Originally Published 2019-08-12 05:12:31 Published on Aug 12, 2019
Some roots lie in July 2016, when the Valley erupted following the gunning down of terrorist Burhan Wani.
How the events of 2016 paved way for eventual abrogation of Article 370
Cross-border security factors have been cited for the timing of the government’s moves on Jammu-Kashmir and Ladakh. While these are important, there is a domestic dimension as well. It goes beyond the limited argument that opposition to Article 370 has been a foundational principle for BJP. Some roots lie in July 2016, when the Valley erupted following the gunning down of Hizbul Mujahideen terrorist Burhan Wani. This represented a new phase in the Kashmir unrest. It was no longer a call for independence, or even merger with Pakistan; it was a call for a caliphate. Islamic State (IS) videos and imagery began to influence young men in Kashmir. ‘Azaadi’ was overwhelmed by ‘jihad’. There was little evidence of physical presence of IS, but internet-based indoctrination was lethal. Between 2011 and 2016, internet penetration in Kashmir had jumped from 3% to 28%.

Out of Circulation

This ‘new wave’ of radicalism also meant traditional politicians in the Valley were irrelevant. Not just the Abdullahs and Sayeeds, but also the Hurriyat —pro-separatist and, supposedly, with a sense of the Kashmiri street. Having sold themselves so often to so many bidders, the political class in Srinagar was in no position to sell anything, any tactical advance or retreat, to the belligerent young Kashmiri. In that period, elements of the Hurriyat reached out to spooks and political operatives in New Delhi. They urged action against the ‘boys’, but also engagement with the Hurriyat to give them (the Hurriyat leadership) a fresh lease. It was too late; the chapter was over. This helps explain why suggestions that ‘political leaders’ in Kashmir should have been consulted before August 5 are easily dismissed. Apart from ensuring a news leak, nothing would have been achieved. The events of 2016 had another impact. They brought the ferocity and rhetoric of Kashmiri separatism into the heart of anti-Modi demonstrations on campuses, media debates and public platforms across India. In recent years, the number of young Kashmiri Muslims studying and working in the rest of India has grown significantly. Kashmiri Muslims have become part of campus politics and been elected to student offices in, for instance, Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). They can be found working in distant Kerala or Goa. Frankly, this osmosis has been a mixed blessing. It was hoped it would introduce young Kashmiris to the diversity and economic opportunities of India. While this has happened to some degree, it has also allowed separatist ideas to make common cause with fringe Left causes, and with a slight, but apparent, susceptibility to Islamism among sections of young non-Kashmiri Muslims. After 2016, the glue for these disparate groups was hostility to Narendra Modi and to the Indian State, in their imagination now juxtaposed as one. In popular opinion in the rest of India, this led to a counter-reaction. It took public impatience with Kashmiri politicians, victimhood, secessionist tendencies, violent street protests, and with Kashmir-related terrorism, to a historical peak. It has not been sufficiently appreciated that Kashmir (and, by extension, Pakistan) as a conflict zone is now an all-India fixation. It is no more a solely north Indian obsession.

View From the Living Room 

Why? For one, TV and social media have taken images and accounts of the Kashmir insurgency, as well as anti-India sloganeering — in the Valley or in other parts of the country — to drawing rooms across India. This has created a revulsion and a reaction. While the expansion of separatist politics into Left-liberal discourse outside Kashmir has given advocates of azaadi new allies, it has also exposed them to a much wider mainstream audience that does not agree with them. That apart, till the 1990s, Indian security forces encountered several live and active internal fault lines — Maoism in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar/Jharkhand; insurgency in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Punjab, J&K. Today, for the most part, these fault lines are stable. The exception is Kashmir. This is reflected in gallantry medals given to military or paramilitary troops each year. Almost all of them now involve action in Jammu-Kashmir and the Pakistan front. As a consequence, Kashmir is a deeply felt all-India issue of unusual intensity. Take March 1, when Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman was released from Pakistani captivity. That fortnight in Kerala — in the far south — the live telecast of Varthaman crossing over to India had among the highest TRP ratings for any programming, even soap operas. The Pulwama car bombing in February provided more sombre evidence. Forty CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) men were killed. They came from 16 of India’s then 29 states. Their bodies went home to emotional funerals in Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand, Assam and Karnataka. Slowly, sedulously, the hardened sentiment on Kashmir had acquired a pan-Indian footprint. An obvious upshot was — and is — a frustration with the status quo in Kashmir, and a fatigue with what is seen as the familiar cycle of victimhood and violence, blackmail and bluster. Politically, the ground was fertile for a break from the past and for a new initiative, however audacious. Perceptive to this mood, Prime Minister Modi and home minister Amit Shah saw their chance.
This commentary originally appeared in The economic Times.
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Rishabh Kandpal

Rishabh Kandpal

Rishabh Kandpal Student Masters in Public Policy National Law School of India University

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