India today sees itself not as a camp follower in a new Cold War, but as an autonomous pole in an emerging multipolar order
Marco Rubio’s visit to India from May 23-26 is far more than a routine diplomatic stopover. It reflects a renewed attempt by Washington to stabilize a relationship that has recently witnessed unusual turbulence, while simultaneously underscoring India’s increasingly sophisticated approach to great-power politics.
At a moment when the international system is marked by fragmentation, New Delhi is seeking to preserve strategic flexibility by deepening engagement with both Western-led coalitions such as the Quad and non-Western platforms like BRICS.
Rubio’s trip-his first to India as US Secretary of State-carries both symbolic and strategic significance. The carefully curated itinerary, stretching from Kolkata and Jaipur to Agra and New Delhi, combines civilizational outreach with hard geopolitical messaging. Yet beneath the optics lies a serious diplomatic agenda focused on energy security, trade frictions, defence cooperation, and the restructuring of critical supply chains.
The carefully curated itinerary, stretching from Kolkata and Jaipur to Agra and New Delhi, combines civilizational outreach with hard geopolitical messaging.
The timing of the visit is particularly noteworthy. US-India ties under the current Trump administration have experienced visible stress over tariffs, India’s continued engagement with Russia, and delays in consolidating Quad initiatives.
Against this backdrop, Rubio’s outreach signals Washington’s recognition that despite episodic disagreements, India remains indispensable to the American Indo-Pacific strategy.
At the centre of the visit is the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India and involving the United States, Japan, and Australia. The Quad has steadily evolved from a consultative mechanism into a central pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategic architecture. For Washington, it represents an instrument to balance China’s expanding regional footprint while promoting technological coordination, maritime security, and supply-chain resilience. Rubio’s presence is therefore intended to reassure partners that the United States remains committed to the Indo-Pacific despite wider global distractions.
For India, however, the Quad is useful precisely because it is not a formal alliance. New Delhi continues to approach the grouping as a flexible strategic partnership rather than a treaty-bound security arrangement. This distinction is crucial. India values the Quad for the opportunities it offers in defence technology, maritime cooperation, and geopolitical coordination, but it remains unwilling to subordinate its foreign policy autonomy to bloc politics.
This is where India’s simultaneous engagement with BRICS becomes significant. Only days before hosting the Quad meeting, India chaired the BRICS foreign ministers’ discussions, reaffirming its role within a grouping that now includes states such as Russia, China, and Iran. To many observers, participation in both frameworks may appear contradictory. In reality, it reflects the logic of India’s contemporary foreign policy: multi-alignment rather than alignment.
India’s engagement with BRICS serves several purposes. It reinforces New Delhi’s credentials as a voice of the Global South, preserves strategic space vis-à-vis Russia, and strengthens its commitment to a multipolar international order.
At the same time, BRICS provides India with an important platform to shape debates on global governance reform and economic restructuring without becoming excessively dependent on Western institutions. It also prevents BRICS from becoming an anti-West platform while retaining its non-western texture.
This is not inconsistency but strategic calibration. India is refusing to accept the binary choices that increasingly define contemporary geopolitics. Instead, it is attempting to maximize its leverage across competing centres of power. Hosting BRICS and Quad engagements in close succession was not accidental; it was a deliberate demonstration of India’s ability to operate comfortably across rival geopolitical platforms.
This balancing act is not without complications. Washington continues to expect greater convergence from India on issues relating to Russia and China, particularly amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Simultaneously, India remains cautious about provoking either Beijing or Moscow while it navigates economic vulnerabilities, defence dependencies, and regional security concerns. The challenge for New Delhi is to sustain strategic autonomy without appearing strategically ambiguous.
India remains cautious about provoking either Beijing or Moscow while it navigates economic vulnerabilities, defence dependencies, and regional security concerns.
Rubio’s visit must therefore be understood as part of a broader recalibration in global politics. For the United States, India remains central to any durable Indo-Pacific framework. For India, engagement with the United States is essential for technological modernization, defence transformation, and economic growth. Yet India is equally determined to avoid being absorbed into any exclusive geopolitical camp.
In that sense, the visit captures the essence of India’s contemporary strategic identity. New Delhi is no longer merely balancing power; it is balancing relationships, institutions, and expectations in an increasingly polarized world in order to shape global outcomes.
The success of Rubio’s outreach will ultimately depend not on rhetorical declarations, but on whether both sides can accommodate each other’s strategic compulsions while expanding cooperation in trade, defence, technology, and regional governance.
The larger message is unmistakable: India today sees itself not as a camp follower in a new Cold War, but as an autonomous pole in an emerging multipolar order.
This commentary originally appeared in Moneycontrol.
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Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King's India Institute at ...
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