This was not the first instance of such manoeuvring. Yet what makes this episode particularly egregious is China’s simultaneous participation in high-level bilateral talks with India, seeking the restoration of normalcy along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) while tacitly empowering India’s most implacable rival.
In that contradiction lies the core of the present crisis: the irreconcilable divergence between China’s spoken assurances and its geostrategic behaviour. Such a dichotomy is not a deviation from Chinese foreign policy — it is its essence.
When strategic patience becomes a delusion
Since the violent confrontation in June 2020, the LAC has transformed from a buffer of ambiguity into a fulcrum of unresolved contest. Although the October 2024 agreement promised disengagement and de-escalation in Ladakh, the terrain has remained heavily militarised. Chinese infrastructure has pushed aggressively westward — roads, helipads, and logistics hubs that speak to permanence rather than peace.
India must now chart a new strategic doctrine: one not of passive engagement, but of measured assertiveness. The doctrine must recognise that stability in Asia cannot be achieved through appeasement of a power that perceives accommodation as weakness.
What emerges is not a post-crisis return to the status quo ante, but the entrenchment of a new status quo: a fragile standoff defined by militarised vigilance, episodic diplomacy, and deep structural mistrust. The LAC has ceased to be a buffer; it is now a frontline.
Strategic patience, if devoid of realism, becomes a delusion. The People’s Republic of China, in its engagements with India, has not sought equilibrium but advantage. Its diplomacy is tactical; its strategy, long-term and revisionist. For New Delhi, to persist in the fiction of mutual trust is to ignore both history and present evidence. The border is not the periphery of the conflict but its epicentre, and Beijing has made clear it intends to write the terms.
In this context, India must now chart a new strategic doctrine: one not of passive engagement, but of measured assertiveness. The doctrine must recognise that stability in Asia cannot be achieved through appeasement of a power that perceives accommodation as weakness.
How India can wrest back control
New Delhi must calibrate its policy instruments — military, diplomatic, and economic — to reflect the reality that China respects strength and exploits hesitation.
Militarily, this entails a continued modernisation of the Indian armed forces with an emphasis on self-reliance. The successful deployment of India’s indigenously developed Pralay missile and the integrated air defence systems during the conflict with Pakistan demonstrated the value of a sovereign defence capability. These assets must be expanded, not merely as deterrents but as statements of national will. The efficacy of Indian systems during Operation Sindoor contrasted sharply with the faltering performance of Chinese-origin platforms used by Pakistan. It was a reminder that strategic autonomy demands technological independence.
Diplomatically, India must deepen its strategic partnerships, particularly with powers that share its apprehensions about China’s ambitions. The United States, Japan, Australia, and France all represent pillars of an alternative Indo-Pacific order — one predicated on collective security. India’s engagement with the Quad, and its increasing convergence with European democracies, must not be episodic but institutional, building a latticework of resilience across oceans and corridors.
It is in the economic realm, however, that India faces its most serious vulnerability. In 2024–25, India’s trade deficit with China ballooned to almost $100 billion, with Chinese imports saturating every domain of India’s industrial architecture, from electronics to renewable energy. The result is a dependency that imperils not only our economic sovereignty but also our strategic leverage.
India must now pursue a deliberate economic realignment. The Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, while commendable in ambition, require ruthless implementation. Supply chains must be diversified, not merely for efficiency but for security. Where disengagement from Chinese components is not immediately feasible — such as in smartphone manufacturing or solar panels — India must build domestic capabilities with the same urgency it once reserved for its nuclear programme.
Moreover, India should assert control over incoming Chinese investment, transforming it from a liability into a lever. Selective approval, conditioned on joint ventures or technology transfer, can give India the upper hand.
Delhi’s real alignment is with DC
Complicating India’s strategic posture is China’s tightening embrace of Russia, our long-time defence partner. In a potential Sino-Indian conflict, Moscow’s equivocation could become a critical liability. Thus, India must expand its defence procurement horizons and reduce overdependence on Russian platforms.
At the same time, India’s deepening partnership with the United States must be navigated with strategic foresight. Washington increasingly views New Delhi as a vital counterbalance to China’s growing assertiveness. This convergence has opened new avenues — enhancing defence cooperation, enabling critical technology transfers, and laying the foundation for comprehensive trade agreements.
Yet obstacles persist. Trade negotiations remain hampered by unresolved tensions stemming from Trump’s tariff regime, casting a shadow over economic engagement despite strong strategic alignment.
Public unease in India also surfaced after Trump’s off-the-cuff reference to Kashmir in his post about the ceasefire announcement between India and Pakistan. Though diplomatically unhelpful and rightly criticised, the episode should not obscure a broader geopolitical truth: the United States remains India’s most consequential strategic partner. The forthcoming Quad summit, with President Trump expected to visit New Delhi, offers a pivotal opportunity to cement a new framework of cooperation — one that positions India at the heart of a free, open, and multi-polar Indo-Pacific.
Beyond reactive diplomacy
As India and China near the symbolic milestone of 75 years of diplomatic engagement, there is an instinct — perhaps even a yearning — to commemorate the idea of a shared Asian renaissance: two ancient civilisations, long oppressed by imperial yokes, now marching together toward mutual resurgence. But this romantic notion of fraternal parity, of kindred giants walking hand-in-hand into modernity, has not survived the crucible of reality. If ever such a vision existed, it has long since been eclipsed by the cold mechanics of power, ambition, and national interest.
For New Delhi, the path forward lies not in indulging theatrical appeals to ‘Asian brotherhood’, but in resolutely preparing to confront Chinese fire with the tempered steel of Indian resolve.
China’s posture today is no longer merely opaque; it is deliberately enigmatic, masking expansionist intentions beneath a veneer of strategic charm and rhetorical equivocation. Its diplomacy is transactional, tactical, and often contemptuous of mutuality. Its actions — whether on the Himalayan frontiers, on India’s western front, in South Asian littorals, or in the boardrooms of multinational commerce — have been less those of a partner and more of an exploiter, seeking not coexistence, but pre-eminence.
There will be two opportunities for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping to meet this year — at the BRICS summit in Brazil in July and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in China later. These encounters, however, must not be misread as signs of a thaw or revival of an equal partnership. India must discard any residual illusions on that front. Strategic nostalgia is not a substitute for strategic clarity. The language of Panchsheel has already given way to a lexicon defined by preparedness, deterrence, and geopolitical realism.
For New Delhi, the path forward lies not in indulging theatrical appeals to ‘Asian brotherhood’, but in resolutely preparing to confront Chinese fire with the tempered steel of Indian resolve.
This contest, of course, need not manifest in open conflict. India’s reply must be more sophisticated — rooted in a diplomacy that is sceptical but not cynical, partnerships that are principled but not naïve, and a national posture that is firm yet restrained. It must project strength not only through its military capabilities but through its economic resilience, technological ambition, and moral stature. India’s task is not merely to react to China, but to shape the conditions under which power in Asia is exercised.
This commentary originally appeared in The Print
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