 | 24.34 million | +264.34% | 66,694 (estimated) |
| 2023-24 | 25.5 million | +4.8% | 69,863 (estimated) |
Source: Compiled from Nagpur Metro Rail Project, Annual Reports[49]
As can be seen from the table above, Nagpur Metro has shown some recovery post-pandemic. Its daily ridership is estimated to have risen from 17,209 in 2021-22 to 66,694 in 2022-23, a 264 percent rise. But the 2023-24 estimates of 69,863 daily passengers suggest that growth is tapering off and is still merely 16 percent of the DPR’s projected 41 lakhs for 2026.[50] This gap between projected and actual ridership continues to be a major barrier to achieving financial viability.
With ridership well below expectations, farebox revenue was bound to be low as well. It remained minimal during the first three years of operations and was further impacted by the pandemic. Since 2021-22, it has shown improvement, increasing from INR 4.94 crore to INR 64.40 crore in 2023-24; in 2024-25, it is estimated to have reached around INR 84 crore (Table 8). But that does not change the overall dismal picture. Delays in operationalising key stations such as Cotton Market and Indora Square have also negatively affected collections.
The shortfall in ridership and farebox revenue are largely due to persistent first and last mile connectivity issues. Even after six years of operations, Nagpur Metro faces significant challenges with connectivity.[51] Across all its 38 operational stations, parking capacity is limited to fewer than 3,200 slots, serving only around 4 percent of riders.[52] There are no efficient feeder services connecting key areas such as Nagpur airport or the Multi-modal International Cargo Hub (MIHAN), forcing commuters to rely on overcrowded and overpriced e-rickshaws.[53] Initiatives like bicycle-sharing, e-scooters, and EV charging stations are non-existent or remain non-functional, while feeder bus services are few and inconsistent.[54] In contrast, the Delhi and Bengaluru Metros have successfully integrated seamless feeder networks, helping boost ridership.
Table 8: Farebox Revenue: Actual versus Projected (in INR crore)
| Year | Farebox revenue | Projected farebox (DPR) |
| 2018-19 | 0.07 | 303 |
| 2019-20 | 1.44 | 309 |
| 2020-21 | 1.48 | 362 |
| 2021-22 | 4.94 | 362 |
| 2022-23 | 22.56 | 426 |
| 2023-24 | 64.40 | 434 |
| 2024-25 | 84.00 (estimated) | 514 |
Source: Compiled by the author – 2018-19 to 2020-21 farebox figures from CAG;[55] 2021-22 and 2022-23, Hitavada;[56] 2023-24 and 2024-25, The Times of India;[57] and Projections, DPR[58]
Changes in fares by the Nagpur Metro have been sudden, affecting ridership, and with it, farebox revenue. In January 2023, it raised fares sharply – by four times on some routes – leading to a drop in ridership, especially among schoolchildren and low-income commuters who shifted to cheaper alternatives such as buses.[59] In February 2024, worried about falling ridership, it dramatically reduced fares by up to 33 percent.[60] This inconsistency reflects a lack of a systematic, transparent framework for fare adjustment.
Unlike in Bengaluru, where fare hikes are based on recommendations from the Fare Fixation Committee under the Metro Railways Act,[61] fare decisions in Nagpur appear to have been taken arbitrarily by Nagpur Metro itself. This shows that having institutional mechanisms in place is not enough–they must be designed with commuter affordability and expectations in mind and used consistently. Ensuring participatory planning, transparent communication, and periodic fare reviews would help build public trust and improve farebox performance over time.
Non-fare revenue includes revenue from property development along the metro corridors, advertisements, additional tax revenue from the increased FSI and the 1 percent additional stamp duty earnings. Here too, revenue generation has been significantly lower than projected in the DPR. Between 2018-19 and 2020-21, revenue was only INR 67.86 crore, just 4 percent of the DPR estimate of INR 1,666.00 crore, the bulk of it, INR 67.59 crore, coming from the additional tax on increased FSI, though that too was just 6 percent of the projection (Table 9). This highlights the Nagpur Metro’s slow execution and inadequate commercial focus.
Table 9: Non-fare Revenue and Its Sources (in INR crore)
| Year | Estimated Revenue (DPR) | Actual revenue realised | Shortfall in actual revenue | Shortfall as a percentage of estimated revenue |
| Property Development and Advertisements | ||||
| 2018-19 | 30.00 | - | 30.00 | 100.00 |
| 2019-20 | 31.00 | 0.10 | 30.90 | 99.68 |
| 2020-21 | 36.00 | 0.17 | 35.83 | 99.52 |
| Sub Total (A) | 97.00 | 0.27 | 96.73 | 99.72 |
| Additional Taxes – FSI | ||||
| Year | Estimated Revenue (DPR) | Actual Revenue realised | Shortfall in actual revenue | Shortfall as a percentage of estimated revenue |
| 2019-20 | 460.00 | 38.73 | 421.27 | 91.58 |
| 2020-21 | 638.00 | 17.40 | 620.60 | 97.27 |
| Sub Total (B) | 1,201.00 | 67.59 | 1,133.41 | 94.37 |
| Additional Taxes – 1% additional stamp duty | ||||
| 2018-19 | 103.00 | - | 103.00 | 100.00 |
| 2019-20 | 113.00 | - | 113.00 | 100.00 |
| 2020-21 | 125.00 | - | 125.00 | 100.00 |
| Sub Total (C) | 368.00 | - | 368.00 | 100.00 |
| Grand Total (A to C) | 1,666.00 | 67.86 | 1,598.14 | 95.93 |
Source: CAG[62]
Post-COVID, non-fare revenue has shown some recovery but remains far below DPR targets: from a mere INR 14.4 crore in the COVID-19-struck year of 2021-22, it rose to INR 75.17 crore in 2022-23. However, this was still a tiny fraction of the DPR projections of INR 1,023 crore and INR 928 crore, respectively for the two years.[63] In 2023-24, it reached INR 137.81 crore, and was expected to touch INR 178 crore in 2024-25; the respective DPR projections, however, had been INR 1,140 crore and INR 816 crore.[64]
Table 10: Non-fare: Actual Revenue versus Projected (in INR crore)
| Year | Actual Non-fare Revenue | Projected Revenue – Property Dev. & Ad (DPR) a | Projected Revenue – FSI (DPR) b | Projected Revenue – 1% Stamp Duty (DPR) c | Total Projected Non-Fare Revenue (a+b+c) |
| 2021–22 | 14.4 | 36 | 850 | 137 | 1,023 |
| 2022–23 | 75.17 | 43 | 734 | 151 | 928 |
| 2023–24 | 137.81 | 43 | 931 | 166 | 1,140 |
| 2024–25* | 178 | 51 | 582 | 183 | 816 |
Source: Compiled by the author – 2021-22 & 2022-23 from The Hitavada,[65] 2023-24 and 2024-25 from The Times of India,[66] and projected figures, DPR[67]
There have also been delays in receiving the funds earmarked. Of the 1 percent additional stamp duty, for instance, collected from 2016-17, totalling INR 488.61 crore till 2024-25 (it was waived in 2020-21 and 2021-22 due to the pandemic), only INR 267.43 crore has been disbursed by the state government so far.[68] Timely release of funds would help MMRCL’s financial sustainability.
Limited commercial leasing has added to the losses. Of the 5,265 square metres constructed to house business properties across 12 stations, only 522.23 square metres had been leased by end-2020 (Table 11). MMRCL‘s priorities too have at times been hard to fathom: at Kasturchand Park station, for instance, out of the total of INR 41.22 crore earmarked by building commercial space, it spent INR 24.75 crore on a parking lot, which, given the limited ridership from that station, was hardly necessary.[69]
Table 11: Income from Leased Properties
| Name of Station | Date of Start of Commercial Operations | Area Constructed for Property Business (sq. m.) | Area Leased Out – Pre-COVID (sq. m.) | Area Leased Out – Post -COVID (Sq. m.) | Total Area Leased (Pre-COVID & Post COVID) | Leasing Date |
| Khapri | 10.03.2019 | 480.00 | 36.20 | - | 36.20 | March 2019 |
| New Airport | 10.03.2019 | 101.00 | - | - | - | - |
| Airport | 10.03.2019 | 1,096.00 | 52.05 | - | 52.05 | March 2019 |
| Jaiprakash Nagar | 20.11.2019 | 2,408.00 | 34.12 | 188 | 222.12 | March 2019 & July 2020 |
| Ajni Square | 18.10.2020 | 79.00 | - | - | - | - |
| Rahate Colony | 18.10.2020 | 136.00 | - | - | - | - |
| Lokmanya Nagar | 28.01.2020 | 58.00 | 21.30 | 36.40 | 57.70 | December 2019 & November 2020 |
| Bansi Nagar | 16.10.2020 | 540.00 | - | - | - | - |
| Vasudev Nagar | 28.01.2020 | 37.00 | - | - | - | - |
| Subhash Nagar | 28.01.2020 | 18.00 | - | 17.56 | 17.56 | June 2020 |
| Institution of Engineers | 28.01.2020 | 106.00 | 90.68 | 14.92 | 105.60 | December 2019 & June 2020 |
| Jhansi Rani square | 28.01.2020 | 206.00 | - | 31.00 | 31.00 | June 2020 |
| Total | 5,265.00 | 234.35 | 287.88 | 522.23 | ||
Source: CAG[70]
Nagpur Metro’s operations have indeed influenced property markets, with land values near the metro corridors rising by 25-30 percent, boosting demand for residential properties within walking distance of stations and spurring new township developments in previously underdeveloped areas.[71] Yet, its revenue from these developments remains constrained by its limited exploiting of non-fare income possibilities, such as commercial leasing within stations. Unlike the Delhi Metro, which generates significant revenue from shopping outlets, advertisements, and parking fees, the Nagpur Metro, as of end-2024, had leased only a small fraction of station space.[72] Despite having acquired a surfeit of land, MMRCL struggles to monetise it, likely due to inadequate market planning. It needs to pursue strategies such as signing PPPs to allow private parties to use its space, enhance the advertising options it offers, and enable real estate projects near stations to bridge the gap. Indeed, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), in its reports on the metro, had recommended a robust land-use policy with expert oversight. While Delhi, Hyderabad, and Bangalore metros earn 40-50 percent of their revenues from non-fare sources, Nagpur’s has managed only 4-16 percent so far.
Given the shortfall in both the farebox and non-fare revenues, MMRCL needs to explore additional revenue streams to sustain operations and cover recurring costs. This section suggests some ways to ensure long-term financial stability of the Nagpur Metro.
The rise in private vehicle use in Nagpur has led to congestion, pollution, and parking challenges. To address these, the ‘polluter-pays’ principle can be applied–vehicle users should be made to bear some of the cost of the negative externalities they generate. Metro rail systems can benefit from revenues raised through mechanisms like congestion charging and parking pricing.[73]
Traffic congestion charges can be levied for entering specific road zones serviced by the metro during peak hours.[74] A notable example is New York City’s congestion pricing initiative, launched on 5 January 2025. Though it has faced political resistance following a change in federal administration, early operational data suggests it had many positive impacts, including reduced travel times and faster bus services across express and local routes.[75] New York’s Metropolitan Transport Authority (MTA) recorded a toll collection of US$ 48.6 million from the congestion charge in January and US$ 51.9 million in February 2025.[76]
Several cities such as Singapore and London have successfully implemented congestion pricing schemes, with demonstrable benefits in traffic management and transit funding. But Indian cities have yet to adopt such a policy. A pilot proposal introduced in Delhi in 2018 was not implemented, and a similar initiative by the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) in Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) was also shelved. The absence of congestion pricing in India may be attributed to political sensitivities and public resistance to new levies.[77]
For cities like Nagpur, introducing congestion pricing could be a viable strategy to strengthen metro rail finances and promote sustainable urban mobility. Obviously, effective coordination among the city authorities, MMRCL and Nagpur residents’ will be required, with residents’ concerns being addressed through stakeholder consultations, a phased implementation roadmap, and comprehensive outreach campaigns. The revenue generated could be reinvested in improving public transport infrastructure. Making the UMTA functional and establishing a city-level UTF in Nagpur should be prioritised.
Charging for on-street and off-street parking can discourage car owners from using them and boost public transit usage, while also generating funds for transit infrastructure. In San Francisco, parking pricing has helped optimise high-demand spaces while funding public transportation improvements. It has reduced cruising time for vehicles in search of parking space, improved space availability, and improved driver behaviour. Importantly, the revenue earned from parking pricing is reinvested in public transit, directly benefiting low-income commuters who rely on these services.[78] A similar policy in Nagpur would reduce traffic, encourage modal shift to public transport, and generate non-fare revenue for Nagpur Metro operations – provided it is implemented with strong stakeholder engagement, effective monitoring, and public awareness strategies.
Widely adopted in over two dozen countries, carbon taxes are considered an effective fiscal instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while mobilising revenue for sustainable infrastructure. Although India does not currently have an explicit carbon tax, it implements various implicit carbon pricing mechanisms, such as the coal cess, the Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme for energy intensive industries,[f] and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs).[g] An explicit carbon tax – levied directly on fossil fuel consumption – would discourage use of non-electric private vehicles, internalise environmental and health externalities, and generate revenues that could be allocated to low-carbon transport systems, including metro rail infrastructure.[79] In Nagpur, such a tax could provide a long-term revenue stream to support metro operations, network expansion, and last-mile connectivity. But once again, to be successful, it would require inter-departmental coordination, stakeholder buy-in, robust revenue recycling frameworks, and institutional mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability.
Taxes on high-emission vehicles, such as those imposed in London’s Low Emission Zone (LEZ) and Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ), were primarily intended to reduce air pollution. They succeeded – since ULEZ's launch in 2019 and its subsequent expansion across Greater London, nitrogen dioxide pollution has declined five times faster than the UK average – but, more importantly, net revenues from these schemes are ring-fenced by law for sustainable transport investments, enhancing public acceptance and supporting continuous transport upgrades.[80] India too has imposed an Environment Compensation Charge (ECC) on commercial vehicles entering Delhi following a Supreme Court order in 2015.[81] Part of these funds was allocated to public transit infrastructure, such as the Delhi-Meerut Rapid Rail.[82] Nagpur Metro needs to emulate such examples which show that targeted environmental charges, if implemented through consultations, stakeholder engagement, phased planning, robust monitoring, and transparent reinvestment into public transit, can help reduce private vehicle dependency, mitigate urban air pollution, and generate a stable revenue stream to support metro rail operations.
No doubt congestion pricing and carbon taxation do hold potential as long-term financing tools, but their implementation in Indian tier-2 cities faces political and administrative challenges. Public resistance, lack of urban tolling infrastructure, and weak enforcement capacities are significant barriers. As noted before, a phased approach – built on stakeholder consultations, political buy-in (despite leadership transitions), and evidence-based planning – can help improve acceptability. Starting with pilot zones or limited-use charges, linked to visible reinvestment in metro services, may ease the transition and build public trust.
Nagpur Metro's financial sustainability is challenged by low farebox recovery and underperforming non-fare revenue streams. This study shows that despite significant investments and planning, revenue gaps remain, mainly due to weak first- and last-mile connectivity, limited asset monetisation, and underuse of institutional mechanisms like UMTA. Comparative case studies of Delhi, Bangalore, and Hyderabad highlight how metros have successfully used tools like TOD, VCF, advertising, and partnerships to diversify income. To address its financial gap, MMRCL should adopt similar strategies and also explore funding options such as congestion pricing and carbon taxation. Strong institutional coordination, stakeholder engagement, and reinvestment of revenues are essential to ensure the long-term financial health of urban rail systems.
Manish Thakre is a consultant specialising in Climate Action, Resilience, and Inclusive Urban Development. Executive MSc in Cities, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
[a] Farebox Revenue: Revenue earned from fare charged for carriage of passengers; Non-Farebox Revenue: Revenue earned from sources other than the fare charged for carriage of passengers.
[b] ‘Value Capture Financing’ means charging fees or taxes from those who benefit from the rise in land prices in surrounding areas that accompanies government-financed infrastructure development and using it to fund the infrastructure.
[c] Public-Private Partnerships are joint ventures of the government and the private sector.
[d] ‘Transit-oriented development’ is creating urban spaces which bring people, buildings, and activity centres together.
[e] The two largest cities are Mumbai and Pune.
[f] Under the PAT scheme started in 2012, eight high emission industries – thermal power plants, aluminium, cement, fertilizer, iron and steel, paper, textiles and alkalis – have been set lower emission targets on achieving which they get Energy Saving Certificates (ESCerts) which can be traded.
[g] Renewable energy certificates are earned by industries which use renewable power, which again can be traded in the market.
[1]Sandip Chakrabarti, Strategies to Improve the Financial Performance of Metro Rail Systems in India, The Infravision Foundation, 2023, https://theinfravisionfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Metro-Rail-Systems-Whitepaper.pdf
[2]Nandan Dawda, “Transit Hubs or Hurdles? Addressing the Lack of Physical Integration in Indian Transit Stations,” Observer Research Foundation, December 3, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/transit-hubs-or-hurdles-addressing-the-lack-of-physical-integration-in-indian-transit-stations
[3]Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2024-25, Chapter 6 Investment and Infrastructure: Keep it Going (New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, 2025), https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/eschapter/echap06.pdf
[4]Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2024-25, Chapter 6 Investment and Infrastructure: Keep it Going
[5]Promit Mookherjee and Dhaval Desai, “Assessing Co-Benefits from Metro Rail in India: Industrialisation and Land Value Capture Financing,” Observer Research Foundation, January 6, 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/assessing-co-benefits-from-metro-rail-in-india-industrialisation-and-land-value-capture-financing
[6]Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Rail Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34-Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Rail Project by MMRCL, (Maharashtra: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 2022), https://cag.gov.in/en/audit-report/details/117826
[7]Nandan Dawda, “Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Public Transport System Planning in India,” Observer Research Foundation, November 23, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/index.php/research/towards-a-comprehensive-framework-for-public-transport-system-planning-in-india
[8]Ravina R. Potey, et. al. “Case Study of Nagpur Metro Rail on Prajapati Square to Lokmanya Square Corridor,” International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts 9, 2021, https://ijcrt.org/papers/IJCRT2104513.pdf
[9]“About Us,” Nagpur Metro Rail Project, https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/about-us
[10]“Strategies to Improve the Financial Performance of Metro Rail Systems in India”
[11]Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[12]“Project Profile,” Nagpur Metro Rail Project, https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/project-profile
[13]Arjun Brij, “Nagpur Metro Hits Weekly Ridership of 1 Lakh As Phase 1 Becomes Fully Operational, Phase 2 To Double Network,” Swarajya, March 11, 2025, https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/nagpur-metro-hits-weekly-ridership-of-1-lakh-as-phase-1-becomes-fully-operational-phase-2-to-double-network#:~:text=Launched%20on%207%20March%202019,first%20stretches%20expected%20by%202027.
[14]“Chapter Wise Detailed Project Report of Nagpur Metro Rail,” Nagpur Metro Rail Project, https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/dpr
[15]Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[16]“Strategies to Improve the Financial Performance of Metro Rail Systems in India”
[17]Nitesh Kumar Garg, “Cost Benefit Analysis of Nagpur Metro Rail Project (Phase – I) During 2019-20,” International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology 12, no. 2 (2023), https://www.ijirset.com/upload/2023/february/79_1_Cost.pdf
[18]Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Metro Rail Policy 2017 (New Delhi: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 2017), https://mohua.gov.in/upload/whatsnew/59a3f7f130eecMetro_Rail_Policy_2017.pdf
[19]Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, National Urban Transport Policy 2017 (New Delhi: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 2017), https://mohua.gov.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/TransportPolicy.pdf
[20]Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, National Transit Oriented Development Policy (New Delhi: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 2017), https://mohua.gov.in/upload/whatsnew/59a4070e85256Transit_Oriented_Developoment_Policy.pdf
[21]National Capital Region Transport Corporation Limited on TOD & VCF, Report: Transit Oriented Development & Value Capture Finance, by NCRTCL, Gatishakti Bhawan, INA, New Delhi-110023, July 2023 https://www.thegpsc.org/sites/gpsc/files/todknowdoc/tod_cvf_knowledge_book_final_0.pdf
[22]National Capital Region Transport Corporation Limited TOD & VCF, Report: Transit Oriented Development & Value Capture Finance
[23]“Home,” Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, https://delhimetrorail.com/
[24]Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Phase-III, Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System by DMRC, Report No.11, 2021 by DMRC (New Delhi: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 2021), https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2021/4_Excutive%20Summary-061a88485dbf3f2.06956353.pdf
[25]Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, Annual Report 2022-23, September 2023, New Delhi, 2023, https://backend.delhimetrorail.com/documents/5227/English_AR-2022-23.pdf?__cf_chl_tk=FMWjMWQ4lCZuH_ghQtuUq2F50B0Mg8SNUyhvz5uALqI-1742906291-1.0.1.1-4sWF3B_CpdoYehkh_6l9y7uJHmkqqQ.rOzFYeJTpSDk
[26] Shehnaz Begam, Priyanka Jha, Pawan Kumar Yadav et al. “Urban Transformation Through Transit: The Case of Delhi Metro,” Discover Cities 1, no. 31 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1007/s44327-024-00035-1
[27]“Home,” Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited, https://english.bmrc.co.in/metro-network/
[28]Suchith Kidiyoor, “ Fare Hike Effect: 13% Drop in Daily Ridership on Namma Metro,” The Times of India, March 3, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bengaluru/fare-hike-effect-13-drop-in-daily-ridership-on-namma-metro/articleshow/118672856.cms
[29]Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited, Annual Report 2022-23, September 2023, Bengaluru, 2023, https://english.bmrc.co.in:8282/English/uploads/finance/english//fileuploads/BMRCL_English_AR-2022-23.pdf; Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited, Annual Report 2023-24, September 2024, Bengaluru, 2024, https://english.bmrc.co.in:8282/English/uploads/finance/english//fileuploads/1730100875629$@!!BMRCL%20English%20Annual%20Report%202023-24.pdf
[30]Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited, Annual Reports 2022-23 and 2023-24
[31]Suchith Kidiyor, “5 Years on, Ads on Metro Pillars may Be Back Soon,” The Times of India, February 6, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bengaluru/5-years-on-ads-on-metro-pillars-may-be-back-soon/articleshow/117992335.cms
[32]Sanath Prasad, “To Boost Non-Fare Revenue, BMRCL Plans Commercial Complex and Hotel Above Majestic Metro Station,” The Indian Express, February 12, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/bangalore/bmrcl-commercial-complex-majestic-metro-station-9832222/
[33]“Bengaluru Metro Considers Cargo Transport to Boost Revenue,” The Hindu, March 20, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/bengaluru-metro-considers-cargo-transport-to-boost-non-fare-revenue/article69352653.ece
[34]L&T Metro Rail Hyderabad Limited, 2024, https://www.ltmetro.in/media/fbal5kfv/2024-11-28-hyderabad-metro-rail-celebrates-7-years-of-transforming-urban-mobility.pdf
[35]“About Us,” L&T Metro Rail Hyderabad Limited, https://www.ltmetro.in/about-us/about-lt-metro-rail-limited/
[36]Gerald Ollivier, Ashish Ghate, Kalra Bankim, and Prerna Mehta, Transit-Oriented Development Implementation Resources and Tools (2nd Edition), Global Platform for Sustainable Cities, Washington DC, World Bank, 2021, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/261041545071842767/pdf/133001-REVISED-TOD-Implementation-Resources-REVISED-March4.pdf
[37]“Transit-Oriented Development Implementation Resources and Tools (2nd Edition)”
[38]L&T Metro Rail Hyderabad, Annual Report 2022-23, May 2023, Hyderabad, 2023, https://corpwebstorage.blob.core.windows.net/media/48487/lt-metro-rail-hyderabad-limited-13th-annual-report-fy-2022-23.pdf; L&T Metro Rail Hyderabad, Annual Report 2023-24, May 2024, Hyderabad, 2024, https://www.ltmetro.in/media/as2polc3/lt-metro-rail-hyderabad-limited-14th-annual-report-fy-2023-24.pdf
[39] “TSRTC Joins Hands with HMR for Last-Mile Connectivity,” Telangana Today, November 11, 2022, https://telanganatoday.com/tsrtc-joins-hands-with-hmr-for-last-mile-connectivity
[40] “Metro Rail Signs MoU with EVZIP for Last-Mile Connectivity in Hyderabad,” The New India Express, January 25, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/hyderabad/2025/Jan/25/metro-rail-signs-mou-with-evzip-for-last-mile-connectivity-in-hyderabad
[41] “Revolutionizing Urban Mobility: Hyderabad Metro and Rapido’s Transformative Partnership,” Hyderabad Metro Rail Limited, December 24, 2024, https://hmrl.co.in/revolutionizing-urban-mobility-hyderabad-metro-and-rapidos-transformative-partnership/#:~:text=Rapido%2C%20a%20popular%20ride%2Dhailing,to%20Metro%20commuters%20across%20Hyderabad
[42] “Nagpur Metro: Failure or Success,” The News Dirt, December 23, 2024, https://www.thenewsdirt.com/post/nagpur-metro-failure-or-success#:~:text=However%2C%20with%20monthly%20operational%20losses,%2C%20electricity%20bills%2C%20and%20maintenance.
[43] Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[44] Ved Ghughule, “10 Glorious Years of Nagpur Metro: Swift, Clean, Green and Zipping Away,” The Times of India, February 18, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/10-glorious-years-of-nagpur-metro-swift-clean-green-zipping-away/articleshow/118338886.cms
[45]Aloke Mukherjee et. al., Improving Metro Access in India: Evidence from Three Cities, WRI India, 2023, https://wri-india.org/sites/default/files/Improving%20metro%20access%20in%20India_%20Working%20Paper.pdf
[46] Nagpur Metro Rail Project, Annual Report 2018-19, Mumbai, Maharashtra Metro Rail Corporation Limited, 2019, https://metrorailnagpur.com/pdf/Annual_Report_18_19.pdf
[47] Ghulghule, “Indora Squares Metro Station to Open Today”
[48] Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[49] Nagpur Metro Rail Project, Annual Report 2021-22, September 2022, New Delhi, 2022, https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/pdf/annual-report-2021-22.pdf; Nagpur Metro Rail Project, Annual Report 2022-23, September 2023, New Delhi, 2023, https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/pdf/METRO-Annual%20report-2022-23.pdf; Nagpur Metro Rail Project, Annual Report 2023-24, September 2024, New Delhi, 2024, https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/pdf/METRO-Annual%20report-2023-24.pdf
[50] Dawda, “Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Public Transport System Planning in India”
[51] “Nagpur Metro Completes Phase 1, Transport 8.83 Crore Commuters in Six Years,” The Economic Times, March 10, 2025, https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/urban-transportation/nagpur-metro-completes-phase-1-transports-8-83-crore-commuters-in-six-years/118834096
[52] Ghulghule, “10 Glorious Years of Nagpur Metro: Swift, Clean, Green and Zipping Away”
[53] Ghulghule, “10 Glorious Years of Nagpur Metro: Swift, Clean, Green and Zipping Away”
[54] “Nagpur Metro: Failure or Success”
[55] Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[56] “Nagpur Metro Records Rise in Revenue from Non-Fare Heads,” The Hitavada, August 31, 2023, https://www.thehitavada.com/Encyc/2023/8/31/Nagpur-Metro-records-rise-in-revenue-from-non-fare-heads.html#:~:text=Under%20the%20non%2Dfare%20box,crore%20(2022%2D230).
[57]Ghulghule, “10 Glorious Years of Nagpur Metro: Swift, Clean, Green and Zipping Away”
[58] Nagpur Metro Rail Project, “DPR 2013,” https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/dpr
[59] “Post Fourfold Fare Hike, Nagpur Metro Ridership Takes a Hit,” The Hitavada, February 1, 2023, https://www.thehitavada.com/Encyc/2023/2/1/Post-fourfold-fare-hike-Nagpur-Metro-ridership-takes-a-hit.html
[60] “Nagpur Metro Slashes Fare by 33% to Attract More Commuters,” Nagpur Today, February 29, 2024, https://www.nagpurtoday.in/maha-metro-slashes-fare-by-33-to-attract-more-commuters/02291610
[61] “After Backlash Karnataka CM Siddaramaiah Directs BMRCL to Reconsider Namma Metro Fare Hikes,” Financial Express, February 13, 2025,
[62] Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[63]“Nagpur Metro Records Rise in Revenue from Non-fare Heads”
[64] Ghulghule, “10 Glorious Years of Nagpur Metro: Swift, Clean, Green and Zipping Away”
[65]“Nagpur Metro Records Rise in Revenue from Non-Fare Heads”
[66]Ghulghule, “10 Glorious Years of Nagpur Metro: Swift, Clean, Green and Zipping Away”
[67]Nagpur Metro Rail Project, “DPR 2013,” https://www.metrorailnagpur.com/dpr
[68]“MMRCL Given INR 267.43 Crore as Share in Stamp Duty,” The Hitavada, September 22, 2023.
[69]Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[70]Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Performance Audit on Implementation of Nagpur Metro Project by MMRCL, Report No. 34
[71]“Nagpur Metro: Failure or Success”
[72]“Nagpur Metro: Failure or Success”
[73]“Strategies to Improve the Financial Performance of Metro Rail Systems in India”
[74]“Strategies to Improve the Financial Performance of Metro Rail Systems in India”
[75]Jose Martinez and Mia Hollie, “Honking Complaints Plunge 69% Inside Congestion Pricing Zone,” The City, March 11, 2025, https://www.thecity.nyc/2025/03/11/traffic-noise-complaints-drop-congestion-pricing/
[76]Elijah Westbrooke, “NYC Congestion Revenue Jumped up in February, MTA Says,” CBS News, March 24, 2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/new-york-city-congestion-pricing-february-revenue-mta/
[77]Ramanath Jha, “The Global Debate on Congestion Pricing: Insights for Urban India,” Urban Futures, February 1, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-global-debate-on-congestion-pricing-insights-for-urban-india#:~:text=Many%20Indian%20architects%2C%20transport%20experts,necessary%20to%20impose%20congestion%20charges.
[78]Ariadna Reyes-Sanchez, Soheil Sharfi-Asl, and Ladan Mozaffarian, “Case Study IV: Parking in San Francisco,” Green Cities and Transportation, 2024, https://uta.pressbooks.pub/oertgreentransport/chapter/chapter-6-case-study-iv-parking-in-san-francisco/
[79]Subrata Sekhar Rath and Jyotsna Goel, “Carbon Taxes Could Be India’s Inclusive Climate Mitigation Strategy,” Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, 2023, https://www.cbgaindia.org/blog/carbon-taxes-could-be-indias-inclusive-climate-mitigation-strategy/#:~:text=India%20does%20not%20have%20an%20explicit%20carbon,Achieve%20Trade%20schemes%20and%20Renewable%20energy%20certificates.
[80]“How Road Pricing is Transforming London,” C40 Knowledge, September 2024, https://www.c40knowledgehub.org/s/article/How-road-pricing-is-transforming-London-and-what-your-city-can-learn?language=en_US
[81]Rumi Aijaz, “The Herculean Task of Improving Air Quality: The Case of Delhi and NCR,” Observer Research Foundation, November 12, 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-herculean-task-of-improving-air-quality-the-case-of-delhi-and-ncr#_edn14
[82]Dipak K Dash, “Relief in Store for Delhi-NCR Commuters As MCD Toll Clogs to Be Removed from Borders,” The Times of India, March 14, 2025, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/119000103.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
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Manish Thakre is a consultant specialising in Climate Action, Resilience, and Inclusive Urban Development. Executive MSc in Cities, London School of Economics and Political Science ...
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