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Anubhav Shankar Goswami, “Indian Cinema and Nuclear Risk Reduction: Lessons from the US, Japan, and the UK,” ORF Special Report No. 269, Observer Research Foundation, July 2025.
Across the globe, cinema can be a powerful tool for reflecting and influencing public opinion on crucial issues. Films such as Schindler’s List (with its theme of genocide), An Inconvenient Truth (climate change), Hotel Rwanda (ethnic conflict), Selma (civil rights and racism), Taare Zameen Par (learning disabilities), and Parasite (class inequality) demonstrate how cinema can powerfully engage audiences with complex global issues, potentially shaping public discourse and raising awareness.
Nuclear risk reduction, though essentially a matter of statecraft and policymaking, has found expression on the silver screen in countries such as the United States (US), Japan, and the United Kingdom (UK). Given the increasing global impact of Indian cinema, filmmakers could potentially contribute to regional stability by exploring themes of nuclear risk in creative ways. This is particularly significant considering the recent crisis between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam terrorist attack in April 2025, which prompted renewed nuclear rhetoric from Pakistani leaders and officials.
Indeed, the nuclear taboo is fragile in Pakistan, influenced by a sense of nuclear nationalism and the belief that a nuclear arsenal serves as an effective safeguard against India.[1] In a 2019 poll, just 60 percent of the respondents said they were opposed to the first use of nuclear weapons, which could suggest a troubling acceptance of a nuclear response to a conflict.[2] In contrast, in India, a 2015 study found that 90 percent agreed that the country should not utilise nuclear weapons unless attacked with nuclear weapons by another state.[3] Indian cinema, a powerful and popular medium in South Asia, can play a key role in sensitising audiences by portraying the catastrophic consequences of nuclear conflict and fostering a culture of peace, awareness, and responsible discourse.
This report draws on insights from works on nuclear policy and cinematic narratives to argue that Indian films can evolve from conventional terrorism-centric portrayals to explorations of nuclear risk reduction strategies. By interweaving lessons from the American film industry’s strategic collaborations with defence agencies, Japanese post-war reflections on nuclear devastation, and the subtle cautionary tones of British nuclear dramas, Indian films can cultivate a narrative that both educates and fosters de-escalatory thinking in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan.
The interplay between cinema and nuclear politics is not a recent phenomenon. Hollywood films such as The Beginning or the End (1947), which dramatised the development of the first atomic bomb, and Strategic Air Command (1955), which showcased the US’s nuclear deterrence capabilities and military discipline, helped shape public perceptions of nuclear weapons as instruments of national security and technological prowess. The depiction of nuclear arsenals and the US military’s technological might in these films was closely aligned with the government’s narrative and underscored the US’s technological superiority, military discipline, and strategic stability to justify nuclear investments and portray the country’s capability and responsibility in maintaining global security during the Cold War.[4]
The American film industry partnered with military and government entities to emphasise technical proficiency, reinforcing confidence in managing nuclear weapons while addressing public concerns.[5] For example, the US Department of Defense (DoD) provided support to the makers of Strategic Air Command by allowing access to Air Force bases.[6] It also featured the B-36 bomber, a key part of the US nuclear deterrent force at the time.[7] Similar collaborations with national defence organisations could enable Indian films to portray technical and institutional safeguards against nuclear risks in South Asia.[a]
In the 1960s, Hollywood films shifted their focus from nuclear ‘stability’, which emphasised the US’s responsible stewardship and strategic capability, to nuclear ‘anxiety’, highlighting the risks of instability and accidental conflict.[8] One of the early films highlighting this shift included Fail-Safe (1964), which explored the consequences of accidental nuclear warfare.
The 1983 television movie The Day After made an impact on people’s views on nuclear war.[9] It depicted human suffering, societal collapse, and the futility of survival in a post-nuclear war scenario. The film’s anti-nuclear message resonated strongly in the US, spawning debate, including viewer guides, discussion clubs, and even mandatory viewings in high schools.[10] It also led the Ronald Reagan administration to revise its nuclear policy, with the president noting the film left him “greatly depressed”.[11] Scholars also contend that the film, in conjunction with other incidents in 1983, influenced the Reagan administration to shift from aggressive rhetoric to engaging in arms control efforts with the Soviet Union.[b] In 1987, the two sides signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a pivotal moment in reigning in the nuclear arms race. Following the signing of the treaty, Reagan reportedly sent a telegram to Nicholas Meyer, the director of The Day After, saying, “Don’t think your movie didn’t have any part of this, because it did.”[12]
For their part, post-war Japanese films reflected the profound national trauma of nuclear devastation, offering unique perspectives on nuclear themes rooted in cultural memory and ethical reflection.[13] For example, The Bells of Nagasaki (1950) and the Children of Hiroshima (1952) grappled with the aftermath of the catastrophic bombings, emphasising the profound human cost of nuclear weapons.[14] Record of a Living Being (1955) portrayed paranoia about nuclear annihilation and reflected the profound existential fears of the atomic age. These works showcased the blending of personal narratives with a broader anti-nuclear message.
Many Japanese science-fiction films, such as Godzilla (1954), critiqued reckless nuclear practices through allegory.[15] Images of post-apocalyptic Tokyo haunted by an unstoppable monster resonated with fears of unchecked nuclear power. Similarly, Black Rain (1989) amplified the human dimension of nuclear exposure by examining an individual’s struggle against the societal and health implications of radiation poisoning.[16] Such narratives underscore Japan’s ability to pair allegory with realism to evoke the horrors of nuclear destruction, a method Indian filmmakers could use to portray regional nuclear dangers.
Although less prolific, British cinema has also made contributions to the filmography on nuclear risks by intertwining realism, critique, and satire. The War Game (1966)[c] examined civilian vulnerabilities during a nuclear fallout.[17] Similarly, Threads (1984) critiqued bureaucratic inadequacies in nuclear crisis management, highlighting disorganised civil defence systems, insufficient preparedness, and the collapse of government structures, exposing their inability to protect civilians from nuclear catastrophe.[18] It offered a grim and detailed depiction of the devastating societal collapse following a nuclear attack. These films emphasise the long-term sociopolitical consequences of nuclear conflict, using realistic portrayals to provoke urgent awareness about crisis management.
Dr. Strangelove (1964) used satire to expose the brittleness of nuclear command and control systems by illustrating the dangers of unauthorised launches, human error, and miscommunication in a nuclear crisis.[19] It exposed flaws in deterrent mechanisms, alerting the public to the possibility of a devastating nuclear war caused by faulty protocols. The movie magnified anti-nuclear activism in the 1960s, resonating with groups like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, amid anxieties due to the Berlin Crisis (1961) and nuclear testing.[d]
War Game, Dr Strangelove, and Threads blurred the lines between realism and critique, and serve as ideal examples for Indian filmmakers seeking to depict a nuanced exploration of nuclear command and control (NC2) issues and civilian vulnerabilities. In the South Asian context, NC2 challenges are particularly acute due to the compressed decision-making timelines between India and Pakistan. Unlike the US–Soviet dynamic, where geographic distance afforded critical minutes for threat assessment and response, the immediate adjacency of India and Pakistan increases the risk of misperception, accidental escalation, and breakdowns in command integrity. This concern is especially pronounced on the Pakistani side, as India does not have tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and thus does not face the same pressure to pre-delegate launch authority. In contrast, Pakistan’s reliance on TNWs for battlefield deterrence might lead to pre-delegation of launch authority to lower-tier field commanders under certain wartime conditions, raising fears of inadvertent or unauthorised use in a fast-moving conflict scenario. Civilian vulnerabilities further compound this danger. Fragile public infrastructure, chronic resource constraints and limited capacity for rapid resource mobilisation in either India or Pakistan leave both populations dangerously exposed. These risks are arguably more severe in South Asia than anywhere else, given the region’s dense population and the urban proximity of likely nuclear targets.
The American, Japanese, and British experiences provide Indian cinema a framework for creating complex narratives on geopolitical issues that are technically authentic and resonate with the audience. While a number of Indian films have invoked nuclear themes, these are often limited to nationalist tropes or simplistic depictions of nuclear deterrence.[20] By learning from global examples, Indian cinema could shift toward creating layered, reflective narratives on nuclear risks.
Indian cinema is popular across South Asia due to linguistic and cultural ties. In Pakistan, Bollywood films remain cultural staples despite restrictions due to the similarities between Urdu and Hindi. For instance, a 2017 report highlighted that during the ban on Indian movies, up to 60 percent of Pakistanis were disappointed at missing Bollywood films.[21] Bangladesh is also a large market for Indian cinema, with Indian Bengali movies influencing local productions.[22] Similarly, Tamil movies have a considerable market in Sri Lanka due to the presence of the Tamil diaspora.[23] In Afghanistan, films like Khuda Gawah (1992) attained iconic status, reflecting the enduring popularity of Bollywood. Indian films remain widely watched across the country despite decades of conflict and censorship.[24]
This regional appeal enables Indian cinema to influence public discourse. This is particularly relevant in relation to geopolitical issues such as nuclear threats. However, mainstream Indian films, particularly Hindi movies, have tended to depict nuclear risk through formulaic scenarios involving terrorist plots or rogue nations rather than analysing the strategic, ethical, or humanitarian implications. Notably, apart from Parmanu (2018), which dealt with the secrecy surrounding India’s 1998 nuclear test, Bollywood movies have only focused on sensational crises,[e] sidelining deeper ethical and human dimensions.
Indian cinema can play a more transformational and socially conscious role by going beyond superficial dramatisation to critically engage with the nuclear threat as a multidimensional challenge involving technology, diplomacy, and global security ethics. First, Indian filmmakers could explore the human aspect of nuclear governance and the relevant organisations. Films could dramatise the difficulties encountered by nuclear experts or governments striving to avert an inadvertent escalation. Much like Strategic Air Command, which showcased US air defence systems’ technical and professional acumen, an Indian film could depict individuals safeguarding nuclear arsenals while manoeuvring through political problems.[25] Such narratives will highlight nuclear experts, eschewing reductionist depictions of nuclear terrorists and war.
Similarly, just as Japanese films like Record of a Living Being and Black Rain humanised nuclear hazards while discreetly advocating for peace, Indian filmmakers can examine the human toll of a potential subcontinental nuclear crisis, investigating the social, familial, and communal angles of tensions among regional nuclear powers.
British cinema’s focus on institutional responsibility is another potential path for Indian filmmakers to emulate. Films like Dr Strangelove, War Games, and Threads critique bureaucratic failures in the planning and preparedness for nuclear threats. Indian films could highlight India’s technical superiority and political responsibility while critiquing the shortcomings of adversaries by contrasting such shortcomings with their ability to implement well-managed safety and de-escalation measures. This duality, which combines affirmation and criticism, might improve the examination of nuclear geopolitics in Indian films.
Movies have historically served as instruments of soft power to further national narratives. As such, Indian films could highlight the country’s standing as a responsible nuclear power. Drawing from the British cinematic tradition of emphasising institutional responsibility, Indian movies can portray the country’s no first-use (NFU) nuclear doctrine as a hallmark of strategic maturity, showcasing India’s commitment to restraint, crisis management, and responsible nuclear stewardship in a volatile region. For example, a movie about India’s involvement in preventing a nuclear crisis in South Asia, such as during the 1999 Kargil War, could highlight its position as a responsible country that continuously values stability over escalation. Such depictions could also influence Pakistani policymakers and citizens on healthy nuclear behaviour. This is particularly important in light of statements by Pakistan’s defence minister[26] and its envoy to Russia[27] threatening the use of nuclear weapons amid the recent cross-border tensions.
In addition to exploring themes of crisis management and institutional accountability, Indian cinema can also delve into narratives that emphasise collective vulnerability and humanitarian concerns emerging from a post-nuclear war scenario for all South Asian states. Indian filmmakers could construct personal stories on post-nuclear war trauma, akin to Japan’s Black Rain, mirroring the collective humanitarian anxieties prevalent in South Asia. This can potentially elevate India’s regional and global influence, presenting it as a reflective and empathetic nuclear power.
Indian filmmakers can also explore raising awareness among South Asian audiences about the dangers of nuclear proliferation. One approach to do so involves examining the real instances of nuclear proliferation, such as the case of Dr. A.Q. Khan, commonly acknowledged as the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, who engaged in the illicit dissemination of nuclear technology to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya.[28]
Hollywood’s strategic collaboration with military and government institutions could also offer a crucial template for Indian filmmakers who may want to tackle the issue of nuclear proliferation. Hollywood partnered with defence agencies to produce films that blend technical authenticity with compelling narratives. Indian filmmakers could emulate this example to craft films grounded in real-life proliferation cases, such as the China–Pakistan proliferation nexus, while showcasing India’s institutional safeguards and commitment to non-proliferation. Such films could mitigate misinformation, enhance public knowledge, and foster a broader global discourse on nuclear security and responsible nuclear behaviour.
Historically, the US has used filmmaking to portray rival nations’ nuclear capabilities as reckless and irresponsible, and to solidify its global position. During the Cold War, films such as The Hunt for Red October (1990) dramatised the catastrophic dangers of nuclear conflict by depicting the Soviet Union as an erratic, unpredictable nuclear force that poses an existential risk. Such films constituted a comprehensive cultural strategy aimed at emphasising the perils of the alleged Soviet nuclear menace by depicting the country’s nuclear aspirations as imprudent and destabilising compared to the West’s ‘rational’ nuclear behaviour. The objective of such a strategy was to instil dread and caution over a potential nuclear conflict while affirming the US’s status as a responsible nuclear power.
Indian filmmakers can adopt a similar strategy. For instance, filmmakers could focus on Khan, who illicitly trafficked uranium enrichment technology and nuclear bomb blueprints, to underscore the dire repercussions of nuclear technology being misappropriated. Such a narrative could also investigate the involvement of the Pakistani state, which has been accused of either ignoring or implicitly endorsing Khan’s actions.[29] By illuminating this proliferation network—including the state’s involvement—Indian filmmakers can enhance the understanding of the hazards of nuclear weapons in unstable or opaque regimes. Indian films could also draw attention to the Chinese government’s role in the Khan network. This is especially relevant because China’s nuclear proliferation record is frequently understated or neglected in mainstream narratives.[f] A documentary-style film could narrate how the Chinese government turned a blind eye to the proliferation activities by Chinese companies. In essence, Indian movies can try to change the regional narrative on nuclear weapons by addressing India’s ethical position and the real threats posed by nuclear proliferation. Drawing on real-life events like the A.Q. Khan episode and the China-Pakistan proliferation network will appeal to South Asian audiences and contribute to a broader discussion on nuclear security and responsibility.
Collaboration between filmmakers and India’s defence organisations is essential to ensuring Indian movies go beyond superficial dramatisation to critically engage with the technological, diplomatic, and ethical dimensions of nuclear threats. The example of Strategic Air Command illustrates how institutional access to genuine locations, research, and technology bolsters authenticity. For Indian movies to meaningfully address strategic and nuclear themes, the Indian government must provide support—not merely as a matter of principle, but through tangible institutional frameworks. Indeed, governments that wish to influence global perceptions must recognise the entertainment media as a form of strategic communication.[30] India can do this by offering filmmakers access, funding, and legitimacy to tackle complex security narratives.
A key measure will be to create a strategic film facilitation body under the National Film Development Corporation (NFDC) in collaboration with either the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, and with the NITI Aayog as a partner. It could be named the ‘RASTRANEETI Cell’ (the Review Authority for Scripted Themes Reflecting National Ethos, Evaluation, and Information Tracking Initiative Cell).[g] This body can arrange consultations with retired defence personnel, grant vetted filmmakers access to restricted areas (such as missile installations, bomber/fighter jet bases, or nuclear command nodes), and offer technical or archival advice on delicate topics. The cell could also be tasked with vetting scripts or assisting scriptwriters on films that promote nuclear literacy, deterrence theory, civil-military relations, or India’s no-first-use doctrine. The US has already established such collaboration. For instance, the US Department of Defence has, through its Entertainment Media Office, provided assistance to films such as Top Gun (1986), Thirteen Days (2000), and Zero Dark Thirty (2012) to ensure realism without jeopardising national security.[31]
Such collaboration can be further advanced through financial incentives. The Indian government could allocate funds through the NFDC for films focusing on national security and diplomacy. These could be co-productions or receive tax rebates. These grants should not be considered blanket subsidies; instead, there should be targeted mechanisms for projects that have been vetted. In the documentary or digital distribution format (Netflix, Amazon Prime, or Disney+), where risks are lower and profundity is often higher, even a modest annual corpus (for instance, about INR 500 million/US$5.95 million) could fund a few strategically themed films per year.
Moreover, intellectual depth can be achieved through collaboration with think tanks that can serve as content advisers to eliminate any gap between policy nuance and creative vision.
The idea of collaboration with the government and institutions is not to promote control but purposeful engagement, empowering filmmakers with the tools to tell authentic, gripping stories that illuminate rather than indoctrinate. Indian cinema has a unique opportunity to create stories about nuclear threats that appeal across boundaries. Movies with non-proliferation themes can increase strategic knowledge at home and expose viewers in other countries to rogue actors’ deception and destabilisation tactics. Done right, such movies can become one of India’s most democratic and far-reaching instruments of regional strategic consciousness.
Indian cinema has showcased reductive and binary portrayals of nuclear issues, emphasising themes of terrorism or nationalistic triumph. By examining the precedents established by filmmakers in the US, Japan, and the UK, their Indian counterparts can attempt to craft narratives that thoughtfully engage with regional nuclear issues. Through collaborative endeavours with institutional stakeholders and nuanced explorations of nuclear risk, such films can enhance public discourse surrounding nuclear safety and de-escalation. By contextualising India’s nuclear sophistication alongside regional challenges and potential resolutions, filmmakers can enhance India’s global geopolitical stature while alleviating nuclear tensions in South Asia.
A note of caution, however: Although cultural narratives and cinematic representations can influence perceptions and foster discussion, the efficacy of soft power is constrained—its influence is fundamentally restricted when juxtaposed with the stark strategic realities of nuclear deterrence and geopolitical competition. Nevertheless, for whatever influence Indian cinema can exert—particularly in sensitising the Pakistani public—such efforts remain worthwhile and should not be easily dismissed.
[a] Certain Indian films have involved similar collaboration in the past. The Indian armed forces provided informal support to films such as Kargil (2003), Lakshya (2004), and Uri (2019), as acknowledged in their opening credits. Nevertheless, formal collaborations will be more effective in the context of nuclear imageries, as they can provide structured access to expertise, ensure accuracy in representing nuclear protocols, and encourage the deliberate use of cinema as a tool for public education on the gravity of nuclear risks and the importance of strategic stability in South Asia.
[b] 1983 was also the year of Able Archer NATO exercise, which nearly triggered Soviet miscalculation. A Soviet early warning system falsely reported U.S. missile launches, narrowly averted by officer Stanislav Petrov. The world did not know of the Soviet miscalculations immediately. At the time, the exercise was conducted as a routine NATO war game, and its near escalation to nuclear conflict remained classified. Reagan himself only fully grasped the severity of the incident after receiving intelligence briefings in 1983–84, which influenced his later arms control efforts. See: Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War.
[c] War Game faced restricted screenings after the BBC deemed it too disturbing for broadcast. It premiered to select audiences and at international festivals, winning major awards. The film was finally televised nationwide in the UK in 1985, ahead of Hiroshima’s 40th anniversary.
[d] The Berlin Crisis of 1961 was Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s second attempt to alter Berlin’s status by demanding the withdrawal of Western forces and halting the mass exodus of East Germans escaping to the West. The crisis brought Cold War tensions to a head, with US and Soviet tanks facing off at Checkpoint Charlie, raising fears of nuclear escalation. This atmosphere of brinkmanship, combined with ongoing nuclear testing, fuelled anti-nuclear activism. See: Eckart Conze, “Cold War Crises and Public Opinion: West European Public Opinion and the Berlin Wall, 1961,” in Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1955-1965, ed. Wilfred Loth (London: Routledge, 2004), 76-93.
[e] For instance, in Fanaa (2006), an insurgent poses a national threat through nuclear devices. Similarly, Hero: Love Story of a Spy (2003) dramatises espionage efforts to thwart nuclear terrorism, 16 December (2002) explores a fictional jihadi attempt to detonate a nuclear bomb in Delhi, Mr. India (1987) features a villain attempting nuclear destruction, and Tirangaa (1993) centres on terrorists trying to abduct scientists to craft nuclear missiles for India’s invasion only to be foiled by patriotic heroes. More recently, Pathaan (2023) depicts a rogue agent’s attempts to unleash nuclear devastation.
[f] In the 1980s and 1990s, China surreptitiously provided Pakistan with crucial nuclear technology, including blueprints for nuclear weapons and missile systems (see: Richard D. Fisher and John D. Tori, “The Strategic Implications of China’s Aid to Pakistan”, Heritage Foundation, June 16, 1998). China also provided “assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran. Beijing exported missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran” (see: Paul K. Kerr, China: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, Washington, DC, US Congressional Research Service, 2024, file:///C:/Users/DELL/Downloads/IF11737.13.pdf). Some sources also say Pakistan’s first nuclear weapon test was carried out for it by China in May 1990 (see: Ramesh Thakur, “China’s role in the India–Pakistan nuclear equation”, ASPI, May 7, 2019). These acts breached international non-proliferation norms, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which China is a signatory.
[g] Restraneeti in English means National Policy, Statecraft, or Strategic Policy, depending on the context.
[1] S. Paul Kapur, Feroz Hassan Khan, Michael S. Malley, and James A. Russell, The Nuclear Taboo and Non-Western Regional Powers (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), p. 24.
[2] Nina Tannenwald, “23 Years of Nonuse: Does the Nuclear Taboo Constrain India and Pakistan?,” Stimson Center, February 22, 2021.
[3] Tannenwald, “23 Years of Nonuse”
[4] John Wills, “A Life in American Cinema: The Nuclear Option,” Perspectives on History, November 2008, https://www.historians.org/perspectives-article/a-life-in-american-cinema-the-nuclear-option-november-2008/; Michael J. Yavenditti, “Atomic Scientists and Hollywood: The Beginning or the End?,” Film & History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and Television Studies 8, no. 4 (1978): 51–66, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/flm.1978.a487255; Matt Novak, “Hollywood and the Bomb,” Federation of American Scientists, December 7, 2020, https://fas.org/publication/hollywood-and-the-bomb/.
[5] Michael J. Dooley, “Impact of American Cinema Nuclear Geopolitical Identity,” Air University, April 2014, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1023587
[6] “AFI Catalogue”.
[7] Stephan Wilkinson, “How Convair’s Big B-36 Kept the Peace By Not Dropping the Bomb,” HistoryNet, July 26, 2021, https://www.historynet.com/the-peacemaker/
[8] Wills, “A Life in American Cinema”
[9] Ronaldo Pujol, “'The Day After:' Nuclear-attack TV Movie Horrifies America in 1983,” ABC7, November 20, 2024, https://abc7ny.com/day-after-nuclear-attack-tv-movie-horrifies-america-1983-eyewitness-news-vault/5709901/
[10] Pujol, “'The Day After:' Nuclear-attack”
[11] David Craig, “Calling Western Union: The Cultural Mission of Television Message Movies,” Journal of Popular Film and Television 42, no. 2 (2014): 63.
[12]Craig, “Calling Western Union”
[13] Ian Hedges, World Cinema and Cultural Memory (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 31-49.
[14] Robert Feleppa, “Black Rain: Reflections on Hiroshima and Nuclear War in Japanese Film,” CrossCurrents 54, no. 1 (2004): 106–19, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24460747.
[15] Louis Wright, “The Influence of the Nuclear Bomb on Japanese Cinema,” Redbrick, August 8, 2023, https://www.redbrick.me/feature-the-influence-of-the-nuclear-bomb-on-japanese-cinema/
[16] Feleppa, “Black Rain: Reflections on Hiroshima and Nuclear War”
[17] John R. Cook, “Who Banned the War Game? A Fifty-Year Controversy Reassessed,” Journal of British Cinema and Television 14, no. 1 (2017): 39–63, https://researchonline.gcu.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/24600569/J.Cook_Who_Banned_The_War_Game_article_for_JBCTV_author_accepted_copy.pdf.
[18] Andrew Bartlett, “Nuclear Warfare in the Movies,” Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropology 10, no. 1 (2004), https://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1001/bartlett/.
[19] Dan Lindley, “What I Learned Since I Stopped Worrying and Studied the Movie: A Teaching Guide to Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove,” PS: Political Science & Politics 34, no. 3 (2001): 663–67, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096501001068.
[20] Raminder Kaur, “The Nuclear Imaginary and Indian Popular Cinema,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (2013): 549, https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2013.831393.
[21] Mohammad Ibrar, “Bollywood First Choice for Pakistan’s Cine Lovers,” Times of India, April 19, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/bollywood-first-choice-for-pakistans-cine-lovers/articleshow/58264516.cms
[22] “Political Unrest in B’desh ‘Can Affect Entertainment Industries,” MillenniumPost, August 7, 2024, https://www.millenniumpost.in/bengal/political-unrest-in-bdesh-can-affect-entertainment-industries-574749; Priyanka Dasgupta, “Tollywood Roots for Team Bangladesh,” Times of India, March 16, 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/tollywood-roots-for-team-bangladesh/articleshow/51417801.cms.
[23] R. Joel Jairus and Sivapriya Sriram, “South Indian Tamil Cinema’s Influence on Sri Lankan Tamil Filmmakers,” International Journal of English Literature and Social Sciences 5, no. 6 (2020).; “‘Both Hindi and Tamil Movies are Famous in Sri Lanka’: Muttiah Muralitharan,” The Indian Express, December 1, 2023.
[24] “Afghanistan’s Love Affair with Bollywood,” The Express Tribune, April 9, 2010.
[25] Dooley, “Impact of American Cinema Nuclear Geopolitical Identity”
[26] Emily Crane, “Pakistan Warns Nuclear War with India is a ‘Clear and Present’ threat,” New York Post, May 8, 2025, https://nypost.com/2025/05/08/world-news/nuclear-war-threat-clear-and-present-pakistan-defence-minister-says/.
[27] Akriti Anand, “Pakistan Envoy Says Ready to Use ‘Conventional and Nuclear’ Weapons Against India,” Mint, May 4, 2025.
[28] Molly MacCalman, “AQ Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 104–18.
[29] Bruno Tertrais, “Khan’s Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy?,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008), 13–57; Richard P. Cronin, Alan Kronstadt and Sharon A. Squassoni, Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: US Policy Constraints and Options, Washington, DC, US Congressional Research Service, 2005.
[30] Philip Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 113–32.
[31] Ben Child, “Zero Dark Thirty's CIA Access Triggered Internal Agency Investigations,” The Guardian, September 12, 2015.
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Anubhav Shankar Goswami is a Doctoral Candidate of Politics and International Relations at the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Science, Murdoch University, Perth. His ...
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