PDF Download 
Introduction
Sanctions are one of the most popular tools of statecraft. Defined as an instrument, employed by one or more international actors against another, with a view to influencing the target's foreign and/ or security policy behaviour,1 the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy is not new. The Megarian Decree imposed by the Athenian Empire on Megara in 432 B.C is the oldest documented example of peace-time economic sanctions. The decree, primarily a response to Megara's cultivation of sacred land, was directed against the citizens of Megara—barring them from trading in the Athenian Empire. Since then many States over the centuries have used sanctions to arm-twist and change the behaviour of target countries. International organisations, throughout the 20th century, used sanctions to impose their positions. The League of Nations first imposed sanctions in 1921 against Yugoslavia when the latter invaded Albania. The organisation imposed or threatened to impose economic sanctions only four times during its existence.2 Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations (UN) can impose sanctions in the event of any “threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression”. The 1990s was called the 'Sanction's Decade' in the UN as thenumber of sanction cases increased from two in the Cold War period (against Rhodesia and South Africa) to 50 between 1990 and 2000.
UN sanctions evolved after the end of Cold War, acquiring a more focused outlook by targeting
individuals and organisations.3 Post-Cold War, the nature of issues that sparked sanctions also
changed significantly. As UN cases involving conflicts within the States increased from 25 per cent to 53 per cent post-Cold War, sanctions started to be used to strengthen the UN's efforts to contain these intra-state conflicts. Other cases usually dealt with states with terrorist links or regimes pursuing weapons of mass destruction–particularly Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea.4 Currently, the UN has 10 sanction regimes in place against the following states: Eritrea and Somalia, Iraq, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Syria, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, and against Al Qaeda members.5
Among States, the US has imposed the highest number of unilateral sanctions in the world. Over the years, sanctions have emerged as a favoured policy tool of the US and served a number of purposes, ranging from signalling disapproval, pleasing domestic constituencies, to meaning actual harm.6 The US has a well-laid and articulate policy on international sanctions: Primary sanctions that directly aim the target and secondary sanctions which are enforced on the bodies that do not conform to established sanction regimes are both enacted through US domestic laws or presidential executive orders.
The idea of economic sanctions as an instrument of policy was introduced by President Woodrow Wilson in 1919. While making a case for the League of Nations, Wilson discussed sanctions, arguing, “apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force.”7 Through the past century, the US imposed a number of economic sanctions. According to Peterson's Institute of International Economics, the US imposed economic sanctions more than 101 times in the 20th century. Acknowledging this fact, in 1998 President Bill Clinton asserted that the US had become “sanctions happy”.8 Later, George W. Bush and Barack Obama would carry on with this legacy and place a number of sanctions on various entities. The US has also imposed sanctions on members of terrorist organisations to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, the US has a number of sanction regimes in place, including against Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Cote d'Ivoire, Syria and Sudan; drug traffickers and terrorist organisations are also under US sanctions.9
Sanctions today have not only gained acceptability but also popularity among a number of Western States. However, China, Russia and various developing states have raised their objections to sanctions, especially unilateral ones. On March 15, 2012, India—along with Russia, China and 32 other States—voted in favour of a UN Human Rights Council resolution (A/ HR C/ 19/ L.12) that lucidly discussed human rights and unilateral coercive measures.10 According to the resolution:
“Unilateral coercive measures in the form of economic sanctions can have far-reaching implications for the human rights of the general population of targeted States, disproportionately affecting the poor and the most vulnerable classes. Long-term unilateral coercive measures may result in social problems and raise humanitarian concerns in the States targeted”.11
Most of the European Union member States and the US voted against the resolution. The Developing States have often argued that sanctions infringe upon sovereignty. Though Developing States cannot be taken as a monolithic entity while exploring their perspectives on sanctions, in general, academics in many Developing States seem sceptical of the true intentions of the sanctioner.12
The UN General Assembly has taken a keen interest on the issue of sanctions. At the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly called upon the Security Council thus: “To ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarianexemptions”.13
However, specialists have pointed out that what constitutes “fair and clear procedures” is contested, and its determination depends on both legal and political arguments. The final judgement always rests with the Security Council.14
Sanctions in the Indian Context
It has been argued that, traditionally, India has viewed sanctions as a diplomatic tool that “does not serve any purpose.”15 However, India's support for various multilateral sanctions regimes is evident, especially the ones against terrorist groups.16 With the opening up of the Indian economy, the State has become a pertinent player in the arena of economic statecraft. India's views are given sufficient consideration at the international level, but unlike the permanent members of the UNSC, its stand on sanctions cases does not carry much weight in the UN. Yet, studying Indian foreign policy and discourse closely reveals that the subject of international sanctions has been amply discussed and debated by Indian leaders, policymakers and economists.
India has not shied away from using economic tools to further its foreign policy goals.17 Nonetheless, it is one of the few States in the world with a unique position, having played the roles of both sanctioner and sanctionee. As the Indian economy grows and becomes more connected with the world economy, it finds itself potent enough to use economic coercion and connected enough to face the same. An emerging power, India's international interests are growing; simultaneously, it has had difficulties dealing with the growing frequency and intensity of international sanctions. Of late, the issue of Iranian sanctions has come to light, and consequently India has had to manage the tension between the international approach to the issue and its own foreign-policy interests. Hence, the question of international sanctions has begun to acquire some salience in the conduct of India's foreign policy. As we examine the future challenges confronting India, it is important to take a step back and study the instances when India imposed sanctions on other states and entities. This paper attempts to study India's perception, understanding and formulation of policy towards economic coercion in general and sanctions in particular. The main purpose of the paper is to evaluate India's past policies as a sanctioner while tracing its history and attitude towards international sanctions.
Sanctions in India's Foreign Policy Tradition
India's foreign-policy makers have been prudent enough to recognise the importance of economic coercion as an instrument of foreign policy. Economic sanctions were discussed as early as in 1936, when the foreign policy discourse was beginning to take shape. Highlighting the broad outline of Indian National Congress's foreign policy, Ram Manohar Lohia, the first secretary of the party's foreign affairs department, announced that India would not hesitate to use economic sanctions against an aggressor, to support “national, democratic and socialist forces” around the world.18 Soon after, in May 1938 the architect of Indian foreign policy, Jawaharlal Nehru, discussed sanctions elaborately while elucidating the Congress's attitude towards collective security. Emphasising Indian foreign policy's leaning towards peacefulmethods to solve international problems, he declared:
“In a world full of war and preparations for war India stands significantly as a country which has deliberately based its policy on peace and non-violence. How far it is possible to apply these methods in the international sphere today is difficult to say. But it must be remembered that the nonviolence of the Indian struggle is not a weak, passive and ineffective pacifism. It is a dynamic thing with sanctions behind it and if the world is to progress in culture and civilization, it will have to adopt peacefulmethods of solving its problems.”19
Nehru believed that for any system of collective security to be successful it had to be backed by sanctions. Stressing that the failure to invoke sanctions would mean allowing complete freedom to the aggressor, he said: “To have no sanctions is to allow free play to the aggressor, and ultimately to bow to his will. That cannot be agreed to for that means no collective security. It means the law of the jungle.”20
Moreover, Nehru explained that among various types of sanctions, the economic ones were most effective and had the advantage of being both powerful and peaceful, at the same time. Though he acknowledged that the effect of sanctions might not be immediate, he had full faith in its “far- reaching” nature and its ability to change the behaviour of the aggressor. Nehru did not rule out the use of military sanctions.21 Later, A. Appadorai, a renowned political scientist of that time, examined three fundamental ideas of India's foreign policy. He listed “whole-hearted co-operation with the United Nations and unreserved adherence in both spirit and letter to the Charter governing it” as the primary element of India's foreign policy.22 He also believed that India had cooperated sincerely with the system of collective security enshrined in the UN charter, implying its adherence to sanctions.
Even before India's independence, economic coercion in the form of sanctions was used by the Indian National Congress and the British government to pursue their foreign policy objectives. In 1939, the Indian National Congress, the party which formed the government post-independence, initiated a boycott of Japanese goods throughout India as a protest against Japan's invasion of China. It was a gesture extended by the leaders of the party to show sympathy to China. Assistance was sent to China in the form of men, money, materials, and medical missions. This decision of the Indian National Congress was also an attempt to show that the party had its own foreign policy.23 Although it was executed more with the purpose of signalling displeasure over Japan's actions than actually meaning economic harm on the target, the episode had significant implications for future policies. After all, this happened at a time when India's international consciousness was growing, though its worldviewwas still in its infancy.
Another sanctions case that can be said to have been initiated at the time of India's independence was the economic boycott of Israel. Being a sympathiser of the Palestinian cause and dependent on the Arabs, India supported the Arab trade and oil boycott of Israel.24 As a consequence, India limited its economic transactions with Israel right upto January 1992, when it established full and normal diplomatic relations with the State. To examine how this tradition influenced India's policies post- independence, it is important to delve further and analyse India's policies and positions towards sanctions after 1947.
India as Sanctioner
Seven years after the Japanese trade boycott, another instance of sanctions came to light. On this occasion, however, political will and might were both channelised to undertake a formal decision which was driven by a strong cause. In 1946, though still under the jurisdiction of the British crown, the Government of India imposed economic and political sanctions on South Africa by initiating the termination of trade agreement and withdrawing its high commissioner. The sanctions were enforced to protest against the discrimination of the Indian community living in South Africa.25 The Viceroy's executive council member, Dr Narayan Bhaskar Khare, played an instrumental role in bringing about the sanctions.26 The sanctions were launched to object to the segregatory Areas Reservation and Immigration and Registration Bill of 1925, which was further “pegged” by the Trading and Occupation of Land Restriction Act of April 1943.27 These sanctions did not only have a symbolic purpose (disapproval of South African policies towards Indians) but were also meant to have an economic impact on the State, which in turn came at an economic cost for India.
On May 1, 1948 there followed a sanctions episode of a different nature. After India's independence, the Nizam of Hyderabad expressed his intention to stay independent. To coerce the largest princely28 state to join the Indian Union, the government of India imposed a series of financial and trade sanctions on Hyderabad beginning in July 1948. Through a cablegram dated August 20, 1948, the Nizam of Hyderabad took the issue to the UN Security Council. Addressing the President of the UNSC, the cablegram stated:
“The Government of Hyderabad, in reliance on Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, requests you to bring to the attention of the Security Council the grave dispute which has arisen between Hyderabad and India, and which, unless settled in accordance with international law and justice, is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security. Hyderabad has been exposed in recent months to violent intimidation, to threats of invasion, and to crippling economic blockade which has inflicted cruel hard-ship upon the people of Hyderabad and which is intended to coerce it into a renunciation of its independence”29
However, the imposition of sanctions was short-lived and on September 16, 1948, the Indian Army moved in and occupied Hyderabad. In November, 1949, the Nizam signed the Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union. The efficacy of sanctions is highly debated in this case. Robert A. Pape considers it a case of “military conquest”30 and not of economic coercion. Nevertheless, this was the first time when sanctions were used by the Indian state for the purpose of political unification. It was the peaceful nature of this tool of foreign policy that made the Indian state choose sanctions before turning to other options. It was also in 1949 when India imposed a trade embargo on Pakistan as it refused to devalue its currency with respect to the US dollar. In 1948-49, before the imposition of sanctions, about 70 per cent of Pakistan's trading transactions were with India and 63 per cent of India's exports went to Pakistan. Economists believe that these sanctions made Pakistan seek new and distant markets in Japan and the US. It is also said to be a “transformational experience” for Pakistan, as after facing the sanctions it intensely tried to acquire an industrial base.31
The government of India again used sanctions in 1954, this time for the purpose of assimilating a province into Indian territory: the target was Goa, a colony of the Portuguese since 1505. In 1954, when tensions and protests started growing in Goa, the government of India imposed a trade embargo against the territories of Portuguese Goa and closed its consulate in Panjim, which had been operating since 1947. The government's decision was in accordance with its policy of following peaceful methods for political integration. On July 26, 1955, speaking in the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said:
“There is no one in this House who requires any argument in justification of India's claim to Goa. It is obvious. There is hardly any question that has come before this House which had such unanimous approval or agreement. The only questions that have arisen are as to the steps that might be taken to give effect to India's claim. Even there, so far as I can understand, it is by and large the opinion of this House that the methods should be peaceful.”32
Nevertheless, it was again the military which occupied Goa in 1961 and helped in its incorporation into the Indian territory. Later, India used sanctions as a signal of disapproval on November 12, 1965, as it imposed diplomatic sanctions in the form of non-recognition against the government of Rhodesia. In this case India was following suit and supporting the UN's condemnation of the “illegal racist minority regime” of Rhodesia.33 Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Israel, Japan and Turkey also imposed similar sanctions on Rhodesia.34
In 1987, India again took a firm stand and reached out for the protection of the rights of the people of Indian descent, this time in Fiji. On September 25, 1987, a coup d'état installed Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, as the head of the country. One of the reasons behind the coup was to keep the Indo-Fijians from gaining political power. The annulment of the Constitution was a subsequent step to
marginalise the Indo-Fijian population of Fiji.35 Understanding the situation, India immediately
Sanctions and Contemporary Issues
In 1989, India imposed unilateral trade sanctions on Nepal to check its growing tilt towards China. Responding to Nepal's purchase of anti-aircraft guns from China, India partially closed its borders with Nepal for thirteen months. This was a peculiar case, as the subject of security was linked to economic and transit issues. The overall stand taken by India was that if Nepal sought a special economic relationship and privileges from India it had to accept a special security relationship as well.37 The spokesperson of the External Affairs Ministry then stated:
“India has always valued the special relationship with Nepal as embodied in the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship For the last four decades India has done everything possible to live up to
the letter and spirit of the treaty. Good neighbourliness implies a degree of mutual sensitivity and concern for the interests of both countries. This is particularly necessary if the special relationship between India and Nepal is to be maintained.”38
To a great extent the sanctions succeeded in changing Nepal’s behaviour, leading to the suspension of its arms purchase from China.39 As a consequence of the sanctions, discontentment among the people grew, and over time the public became disillusioned with their King. In 1990, the Nepali Congress called for strikes. Thirteen months after India sanctioned Nepal, King Birendra had to give way to a democratically elected government and assume the position of a constitutional monarch. The new government agreed to consult India while deciding on defence issues. Sanctions were lifted on July 1, 1990.40 It is believed that the monarchy in Nepal collapsed under the impact of Indian sanctions. This case is regarded as an example of efficient economic statecraft.41
Responding primarily to Pakistan's inaction against two militant groups, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, blamed for a suicide attack on the Indian Parliament, India imposed sanctions on Pakistan. The Indian High Commissioner was withdrawn from Islamabad, the strength of its mission was reduced, and overhead-flights were banned. The Lahore-New Delhi bus and train services were also suspended.42 Announcing the sanctions in a statement issued on December 27, 2001 Jaswant Singh, then the External Affairs Minister, explained:
“Regrettably India's serious concerns about all the ramifications of the 13th December attack on our Parliament have not been fully grasped in Pakistan. The depth of concern in India, the totality of rejection by the entire cross-section of our country's opinion of Pakistan's continued
As soon as India announced the sanctions, Pakistan counter-scored with its reciprocal measures.44 Thereafter, Pakistan banned the two groups in January 2002.45 This decision was welcomed in India, and on January 13, 2002, the External Affairs Minister announced:
“We welcome the now declared commitment of the Government of Pakistan not to support or permit any more the use of its territory for terrorism anywhere in the world, including in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. This commitment must extend to the use of all territories under Pakistan's control today. ”46
Table 1. Major sanctions imposed by India
|
|
Target |
Issue |
Year |
|
1. |
Japan (sanctioned by Indian National Congress) |
China invasion |
1939 |
|
2. |
South Africa (sanctioned by the Government of India) |
Discrimination against Indians |
1946 |
|
3. |
Israel |
Pro-Arab/Palestine |
1947 |
|
4. |
*Hyderabad |
Integration into Indian Union |
1948 |
|
5. |
Pakistan |
Currency devaluation |
1949 |
|
6. |
*Portuguese Goa |
Integration into Indian Union |
1954 |
|
7. |
Rhodesia |
Against minority white rule |
1965 |
|
8. |
Fiji |
Restore democracy and modify Constitution |
1987 |
|
9. |
Nepal |
China proximity |
1989 |
|
10. |
Pakistan |
Action against militants |
2001 |
Conclusion
Sanctions always come at a cost, not only for the target but also the entity that imposes them. At the end of the day, sanctions are a political tool, entailing costs that are not only economic in nature. Today, sanctions are understood in different ways especially in the discipline of International Relations. According to Robert Gilpin, a renowned International Political Economy scholar, sanctions constitute a rigorous manipulation of economic relations to achieve political aims.47 Meanwhile, David Baldwin, an eminent political scientist, believes that sanctions are merely a part of a larger set of policy instruments available to foreign policy makers.48 Sceptics argue that sanctions or threats of sanctions can send messages of fear, anxiety, and resentment, rather than of a serious attempt at solving the issue at hand. The efficacy and impact of sanctions is also highly debated across various academic disciplines.49 Nevertheless, the general view about sanctions is that their use is likely to increase in the future.
While examining India's attitude towards international sanctions, its considerations for interests and responsibilities both are visible. Over the years India has emerged as an important player in the arena of global politics. Domestically, foreign policy is an important issue for India's electorate and the Indian government has spent substantial time and effort in developing its policies and relations with the rest of the world. With the development of its economy and expansion of its relations, India is more interconnected and relevant than ever before. Its acceptance in the global nuclear order has also made it attentive to new responsibilities and obligations. In the past, India has used sanctions for various purposes with varying degrees of impact and efficacy. Sanctions seem to have aided India while seeking various policy objectives, including political integration, national security, signalling disapproval, pursuing economic gains, showing support to international organisations, and upholding the principlesof collective security.
India has underlined its normative stands and values through sanctions as in the case of Japan, South Africa, Israel and Rhodesia; it has also focused on tangible returns in Hyderabad, Portuguese Goa, Pakistan, and Nepal. It has reached out for the protection of its people in South Africa and Fiji by the same means and pursued economic ends in Pakistan. India has acknowledged its role as a responsible international actor by not only accepting multilateral sanctions, but also endorsing them as in the case of South Africa and Fiji. Yet, India's stand on unilateral sanctions has often aligned more with the Eastern part of the world than the West.
In the past India has been sceptical of the use of unilateral sanctions; recent events, however, have called for adaptation rather than an outright rejection of unilateral sanctions. In the case of Iran, India has been constantly trying to deal with the issue of sanctions, though it has not succeeded completely. In the coming months, if the frequency and intensity of sanctions increase, India will have to walk a tightrope. There will be a constant need to balance interests and responsibilities by making sensible choices. It cannot be overlooked that this instrument of statecraft has been employed by the Indian State in the past and is still available to it. With growing external and internal pressures, it remains to be seen what kind of policy India adopts with respect to economic coercion in general, and sanctions in particular: assertive and vocal, or reserved yet strong.
1. Brendan Taylor, “Sanctions as Grand Strategy” Adelphi series, Volume 49, Issue 411, 2009, p 12. However, sanctions can be economic, in the form of trade embargoes, asset freeze, import restrictions etc; diplomatic, which may include limitations or cancellation of high-level government visits or expulsion or withdrawal of diplomatic missions or military, that targets the military sector of a state, and may include arms embargo or total cut off of military supplies. International sanctions include unilateral and multilateral sanctions both as the scope of these sanctions extends beyond the national territories of a state.
2. Apart from Yugoslavia, the League of Nations (1919-1946) imposed sanctions on Greece in 1925, Paraguay- Bolivia in 1932-35 and on Italy in 1935-36. For details see, Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 3rd Edition, Washington, D.C: Institute of International Economics, 2007, Appendix 1A, p. 20
3. Targeted sanctions, also termed as smart sanctions became popular after the severe humanitarian effects of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq came to light. For details see, David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, p.6
4. Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Assessing UN sanctions after the Cold War: New and evolving standards of measurement”, International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 1, Winter 2009-10, p.90
5. For details refer to UN data, available at: http://www.un.org/ sc/ committees/ (accessed on June 13, 2013)
6. Richard N. Haass, “Sanctioning Madness”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, November -December,1997.
7. Quoted in, Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 3rd Edition, Washington, D.C: Institute of International Economics, 2007, p. 1.
8. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “Sanctions-Happy USA”, Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 98-4, available at: http://www.piie.com/ publications/ pb/ pb .cfm?ResearchID=83, accessed on December 12, 2012.
9. Knights Templar of Mexico, Colombia's Los Urabenos and Los Cachiros of Honduras are some of the individuals and groups sanctioned under the provisions of the US Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Mujahedin-e Khalq, New People's Army are among the terrorist organizations under US sanctions. For details of sanctions imposed by US, see Paul F. Kilmerand Michael J. Mlotkowski , “U.S. Economic Sanctions and Anti-Boycott Laws”, International Trademark Association, Updated May 2012, available at:http:// www.inta.org/ Advocacy/ Documents/ INTA%20U%20S%20%20Economic%20Sanctions%20and
%20Anti-Boycott%20Laws%20May%202012.pdf(accessed on June 13, 2013)
10. Unilateral coercive measures include war, militarism and targeted economic sanctions. For details of the voting, see: http:/ / www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ HRBodies/ HRCouncil/ RegularSession/ Session19/ resolutions/ votingprocess/ L12.pdf ( accessed on December 12, 2012)
11. For details see Human rights and unilateral coercive measures draft resolution, available at : http:/ / blog. unwatch. org/ w p- content/ uploads/ H uman- Rights- and- Unilateral- Coercive- Measures.pdf.(accessed on July 12, 2013)
12. Anuradha Chenoy argues that sanctions are often imposed with geo-strategic considerations in mind, for details see, Anuradha Chenoy “India and the issue of sanctions”, New Indian Express, April 15, 2013, available at: http:/ / newindianexpress.com/ opinion/ India-and-the-issue-of-sanctions/ 2013/ 04/ 15/ article1544873.ece, (accessed on 30 July 2013)
13. 2005 World Summit Outcome, paragraph 109, September 20, 2005, available at: http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/ doc/ UNDOC/ L TD/ N05/ 511/ 30/ PDF/ N0551130.pdf ?OpenElement (accessed on 30 July 2013)
14. For details see “Strengthening Targeted sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures”, Watson Institute for International studies, Brown University, March 2006, available at: http:/ / wat soninstitute.org/ pub/ Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf (accessed on 30 July 2013)
15. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “US wants India to act on Iran sanctions”, Mail Today, July 15, 2010, available at: http://indiatoda y.intoday.in/ stor y/ us-wants-india-to-act-on-iran-sanctions/ 1/ 105461.html( accessed on July 30, 2013)
16. Refer to Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri's statement in New York on July 17, 2011, available at: http:/ / www.mea.gov.in/ Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/ 372/ Indias+ Explanation+ of+ Vote+ after+ the+ adoption+of+the+tw o+resolutions+succeeding+1267+Sanctions+R egime( accessed on July 22, 2013)
17. Refer to Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid's interview, available at : http:/ / www.bloomberg.com/ news/ 2012-12-02/ vietnam-says-china-must-avoid-trade-weapon-in-maritime- disputes.html(accessed on December 19, 2012)
18. Bimal Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947, Bookland, Calcutta, 1960, p. 134.
19. Jawaharlal Nehru, Forward in Rammanohar Lohia, Indian Foreign Policy, Congress Political and Economic Studies, no 12, Allahabad, 1938, p. 4
20. Ibid
21. Ibid
22. A. Appadorai,“India's Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1,January 1949, p. 40
23. J.N Dixit, Indian Foreign Policy1947-2003, Thomson Press, New Delhi, p. 16. Also see, Verinder Grover, Political Thinkers of Modern India: Rammanohar Lohia: Volume 9, Deep and Deep Publications, 1992, p. 539.
24. Gil Feiler, “India's Economic Relations with Israel and the Arabs”, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 96, The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, 2012. available at: http://www.biu.ac.il/ SOC/ besa/ MSPS96.pdf (accessed on December 4, 2012)
25. See the statement of the Indian High Commission in South Africa, available at : http://www.indiainsouthafrica.com/ indiasouthafrica/ indiasarelations .html(accessed on December 5, 2012)
26. For a detailed account of how Dr Khare helped in getting the Government of India to sanction South Africa, and other details of the episode see, Lorna Llyod, “ 'A Family Quarrel' The Development of the Dispute over Indians in South Africa”, The Historical Journal , Volume 34, Issue 3, September 1991, pp.703-725.
27. Ibid
28. See Mohan Guruswami, “There Once was a Hyderabad!” Hyderabad On the Net, available at: http://www.hyderabad.co.uk/ policeaction.htm( accessed on March 22, 2013)
29. U.N. Doc. S/ 986, Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, Supp., September, 1948,, available at: http:/ / daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ NL4/ 809/ 86/ PDF/ NL480986.pdf?OpenElement ( accessed on December 12, 2013). Also see Clyde Eagleton, “The Case of Hyderabad Before the Security Council”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, No. 2,April, 1950, p. 277.
30. Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 .Autumn, 1997, p. 111.
31. Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan-India Trade”, ISAS Brief, National University of Singapore, No. 211, 4 August, 2011 , pp. 1-2
32. Jawaharlal Nehru's reply to a debate on Goa in Lok Sabha, on July 26, 1955. See Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-A pril 196, The Publications Division, ,Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, pp. 111-112
33. See UNSC Resolution 216, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny .un.org/ doc/ RESOL UTION/ GEN/ NR0/ 222/ 88/ IMG/ NR022288.pdf ?OpenElement (accessed on December, 21 2012)
34. “British South Rhodesia (1964-1980)”, DADM-Project, University of Southern Arkansas Sub-Saharan African Region, available at : http://uca.edu/ politicalscience/ dadm-project/ sub-saharan-africa-region/ british-south- rhodesia-1964-1980(accessed on December, 21 2012)
35. Julia Fogleman, “Fiji ' s Relationship with India: The Answer to or the Source of Fiji's Problems?”, Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, Paper 581, 2008, available at: http:/ / digitalcollections.sit.edu/ isp_collection/ 581(accesed on January 22, 2013)
36. Ajay Singh quoted in Radio New Zealand on April 2, 2007, available at: http://www.rnzi.com/ pages/ news.php?op=read&id=31238 (accessed on March 22, 2013) Also see Wadan Narsey, “China and India in the Fiji equation”, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for Public Policy, January 16, 2013, available at: http:// www.lowyinterpreter.org/ po st/ 2013 / 01/ 16/ China-and-India-in-the-Fiji-equation.aspx (accessed on May 21, 2013)
37. John W. Garver, “ China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales”, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10,October, 1991, p. 958
38. India News, no. 7/ 89, Embassy of India, Beijing, 27 March 1989, as quoted in John W. Garver, “ China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales”, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10 ,October, 1991, pp. 958-959.
39. United States General Accounting Office Report, “Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy”, February 19, 1992, p. 25.
40. Barbara Crossette, “India to Lift Nepal Embargo and Discuss Rift”, New York Times, July 2, 1990, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/ 1990/ 06/ 12/ w orld/ india-to-lift-ne pal-embargo-and-discuss-rift.html ( accessed on 12 December 2012)
41. Rahul Mukherji, “Economic sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool”, in Kanti Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu, (eds.) International Relationsin India: Bringing theory back home, Orient Blackswan, New Delhi, 2004.
42. India Pakistan Relations 1947-2007, Vol -I-X, Public Diplomacy Division, Ministry of External Affairs, pp. CLXXVI.
43. Text of the Statement made by the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, December 27, 2001, Ministry of External Affaris, Government of India, available at: http:/ / www.mea.gov.in/ Speeches- Statements.htm?dtl/ 6024/ Text+of+the+Statement+ made+by+the+E xternal+Affairs+Minister+Shri+Jaswa nt+Singh(accessed on December 13, 2012)
44. “India, Pakistan Trade Sanctions, Both Say Ready For War”, Space Daily, December 27, 2001, available at: http://www.spacedaily.com/ news/ n uclear-india-pakistan-01b.html(accessed on December 12, 2013)
45. BBC India Profile: chronology, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ w orld-south-asia-12641776,(accessed on February 5, 2013)=
46. Statement by Jaswant Singh, External Affairs Minister, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, available at:http:/ / www.mea.gov.in/ SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/ 5751/ Statement+ by+ External+ Affairs+Minister(accessed on December 12, 2013)
47. As explained in Merom, Jill, “Democracy, Dependency, And Destabilization: The Shaking of Alende's Regime”,
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, No. 1, 2001
48. Baldwin, David et al , “Evaluating Economic Sanctions”, International Security, Vol. 23, 2, pp. 189-198, 1998.
49. Examining a study conducted by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, KimberlyAnn Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, Robert Pape has argued that out of 115 cases of sanctions merely 5 have been successful. See Robert Pape, “Why Economic sanctions Still Do Not Work” International Security, Vol. 23, Summer 1998,pp. 66-77. Also see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, et al., Economic sanctions Reconsidered, Peterson's Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 1990.
*Although part of Indian territory, Hyderabad and Goa were separate entities when sanctions were imposed on them; hence, they have been considered in this study.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
