Peacekeeping

India's engagement with the United Nations reflects policy makers' efforts to demonstrate that India is a responsible global citizen that deserves to play a leading role among developing nations. In turn, most Indians recognise the domestic benefits of UN assistance on a range of development challenges. Among India's most important commitments is its long-standing contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. Such operations further India's claims to international prominence.

India is currently the third largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions (after Pakistan and Bangladesh), with 7,889 police and army personnel serving in January 2013.7 In addition to contributing peacekeeping troops, India stresses the longevity of its participation in peacekeeping missions which date back to the Korean War, and its friendly relations with a number of countries in Africa and Asia. Approximately 50,000 Indian peacekeepers have served in 30 conflicts in the Middle East, Congo, Namibia, Cyprus, and elsewhere. India has also contributed military observers to monitor borders.

Indian troops had operational responsibility for one-third of Somalia during UNOSOM II (the UN Operation in Somalia). Elsewhere in Africa, Indian peacekeepers have served in Angola, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

India is happy to undertake peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate; unpleasant memories of sending its peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka in the late 1980s remain strong and limit the options for military action in South Asia. India has undertaken military action without a UN mandate in Sri Lanka and the Maldives; in both cases, however, this was in response to a request for assistance by the host government.

Food security

India went from being a net recipient of food aid in 2000 to becoming the 15th largest donor to the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2005, when its contribution peaked at $33.7m. In 2012 it provided

$3.39m.8 India plays an increasingly important role in providing food security in South Asia, notably to Afghanistan as well as Iraq. Finding its bilateral food assistance programmes ineffective (in 2004 it provided 20,000 tonnes of wheat to Sudan but the impact was undermined by weak reporting structures) India appears to have shifted away from bilateral efforts and towards assistance through the WFP. India is also a member of the Inter-Governmental Working Group (a subsidiary of the Food and Agriculture Organization's Committee on World Food Security) which is formulating voluntary guidelines to address issues of food security and enforce the right to adequate food.9 In March 2010, the BRIC countries agreed to cooperate on a common strategy to ensure global food security. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has also sought to enhance cooperation to improve food security; in 2009 the South Asia Food Security Programme was launched, with funding of $25m (from the Asian Development Bank, the International Fund for Asian Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization) for 10 projects, focusing on scientific advances as a vital means of improving production and nutrition. In 2012 India donated 306,000 tonnes of food to the SAARC Food Bank.10 This contributes to the SAARC food reserve, intended to provide emergency relief for severe food shortages as well as regional food security during times of more regular food shortages.11 This is likely to remain the primary means by which India contributes to regional food security.

Afghanistan

While India seeks mutual economic benefit in providing assistance to most of its South Asian neighbours (for example, much of the assistance provided to Bhutan, the largest recipient of Indian aid, is invested in hydro-electric schemes, power from which is subsequently utilised in India), Indian aid to Afghanistan is motivated by specific strategic interests. While assistance to Afghanistan is not dissimilar to the project-based approach adopted in Africa, it is on a much larger scale. Whether India's aid to Afghanistan is likely to form a template for future assistance to other countries may depend on whether the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates (from an Indian perspective), in which case it might well be some years before India attempts a similar large-scale package of bilateral assistance.

India is currently the fifth largest provider of aid to Afghanistan. Since 2001 it has dispersed some $1billion, having pledged $2 billion.12 Unlike China and Pakistan, it has contributed funds to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (although this assistance is small-scale; India pledged just $200,000 at the fund's inception). Most of India's assistance has gone to traditional developmental projects such as training civil servants, constructing wells, power plants and transmission lines, and building and staffing hospitals. Other projects have clear strategic functions: the construction of a road linking Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabahar, and the recent announcement that India would renovate the port itself, has created an alternative route for Indian goods to travel to Afghanistan (between 2002 and 2008 Pakistan had refused access for Indian assistance destined for Afghanistan).

India's strategic concerns in Afghanistan include the promotion of a stable, pro-Indian government. India also recognises that Pashtun areas of Afghanistan will almost certainly look towards Pakistan rather than India for support. India's opposition to talks with the 'moderate' Taliban stems partly from concerns over whether such a group really exists and partly from a fear that it will be presented with an uncomfortable choice if Western troops leave: whether to provide security for its own development projects or for the Afghan state itself.

The Indian Government has sought to enable its private sector to provide development, allowing some state-owned firms, including oil companies and infrastructure companies (such as RITES, which provides engineering and consultancy services in transport and infrastructure) to play an important role.

Economic interaction between India and other developing countries has increased rapidly in recent years, in part enabled by the introduction of concessional LoCs,13 particularly since 2002. The Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank) has extended LoCs to over 75 countries with credit commitments of over $8.69billion.14 When the policy was introduced it had three clear strategic aims:

•           revitalising bilateral relations, not least to increase support for India in the UN;

•           improving relations with resource-rich countries; and

•           creating economic opportunities for Indian firms.

Subsequently, policy has shifted to spread LoCs more broadly. Although India has made aid a component of its foreign policy agenda, it stresses that projects undertaken with Indian assistance should be led by the needs of other countries and does not impose its own solutions. In providing LoCs, the Exim Bank does not have an overriding sectoral preference since such an approach would involve imposing its own priorities rather than those of the recipients. Nonetheless, given the capacity of Indian firms, many of the projects funded through LoCs provide clear developmental benefits, involving sectors such as rural development and agriculture, education and health as well as infrastructure, notably power, renewable energy, irrigation and railways.

In March 2011 India announced the extension of the India Development and Economic Assistance scheme from 2010/11 until 2014/15, which will allocate $8.5billion (although previous targets have been missed.) The allocated government spending amounts to Rs18.8billion, reflecting the interest subsidy component of the loan. The government has also suggested that concessional LoCs may be used to supplement assistance from other donors, raising the possibility of triangulation utilising cheaper Indian manufacturers. The press release announcing the move said that the scheme 'will promote India's political, economic and strategic interests besides building a positive image of India abroad’.15

 AFRICA

India emphasises skills and knowledge transfer as central to development in Africa. In contrast to Chinese practice, many Indian firms train local staff for particular projects. Lacking the financial resources of China and the West, India's stature in many African countries derives from its long- standing support for decolonisation. That India and African States shared many problems often makes Indian investors more acceptable than those from more developed countries.

India's interaction does not have a 'heavy governmental footprint'.16 Instead, the Indian government engages with governments in Africa, the LoCs are then established and companies are left to take advantage of opportunities arising. As of 2011, India had extended $5billion in LoCs and $500m in grants to African nations, and 98 of Exim Bank's 138 operative LoCs were located in Africa.17

SOUTH ASIA

Indian exports to and investment in neighbouring South Asian states face several roadblocks. India's regional policy is frequently reactive to events and policy shifts in its neighbours, and conducted through a prism of national security or, frequently, insecurity. Each neighbour presents both political and security threats as well as economic opportunities.

Indian exports to other countries in SAARC comprised just 4.1% of total exports in 2011-2012 according to the Reserve Bank of India, and imports from those countries were worth just 0.5% of total imports.18 Policy-makers recognise the potential benefits from greater trade with India's neighbours, not least as a means of generating benefits for adjacent districts in India. But even when progress on improving localised economic interaction is slow, policy-makers are frequently sanguine given that economic benefits may already stem from informal trade.

As with state-funded assistance projects, Indian investment in neighbouring countries is made with an eye towards mutual economic benefit. Closer economic links with Nepal are of particular use to the neighbouring states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and India's road-building is focused on linking Uttar Pradesh with Nepal's southern Terai districts. Improving infrastructure has also charged up the domestic political agenda.

Northeast India is almost land-locked and would benefit substantially from improved trade with its neighbours. The high costs of formal trade between this region and Myanmar have led to a long history of informal trade and barter. Regional trade agreements such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Agreement are intended to enhance regional trade.

India's increased global standing is a common source of pride for its citizens, particularly within the growing middle class. Within a short time it has evolved from a country with a marginal role to a key participant in global decision-making. This is frequently seen as an example of India's coming of age, as are manifestations of its hard power projection (for instance in anti-piracy operations) and the success of its companies.

While traditionally India has provided assistance to countries bilaterally, it has recently demonstrated a greater willingness to pool sovereignty in multilateral structures such as IBSA. While Western countries may not be ideal partners from an Indian perspective, there is greater openness, particularly in the private sector, to ideas such as triangulation, whereby Western governments could utilise Indian capacity in third countries.

In keeping with efforts to show itself to be a good global partner and push for permanent Security Council membership, India is committed to UN peacekeeping operations and food aid. However, India remains constant in its championing of state sovereignty and unwillingness to impose values on other countries. Consequently, it is difficult to envisage India demonstrating strong support for democracy promotion. However, in this field India already provides practical assistance for other countries—training election monitors, for instance—and this is more likely to increase than be scaled back.

India can and will gradually play a more significant role in global development, through training and through the capacity of its private sector and NGOs, but a significant escalation of India's global role is unlikely until its domestic development challenges are better addressed. Until it is clear that the country has found a model that makes more progress in tackling domestic issues such as poverty, there will remain reluctance to attempt exporting an Indian model of development. However, the process is likely to be speeded up by the increasing (and overdue) attempts by other countries at engagement with India on tackling a host of global challenges.

APPENDIX 1

Technical and economic cooperation with other countries and advances to foreign governments (Rs m)

Source: Ministry of External Affairs. http://indiabudget.nic.in

a http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2006-07/eb/sbe30.pdf Revised 2005-06, Total (plan and non-plan) b http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2007-08/eb/sbe31.pdf. Revised 2006-07, Total (plan and non-plan) c http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2008-09/eb/sbe30.pdf Revised 2007-08, Total (plan and non-plan) d http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2009-10/eb/sbe31.pdf Revised 2008-09, Total (plan and non-plan) e http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/eb/sbe31.pdf Revised 2009-10, Total (plan and non-plan)

f http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2011-12/eb/sbe31.pdf Revised 2010-2011, Total (plan and non-plan) g http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2011-12/eb/sbe31.pdf Revised 2011-2012, Total (plan and non-plan)

Technical and economic cooperation with other countries and advances to foreign governments (US$ m)

Source: Ministry of External Affairs http://indiabudget.nic.in a Rs 44.273 per $

b Rs 42.25 per $ c Rs 40.261 per $ d Rs 45.993 per $ e Rs 47.42 per $ f Rs 45.5 per $

g Assuming Rs 47.89 per $

APPENDIX 2

Indian Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (US$m)

Endnotes:

1.                   This paper represents an updated version of an earlier publication by Gareth Price, “For the Global Good: India's Developing International Role”. See http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/ Research/Asia/r_indiarole0511.pdf. The author would like to thank Anna Feuer for her assistance in updating and revising the text.

2.                   The classic definition of public goods is that they are 'non-rival' in consumption – that is, consumption by one does not reduce the availability to another – and 'non-excludable' – no one can be excluded from their benefits. The domain of global public goods has extended to a range of fields that do not necessarily meet these tests but are seen as public goods because of public choice; thus the UN Millennium Development Goals are regarded as global public goods.

3.                   See C. Lata Hogg (2007), India and its Neighbours: Do Economic Interests Have the Potential to Build Peace?, Chatham House Report; G. Price (2004), 'India's Aid Dynamics: From Recipient to Donor?', Asia Programme Working Paper, Chatham House; G. Price (2005), 'Diversity in donorship: the changing landscape of official humanitarian aid India's official aid programme', ODI; G. Price (2009), http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=3279&title=states-crisis-india-humanitarian-action; Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (2011), India and South Africa as Partners for Development in Africa, Chatham House Briefing Paper.

4.                  Nishika Patel, “India to create central foreign aid agency,” The Guardian, 26 July 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/jul/26/india-foreign-aid-agency; http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/india-sets-up-global-aid-agency

5.                  World Bank (2010), 'South-South Experience Exchange Trust Fund'. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/CFPEXT/EXTTRUFUN/EXTMAINPRO/EXT SEETF/0,,contentMDK:21936473~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:5279897,00.html.

6.                  Appendix 1 sets out recent spending on technical and economic cooperation with other governments

7.                  UN, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jan13_2.pdf

8.                  WFP, http://www.wfp.org/about/donors/year/2012

9.                  Government of India, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution.http://fcamin.nic.in/ dfpd/EventListing.asp?Section=International%20Cooperation&id_pk=126&ParentID=0.

10.             South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and Environment, http://www.sawtee.org/presentations/ SessionThree20Dec2012.pdf

11.             Government of India, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. http://fcamin.nic.in/dfpd/EventListing.asp?Section=International%20Cooperation&id_pk=126&Parent ID=0.