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Samir Bhattacharya, “Japan’s New Africa Playbook,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 522, Observer Research Foundation, February 2026.
The year 2025 marked a turning point in Japan’s re-engagement with Africa. The ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 9), held in Yokohama from 20 to 22 August 2025, convened leaders and representatives from 49 African countries, including 33 heads of state, alongside delegates from 52 development partner nations and 108 international and regional organisations.[1]
The conference featured more than 200 thematic networking events and 300 exhibition booths, designed to foster exchanges between Japanese and African enterprises.[2] More than a high-level diplomatic forum, TICAD 9 reflected Japan’s strategic recalibration of its Africa policy amidst shifting global dynamics and intensifying competition for influence on the continent.
Since its inception in 1993 under then Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, TICAD has served as a cornerstone of Japan’s Africa policy. Conceived in the aftermath of the Cold War, the initiative reflected Japan’s intent to engage Africa not merely as a recipient of aid but as a partner in mutual growth and global governance.[3] The framework emphasised African ownership, multilateral cooperation, and sustainable development. These principles distinguished Japan’s approach from the more transactional or resource-oriented strategies of other states.
In this broader historical continuum, TICAD 9 represents a new phase in Japan’s African diplomacy, one driven by both global and domestic imperatives. Intensifying competition from external powers, particularly from China, has compelled Tokyo to reaffirm its distinctive role as a development-oriented yet economically ambitious partner in Africa.
Concurrently, economic pressures, including potential tariff hikes by the United States and the need to diversify export markets, have prompted Japanese companies to view Africa as a promising frontier for trade and investment. Against this backdrop, Japan’s renewed Africa policy, articulated through the TICAD 9 agenda, reflects a synthesis of economic pragmatism, geopolitical strategy, and normative diplomacy aimed at redefining Japan’s place within the evolving architecture of Africa–Asia relations.[5]
Japan’s engagement with Africa has had a longer and more complex history than is often acknowledged. Japan is the first non-Western nation to pioneer an Africa-focused multilateral summit framework, launching the TICAD in 1993. This was well before similar initiatives by China (2000), France (2007), India (2008), the United States (2014), and Russia (2019).[6] Even before TICAD was formed, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had an Africa department since the 1960s.
During the period from 1974 to 1980, driven by the need to import oil, Japan increased its outreach to Africa. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa increased notably, reaching 15 percent of total aid to Africa by the end of the 1980s.[7] Japan also took active interest in security crises in the continent by contributing to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). Yet, diplomacy with Africa remained a low priority throughout the 1970s and 1980s, largely due to its focus on neighbours in Asia as well as on Western countries. Geographical distance, along with cultural and social differences, also played a role in hindering the organic progress of the relationship.
These early initiatives built on Japan’s outreach to Africa following the first energy crisis of 1973 and the long postwar boom, when Tokyo sought to diversify its sources of natural wealth beyond the Middle East and to strengthen political and economic ties with emerging African states. In 1974, Kimura Toshio became the first Japanese foreign minister to visit five African countries—Egypt, Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo). Five years later, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Naochi Sonoda visited Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Kenya in 1979 in the aftermath of the second oil crisis. As Japanese institutions built large cash reserves, they were looking for markets to invest beyond their neighbourhood.[8] It is worth noting that these visits coincided with the anti-Japanese rioting and protests against Japanese business presence in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia, as they regarded it as Japanese “economic imperialism”.[9] The visits reflected Japan’s desire to diversify its investment destinations and procurement of raw materials.[10]
The establishment of TICAD occurred at a critical juncture in global politics. The United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UN-OSAA) and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) were the key partners in organising the first event in 1993. Additionally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank supported Japan’s endeavour to foster post-Cold War development in Africa, including through TICAD.[11]
As a result of the Cold War, many African nations faced acute political and economic challenges. These included deep social inequalities, reduced public health and education spending, and high inflation, particularly due to structural adjustment programmes imposed by international financial institutions. Against this backdrop, the inaugural TICAD, convened under the premiership of Morihiro Hosokawa, positioned Japan as a unique development partner. While its domestic energy needs primarily contributed to the creation of TICAD, Japan also showed interest in contributing to Africa’s growth in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Consequently, Japan emphasised principles of equality, ownership, and mutual respect, moving beyond the conventional donor–recipient paradigm that had long defined North–South relations. Hosokawa’s articulation of this vision laid the normative foundation for Japan’s Africa policy and continues to inform its diplomatic and economic engagements across the continent, as evidenced in the Tokyo Declaration on African Development in 1993.[12]
Over the subsequent decades, the TICAD process evolved both in scope and substance. Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan’s Africa strategy underwent a notable transformation. At the TICAD 5 in 2013, Abe reoriented the framework away from a predominantly aid-based approach toward one centred on investment, innovation, and private-sector partnership. The shift was institutionalised through the decision to hold TICAD summits every three years, rather than the initial plan of every five years, reflecting the growing strategic importance of Africa within Japan’s foreign policy.[13]
Subsequent conferences further consolidated this trajectory. The Yokohama Declaration and Yokohama Action Plan (2019) articulated a comprehensive framework prioritising economic growth, societal resilience, and peace and security, while the Tunis Declaration (2022) reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to these pillars. Most recently, TICAD 9 has sought to elevate Japan–Africa relations to a new phase of collaboration, characterised by enhanced private-sector participation and a stronger emphasis on sustainable, mutually beneficial development.
Table 1. Key Features and Outcomes, TICAD 1 to TICAD 8
| Event | Year and Place | Outcome Document | Pillars of Collaboration |
| TICAD 1 | 1993, Japan | Tokyo Declaration on African Development | · Advancing political stability and economic governance · Promoting economic growth, strengthening private sector participation · Enhancing regional cooperation and integration |
| TICAD 2 | 1998, Japan | African Development Towards the 21st Century: the Tokyo Agenda for Action | · Reducing poverty, integrating economies into global markets Promoting Human Development · Strengthening development ownership · Promoting regional markets and South–South cooperation |
| TICAD 3 | 2003, Japan | TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration | · Strengthening leadership and people’s participation · Promoting peace and good governance · Advancing human security · Upholding respect for diversity, identity, and cultural distinctiveness |
| TICAD 4 | 2008, Japan | Yokohama Declaration and the Yokohama Action Plan | · Enhancing Economic Growth · Attaining the Millennium Development Goals · Strengthening Peace and Good Governance · Addressing Environmental and Climate Change challenges |
| TICAD 5 | 2013, Japan | Yokohama Declaration (2013-2017) and the Yokohama Action Plan (2013 -2017) | · Promoting Sustainable, Resilient and Private Sector-led Growth · Accelerating Infrastructure Development · Empowering Farmers as Mainstream Economic Actors · Consolidating Peace, Stability and Good Governance · Building a New International Development Framework · Making the African Voice Heard in the Post-2015 Development Agenda |
| TICAD 6 | 2016, Kenya | Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Implementation Plan | · Promoting structural economic transformation · Promoting resilient health systems · Promoting social stability |
| TICAD 7 | 2019, Japan | Yokohama Declaration and the Yokohama Plan of Actions | · Accelerating economic transformation and improving the business environment · Deepening a sustainable and resilient society · Strengthening peace and stability |
| TICAD 8 | 2022, Tunisia | Tunis Declaration | · Achieving sustainable and inclusive growth · Realising a sustainable and resilient society based on human security · Building sustainable peace and stability · Supporting Africa’s own efforts in the post-pandemic context |
Source: Author’s own, based on information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.[14]
Sustainability is at the core of Japan’s contemporary engagement with Africa, underpinning both its development assistance and its broader diplomatic strategy. Japan’s Africa policy is characterised by a model of “partnered engagement,” in which public and private sector actors collaborate to promote long-term economic growth, social stability, and the dissemination of high-quality infrastructure.[15]
Rather than adopting rigid, country-specific policy frameworks, Tokyo has pursued an adaptive and inclusive approach that aligns its initiatives with continental priorities. Most notable are the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This alignment enables Japan to maintain policy coherence while remaining responsive to the diverse developmental trajectories and institutional contexts of African states.
Japan’s renewed approach to engaging with Africa, as outlined at TICAD 9, can be broadly grouped into three broad themes, discussed in turn in the following paragraphs.
A central feature of TICAD 9 was the renewed emphasis on enhanced economic cooperation. Japan signalled its intention to deepen trade and investment linkages by promoting technology transfer, supporting infrastructure development, and financing projects aligned with sustainable growth objectives. In doing so, Tokyo sought to distinguish its approach from those of other external actors by prioritising transparency, local capacity-building, and the long-term viability of economic initiatives.[16]
The summit also reaffirmed Japan’s doctrine of “quality engagement”, a concept that emphasises inclusivity, environmental sustainability, and human-centred development.[17] Whereas earlier TICADs focused primarily on aid and capacity-building assistance, TICAD 9 underscored the need to integrate quality growth principles across all aspects of economic and industrial collaboration, ensuring that development outcomes bring tangible benefits to local communities.
Another innovation introduced at TICAD 9 was the stronger focus on youth and innovation. Recognising Africa’s dynamic demographics and expanding digital economy, Japan launched several initiatives to empower young entrepreneurs, foster research and technological cooperation, and support skills development through public–private partnerships. This generational approach reflects Tokyo’s awareness of Africa’s shifting socio-economic realities and its potential as a driver of global innovation.[18]
A key component of Japan’s Africa policy is its enduring commitment to Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Long recognised as a cornerstone of its global health diplomacy, UHC has become central to Japan’s engagement with African partners. Tokyo’s approach prioritises preventive healthcare, strengthening health systems, and expanding local production capacities for vaccines and pharmaceuticals.[19]
The COVID-19 pandemic further underscored the importance of these goals for Africa, reinforcing Japan’s advocacy for resilient and autonomous African health sectors. Partnerships between institutions such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the African Export–Import Bank exemplify this strategy, facilitating investment in local manufacturing and research infrastructure while fostering public–private collaboration in medical innovation.[20]
TICAD 9 also marked a step toward strengthened political engagement. The Japanese government, under former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, articulated plans for more frequent high-level exchanges and deeper involvement in African regional forums, signalling a desire to move beyond episodic summitry toward continuous strategic dialogue.[21] This expansion of political engagement complements Tokyo’s broader goal of enhancing multilateral partnerships, involving not only African states but also international organisations, private sector actors, and civil society stakeholders.
Emphasis was also placed on promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, which are central to Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. In pursuit of these objectives, Japan seeks to encourage and support Africa-led initiatives in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The commitment to inclusivity is further reflected in the peace and security domain, particularly through Japan’s focus on community empowerment and advancing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) vision. Collectively, these innovations make TICAD 9 a milestone in the evolution of Japan–Africa relations. Unlike earlier conferences that primarily revolved around development assistance, TICAD 9 reflects a more mature partnership model rooted in shared interests, co-creation, and mutual benefit. By aligning its Africa policy with contemporary global priorities such as sustainability, innovation, and resilience, Japan is seeking to reinforce its distinct diplomatic identity and reaffirm its long-term commitment to a stable, prosperous, and autonomous Africa.
Japan’s economic diplomacy with Africa has historically combined development assistance with efforts to promote private sector participation and long-term partnerships. While ODA remains an important instrument of engagement, Tokyo has increasingly emphasised economic cooperation, investment facilitation, and trade diversification as part of its evolving Africa policy.[22] During TICAD 8, Japan pledged to mobilise US$30 billion in public and private investments over three years.[23] By the end of fiscal year 2023, approximately US$1.5 billion had been implemented under the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA) initiative. This was jointly established by Japan and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 2005 to strengthen Africa’s private sector, enhance food security, and promote green growth.[24]
Building on this momentum, TICAD 9 introduced a qualitatively new phase in Japan’s economic diplomacy under the theme, “Co-creating Innovative Solutions with Africa”.[25] The summit signalled a deliberate shift from a donor–recipient framework to one premised on co-creation, reflecting Tokyo’s ambition to redefine its economic presence in Africa. Japan announced a US$5.5-billion package, including US$1.5 billion in impact investments through JICA, to expand training programmes for 300,000 Africans in Artificial Intelligence (AI), strengthen healthcare and education infrastructure, and foster closer trade and investment linkages.[26] This reorientation underscores Japan’s strategy of coupling development cooperation with innovation-driven industrial and technological collaboration.
Japan’s development finance institutions—JICA, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI)—are charged with playing a more integrated role in complementing the AfDB’s “High 5” development priorities of energy, transport, health, education, and climate resilience. At the TIDCO 9, AfDB also highlighted investment opportunities in green hydrogen, transportation, health, agriculture, and education, illustrating the convergence of Japan’s green growth agenda with Africa’s sustainability objectives.[27]
Despite these efforts, Japan’s economic footprint in Africa remains modest relative to that of other major actors. In 2024, Africa accounted for only 0.5 percent of Japan’s global foreign direct investment.[28] Japan’s trade with the continent, valued at US$8.9 billion in 2024, has grown only marginally since the early 2000s.[29] Persistent challenges include low investment profitability, exchange rate volatility, and high operational costs.[30]
Structural constraints further impede progress. Japan’s limited diaspora presence and restrictive immigration policies hinder cross-cultural integration. Further, the scarcity of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—currently limited to six African countries (Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, and Mozambique)—reduces investor confidence and legal protection.[31]
In response, Japan has intensified efforts to de-risk investment and to enhance private-sector confidence. Collaboration among African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI), MUFG Bank, and NEXI has expanded access to political risk insurance and financial instruments to mitigate exposure.[32] For instance, ATI’s issuance of a ten-year political risk insurance policy to Sumitomo Corporation in 2025 enabled Japanese participation in the Safaricom Telecommunications Ethiopia consortium—one of the most significant Japanese-backed projects on the continent.[33] Currently, Japanese-backed insurance policies in Africa cover over US$5.4 billion in transactions, signalling incremental progress toward risk diversification.[34]
At TICAD 9, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced two complementary initiatives aimed at embedding Africa more firmly within Japan’s broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. The Indian Ocean–Africa Economic Region Initiative aims to align Africa’s economic transformation with Indo-Pacific connectivity frameworks.[35]
At the same time, the Nacala Corridor Development Initiative, spanning Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia, seeks to strengthen regional supply chains through infrastructure and industrial corridor development. These projects, conceived as public–private partnerships, exemplify Japan’s “quality infrastructure” approach by integrating transparency, accountability, and stakeholder participation.[36]
The Nacala Corridor stretches from Lusaka in Zambia, through Malawi to the port of Nacala in Mozambique, and from there it would connect Japan via sea route. Maritime links between Japan and Africa began with the Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line in 1926. Japanese vessels first arrived at key ports in southern and east Africa, such as Mombasa, Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, and Durban, laying the foundation for regular sea-borne trade.[37]
By the 1920s and 1930s, scheduled liner services connected Japan with major ports along Africa’s east coast and later West Africa, facilitating the growing overseas presence of Japanese goods. These routes expanded Japan’s commercial reach across the continent and became an important conduit for trade.
After a brief interruption during the Second World War, shipping services were gradually restored and diversified across East, South, and West Africa, leading to decreased transit times and lower freight costs. The containerisation of global shipping in the 1980s also enabled more efficient, reliable, and integrated logistics networks in African ports.
Figure 1. The Nakala Corridor
Source: World Bank Group[38]
Japan’s approach is not without precedent. Previous JICA-led projects, such as the Integrated Corridor Approach in Kenya’s Mombasa Special Economic Zone and transport infrastructure development across Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, demonstrate Japan’s long-standing emphasis on connectivity and local capacity building.[39] However, TICAD 9 represents a transformative effort to consolidate these fragmented engagements into a more coherent economic diplomacy framework—one that prioritises innovation, sustainability, and shared prosperity. Another new addition in Japan’s economic diplomacy with Africa, shifting from traditional aid-driven models, is the venture capital (VC) model.[40] This approach emphasises innovation, entrepreneurship, and long-term partnership. Through initiatives such as the Uncovered Monex Africa Investment Partnership (UMAIP), Samurai Incubate Africa, Kepple Africa Ventures, and JICA’s start-up programmes, Japan is expanding its footprint across Africa’s fast-growing innovation ecosystem. At TICAD 9, Japan pledged US$5.5 billion to foster trade, private-sector collaboration, and digital innovation, including a US$40-million tech startup fund in Nigeria.[41]
In recent years, Japanese venture firms have become active players in Africa’s startup scene. Samurai Incubate Africa has invested in over 240 startups across Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, while Uncovered Fund and Monex Ventures are backing fintech, mobility, and climate tech startups through UMAIP—a US$20-million fund targeting early-stage enterprises.[42] UMAIP also aims to connect African startups with Japanese corporations, fostering technology transfer and sustainable business models. Similarly, Kepple Africa Ventures’ partnership with Verod Capital Management has strengthened Japanese-African collaboration in early-stage investment.
Beyond private capital, Japanese public institutions are fostering startup ecosystems. This includes initiatives like UNDP’s ‘Meet the Tôshikas’, funded by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which connects African startups with Japanese investors. The programme’s 2024 edition provided catalytic grants to startups from Angola, Zambia, and South Africa, alongside in-depth ecosystem mapping to guide future investment.[43]
Despite challenges such as limited early-stage funding, inadequate market data, and gaps in investment readiness, Japan’s context-sensitive approach stands out. Unlike Western VC models, which focus primarily on rapid returns, Japan prioritises patient capital, capacity-building, and technology co-creation. By integrating venture investment with developmental and educational support, Japan is positioning itself not merely as a financier, but as a partner in building Africa’s innovation economy—one that values sustainability, local ownership, and shared prosperity.
In the words of the late Prime Minister Abe, a “quality Africa” is to be built through three key pillars: infrastructure development, human resource development, and kaizen, which translates as “continuous improvement”.[44]
Over the years, Africa has witnessed progress in expanding access to primary education and in reducing gender disparities at both primary and secondary levels. Nevertheless, despite improvements in enrolment, many African countries continue to lag behind global averages. Moreover, the rapid quantitative expansion has not been matched by improvements in educational quality, as reflected in low learning outcomes. Inadequate government budgetary support has further constrained policy effectiveness, resulting in persistently suboptimal education quality across the continent.
Tokyo has increasingly prioritised education, skills training, and innovation within its development cooperation agenda with Africa. With projections indicating that by 2050, one in three of the world’s youth will be of African descent, Japan’s strategy emphasises empowering Africa’s young population as agents of innovation, peace, and sustainable growth.[45]
Since 2018, Japan has strengthened its collaboration with multilateral partners to advance higher education and research capacity in Africa. Through World Bank–supported frameworks such as the Africa Centres of Excellence (ACE) programme and the Partnership for Skills in Applied Sciences, Engineering, and Technology (PASET) Regional Scholarship and Innovation Fund (RSIF), Japan has contributed to improving the quality of scientific research, innovation, and applied technical training across Sub-Saharan Africa. These initiatives promote regional and international cooperation among universities and research institutions, advancing shared priorities in science, technology, and engineering education.
Complementing its multilateral efforts, Japan has launched several initiatives to nurture entrepreneurship and employable skills among Africa’s youth. Programmes such as the African Business Education Initiative for Youth (ABE Initiative) and the Timbuktoo initiative underscore Tokyo’s increasing emphasis on youth entrepreneurship, digital innovation, and the creative industries.[46]
Launched in 2013 during TICAD 5, the ABE initiative represents a strategic approach to human resource development through vocational training and higher education linked directly to professional career pathways. Structured as a five-year programme, it provides 1,000 African youths with opportunities to pursue studies at Japanese universities and undertake internships with Japanese companies. The initiative is premised on the recognition of human capital development needs across both public and private sectors in Africa and aims to cultivate enduring professional and institutional networks between Japan and the continent.[47]
The Timbuktoo Incubator Network, a pan-African platform operating under UNDP’s flagship innovation framework, seeks to transform Africa’s startup ecosystem by mobilising US$1 billion to support 10,000 startups and scale more than 1,000 enterprises over a ten-year period.[48]
These programmes not only equip young Africans with practical business and management skills but also seek to strengthen people-to-people ties, thereby embedding economic diplomacy within broader cultural and educational exchange. Japan has also expressed interest in supporting African education systems by adapting pedagogical models rooted in Japanese schooling practices. The government plans to assist African countries in improving science and mathematics education by introducing elements of the Japanese educational ethos—such as participatory classroom discussions, collaborative learning, and the nitchoku system meant to instil discipline and teamwork among students.[49] These exchanges are expected to be reinforced through teacher training workshops, inter-school cooperation, and partnerships between Japanese and African universities specialising in science and technology.
Following the 2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit, Japan launched the Hiroshima AI Process, an international initiative to address the opportunities and risks associated with advanced AI systems.[50] Within the Japan–Africa context, the Hiroshima Process is envisioned as a framework for supporting the establishment of AI Centres of Excellence across the continent.[51]
These centres would foster domestic innovation ecosystems by nurturing startups, promoting digital literacy, and facilitating technology transfer under mutually agreed terms. The Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for Organisations Developing Advanced AI Systems further outline global standards for trustworthy and secure AI development—principles that Japan seeks to extend to African partners to ensure inclusive participation in the digital economy.
Japan’s evolving approach to migration and human mobility in its engagement with Africa reflects an effort to reconcile domestic demographic imperatives with the principles of sustainable and mutually beneficial partnership. While Japan has traditionally maintained a restrictive immigration regime, recent policy innovations suggest a gradual shift toward more structured, development-oriented forms of mobility. The most notable of these was the JICA Africa Hometown Initiative. Unveiled at TICAD 9, this initiative sought to pilot a novel model of decentralised international cooperation linking Japanese municipalities with African nations through localised partnerships.
Under this scheme, the four Japanese cities of Kisarazu, Sanjo, Nagai, and Imabari were paired, respectively, with Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique, in a framework of “sister city” diplomacy.[52] Each pairing was designed to leverage complementary comparative advantages. The initiative envisioned two-way exchanges encompassing vocational training, technical cooperation, and cultural understanding to integrate local-level development diplomacy into Japan’s broader Africa strategy.
However, the initiative encountered domestic controversy soon after its announcement. Misinterpretations in international and local media, particularly claims that the scheme constituted a new migration or visa framework, provoked backlash among sections of the Japanese public and conservative commentators, who voiced concerns about a potential “influx” of African migrants. The government swiftly clarified that the initiative was not an immigration programme but a mechanism for educational, vocational, and cultural exchange. Despite this clarification, the political sensitivity surrounding migration reform ultimately led to the suspension of the pilot project.[53]
The Hometown Initiative can be understood as a cautious experiment in migration diplomacy, designed to complement Japan’s existing Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) framework. By embedding African trainees and professionals within smaller regional cities rather than major urban centres, the programme aimed to facilitate community-based integration, address rural depopulation, and cultivate long-term human linkages beyond short-term labour needs. This localised approach aimed to balance Japan’s demographic and labour-market challenges with Africa’s expanding pool of young talent.
In conceptual terms, Japan’s migration vision for Africa thus signals an emerging paradigm that prioritises mobility as development, rather than migration as displacement. If future iterations of the Hometown Initiative or similar models are successfully implemented, they could contribute to a new form of people-centred diplomacy—anchoring Japan–Africa relations in sustained human exchange, skill circulation, and shared prosperity. The viability of such a framework, however, will depend on the political will of both sides to manage public perceptions, institutionalise trust, and articulate a migration narrative grounded in reciprocity rather than risk.
The extraction and development of critical minerals has become a central component of Japan’s contemporary engagement with Africa, reflecting both industrial imperatives and strategic geopolitical considerations. Africa’s abundant reserves of base metals and rare-earth elements—such as cobalt, lithium, nickel, and copper—are increasingly vital to Japan’s efforts to secure stable supply chains for its advanced manufacturing sectors, particularly in the production of electric vehicles, renewable energy technologies, and semiconductors.[54] This growing focus also aligns with Tokyo’s broader objective of reducing its dependence on China, which currently dominates the global supply and processing of many critical minerals.
Japan’s reliance on Chinese rare-earth supplies declined from approximately 90 percent in 2010 to around 60 percent at present.[55] However, the level of dependence still remains substantial. China’s dominance in the global rare-earths supply chain is even more pronounced, heightening concerns over supply vulnerability. In response, the Japanese government has formulated a comprehensive set of measures to strengthen the resilience of its rare-earth mineral supply chains. Within this strategic framework, Africa has emerged as a significant and increasingly important component of Japan’s diversification efforts. Japan’s interest in Africa’s mining sector has been reinforced through a series of high-level diplomatic initiatives. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s 2023 tour of Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, and Mozambique underscored Tokyo’s commitment to building diversified partnerships in resource-rich regions.[56] Similarly, the 2024 visit by Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko to Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria sought to advance frameworks for economic cooperation and investment in critical mineral value chains.[57] These visits collectively aimed to establish the diplomatic and institutional foundations for sustained Japanese participation in Africa’s extractive industries.[58]
Recent agreements further demonstrate the materialisation of this agenda. The Japanese government signed key contracts with Namibia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2023, focusing on exploration, extraction, and supply-chain security. Japan has also pledged a US$1-billion investment to support mineral exploration in DRC, a country that holds some of the world’s largest deposits of cobalt, lithium, and copper.[59] Similarly, MoUs with Zambia and Namibia outline joint ventures and exploration programmes designed to guarantee long-term access to essential minerals while promoting local industrial development. These initiatives are supported by Japanese policy banks and public–private partnerships that combine financial investment with technical expertise and capacity building.[60]
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) has effective MOUs with 14 countries in Africa—South Africa, Zambia, Namibia, Angola, Lesotho, Eswatini, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, DR Congo, Madagascar, and Kenya.[61]
Table 2. Key MoUs Between JOGMEC and African Countries
| Country | Date of Signing | Components |
| Republic of Namibia | 8 August 2023 | Rare-earths exploration, cooperation in supply chain research, training in metallic mineral resource exploration technology using satellite images and geographic information systems, joint analysis, and field surveys |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 10 August 2023 | Exploration sector and environmental monitoring, technical support for environmental monitoring, cooperation in satellite image analysis, and joint implementation of field surveys |
| Republic of Zambia | 11 August 2023 | Cooperation in the field of exploration and human resource development, holding seminars on sustainable development and assessing the potential of unutilised resources, expansion of the area covered by the joint geological survey |
| Republic of Angola | 26 March 2021 | Engineering activities and related techniques for mineral exploration |
| Republic of Madagascar | 4 April 2014 | Investment in Madagascar’s mining sector, technical transfer of remote sensing, and GIS with Malagasy geologists |
Source: Author’s own, using various government sources.
Beyond mineral extraction, Japan’s engagement increasingly integrates technological and environmental dimensions. Japanese corporations, often with government backing, are introducing advanced mining and processing technologies to improve safety, efficiency, and environmental sustainability. Concurrently, there is growing interest in green hydrogen and green ammonia projects as part of a broader effort to decarbonise African industries and enhance bilateral cooperation in clean energy transitions.[62] Tokyo’s approach thus extends beyond traditional resource acquisition toward fostering technological co-creation and sustainable resource governance.
Japan’s engagement with Africa, historically rooted in economic development and cultural diplomacy, has in recent years assumed an increasingly pronounced security dimension. This evolution reflects a growing recognition in Tokyo that sustainable economic growth, foreign investment, and inclusive social development are contingent upon peace, stability, and effective governance.
Since the 2010s, Japan’s Africa policy has expanded to encompass a broader security diplomacy framework. It is shaped by four objectives: safeguarding Japanese nationals and assets abroad; responding to China’s expanding strategic footprint; enhancing Japan’s international profile as a “proactive contributor to peace”; and integrating Africa into broader geopolitical frameworks, notably the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision.[63]
Discussions on conflict prevention and peacebuilding—a cornerstone of Japan’s post-Cold War diplomacy—featured prominently at TICAD 9.[64] Tokyo continues to prioritise non-combat contributions that combine technical expertise, financial assistance, and institutional capacity building, rather than direct military intervention.
Japan’s engagement in African peacekeeping and stabilisation efforts has been multifaceted, encompassing financial, technical, and institutional support. Japan contributes 8 percent to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) budget of US$5.4 billion, behind only the US and China.[65]
Japan has played an active role in missions in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mozambique.[66] Leveraging its advanced engineering expertise, Japan has contributed to the construction of essential infrastructure and provided logistical assistance in conflict-affected areas.
Through initiatives such as the Triangular Partnership Project for Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC), it has also provided extensive training to African peacekeepers, enhancing their operational, engineering, and maintenance capacities.[67] Furthermore, Tokyo extends bilateral and multilateral assistance to African Union (AU) missions and collaborates closely with regional and sub-regional organisations to reinforce Africa-led peacekeeping capacities and security institutions.
Japan’s most visible and enduring military presence on the continent remains its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) base in Djibouti, established in 2011 and expanded in 2016.[68] Initially conceived as a response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the base has evolved into a strategic outpost supporting maritime security cooperation, humanitarian response, and the protection of Japanese citizens in the region. With 600 personnel and situated near China’s first overseas military base, the facility holds symbolic significance as part of Japan’s broader strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and the Red Sea corridors.
Under former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Japan’s engagement with Africa was expected to place greater emphasis on peacebuilding, resilience, and governance. While the current Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi does not have a personal military background, she sees herself as the successor of the late PM Abe Shinzo and his assertive foreign policies.[69] Given the prime minister’s strong conservative viewpoint and endorsement for military engagement, Japan is likely to expand its security partnership in Africa.
Despite the constraining nature of Japan’s Constitution on military expansion, in the short term, Tokyo is likely to deepen its non-combat involvement through enhanced support for Africa-led peace operations, vocational and technical training, disaster prevention, and renewable energy projects aimed at building sustainable security infrastructures. Aligning peacebuilding with environmental and human security priorities, such as green energy investment, circular waste management, and disaster resilience, illustrates Japan’s effort to integrate security diplomacy with sustainable development objectives.
Nevertheless, Japan’s ambition to position itself as a credible security partner in Africa faces structural and perceptual challenges. The FOIP vision, while resonant in the diplomatic and maritime security spheres, lacks a clearly articulated economic development strategy that appeals to African priorities. Moreover, Japan’s cautious approach to political engagement and limited diplomatic presence constrain its influence relative to actors such as China, the United States, and the European Union.
In his 2023 address to the United Nations General Assembly, former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida invoked the principle of “human dignity” as the moral foundation of Japan’s global engagement.[70] This discourse, resonant across the Global South, encapsulates Japan’s distinctive approach to security diplomacy—one that reframes peace and stability not merely as geopolitical objectives but as integral components of human-centred development. In Africa, this philosophy continues to inform Japan’s evolving balance between its normative commitments to peace and its pragmatic pursuit of strategic influence.
During his term, Prime Minister Abe conceptualised the framework as “Asia’s democratic security diamond”.[71] This articulation can be seen as laying the intellectual groundwork for Japan’s foreign policy with the promotion of “universal values” such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy.[72]
Japan’s Africa policy cannot be understood in isolation from its strategic rivalry with China, Africa’s largest trading partner, with a total trade volume reaching a record US$295.6 billion in 2024.[73] Given Beijing’s far greater economic presence, this competition has contributed to shaping Tokyo’s engagement. Japan has prioritised strategic sectors such as raw materials, critical minerals, base metals, and rare-earths, not only to secure its own supply chains, but also to position itself as an alternative partner for African countries seeking to diversify beyond China.
The geopolitical rivalry is increasingly shifting from conventional infrastructure initiatives to strategic domains such as key minerals. Japan’s industrial economy is significantly reliant on these resources, and its dependence on China for them is regarded as a “perilous vulnerability”.[74] In early January 2026, China announced a ban on the sale of more than 800 dual-use items to end users that could aid Japan’s military capabilities.[75] As many of the listed critical minerals were already banned since April 2025, this signifies further intensification of its export control. However, this is not a completely new phenomenon. In 2010, China introduced similar restrictions on rare-earth exports. These disruptions have highlighted Japan's vulnerability in its bilateral supply chains.[76] Japan’s reaction is a targeted approach to safeguard its supply networks via multilateral and bilateral agreements.
China’s industrialisation is heavily dependent on raw materials from Africa. In its pursuit to acquire raw materials from Africa, China is implementing a large-scale initiative, “One Belt, One Road”. The initiative is also helping China to position itself as a strategic partner, peacemaker, and leader of the Global South, striving to create new international institutions and advance its national interests, including support for its claims against Taiwan. The BRI, in particular, has deepened China’s presence and influence across Africa.[77] As a counter-strategy to China’s dominance, Japan is focusing on FOIP, an initiative aiming to reform existing institutions in collaboration with Western countries and India.[78]
Tokyo’s engagement with the Quad in the Indo-Pacific can be interpreted as a geopolitical instrument aimed at balancing China’s expanding influence, particularly as the BRI extends Beijing’s strategic reach beyond its traditional focus on its immediate neighbourhood. As Japan’s strategy of alignment with the United States, Australia, and India in the Indo-Pacific continues to consolidate as a counterbalance to China, Africa has emerged as an additional arena of great-power competition. While Japan has so far worked mostly independently in Africa, in the future, it may decide to pursue issue-based collaboration with like-minded countries, such as India.
In August 2025, India and Japan articulated a joint vision for the coming decade, grounded in their shared commitment to a free, open, and rules-based international order, complementary economic strengths, and a longstanding partnership. A pillar of this vision is the deepening of bilateral cooperation to strengthen the Global South and leverage its growth potential, reflecting convergence between India’s MAHASAGAR framework and Japan’s Indian Ocean–Africa Economic Region Initiative.[79]
Accordingly, the two countries launched the India–Japan Cooperation Initiative for Sustainable Economic Development in Africa and proposed the India–Japan Economic Security Initiative to reinforce resilient supply chains.[80] Together, these initiatives signal the potential for expanded strategic collaboration between India and Japan in Africa. There are fundamental differences in how China and Japan approach Africa. The strategies of the two countries differ in terms of the choice of partners and the format of projects: Japan prefers to work with the most developed African states, implementing targeted projects with a high degree of investment guarantees, while China relies on countries rich in mineral resources or states with minimal development indicators, and infrastructure projects spanning several countries, but is gradually moving to the “small and beautiful” format.
Both countries invest in mining, energy, and technology; however, China is more interested in infrastructure, while Japan is more interested in human development projects. The perception of these countries by African countries also differs: China is seen as a powerful partner but faces criticism for debt traps and limited socio-cultural integration on the continent, while Japan is seen as a source of high-quality goods and investment in human capital, but with less expertise and cultural influence.
During TICAD 9, Japan sought to intensify its efforts to compete with China in Africa by expanding trade and investment across the continent. To support this ambition, Japan is leveraging public–private partnerships, including financial backing from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), to fund green and strategic projects across the continent. Leading Japanese companies, such as Mitsui, Hitachi, Toyota Tsusho, Mitsubishi, and Komatsu, are already investing in areas like sustainable mining, renewable energy, and transportation.
Notable ventures include Mitsui’s stake in a copper mine in Zambia and Hitachi’s rollout of hybrid trucks to reduce carbon emissions in the mining sector. During TICAD 9, the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG) signed MOUs with the African Finance Corporation, African Trade and Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI), and private energy companies.
Acknowledging its inability to rival China independently, Japan’s counter-strategy is also founded on a “coalition of the willing,” utilising a multifaceted approach that integrates its distinct advantages with those of its allies. The G7 has reiterated its commitment to strengthen partnerships with Africa. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) represents a collaborative initiative to counter China’s BRI by mobilising US$600 billion for infrastructure projects in developing nations.[81]
Japan plans to work with the United States and other Western countries to deepen policy dialogue with African countries on a shared vision for the continent and the Global South.[82] An illustrative example is the Japan-India partnership, which can combine Japanese technology, investment, and expertise with India’s soft power and digital capabilities. The Japan-India-Africa Business Forum is a timely initiative, especially considering the lacklustre traction of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which India and Japan initiated in November 2016.[83]
The Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, established with the United States, India, and Australia, exemplifies another collaborative strategy to diversify supply chains and mitigate the risk of economic coercion. JOGMEC (Japan Organisation for Metals and Energy Security) has entered into agreements with mineral-rich nations, such as Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia, emphasising responsible mining practices and sustainable capacity development, rather than just resource extraction.[84]
In July 2025, the US-Japan tariff deal, which imposes a 15-percent flat tariff on Japanese exports, has threatened Japanese goods in the American market.[85] Similarly, the United States has concentrated on the vast African markets, including the “Prosper Africa Initiative.”[86] Under pressure, the Japanese government plans to propose a new economic zone at TICAD 9, as it believes the region stretching from India through the Middle East to the Africa has the potential to become the centre of economic growth.
Japan’s engagement with Africa is hinged on three pillars: quality, trust, and non-interference. Over the years, Japan has carefully cultivated a reputation in Africa as a non-controversial and trusted partner. Unlike many other prominent global actors, Japan has no history of colonial legacy in Africa, allowing it to approach the continent in terms of a partnership rather than dominance.
Japan’s engagement is primarily oriented toward trade, investment, and sustainable access to resources, emphasising capacity-building, quality infrastructure, and human capital development. This non-confrontational posture allows Tokyo to engage broadly with African states; unlike other global powers whose diplomatic initiatives have been shaped by exclusions and geopolitical sensitivities.
For instance, China’s Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) excludes Eswatini due to the One-China principle,[87] and the 2022 US Africa Summit excluded several countries, including Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso, due to concerns over their political or governance systems.[88] Japan, in contrast, maintains open engagement with all willing partners, reflecting its commitment to inclusivity and partnership.
Japan also demonstrates caution in navigating politically sensitive conflicts, such as the one in Western Sahara. Tokyo maintains long-standing relations with Morocco and tacitly supports Morocco’s autonomy plan for resolving the Saharawi territorial dispute, while simultaneously continuing to endorse United Nations-led mediation efforts. Japan does not recognise the Polisario Front, and its participation in forums like TICAD, highlighting Tokyo’s careful balancing of principled neutrality with pragmatic engagement.[89]
Financial engagement further strengthens Japan’s reputation as a trusted partner. Japanese development finance in Africa is predominantly structured through blended financing mechanisms, that combine public-private partnerships, co-financing arrangements, and collaboration with local actors.[90]
Historically, Japan’s influence in Africa has been modest compared to other major actors, particularly China and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Recent developments, however, indicate a revitalised strategy in which Japan is more proactively engaging in areas of strategic importance, including critical minerals, sustainable infrastructure, and technological innovation.
This strategy seeks both to enhance Japan’s presence as a credible alternative to dominant actors and to advance its development and economic objectives in alignment with African priorities. Central to this approach is the leadership of the private sector, facilitated through public-private partnerships, blended finance mechanisms, and targeted investments that emphasise quality, sustainability, and local integration.
Japan’s Africa policy encompasses economic, social, and environmental dimensions, integrating trade facilitation, infrastructure development, improvements in health and sanitation, agricultural value chain enhancement, capacity building, and technology transfer. By promoting local ownership and embedding sustainability as a guiding principle, Japan distinguishes its approach from models primarily focused on resource extraction or short-term strategic gains.
Looking ahead, Japan has significant opportunities to expand its influence. Shifts in global engagement, including relative Western disengagement and African countries’ interest in diversifying partnerships, create a favourable environment. Strategic expansion in digital transformation, green technologies, and human capital development, coupled with cultural and educational initiatives such as scholarships, fellowships, and exchange programmes, will be essential for deepening trust and fostering sustainable collaboration.
Ultimately, the success of TICAD 9 and Japan’s broader Africa policy depends on its ability to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics, cultivate genuine partnerships, and leverage its distinct strengths to support African countries’ aspirations for self-sustaining growth.
Samir Bhattacharya is Associate Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
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[86] African Development Bank, “African Development Bank partners with Prosper Africa and the U.S. Department of the Treasury to enhance capital flows to Africa”, January 17 2025, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-partners-prosper-africa-and-us-department-treasury-enhance-capital-flows-africa-80212
[87] Jevans Nyabiage, “China to remove tariffs on nearly all goods from Africa as both criticise US trade moves”, South China Morning Post, June 12 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3314143/china-remove-tariffs-nearly-all-goods-africa-both-criticise-us-trade-moves
[88] Ignatius Annor, “US Confirms Eritrea, Somaliland Exclusions From Africa Summit”, Voice of America, December 7, 2022, https://www.voaafrica.com/a/us-confirms-eritrea-somaliland-exclusion-from-africa-summit/6866368.html
[89] jihane-rahhou, “Western Sahara: Japan Hails Morocco’s Autonomy Plan”, Morocco World News, May 31 2024, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/05/18940/western-sahara-japan-hails-moroccos-autonomy-plan/
[90] Paul Nantula, “Japan Innovates to Deepen Africa Relations”, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, September 3, 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/japan-innovates-africa-relations/
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Dr. Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing ...
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