Originally Published 2021-01-05 11:04:28 Published on Jan 05, 2021
Like several other countries in the Indo-Pacific, India is also hardening its policy posture vis-à-vis China.
India, China, and the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s recalibration is underway
The growing importance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape in Asia have brought the Indo-Pacific construct to the center of global political discourse. The region is marked by uncertainty about expansionist Chinese territorial policies and concerns about the United States’ long-term commitment to Asia amidst inherent limitations of existing regional multilateral institutions. This geography is being viewed as the new and expanded theater of great-power contestation. India has in general stayed away from taking a defined stand on the contested power politics and maintained cordial relations with most of the stakeholders of this region by engaging bilaterally as well as within plurilateral and multilateral platforms with its Indo-Pacific partners. Inclusiveness, openness, ASEAN centrality have been the predominant pillars of India’s conception of the Indo-Pacific. But given Chinese aggression along the Sino-Indian border, especially after the 15 June 2020 clash with PLA troops in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, India is in the process of redefining its priorities in the wider Indo-Pacific region even as it re-evaluates its assumptions underlying China policy. The choice to work closely with like-minded countries and develop a stronger stance against China’s “not so peaceful rise” is viewed as a priority now by New Delhi. Like several other countries in the Indo-Pacific, India is also hardening its policy posture vis-à-vis China. In more ways than one, however, it is the rise of China that has been instrumental in shaping New Delhi’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. China’s growing ambitions, its increasingly aggressive foreign policy posture, and its border skirmishes with New Delhi have evoked a disconcerting feeling, forcing India to focus its energies on the rise of Beijing and establish itself in a leading role in the Indo-Pacific.

In more ways than one, however, it is the rise of China that has been instrumental in shaping New Delhi’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

There has been a marked shift in China’s foreign policy posture in recent years. Since the 2008–09 financial crisis, perception of a geopolitical opening has pushed China toward making bolder moves on the global stage. And under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China sees itself as moving to the center stage of global politics as perceptions about relative American decline have gathered pace. China’s aggressive foreign policy stance is reflective in the assertive security policies it has been adopting towards its neighbours. It is engaged in territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Since 2013, it has been building up and militarising many of the islands and reefs it controls in the region and stepping up its aggressive posturing toward New Delhi, with repeated altercations with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Additionally, China has also been trying to establish itself as the foremost regional player through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Even when the world is grappling with the manifold impact of the ongoing pandemic, China has been actively pressing its sovereignty claims. Chinese creeping assertiveness and territorial expansionist policies have demolished the idea of China’s “peaceful rise,” and most countries, such as the United States and Australia, are now resetting their China policies and their policy priorities in the Indo-Pacific region in general. As China has become more assertive in the region, these countries are further remapping their defence strategies and foreign policies, looking to strengthen cooperation with like-minded countries. Sino-Indian relations have also been rather turbulent in recent years. Though the border dispute has been clouding bilateral relations for more than half a century, the frequency of events along the border appears to have increased in the last few years. In 2017, it was the Doklam crisis at the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction that brought the two Asian giants close to a conflict. Though the two nations decided to engage with each other after this crisis, there were various other issues that made it difficult to bring normalcy to bilateral relations. After the Doklam stand-off, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held an informal summit in 2018 in the Chinese city of Wuhan and hammered out the idea of a “Wuhan spirit” between the two nations that would allow for both to move forward without necessarily being a threat to each other. Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi met for their second informal summit in October 2019 at Mamallapuram, near Chennai in southern India, and agreed to set up a new high-level mechanism to increase trade and commercial relations and better balance trade between the two countries.

With the two nations jostling for influence in their respective neighbourhoods and beyond, the 2020 border crisis was the last straw for a fundamental reappraisal of India’s China policy as well as its larger regional outlook.

Overall, the so-called “Wuhan spirit” did not have much of an impact in galvanising Sino-Indian ties in a positive direction. Furthermore, China’s apprehension about India’s aspirations to play a larger role in the regional and global arena remains strong. With the two nations jostling for influence in their respective neighbourhoods and beyond, the 2020 border crisis was the last straw for a fundamental reappraisal of India’s China policy as well as its larger regional outlook. Managing the strategic challenge from China has become the topmost foreign policy priority for India. With growing concerns in India about China’s expansionist tendencies, India is ready to embark on a more proactive role in the region, reflected in a range of policy choices New Delhi has made in recent times both about the region and China. Given Chinese sensitivities, India had been reluctant to brand its Indo-Pacific policy as a “strategy” but has mostly referred to it as its “vision” for the Indo-Pacific. As a more robust Quad takes shape and as other regional powers also recalibrate their China ties, India is trying to devise a stronger Indo-Pacific approach with other like-minded nations. The securitisation of the Quad with joint military exercises and moves toward greater interoperability might be the first step as a new security architecture emerges in the maritime geography. In every aspect ranging from trade and technology to regional and global collaborations, Indian foreign and security policy is being designed with the aim of tackling the China challenge. Therefore, this wider shift in India’s regional stance will not only have a significant bearing on the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy but on the larger regional security matrix as well.
This is an extract from Harsh V. Pant and Premesha Saha, “India, China, and the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Recalibration Is Underway,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, No 4 (Winter 2021), pp. 187-206.
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Authors

Harsh V. Pant

Harsh V. Pant

Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President – Studies and Foreign Policy at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations ...

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Premesha Saha

Premesha Saha

Premesha Saha is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses on Southeast Asia, East Asia, Oceania and the emerging dynamics of the ...

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