Introduction
The West Asian region has been undergoing great churn since the signing of the Abraham Accords[1] in September 2020, which kickstarted the reconciliation between Israel and the Arab countries. In March 2023, the peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran,[2] brokered by China, emerged as a welcome development in the region. There were also talks of a possible Saudi-Israel normalisation by September 2023.[3] However, the war in Gaza, triggered by the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023,[4] pushed the region into turmoil.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is the primary regional forum for cooperation and consultation among the six members states in the Arabian peninsula, has supported the right of the Palestinian people to a “two state solution” and strongly condemned Israel for the death and destruction in Gaza.[a] The GCC reaffirmed its support for the Palestinian cause during its 46th Summit in Kuwait in December 2024,[5] where it condemned Israel’s ongoing military actions in Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank and violations in occupied Jerusalem’s holy sites and called for an immediate end to the war in Gaza. It also emphasised the importance of creating an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as capital, as a part of the two-state solution. The Final Communique[6] also included resolutions of the Arab-Islamic summit, hosted by Saudi Arabia on 11 November 2024, which called for enhancing efforts to end the war in Gaza. It also commended Qatar’s efforts in brokering a ceasefire in Gaza and facilitating the exchange of detainees.
The Summit took two different and conflicting positions on Iran—one of the primary reasons for the establishment of the GCC and often considered a key rival of GCC countries. On the one hand, the GCC supported Iran in its defence against Israeli air strikes into Iran on 26 October 2024. The GCC also praised Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s statement during the joint extraordinary leaders’ summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League in Riyadh on 11 November 2024 that the international community should oblige Israel “to respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not to violate its lands.”[7]
At the same time, the GCC was critical of the “three island dispute”[8] between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and condemned Iran for continuing to occupy the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, which belong to the UAE. The GCC asked Iran to resolve the issue with the UAE through either direct negotiations or the international courts.[9]
These contradictions in the GCC, its reluctance to take a more proactive stance in the Gaza war, and its failure to develop a long-term vision and strategy in line with the rapidly changing Gulf region have often invited criticism. It has also been accused of being rigid in its approach, as witnessed during the GCC-Qatar diplomatic stand-off in 2017.[10] Additionally, the GCC comprises only countries south of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and does not include Iran and Iraq in the north. These factors necessitate a review of the GCC’s structure, charter, and role in the region. This brief proposes ways in which the GCC can add value to its structure and evolve into the primary platform for any discussions in the region, both north and south of the Arabian Gulf.
The Genesis of the GCC
The GCC was established on 25 May 1981 in Abu Dhabi[11] after years of negotiations on the necessity and possible role of such an organisation. It originally consisted of six Arab states within the Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.[b] The forum aimed to effect coordination, integration, and connection among the member states; its Charter emphasised the deepening and strengthening of relations, links, and areas of cooperation among their citizens.[12]
However, initial proposals by the GCC’s founding members reveal that security was the dominant factor behind the formation of the organisation, in the context of the perceived threats from Iran and Iraq.[13] In 1979, the Iranian revolution had toppled the Shah’s regime in Iran. The policies subsequently pursued by the Khomeini-led regime in Iran—particularly its attempts to export its revolution to the broader Gulf region, seek leadership in the Muslim world, and foment Sunni-Shia conflict—created apprehensions on both sides of the Arabian Gulf. The Iran-Iraq war, which broke out in 1980, also raised security concerns for the countries south of the Persian Gulf, which had weaker military capacities and could not have confronted either Iran or Iraq by themselves.
Leading up to the establishment of the GCC, foreign ministers of eight Gulf States (the six future GCC states as well as Iraq and Iran[c]) first met in Jeddah in July 1975 to discuss a Saudi proposal for a collective security agreement in the Gulf, then met again in Muscat in November 1976, where regional security arrangements were discussed.[14] Neither meeting yielded an agreement due to the lack of consensus on defence, security, and foreign policy. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980 removed Iraq and Iran from subsequent participation in the GCC.
Britain’s January 1968 announcement of its intention to leave the Gulf region by 1971[15] forced countries in the region to seek a new and more reliable security architecture. Following this, the UAE was formed on 2 December 1971,[16] comprising the six emirates.[d] Although Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, called for a federation that would also include Qatar and Bahrain,[17] they opted out, having declared their independence well before the formation of the UAE. Following the Iranian revolution, in October 1979, a meeting was held in Taif, Saudi Arabia, where the general framework of the GCC was decided. However, there were some differing views; some favoured focusing on security and military integration, even a formal military alliance, while others wanted the new organisation to emphasise soft power and economic integration.
In 1980, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal was tasked with bringing the different views together and leading the drafting of the charter. The final draft was adopted by the heads of state on 25 May 1981 in Abu Dhabi.[18] Other factors that expedited the creation of the GCC were the Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1979 and the Soviet Union’s intentions to interfere in the affairs of the Gulf region. Sensing a threat to US interests in the Gulf region and a possible expansionist act by the Soviet Union, and in an attempt to control the region’s vast oil resources, then US President Jimmy Carter, in his State of the Union Address in January 1980, announced the “Carter Doctrine”,[19] stating that the US would employ military force against any country that attempted to gain control of the Persian Gulf region. The Soviet Union reacted by trying to develop close relations with Iraq and Kuwait, causing further unease in the region facing a collective security dilemma. Additionally, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979[20] caused a rift within the Arab world,[e] undermining the concept of Arab national security.[21]
Changing Regional Dynamics
In the 45 years since the establishment of the GCC, the Gulf region has undergone many changes even as its basic structure has stayed the same. The 9/11 attacks in the US—most perpetrators of which were identified as Saudi citizens—made the region the focus of the global war on terror. The US-led military campaign against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan forced Al Qaeda to spread across the Gulf region and Africa. In 2003, the US launched a war on Iraq under the pretext of Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction, which led to Saddam Hussein being ousted and his Baath Party demolished. A weakened Iraq fell under Iran’s influence, a dynamic that persists to this day.
Iran developing nuclear weapons has posed the greatest threat to the region, which was intensified when a uranium enrichment site built inside a mountain near the ancient city of Qom was discovered in September 2009.[22] In July 2015, the Iran Nuclear Deal was signed,[23] rolling back the country’s nuclear programme and placing severe restrictions and checks on it. However, the deal was revoked by the US under Donald Trump in May 2018,[24] and Iran has since escalated its uranium-enrichment programme.
The Arab Spring protests in March 2011 forced internal changes in certain countries of the region,[f] although the GCC countries were largely unaffected. The Saudi-led war in Yemen, named Operation Decisive Storm, and the subsequent attacks by Houthis from Yemen on Saudi Arabia and the UAE also threatened regional security and the unity of the GCC.[g] The danger of the conflict to the region intensified when the Houthis targeted Saudi oil fields in September 2019[25] and a UAE airfield in January 2022.[26]
In June 2017, a diplomatic standoff emerged between the GCC and Qatar, sparked by allegations that Qatar funds “terrorism” and that it has close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, including Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).[27] The standoff was a result of news items and stories posted on a number of official Qatari websites (which Qatar claimed had been hacked) in which the Qatari emir is shown to be criticising Donald Trump, describing Iran as a force of stability in the region, and threatening to withdraw ambassadors from a number of regional countries including Saudi Arabia.[28] The standoff persisted till the Al Ula Summit in January 2021,[29] without either side making any concessions. This was perhaps the first conflict within the GCC that challenged its diplomatic skills.
In recent years, there have been positive developments in the region that could lead to a shift in the structure and relevance of the GCC. This includes the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran—rivals since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and on opposing sides of the war in Yemen. The agreement included reopening the embassies and missions of both countries within two months and an affirmation of respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in internal affairs. It also paved the way for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Yemen.[h],[30]
The Saudi-Iran deal also led to Syria’s membership in the Arab League being reinstated,[31] 12 years after it was revoked following the Assad regime’s crackdown on Arab Spring protesters. Syria’s re-admission to the Arab League represented a clear concession to Iran, which had supported the Assad regime throughout the crisis.
There is also an overall sense of reconciliation in the region. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry visited Syria on 27 February 2023,[32] the first such trip by an Egyptian foreign minister since the civil war began in 2011. On 18 March 2023, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met his Egyptian counterpart[33] during the first such visit to Cairo since bilateral relations were disrupted following the Muslim Brotherhood government of Egypt being overthrown in 2013 and held talks on the possibility of restoring bilateral ties. Qatar and Bahrain, too, announced the restoration of diplomatic ties on 13 April 2023.[34]
Egypt has also sought to mend ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia. On 16 March 2023, following the Saudi-Iran peace deal, the spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry, Naseer Kanaani, confirmed that Iran, too, aims to improve relations with Egypt.[35] On 2 April 2023, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi visited Jeddah, where he held talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.[36] The two leaders “affirmed mutual concern for promoting common cooperation in all fields” and “coordination and consultation” on regional and international issues.
Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 and the subsequent internal political churn, Iraq is no longer considered hostile to its Arab neighbours. Instead, it has emerged as an important ally of Iran. Iran also has a large influence in the selection of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[37] The current prime minister, Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani, a prominent Shia Iraqi politician, took office in October 2022, after being nominated by the Iran-backed Shia Coordination Framework,[38] the largest parliamentary bloc in Iraq.[i]
The outbreak of the war in Gaza in October 2023 may have reintroduced conflict into the region but it has also led to closer coordination in the region as well as within the GCC. While Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye opposed Israeli attacks and provided a platform for negotiating a ceasefire, Saudi Arabia and the UAE coordinated to highlight the humanitarian toll of indiscriminate strikes by Israel, which killed thousands of civilians in the Gaza Strip. Iran, Syria, and to some extent Iraq challenged Israel directly through their sustained support of Hamas and Hezbollah.
Saudi Arabia, which was almost at the final stages of normalising relations with Israel in September 2023, has since stated that there cannot be any normalisation with Israel until there is a permanent resolution to the Palestine issue.[39] It has also often taken the lead in condemning Israel for its strikes in Gaza and Lebanon. Additionally, Saudi Arabia supported Iran against Israeli strikes; at the joint extraordinary leaders’ summit of the OIC and the Arab League in Riyadh on 11 November 2024, the Saudi Crown Prince asked the international community to force Israel to respect the sovereignty of Iran.
The Gaza war has, therefore, brought the countries of the region together and served as a reminder that Israel is a key adversary in the region and an obstacle to an independent Palestine. While the threat from a revolutionary Iran has not been completely eliminated, reconciliatory steps with Iran have raised hopes for a Saudi-Iran rapprochement and a broader regional reconciliation with Iran.
Other Factors: The US and China
In the decades since the establishment of the GCC, the US has assured security to countries in the Gulf region, especially against a hostile Iran and the growing threat of terror. The countries in the region also host a number of US military bases.[40] However, after failed attempts at regime change during the Arab Spring and the setbacks suffered by the US military in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US under President Barack Obama decided to militarily disengage from the region. This change indicated that the US would refrain from deploying ground troops in case of regional conflicts, requiring regional states to take primary responsibility. The US would continue to provide intelligence and technological backup in terms of satellite coverage and to participate in aerial operations, drone strikes, and, in rare cases, special forces operations, but the issues would need to be resolved by regional players.
This led to a progressive withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Although the US did send in some forces to tackle the IS threat in Iraq and Syria in 2014, it was as part of a coalition of regional states. This was also a period of a broader “pivot to Asia” by the US in an attempt to contest a rising China. By this time, it was clear to the US that the Indo-Pacific region was emerging as a more prominent security challenge for the US and that the US could not afford to remain actively engaged militarily both in the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific. This disengagement was a shock to Arab countries, especially when Iran-backed proxies, especially Houthis, had begun targeting regional countries and Iran was pursuing its nuclear programme. Consequently, countries in the region began looking to China.
For China, too, the Gulf region was becoming a key foreign policy priority, especially since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. At the China-GCC Summit in December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that the summit heralded a “new era” in the China-Arab partnership and invited the Gulf states to join the Global Security Initiative “in a joint effort to uphold regional peace and stability”.[41] At the same Summit, China and Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement,[42] paving the way for increased security collaboration.
Recommendations and Conclusion
In a context where Iraq is no longer a threat and Iran is no longer the primary adversary, can the GCC afford to remain unchanged? An immediate expansion of the GCC, especially including Iraq and Iran, may not be feasible. Nevertheless, it would be preferable to initiate a dialogue with Iran rather than have the country be isolated and perceived as the primary threat. A future model would need to be more inclusive, which would imply including countries on the northern shores of the Persian Gulf.
The GCC will also need to evolve structures for wider cooperation and confidence-building. While the core membership of the GCC may remain the same, it could initially include new members as observers or ‘plus’ members, similar to the mechanism adopted by the Association of South East Asian Nations. The Gulf region, due to its geographical and geopolitical linkages with West Asia and North Africa, is ideally placed to incorporate such additional memberships. Given the evolving dynamics in the Gulf region, a revised structure may look as follows:
- Jordan and Yemen can be included as new members in an expanded GCC. Morocco could also be considered as it had been invited to join the GCC, along with Jordan, in May 2011.[43]
- Lebanon and Palestine may be added as ‘plus’ members (e.g., ‘GCC plus 2’).
- Iran and Iraq may be invited to join as dialogue partners for an initial period of five years.
- Egypt may be considered for inclusion as a ‘plus’ member (e.g., ‘GCC plus 3’) due to its historical and geopolitical significance in the region, its role in frequently brokering peace between Palestine and Israel, and the Suez Canal being the primary route for the passage of oil and natural gas consignments from the Gulf region.
- Syria and Lebanon may be considered for inclusion later, depending on how the political situation develops in these two nations.
A gradual expansion will ensure that there are no major upheavals and that the organisation has ample time to absorb the changes before making additional shifts.
The current structure of the GCC has become outdated. A revised, appropriately scaled, and purpose-driven structure is urgently needed not only for the Gulf region but also for the entire West Asian region. However, this would be challenging, given the deep-seated mistrust, ideological conflicts, and regional rivalries. Nonetheless, maintaining the status quo might cause even more harm. Additionally, the inclusion of influential members such as Iran, Iraq, and Egypt could help alleviate concerns over Saudi Arabia’s dominance within the GCC. Countering the threat of terrorism through cooperation and collaboration could be another unifying factor.
It is time for the GCC to evolve into a larger and more realistic Gulf forum and for major nations like Iran, Iraq, and Egypt to establish a stronger regional partnership. What matters most is not how the structure evolves in the next 20 years, but rather, how a common platform is established where key stakeholders can shed their mutual suspicions and mistrust and initiate dialogue. The time is ripe for the GCC to reinvent itself to maintain its relevance in the region.
Endnotes
[a] At the time of the ceasefire on 19 January 2025, more than 47,000 had been killed and over two million internally displaced multiple times within Gaza due to forced evacuation orders by Israel.
See: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy5klgv5zv0o
[b] There was also talk of Yemen, Jordan, and Morocco joining later, but nothing came of it due to differences of opinion between the GCC members.
[c] According to Abdulla Y. Bishara, Founding Secretary General of the GCC, “it was Iran’s and Iraq’s resort to armed conflict that provided the immediate geostrategic and geopolitical context and also the pretext for the GCC’s establishment, indeed its necessity.” He explains that both Iran and Iraq claimed legitimate stakes in Gulf regional forums, each with distinct justifications. Iraq’s claim stemmed from Arab nationalist sentiment, with its Arab population nearly matching that of all six GCC states combined. Iran’s position rested on its demographic and geographic advantages; its population exceeded that of Iraq and all GCC states together, while its Gulf coastline stretched longer than any three GCC countries combined. Moreover, in the wake of its revolution, the Islamic Republic, having toppled the Shah’s Western-aligned regime, asserted that only Iran could ensure regional security. See: https://ncusar.org/blog/2015/12/founding-of-the-gcc/
[d] Ras Al Khaimah, the seventh emirate, joined a few months later.
[e] The Egypt Israel Peace Treaty was seen as an act of betrayal by Egypt and undermined the whole concept of collective Arab. It also seriously undermined the Arab League, leading to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League.
[f] In Morocco, the king was forced to allow the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) to form a new government. In Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the regimes made huge concessions and resorted to large direct and indirect payments to the population in order to avert protests.
[g] Notably, Oman and Kuwait refrained from joining the Saudi-led alliance in fighting the Houthis in Yemen.
[h] The conflict in Yemen had turned into a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia ever since a Saudi Arabia-led coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015.
[i] Iraq has a power-sharing arrangement where the prime minister, who is the Chief Executive, is typically Shia, the president is Kurd, and the speaker of the parliament is Sunni.
[1] The Abraham Accords Declaration, US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/
[2] “Saudi Arabia and Iran Agree to Restore Diplomatic Relations,” Saudi Gazette, March 10, 2023, https://www.saudigazette.com.sa/article/630567/SAUDI-ARABIA/Saudi-Arabia-and-Iran-agree-to-restore-diplomatic-relations
[3] “Saudi Crown Prince MBS Says Israel Normalisation Getting ‘Closer’,” Al Jazeera, September 20, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/saudi-crown-prince-mbs-says-israel-normalisation-getting-closer
[4] Rajeev Agarwal, “Hamas Attacking Israel from Gaza was a War Waiting to Happen,” India Today, October 9, 2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/opinion/story/opinion-hamas-attacking-israel-from-gaza-was-a-war-waiting-to-happen-2446356-2023-10-09
[5] “Kuwait’s 45th GCC Summit Final Communique Calls for Stopping War Crimes in Gaza, Ending Occupation of Palestinian Territories,” Qatar News Agency, December 1, 2024, https://www.qna.org.qa/en/News-Area/News/2024-12/01/0080-kuwait's-45th-gcc-summit-final-communique%C2%A0calls-for-stopping-war-crimes-in-gaza,-ending-occupation-of-palestinian-territories
[6] GCC, https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2024-12-1-3.aspx
[7] “At Riyadh Summit, Saudi Crown Prince Backs Iran, Accuses Israel of Genocide,” The Times of Israel, November 11, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/at-riyadh-summit-saudi-crown-prince-backs-iran-accuses-israel-of-genocide/
[8] Noura S. Al-Mazrouei, “Disputed Islands Between UAE and Iran: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz,” Gulf Research Centre Cambridge Paper, October 2015, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194095/GRM_Noura_paper__30-09-15_new_7634.pdf
[9] “Kuwait’s 45th GCC Summit Final Communique: More Cooperation, Addressing Numerous Challenges,” Kuwait News Agency, December 1, 2024, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=3206968&language=en#
[10] “Qatar Crisis: What You Need to Know,” BBC News, July 19, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757
[11] Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, “The Founding of the GCC,” Arab News, June 8, 2020, https://www.arabnews.jp/en/45thanniversary/article_21122/
[12] “Gulf Cooperation Council,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, https://www.mofa.gov.bh/en/gcc
[13] Dr. Omar Al Hassan, “The GCC’s Formation: The Official Version,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, March 30, 2015, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2015/03/201533011258831763.html
[14] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Missed Opportunities and Failed Integration in the GCC,” Arab Centre Washington DC, June 1, 2018, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/missed-opportunities-and-failed-integration-in-the-gcc/#_ftnref1
[15] “Persian Gulf: Withdrawal Of British Forces,” UK Parliament, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1968-05-22/debates/90dd63fc-db45-4ae1-9087-001574bee8e0/PersianGulfWithdrawalOfBritishForces
[16] “History,” Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington, DC, https://www.uae-embassy.org/discover-uae/history
[17] Founders of the Union, “About the UAE,” https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/founders-of-the-union#:~:text=Sheikh%20Zayed's%20role%20in%20establishing%20the%20UAE,Trucial%20States%2C%20but%20also%20Qatar%20and%20Bahrain
[18] “The Founding of the GCC,” Arab News, June 8, 2020, https://www.arabnews.jp/en/45thanniversary/article_21122/
[19] “The Carter Doctrine,” Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Carter-Doctrine
[20] “Egypt Israel Peace Treaty,” https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201136/volume-1136-i-17813-english.pdf
[21] Omar Al Hassan, “GCC’s Formation- The Official Version,” Al Jazeera Centre of Studies, March 30, 2015, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2015/03/201533011258831763.html
[22] “Iran Admits Secret Uranium Enrichment Plant,” Guardian News, September 25, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/25/iran-admits-uranium-plant
[23] Resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue, UN Security Council, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background
[24] “Trump’s Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, Explained,” Vox News, May 8, 2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/5/8/17328520/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-withdraw
[25] “Houthi Drone Attacks on 2 Saudi Aramco Oil Facilities Spark Fires,” Al Jazeera, September 14, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/9/14/houthi-drone-attacks-on-2-saudi-aramco-oil-facilities-spark-fires
[26] “UAE Under Drone, Missile Attacks,” Al Jazeera, February 3, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/3/timeline-uae-drone-missile-attacks-houthis-yemen
[27] “Arab States Issue 13 Demands to End Qatar-Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera, July 12, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/12/arab-states-issue-13-demands-to-end-qatar-gulf-crisis
[28] “Saudi Arabia and UAE Block Qatari Media Over Incendiary Statements,” Al Jazeera, May 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/25/saudi-arabia-and-uae-block-qatari-media-over-incendiary-statements-iran-israel
[29] “Transcript: Closing Statement of 41st GCC Summit,” Al Jazeera, January 7, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/7/closing-statement-of-41st-gulf-cooperation-council
[30] “Saudi Arabia Launches Yemen Air Strikes as Alliance Builds Against Houthi Rebels,” The Guardian News, March 26, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in-yemen
[31] “Arab League Readmits Syria as Relations with Assad Normalize,” Reuters, May 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-league-set-readmit-syria-relations-with-assad-normalise-2023-05-07/
[32] “Egypt Foreign Minister Visits Syria for First Time Since 2011,” Al Jazeera, February 27, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/27/egypts-foreign-minister-visits-syria-for-first-time-since-war
[33] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-misir-i-ziyareti--18-mart-2023.en.mfa
[34] “Qatar and Bahrain to Restore Ties, End Years-Long Dispute,” Al Jazeera, April 13, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/13/qatar-and-bahrain-to-restore-ties-end-years-long-dispute
[35] “Iran Looks to Restore Ties with Egypt Following Saudi Rapprochement,” Middle East Monitor, March 16, 2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230316-iran-looks-to-restore-ties-with-egypt-following-saudi-rapprochement/
[36] “Egypt’s Leader Makes Surprise Visit to Saudi Arabia,” AP News, April 3, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/egypt-saudi-arabia-sissi-bin-salman-economy-0ae05c6dbe715433015db07ef97519bb
[37] Kali Robinson, “How Much Influence Does Iran Have in Iraq?,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-iraq
[38] “Iraqi Parliament Approves New Government Headed by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani,” Reuters, October 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-lawmakers-approve-government-prime-minister-designate-sudani-2022-10-27/
[39] “‘No Israel Normalisation Without Palestinian State,’ says Saudi Arabia,” Live Mint, February 5, 2025, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/no-israel-normalisation-without-palestinian-state-saudi-arabia-benjamin-netanyahu-donald-trump-white-house-gaza-war-11738729060570.html
[40] “Here’s Where U.S. Forces are Deployed in the Middle East,” New York Times, October 2, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/02/world/middleeast/us-troops-middle-east-map.html
[41] Mordechai Chaziza, “The Global Security Initiative: China’s New Security Architecture for the Gulf,” The Diplomat, May 23, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/the-global-security-initiative-chinas-new-security-architecture-for-the-gulf/
[42] Md. Muddassir Quamar, “China and Saudi Arabia: A Deepening Strategic Partnership,” Observer Research Foundation, January 16, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-and-saudi-arabia-a-deepening-strategic-partnership
[43] Anne Allmeling and Johannes Krug, “How would Jordan and Morocco change the Gulf Cooperation Council?,” Al Arabiya English, June 9, 2011, https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011%2F06%2F09%2F152623
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