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Nisha Holla, “India Could Age Before It Becomes Rich: From Demographic Dividend to Productivity Dividend,” ORF Issue Brief No. 862, Observer Research Foundation, March 2026.
Three converging forces are driving India’s rise as a global economic power: accelerated technology adoption, market liberalisation, and the scale-based consumption advantage of a vast and youthful population. Since the economic reforms of the 1990s, India’s demographic profile—with more than half the population under 30—has served as a structural tailwind. It has boosted domestic growth through a surging labour force and rising consumption while supplying global talent pipelines in Information Technology (IT), healthcare, and services.
That equation is now changing as fertility has declined sharply across regions, income brackets, and religious groups. Data from various National Fertility and Health Surveys show that India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) dropped to 2.0 in 2019–21 from 3.39 in 1990-92 and 2.18 in 2015–16. The replacement threshold is 2.1.[1] With a population of 1.46 billion,[2] the ramifications are sweeping: school enrolments will taper, the working-age population will peak within decades, and the share of elderly citizens will accelerate. The Indian policymaking machine must study the various first-, second-, and third-order effects of this drop to mitigate their negative consequences.
This risk is compounded by the broader structural challenge of what is referred to as the ‘middle-income trap’. According to the World Bank, most emerging economies that escape poverty to achieve middle-income status then struggle to reach high-income status, experiencing long periods of stagnation as earlier growth drivers—abundance of low-cost labour, capital formation, and export expansion—begin to exhaust. Just 34 countries have broken out of this trap since 1990.[3] The World Bank classifies India as a lower-middle-income country with a median age under 30, and identifies a critical window to avoid this stagnation spiral.
In 2023, India overtook China to become the world’s most populous country at 1.43 billion.[4] At the same time, however, population growth in India is slowing down. The following points put these numbers in perspective:
The window to act is narrow. Over the next 15–20 years, India must convert its demographic dividend into a productivity dividend. By the 2040s, the dependency ratio will rise, fiscal space will tighten, and each worker will carry greater economic and welfare burdens. Demography will no longer drive growth. Without rapid gains in productivity, innovation, and institutional capacity, progress could begin to stall. India’s growth model must now evolve to secure long-term momentum after its population peaks.
Several opportunities lie in this window. India has already laid the foundations for technology- and innovation-led strategies that can fuel the productivity engine when demographic tailwinds fade. It also marks the emergence of a silver economy—a new demand frontier that spans healthcare, long-term care, housing, financial services, assistive technology, and age-friendly infrastructure. If anticipated early, India’s ageing trajectory can yield a silver dividend, creating jobs, new markets, and productivity gains rather than becoming a fiscal drag.
Indian families are confronting an unprecedented demographic shift, marked by a decline in family size and shrinking sibling cohorts. The current decline in joint families—with an accompanying rise in nuclear families and single-child households—will accelerate more sharply. The progression towards nuclear families and single-child households is no longer just an urban trend, and is now prevalent across income groups and geographies. As the demographic bulge ages, the burden of eldercare will fall on fewer adults, increasing stress on working-age individuals, particularly women.[11]
This creates a structural tailwind for long-term care, assisted living, home health services, and geriatric infrastructure. Family-based care today is largely informal and must evolve into a formal care economy. Age care services are labour-intensive, locally anchored, and well-suited to absorbing female employment, especially in semi-urban India. If formalised and professionalised, the care economy can become a major source of inclusive job creation.[a]
This moment also creates a historic opportunity to reshape gender inclusion. With fertility declining and caregiving dynamics shifting, women’s time-use patterns can be reallocated towards paid work, provided enabling conditions exist. Investment in childcare and eldercare infrastructure, workplace flexibility, and digital safety nets can unlock India’s most underutilised growth lever: female labour participation.[12]
India’s working-age cohort—those between 15 and 59—makes up about 66 percent of the total population. This share is expected to peak in the early 2040s, after which the labour force will contract and dependency ratios will climb. The next 15 to 20 years represent the final phase of India’s youth bulge entering the workforce. A large and productive workforce is central to long-term economic growth. It fuels demand and consumption, drives innovation, and sustains public finances. When this workforce is equipped with the right skills, good health, and gainful employment in high-value sectors, it serves as a lever for accelerating economic growth and building national prosperity.
With the demographic window closing, there is a narrow and urgent opportunity to ensure that this final wave of new workers is effectively absorbed—particularly into sectors that require advanced and interdisciplinary skills.
The demographic transition will place sustained and multidimensional pressure on India’s already stretched state capacity. As the age profile of the population shifts, the public sector will be forced to rebalance expenditure from child-centric services toward eldercare, chronic disease management, and social protection. Rising dependency ratios will strain public finances even as the tax base flattens.
As mentioned briefly earlier, India’s old-age dependency ratio, currently at 16 percent, is projected to rise sharply to 30 percent by 2050. This means that for every three working-age individuals, there will be one person aged 60 or above, massively reshaping intergenerational economics. Without adequate pension systems, insurance coverage, and preventive healthcare, the working-age population will bear rising fiscal and caregiving burdens, heightening intergenerational inequity. Investing early in care systems and productivity-enhancing health infrastructure is essential to sustaining social contracts and political stability.
Technology can be an important differentiator in the delivery of these services. Health tech, telemedicine, and diagnostics driven by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and advancements in biotechnology and materials can ensure medical services at scale.
Fertility decline is now a trend across India, though with notable regional asymmetries.
Table 1: Fertility Trends in Indian States and Union Territories (by Region)
| Location | Number of States/UTs | Notes |
| North | 9 | All states/UTs have TFRs below the national average, except Rajasthan (2.01). |
| Central | 3 | Madhya Pradesh is at par, Chhattisgarh is below, and Uttar Pradesh is above with 2.35. |
| East | 4 | Bihar (3) and Jharkhand (2.3) are above the national average, while Odisha and West Bengal are below. |
| Northeast (NE) | 8 | All NE states are below the national average except for Manipur (2.2) and Meghalaya (2.9). |
| West | 4 | All states/UTs have TFRs below the national average. |
| South | 8 | All states/UTs have TFRs below the national average. |
| India | 36 | Total Fertility Rate of 2 |
Source: National Family and Health Survey[13]
While India’s TFR has fallen to 2.0 overall, the speed and stage of transition vary sharply by region. These disparities have implications for workforce availability, state-level fiscal burdens, and the timing of demographic ageing. Southern and Western India have uniformly transitioned below replacement levels. All eight southern and four western states/UTs now report TFRs below 2.0, indicating the early onset of population stabilisation and ageing pressures. Northern India is also below the national average in most states, including Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and the erstwhile Jammu & Kashmir. Rajasthan is the only northern state at par, with 2.01. Central India presents a mixed picture, with Madhya Pradesh nearing the national average and Chhattisgarh indicating a further decline. Uttar Pradesh registered a high of 2.35, making it an outlier and contributor to future population momentum. Eastern India is bifurcated: Odisha and West Bengal are below 2.0, while Jharkhand (2.3) and Bihar (3.0) remain well above replacement levels. Bihar’s high TFR skews national averages and extends the demographic window regionally. Northeast India, excluding Manipur (2.2) and Meghalaya (2.9), is largely below the national average.
This divergence implies that India’s demographic shift will occur in an uneven manner. Some states—especially in the South and West—will face ageing burdens and shrinking labour forces by the 2030s. These states have high per-capita incomes and higher levels of industrialisation and urbanisation. They also face higher degrees of immigration from labour-surplus states.
Other states, particularly in the Hindi heartland and East, will continue to generate young workers well into the 2040s. These states also have notably lower per-capita incomes and lower levels of industrialisation and urbanisation. Dependence on agriculture and rural sectors is steep. Without access to sufficient high-income opportunities, emigration from these states to southern and western states is also substantial.
Policymakers must take into account these divergent regional trajectories to tailor state-specific strategies. State governments must take the lead in understanding the needs of their populations, often varying within the state as well.
India’s demographic shift window coincides with the nation entering the largest urbanisation wave in human history. As of 2024, it was estimated at around 37 percent, compared to the world average of 58 percent.[14] The United Nations (UN) estimates that, by 2050, more than 400 million people will require new housing, infrastructure, and employment opportunities in towns and cities across the country.[15] To facilitate this shift sustainably and avoid overwhelming the top 20 cities, India must systematically develop 5,000 census towns.[16] Its urban transition will define how effectively it manages demographic change.
Cities will carry the dual challenge of absorbing a young and restless labour force while simultaneously adapting to an ageing population that will demand care, comfort, and safety. Urban agglomerates today are woefully unprepared with urban design, housing, and transport systems that are accessible, closer to healthcare centres, and safe for the elderly. This challenge will be compounded by climate risk. Heat stress, air pollution, flooding, and water scarcity disproportionately harm older populations and raise chronic disease burdens. Indeed, India risks ageing before becoming rich, and before becoming climate-resilient. ‘Smart city’ initiatives must therefore go beyond sensors and dashboards to integrate age, family-friendly, and climate-resilient design as productivity infrastructure.
As fertility declines, families resize, and the population ages, India’s consumption dynamics will evolve from mass-market to segmented precision-market. The shifting customer age segments will reshape what households buy, how they save and invest, and which industries drive growth. Though Indian youth will continue to be a large target segment, the economic engine will increasingly depend on the purchasing power of its middle-aged and elderly citizens.
Younger households with fewer children will spend more per child on education, health, and enrichment. At the same time, ageing households will direct a higher share of their spending towards medical insurance, preventive healthcare, geriatric care and housing, and financial security. This demand transition can unlock a new wave of innovation. India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) is already formalising consumption at scale, expanding financial inclusion, and enabling new verticals like healthtech, insurtech, longevity finance, retirement planning, assistive devices, and age-friendly housing.
The expanding silver market provides significant incentives for startups and large enterprises to carve out markets in. India’s opportunity lies in building affordable, scalable models that can serve domestic needs and tap into global ageing markets.
India’s current growth model, driven by abundant labour, services exports, and domestic consumption, must pivot from scale to sophistication and productivity. It will be easier to anticipate and facilitate the pivot, and infinitely more expensive to wait and react later. As fertility falls and the labour force plateaus, India can no longer rely on the volume of workers to sustain growth. It must focus on increasing the value created per worker.
For decades, India’s competitive advantage came from cost arbitrage—young engineers in IT services, affordable factory labour, and a vast informal sector absorbing a mass of low-skilled labour. This model delivered scale but not resilience, creating low-productivity growth. As the labour-surplus shrinks, cost competitiveness will no longer suffice. Future prosperity depends on how fast India can create a mosaic of growth vectors with technological depth, capital intensity, innovation density, and broad-based productivity.
India needs a systematic shift where every sector—agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and services maximises its output with fewer hands. That requires capital deepening through automation, robotics, and high-tech equipment; a nationwide upskilling through AI-driven education and digital skilling, a boost in manufacturing and production that reduces reliance on imports and supply-chain vulnerabilities, and strategic indigenous technological advancement that underpins all the above.
India’s anticipated demographic shift compels a fundamental redesign of its growth model, where technology will take centre-stage. As the working-age population plateaus, future growth will depend not on additional workers, but on architecting more value per worker. The question before policymakers is no longer whether India can employ its youth, but whether it can equip them with the tools and technologies to outperform their numbers.
The Solow Growth Model explains output (Y) as a function of labour (L), capital (K), and total factor productivity (A):[17]
Y = A x f (K,L)
The model stipulates that growth is driven by three sources: a large workforce, greater capital investment, and higher productivity. However, labour and capital eventually face diminishing returns. Technology and innovation, captured in —known as the Solow residual—drive long-term growth. The model is useful to inform policymaking to facilitate a productive demographic shift. With labour growth flattening and capital accumulation gradually slowing, productivity must now carry the weight of the nation’s economic ambitions. This is where technology—in its broadest sense, from AI and robotics to DPI and frontier innovation—becomes the decisive growth engine. It enhances output across all three of Solow’s factors with labour augmentation, the deepening of capital, and broad-based productivity boosts. The innovation frontier, underpinned by technology, creates new value-added sectors that further economic growth.
Techno-sovereignty is a macroeconomic necessity. The forthcoming decades of productivity gains will depend on access to advanced technology stacks—semiconductors, batteries, AI models, quantum computing, and new materials. Without domestic capability in these inputs, India’s productivity frontier will always be dependent on global supply chains, and its growth hostage to external factors.
The demographic clock is ticking in policy time. The investments that India makes in the next five years—in skills, technology, healthcare, and state capacity—will determine its economic trajectory for the next 50, and convert the demographic dividend into a productivity dividend. Productivity gains take years to compound, and human capital and infrastructure take a decade to mature. To sustain growth after the workforce peaks in the 2030s, India must act now, building the technological and institutional foundations whose dividends will arrive in the 2040s. Policymakers at all levels must act across this narrow window.
India’s demographic dividend can become productive only if every citizen, particularly in the working age group, is equipped for 21st-century work. Yet today’s skilling ecosystem is fragmented, curriculum-industry alignment remains weak, and core employability—especially beyond Tier-1 cities—is low. As the economy shifts towards productivity-led growth and automation expands, India must move from enrolment-driven education to outcome-driven skilling. Skilling must now become core infrastructure.
A healthy population is the ultimate productivity asset for any nation. Every additional healthy year contributes directly to GDP and its growth. Policymakers must put in motion mechanisms to unlock healthier lives for the gradually ageing population. Longer health spans can unlock greater workforce participation among the 60-64 age group in age-appropriate work, which will help offset the growing old-age dependency ratio.
Globally, ageing economies have spurred multi-trillion-dollar silver economies through innovation in assistive technology, telemedicine, geriatric care, wellness services, and age-friendly infrastructure. India has the advantage of scale as well as the time to prepare, with the potential to pioneer affordable longevity solutions that also serve global markets.
India’s demographic window is narrowing unevenly. States like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, and parts of the Northeast will continue producing large cohorts of young workers over the next two decades—precisely as Southern and Western states begin to experience labour shortages and ageing burdens. This demographic divergence is both a risk and an opportunity.
To harness it, India must proactively anchor labour-intensive industries, such as textiles, food processing, leather, construction materials, logistics, and electronics assembly, in these surplus-labour states. Doing so not only absorbs youth locally but also reduces the fiscal and social pressures of unmanaged migration. Combined with the portability of social benefits, digital public infrastructure (DPI) for financial and skills credentials, and MSME (Micro, Small and Medium Industries) credit expansion, this becomes a scalable play for regional rebalancing.
Sovereign technology capacity and strategic moats are the determinants of economic resilience, productivity, and geopolitical leadership. Dependence on imported tech constrains economic output and endurance.
India’s urban transition will determine whether demographic change boosts productivity or overwhelms state capacity. Cities must be designed for youth employment, elderly wellbeing, and climate resilience.
Supporting the outward mobility of skilled and semi-skilled workers must become an intentional policy instrument. India’s scale advantage in human capital—across tech, healthcare, construction, and services—can be strategically deployed to meet global talent shortages, while simultaneously driving remittances, global influence, and skilling upgrades. Remittance transfers to India hit a record high of US$135.5 billion in FY25, contributing substantially to the country’s balance of payments.[18]
Recent bilateral mobility agreements with Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, and Australia signal a shift towards extended legal, skills-linked migration frameworks.[b] Global talent mobility pathways create a triple dividend for India: easing domestic labour pressures, integrating Indian talent into advanced economies’ value chains, and maintaining the flow of remittances.
Metrics: Share of outbound workers with formal, certified skills; annual remittance inflows; ratio of legal to irregular migration flows.
India’s rise as a global tech and innovation hub is driven by its talent pipeline into both the domestic and global ecosystems. The country already hosts 1,700+ Global Capability Centres (GCCs), including 400 of the Fortune 500 companies, which have moved from simpler, repetitive tasks to generating core R&D.[19] MeitY has recently taken the lead in building a national framework to expand India’s GCC ecosystem.[20]
As major economies tighten high-skilled migration—most notably the US with its recent imposition of a US$100,000 H-1B visa fee, India must seize the opportunity to become a “talent haven”. Industry voices argue that just as Ireland successfully positioned itself as the tax haven of choice for US firms seeking jurisdictional advantages, India can position itself as the default hub for talent-intensive operations of enterprises headquartered in the US and elsewhere.[21] While India scales domestic deep tech capabilities, positioning itself as a global talent haven is the most effective way to rapidly cultivate a large pool of experts at the cutting edge.
These seven policy levers operationalise the Solow framework for 21st-century India. As labour expansion fades, productivity, capital deepening, innovation, and institutional efficiency become the dominant force multipliers of output. The Indian policy machine must move technology from sectoral policymaking to an integrated core agenda. NITI Aayog has created several state-wise dashboards, like the Sustainable Development Goals index, and can repurpose these templates to track the metrics formulated for each policy lever.
India’s economy can no longer grow on the back of its demographic dividend. Fertility rates have fallen below replacement levels across states and income groups. The working-age population will plateau by the early 2040s, and the old-age dependency ratio is already rising. India is confronting a narrowing window in which population size alone can no longer guarantee growth.
India’s ability to avoid the middle-income trap will depend on the timely and coordinated execution of targeted policy pathways. The trap catches economies that fail to upgrade their productivity engines. Each of the seven strategies outlined in this brief directly targets this challenge. Anchoring labour-intensive industries in surplus states addresses spatial mismatches in job creation. Skilling and education reforms build a globally relevant, future-ready workforce. Supporting global talent flows and reinforcing India as a talent haven deepens its integration with global value chains. Deep tech capacity building and techno-sovereignty reduce vulnerability in a geopolitically fragmented world. Smart urbanisation that is age-inclusive and climate-resilient safeguards productivity.
Handled strategically, ageing can also be a demand-side catalyst. The rise of the silver economy and formalisation of the care economy can create new markets and inclusive employment at scale, turning longevity into a silver dividend rather than a fiscal trap. The connective tissue across the board is productivity, measured not just by output per worker but by the nation’s capacity to adapt, absorb technology, and reallocate talent to high-value sectors.
Middle-income economies that fail to act tend to stagnate under fiscal strain, an ageing population, and a loss of competitive edge. India must defy that pattern. By executing these reforms in tandem and at speed, the country can shift from a labour-quantity growth model to a productivity-quality paradigm. That is the surest path to high-income status, resilience, and long-term economic sovereignty.
Further, the ongoing geopolitical reordering is being shaped not only by trade and security blocs but by asymmetric demographic trajectories. China, Japan, Europe, and South Korea are ageing rapidly, with shrinking workforces and rising dependency ratios constraining fiscal space, innovation velocity, and military and industrial capacity. India, despite its own ageing trajectory, remains structurally younger than other large economies. This relative demographic position enhances India’s strategic weight as a growth anchor, talent supplier, and demand centre in a fragmenting global economy. Its emerging silver economy positions it as a testbed for affordable care, longevity tech, and age-friendly systems that other ageing nations will need. Converting its remaining demographic window into productivity gains is therefore not only a socio-economic imperative but a geopolitical one.
Nisha Holla is Visiting Fellow, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] Japan, for instance, has its Long Term Care Insurance (LTCI) Act (2000) that formalised the role of “certified care workers”, providing formal labour opportunities in the silver economy. South Korea modeled its own LTCI Act on Japan’s, with a sharper focus on private sector participation. Germany, Denmark, and Sweden have also built successful formal care worker programmes. All of these countries face severe labour shortages in these sectors due to aged populations and smaller workforces, and their formalisation frameworks have met with success.
[b] These include Germany’s Skilled Labour Strategy for India which was affirmed in January 2026 during the Chancellor’s visit to India, the Young Indians Professionals Scheme renewed by the UK for 2026, the India-Japan Human Resource Exchange and Cooperation program signed in August 2025, and Australia’s MATES visa program that concluded its latest ballot in December 2025.
[c] UPI International is the global expansion of India’s UPI network, allowing for the “scan and pay” experience to work across borders. It has three distinct use cases: Indian tourists can pay at international merchant locations in select countries, NRIs in select countries can link NRE/NRO accounts to their international mobile numbers, and foreign tourists can open prepaid wallets in India.
[1] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results, July 2024, New York, United Nations, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/files/documents/2024/Jul/wpp2024_summary_of_results_final_web.pdf.
[2] United Nations Population Fund, “India – Population 2025,” https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/IN.
[3] World Bank, World Development Report 2024: The Middle-Income Trap Overview, August 2024, Washington DC, World Bank Group, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099080824150598470/pdf/P1807451cdbcc60881afdc19c40acb2e017.pdf.
[4] “India to Overtake China as World’s Most Populous Country by April 2023, United Nations Projects,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, April 2023, https://www.un.org/en/desa/india-overtake-china-world-most-populous-country-april-2023-united-nations-projects.
[5] “World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results, July 2024.”
[6] Sampurna Panigrahi, “India’s fertility rate plunged in last 70 yrs, population to shrink further by 2050 — Lancet study,” The Print, March 23, 2024, https://theprint.in/india/indias-fertility-rate-plunged-in-last-70-yrs-population-to-shrink-further-by-2050-lancet-study/2012615/.
[7] United Nations Population Division, “Data Portal,” https://population.un.org/dataportal/home?df=446c4c9b-3837-4d35-9a03-e6f4bd734c50.
[8] India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Sample Registration System Statistical Survey 2023, New Delhi, 2023, https://censusindia.gov.in/nada/index.php/catalog/46172/download/50420/SRS_STAT_2023.pdf.
[9] International Institute for Population Sciences & United Nations Population Fund, India Ageing Report 2023, Caring for Our Elders: Institutional Responses, 2023, New Delhi, United Nations Population Fund, https://india.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/20230926_india_ageing_report_2023_web_version_.pdf.
[10] India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Sample Registration System Statistical Survey 2023.
[11] “Unpaid care work prevents 708 million women from participating in the labour market,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, https://social.desa.un.org/sdn/unpaid-care-work-prevents-708-million-women-from-participating-in-the-labour-market.
[12] World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2024, June 2024, Cologny, World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2024/in-full/economic-and-leadership-gaps-constraining-growth-and-skewing-transitions-7b05a512cb.
[13] National Family Health Survey, https://www.nfhsiips.in/nfhsuser/index.php.
[14] “Our World in Data,” https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization.
[15] “68% of the world population projected to live in urban areas by 2050, says UN,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018, https://www.un.org/uk/desa/68-world-population-projected-live-urban-areas-2050-says-un#:~:text=Today%2C%2055%25%20of%20the%20world's,increase%20to%2068%25%20by%202050.
[16] TV Mohandas Pai and Nisha Holla, “Planned urbanization is key to employment and development,” Financial Express, July 9, 2024, https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/planned-urbanization-is-key-to-employment-and-development/3548487/.
[17] Robert M Solow, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1957, Vol. 39 No. 3 pp.312-320, The MIT Press, http://www.piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Solow1957.pdf.
[18] TOI Business Desk, ““Remittances at a Record High: Indian Diaspora Sends Home $135.46 Billion, Inflows More Than Double in Eight Years,” Times of India, June 30, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/remittances-at-a-record-high-indian-diaspora-sends-home-135-46-billion-inflows-more-than-double-in-eight-years/articleshow/122153757.cms.
[19] Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2025-26, January 2026, New Delhi, Government of India, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/.
[20] Palak Sharma, “MeitY Forms Panel to Build National Framework for GCCs: Report,” Inc42, May 28, 2025, https://inc42.com/buzz/meity-forms-panel-to-build-national-framework-for-gccs-report/.
[21] Pranav Pai, “A Second Turning: India as the Talent Haven for Global Tech,” Inc42, September 22, 2025, https://inc42.com/resources/a-second-turning-india-as-the-talent-haven-for-global-tech/.
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Nisha Holla is Visiting Fellow at ORF where she writes on ideas and shifts at the intersection of technology economics and policy. She tracks the ...
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