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Manini, “India and EU's Shared Imperative of Critical Minerals Cooperation,” ORF Issue Brief No. 874, Observer Research Foundation, May 2026.
Critical raw materials (CRMs) are important across various domains, from the energy transition and advanced green manufacturing to defence production and digital infrastructure. As economies shift towards cleaner energy and high-tech production, demand for these minerals has grown rapidly. Minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and rare-earth elements are key inputs for batteries, wind turbines, semiconductors, aircraft components, military hardware, and high-performance magnets. Their importance has reshaped how governments view natural resources. What once appeared to be a straightforward resource issue now shapes economic security and digital futures. This shift underpins the distinction between what is “critical,” “strategic,” and “abundant”.
At the same time, rising geopolitical tensions and trade restrictions have made supply chains more fragile, leaving many countries exposed. China’s 2010 rare-earth export ban during a period of dispute with Japan showed how easily entire industries can be disrupted.[1] The 2023 export restrictions on gallium, germanium, and graphite, followed by the 2025 restrictions on rare-earths, hit European economies hard.[2],[3] Trade restrictions, tariffs, and political disputes increasingly affect the availability of these materials, exposing the vulnerability of global supply chains. Entire industries have faced sudden shortages as a result.
Countries have begun to respond. Japan, for instance, has invested in overseas mining projects and supported its companies through institutions such as the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), highlighting the importance of state-backed mineral partnership.[4]
Broader geopolitical conflicts, from the United States (US)-China rivalry to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, have pushed mineral security higher on national policy agendas. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, along with China’s dominance in processing, has exposed Europe to supply chain insecurities. India, meanwhile, is trying to build supply chains that are less dependent on China while navigating geopolitical pressure.
India and the EU share a long history of cooperation and operate across multiple frameworks.[5] Trade between the two has grown steadily: in 2024-25, bilateral trade in goods reached US$136.54 billion, making the EU India’s largest goods trading partner, while trade in services stood at US$83.10 billion in 2024.[6] Importantly, the two are not geostrategic rivals, unlike the US and China, creating scope for a deeper partnership. Both rely on many of the same critical minerals, yet regulatory and environmental constraints limit the development of domestic resources, creating a natural alignment.
The key question is why and how India and the EU can collaborate on CRMs. While certain shared frameworks exist, coordination remains limited. Instead of new agreements, there is need for a clear and coherent pathway that links existing mechanisms and partnerships. This brief examines the evolving partnership, identifies the possible strategic convergences, and analyses existing frameworks, while considering the implications of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
India-EU partnership has moved beyond aid and trade to take on a more strategic focus. Supply chains, clean energy, technology, and AI now shape much of the dialogue. Key initiatives are outlined in Table 1. This expanding economic and strategic base also supports cooperation on critical minerals, linking industrial policy with green transition efforts on both sides.
Table 1: Key EU-India Initiatives on Climate, Clean Energy, and Industrial Cooperation
| Year | Policy | Highlights |
| 2004 | India-EU Strategic Partnership | Created the institutional basis for widened collaboration in science, technology, energy, and climate-related policy exchanges.[7] |
| 2005 | Joint Action Plan | Introduced structured engagement on environmental protection and renewable energy, laying early groundwork for technology-intensive clean energy cooperation.[8] |
| 2012 | Joint Declaration for Enhanced Energy Cooperation | Strengthened commitments to work together on energy security, efficiency, and renewables.[9] |
| 2016 | India-EU Clean Energy and Climate Partnership | Marked a shift toward practical cooperation on renewables, grids, and storage technologies, all of which depend on secure mineral supply chains.[10] |
| 2018 | International Solar Alliance (India–France initiative) | The EU became an official partner organisation of the ISA, positioning India and European partners within a global solar ecosystem, indirectly increasing demand for mineral-intensive components like silicon, silver, and copper.[11],[12] |
| 2020 | India-EU Roadmap to 2025 | Provided a joint blueprint aligning India’s energy transition with the EU Green Deal, signalling convergence on sustainability and industrial decarbonisation pathways.[13] |
| 2021 | India-EU Connectivity Partnership | Linked infrastructure development with sustainability goals, creating space for cooperation on clean-tech manufacturing.[14] |
| 2022 | India-EU Trade and Technology Council | Created a new platform for cooperation on clean technologies, resilient value chains, and standards, directly relevant for critical minerals processing and traceability.[15] |
Source: Author’s own, using various sources, as cited. The list is indicative.
As the world’s third- and fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitters, respectively, India and the EU are facing an increasingly pressing climate challenge.[16] Both will require secure access to critical minerals as a prerequisite for their transition to cleaner energy. The factors discussed in the following paragraphs explain the push for India-EU cooperation and how it could be mutually beneficial.
Every country publishes its own list of critical minerals, usually based on economic needs, industry priorities, national security concerns, technology demand, and available resources. Methods might differ, but most assess a mineral’s “criticality” based on two factors: its economic importance and the risk of supply disruptions.[17]
India and the EU therefore have strong incentives to work together to secure their critical mineral supply chains. One reason is their shared economic and strategic interests. Out of the 30 minerals marked as critical by the Indian government, nearly 70 percent also appear on the EU’s CRM list.
These overlaps reflect shared concerns, as both depend heavily on external suppliers. At the same time, they are expanding domestic clean-technology manufacturing and moving beyond straightforward imports towards deeper supply-chain partnerships, including extraction, processing, standards, and technology transfers.
Figure 1: Critical Minerals: India-EU Convergence
Source: Author’s own, using the published CRM lists of the EU and India.[18],[19]
India’s National Critical Minerals Mission, launched in 2025, lists 30 key minerals, including lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, rare earths, and natural graphite. The country’s goals for electric vehicles and solar manufacturing closely mirror the EU’s green transition plans.
The EU aims to cut emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030 and reach climate neutrality by 2050. India aims for net-zero by 2070.[20] To achieve this, it targets 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030, meeting about half of its energy needs from renewables and reducing carbon intensity by 45 percent from 2005 levels.[21] As a result, India’s demand for critical minerals could rise five to six times by 2040.[22] However, securing raw minerals is only part of the challenge. India still has limited midstream processing and refining capacity, making it difficult to build a secure critical minerals value chain.
The EU’s 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) formalises this approach by setting clear targets for 2030: 10 percent of strategic raw materials to be extracted in the EU, 40 percent processed within the EU, 25 percent recycled domestically, and no more than 65 percent sourced from any single foreign supplier.[23] This creates space for cooperation with trusted partners like India.
For India, critical minerals are now central to economic planning. The National Critical Minerals Mission reflects a long-term effort to strengthen clean supply chains and cut import dependence.[24] India’s EV and solar manufacturing programmes under the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme are also increasing demand. India has also been updating its mining laws, with amendments to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act in 2023 and 2025 allowing the central government to auction critical mineral blocks directly, share revenues with states, and introduce new exploration licences for deep-seated minerals.[25],[26] India’s Union Budget 2026-2027 also exempts customs duties on capital goods imports required for critical mineral processing and on selected raw minerals used in the manufacturing of aircraft, microwave ovens, and lithium-ion batteries.[27] These policies aim to attract private investment and support the expansion of domestic processing and downstream manufacturing by lowering input costs and simplifying tariff structures.
Shared goals alone are not sufficient, however. The core vulnerability lies in mineral processing. China controls nearly 90 percent of rare-earth refining, 60-70 percent of lithium and cobalt refining, and almost 90 percent of graphite processing, while dominating key materials used in lithium-ion batteries—giving it significant geopolitical leverage. With midstream processing the main bottleneck, partnerships and joint ventures are increasingly important. No country has all the resources it needs: some have the minerals; others have the processing capacity. Indeed, several countries outside China hold large reserves and substantial production capacity for critical minerals. India and the EU are already building partnerships with these countries for mineral exploration. A practical approach is to work with resource-rich countries while jointly investing in processing capacity.
Mineral partnerships rarely operate through a single channel. Bilateral agreements provide access to country-specific resources or technology. Minilateral platforms such as the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) and the Quad help coordinate policy and investment. At the same time, multilateral forums like the G20 and the International Energy Agency set broader norms on sustainability and supply chain governance. This layered approach allows countries to combine resources, technology, capital, and policy within a broader mineral strategy.[28]
Since 2021, the EU has signed 14 Strategic Partnerships on raw materials, including with Chile, Australia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Argentina, Canada, and Zambia.[29] These agreements are not binding but help connect European industries with mineral supply chains in partner countries.
India established Khanij Bidesh India Ltd. (KABIL) in 2019 as a joint venture between National Aluminium Company Limited (NALCO), Hindustan Copper Limited (HCL), and Mineral Exploration and Consultancy Limited (MECL) to identify and acquire mineral assets abroad.[30] KABIL is actively exploring in Argentina, Chile, and Australia, mainly for lithium and cobalt.[31] It has signed an agreement with Australia’s Critical Mineral Office to explore, research, and develop critical mineral supply chains.[32] It also signed an agreement with Argentina’s state-owned company CAMYEN to acquire five lithium brine blocks in Catamarca province.[33] These initiatives support India’s mineral sourcing requirements while building technical and operational experience in overseas asset acquisition and navigating regulatory challenges in processing and extraction. India is a member of the US-led MSP and participates in frameworks like the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).[34],[35],[36] The country is also exploring opportunities in African countries such as Zambia, Namibia, Congo, and Ghana, and in Latin American countries like Bolivia and Brazil.[37],[38],[39]
The number of partnerships alone is not decisive; their combined leverage matters more. Together, these countries account for a large share of global mineral resources, historically concentrated in China. For example, Congo is the world’s largest cobalt producer, with nearly 76 percent of global output, followed by Indonesia at around 10 percent. Australia and Chile lead global lithium production. For nickel, even with a recent dip in global output, Indonesia remains the top producer with nearly 60 percent of the world’s supply, followed by the Philippines at about 9 percent.[40] Table 2 highlights these trends. Some of these countries already have agreements with the EU and India, while discussions with others are ongoing. Securing supplies from these sources can improve resilience and reduce dependence on highly concentrated markets.
Table 2: Critical Minerals Reserves and Strategic Partnerships
| Mineral | Top Reserve Country | World Reserves Share | Major Mine Producers | India’s/EU’s Partnerships |
| Cobalt | Congo (Kinshasa), Australia, Indonesia | ~55%, ~16%, ~6% | Congo (Kinshasa) > Indonesia | Both India and the EU are partners with DRC through the MSP and have separate critical mineral cooperation agreements with Australia.[41] |
| Copper | Chile, Peru, Australia | ~20%, ~10%, ~10% | Chile> Congo (Kinshasa)> Peru | Peru is also a partner to both through the MSP, while India is actively negotiating economic partnerships with Chile and Peru focused on critical minerals.[42] |
| Graphite (Natural) | China, Brazil, Madagascar, Mozambique | ~28%, ~26%, ~9%, ~9% | China> Madagascar> Mozambique> Brazil | Brazil, Madagascar, and Mozambique are EU partners as part of the Global Gateway Strategy. India is similarly engaged in talks with Brazil on CRMs, though bilateral relations with Madagascar and Mozambique are still developing and have room for improvement. |
| Lithium | Chile, Australia, Argentina, China | ~31%, ~23%, ~13%, ~10% | Australia> Chile> China> Argentina | India and the EU both maintain separate partnerships with Argentina related to critical minerals and participate in MSP.[43] |
| Nickel | Indonesia, Australia, Brazil | ~42%, ~18%, ~12% | Indonesia > Philippines | The Philippines is an MSP member, while Indonesia and the Philippines are part of ASEAN, with the recent free trade agreement (FTA) between India and the EU to facilitate broader mineral trade and investment cooperation. |
Source: Author’s own, using US Geological Survey Report 2025, MSP, EC and PIB.[44],[45],[46]
The challenge for India and the EU is not a lack of tools—as both have several—but that these tools are not well connected. This section examines four existing mechanisms that could serve as practical starting points.
In 2021 the EU launched the Global Gateway, which does not function as a traditional infrastructure fund that directly finances rail lines, mines, or similar projects but works as a risk-sharing mechanism. It lowers the cost of capital using guarantees, blended finance, and insurance, making private investments in high-risk regions more viable.[47] From a CRM perspective, it is relevant in two ways.
First, it can offer guarantees and blended finance for joint ventures in third countries, making mineral projects more viable, especially where mining and processing carry high political or financial risk. For India, which faces high risks in Africa and Latin America, these guarantees can make overseas mining investments workable. Second, the Global Gateway can help counter China’s financial influence by offering transparent, governance-focused financing. This helps the EU secure mineral supplies while reducing dependence on any single non-EU supplier.
The EU-India Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was launched in February 2023. For critical minerals, TTC’s Working Groups 2 (green and clean energy technologies) and 3 (trade, investment, and resilient value chains) can play a direct role.[48] They can develop shared templates for emissions reporting, due-diligence, traceability, and proof of origin. This reduces compliance costs for Indian companies and provides EU buyers with the data required for CBAM reporting.
For the EU, the TTC reflects its effort to “de-risk” and reduce dependence on China. For India, Europe offers capital and advanced green technologies, while India brings scale, a large clean-energy market, and a growing role in the Indo-Pacific. For the TTC to be effective, both sides will need strong private-sector participation. Without companies driving projects and investing on the ground, progress will remain limited. Indian firms operating in European value chains often face compliance challenges related to sustainability reporting and traceability standards, raising costs and slowing participation in mineral supply partnerships. This dynamic may change following the conclusion of the India-EU FTA in January 2026. The agreement is expected to provide preferential market access for over 99 percent of Indian exports and could further strengthen the TTC’s role in building resilient supply chains.[49] By easing trade barriers, it may also facilitate private investment and technology flows relevant to mineral processing and clean-technology manufacturing.
India became a member of the US-led MSP in 2024, a coalition of mineral-consuming and producing countries, including the EU, the US, Japan, Australia, and resource-rich states such as the DRC and Argentina.[50] This gives India a ready-made platform to work closely with the EU on critical minerals. The MSP does not directly fund or execute projects. Instead, it screens “responsible” mineral projects, connects them to member development banks and aligns environmental and labour standards across buyers.
Through the MSP, Indian public and private companies can access a vetted list of global projects and secure faster financing. This lowers reputational and regulatory risks and reduces transaction costs. Moreover, as MSP members are supposed to follow high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) norms, projects linked to India also gain credibility in European markets, which is important in the CBAM context.[51] In essence, for India, the MSP helps de-risk overseas mineral investments. For the EU, it provides a way to diversify its supply chains while keeping high governance standards. Its effectiveness increases when combined with CRMA recognition and Global Gateway financing.
The EU’s CRMA entered into force on 23 May 2024. In line with the EU Green Deal Industrial Plan, it complements the EU’s Net Zero Industry Act.[52] The CRMA sets targets for mining, processing, and recycling inside the EU and offers a direct route to institutionalise India-linked mineral projects. Its “strategic project” status goes beyond a label, providing faster approvals in Europe, regulatory priority, and access to EU offtake and financing support.[53]
For India, this means joint ventures in Africa, Latin America, or Australia—whether led by public or private firms—can qualify as “strategic” if they meet sustainability and traceability standards. This improves their credibility with European buyers, who otherwise hesitate to enter long-term deals in new or high-risk regions.
CBAM, which entered its definitive phase in 2026, is often described as a “climate tariff.”[54] In mineral processing, however, it functions more as a market filter, given the sector’s high energy intensity. While this pushes producers to adopt cleaner methods, it can also negatively affect developing countries that supply many of these minerals.
High carbon intensity in mineral processing often reflects limited access to affordable low-carbon power rather than deliberate policy choices. Countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the DRC depend disproportionately on fossils, as renewable infrastructure is expensive and slow to develop.[55] Instead of viewing CBAM only as a barrier, India and the EU could treat it as a convergence point—aligning standards and promoting cleaner processing methods. Such cooperation may also put a stop to the trend where countries are just importing raw African ore and refining it domestically, which brings little value to African economies and pushes them further toward China.[56]
From an EU-India CRM cooperation perspective, CBAM could create steady demand for cleaner, well-reported production. In this sense, it creates market incentives that complement other cooperation tools.
The imperative is for a practical pipeline for India-EU mineral cooperation. Mineral projects often stall because of financing risks, weak standards alignment, low investor confidence, and scattered project pipelines. Institutional coordination is another challenge. India’s mineral policy involves multiple ministries and public-private firms that often pursue parallel initiatives without a single guiding strategy. For India-EU CRM cooperation to work, the existing frameworks must operate together.
The first step is project recognition. Under the EU’s CRMA, India-linked mining or processing projects—whether in India or in third countries such as Australia or those in the African continent, provided they support EU supply security—can be designated as “strategic.” This provides visibility and faster approvals in Europe while reassuring EU buyers, who may otherwise hesitate to commit to long-term contracts.
Once a project is identified, credibility and governance become critical. This is where the MSP plays a role. It does not fund projects but screens them against baseline ESG standards. For example, if an Indian public or private company invests in lithium or cobalt processing in Africa, MSP alignment signals to EU buyers and lenders that the project meets recognised standards and is not linked to opaque practices. It also helps build a trusted mineral corridor outside Chinese control.
At this stage, many mineral projects fail—not due to a lack of demand, but because the risks are steep. The EU’s Global Gateway can address this by offering guarantees and blended finance, making projects financially viable, even in politically risky regions. After financing, regulatory standards and compliance become key friction points. Through the India-EU TTC, both sides could agree on shared templates for emissions data, transparency, traceability, and due diligence reporting. This reduces duplication and compliance costs while preparing suppliers for the EU’s CBAM rules.
Finally, CBAM can create demand for cleaner mineral production. EU buyers are likely to prefer minerals with verified emissions data, especially as CBAM’s scope is likely to expand further to additional sectors in the future. When all these tools are aligned within a single project pipeline, cooperation becomes more practical and investment-ready.
One practical route is triangular cooperation. In such arrangements, EU technology and finance can combine with resource-rich countries in Africa or Latin America, while India contributes processing capacity and manufacturing demand. This structure could help India and the EU develop mineral value chains while supporting resource-rich economies.[57]
India and the EU already have most of the tools needed to build a credible minerals partnership. The primary challenge lies less in creating new institutions and more in connecting the existing ones. For Europe, India offers scale, democratic stability, a large skilled workforce, and a rapidly growing clean-technology ecosystem. For India, this alignment fits its own goals. It needs stable and reliable buyers, long-term offtake agreements, and investment to expand its domestic processing and manufacturing capacity. The EU can provide these but also requires credible data and basic sustainability reporting. These requirements partly explain why EU incentives remain difficult to implement.[58] If India can match these expectations, its producers could become reliable suppliers as EU buyers seek to diversify away from China.
Both sides recognise that securing mineral supply chains will shape the future of clean industry. By combining standards, financing tools, governance mechanisms, and market incentives, India and the EU together can build a more resilient and transparent supply chain over time.
Manini is Research Assistant, Centre for Economy and Growth, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
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[56] Bore, “Europe’s Green Mining Regulations May Push Africa Closer to China.”
[57] Anindita Sinh and Constantino Xavier, “Partnerships for Self-Reliance: Internationalising India’s Critical Minerals Sector.”
[58] Bernhard Tröster, Simela Papatheophilou and Karin Küblböck, “Europe’s Critical Raw Materials Strategy Demands Equitable Global Partnerships,” Social Europe, August 19, 2025, https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-critical-raw-materials-strategy-demands-equitable-global-partnerships.
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Manini is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Economy and Growth, ORF New Delhi. Her research focuses on the intersection of geopolitics with international ...
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