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DCS Mayal, “Global Development Initiative and Military–Civil Fusion Synergy: China’s Strategy for Global Influence,” ORF Special Report No. 274, Observer Research Foundation, September 2025.
Since Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2013, the People’s Republic of China has launched a number of initiatives to augment its global influence, technological prowess, and military modernisation. These efforts are rooted in the ‘Middle Kingdom Dream’ and the ambitious 2049 Mission, which aim to position China as a hegemon in global affairs and transform it into a fully modernised military superpower by 2049. To achieve “national rejuvenation” and establish a “great modern socialist country” by its centenary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is prioritising the development of a modern world-class military to successfully navigate an increasingly volatile global environment. During his speech at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, President Xi Jinping reiterated his dedication to meeting the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 2027 modernisation goals, accelerating the integration of “mechanisation, informatisation, and intelligentisation” within China’s armed forces. If achieved, these capabilities would enhance the PLA’s ability to support CCP objectives, including efforts toward Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland.[1]
Under Xi, China aims to expand its global influence, enhance military capabilities, and reshape international norms by capitalising on dual-use technological innovations through its state-led Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy. This strategy aims to advance Beijing’s vision of a multipolar world order centred on China. Xi has launched four major initiatives: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013; the Global Development Initiative (GDI) in 2021; the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022; and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) in 2023. China’s motivations for launching these global initiatives include stimulating its economy, managing excess industrial capacity, expanding its international influence, securing energy resources, and supporting regional stability. These initiatives have the potential to enhance China’s strategic influence, promote international partnerships, and integrate civilian and military technological advancements to bolster PLA modernisation, which can help transform the PLA into a world-class military.
With the BRI witnessing a slowdown, China has redirected its efforts toward smaller-scale grants, capacity-building initiatives, and training programmes under the GDI, which circumvent the high costs associated with the BRI’s large infrastructure projects. The GDI is broader and more conceptual than the BRI, focusing on promoting discursive concepts of Chinese-style development.[2] Unlike the BRI’s large-scale infrastructure ventures, the GDI prioritises localised, community-driven projects, enabling China to foster closer ties with developing nations, augment its soft power, and promote a development model aligned with its geopolitical interests. The GDI advances China’s economic statecraft, supports its state-led development model, and reshapes global narratives on governance and human rights. It also serves as a diplomatic tool to counter US-led Indo-Pacific Strategies (IPS), advocating “win-win” economic cooperation over perceived “zero-sum” alliances.[3]
The synthesis of China’s MCF strategy and GDI has the potential to exponentially expand Chinese influence globally. While MCF accelerates military modernisation through dual-use technological advancements, the GDI fosters economic and diplomatic ties under the banner of development cooperation. By integrating these strategies, China not only plans to strengthen the PLA, but also shape the global order, nurture strategic partnerships, and confront Western-led global governance. This fusion of military and development strategies positions China as a formidable force in reshaping the international order to align with its long-term geopolitical ambitions.
China began integrating civilian and military products in the late 1990s by promoting their joint development under the framework of Civil-Military Integration (CMI), with a focus on modernising defence capabilities.[4] China began replacing CMI with MCF during its 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), expanding MCF to align economic, social, and security development with its national rejuvenation strategy.[5] China views MCF as a core strategy that must be integrated with other national initiatives to drive economic growth and transformation, aiming to establish a cohesive, robust, and comprehensive strategic framework. While CMI focused on the civilian sector supporting the military in areas such as logistics and technological development, MCF seeks to harness emerging and advanced civilian technologies to augment military capabilities.[6] After 2017, MCF diverged from past CMI endeavours in a number of respects. Its first goal was to integrate the civilian industrial sector into the PLA’s supply chain in its entirety. Non-defence corporations were urged to sell directly to the military for the first time. Second, China’s military is explicitly using MCF to gain access to vital Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies such as AI and Machine Learning, Quantum Computing and Communications, 5/6G Telecommunications, and Robotics and Automation.[7]
In 2015, the CCP elevated Military-Civil Fusion Development (MCFD) to a national-level strategy to serve as a bridge between China’s national development strategy and its national security strategy. Its drive for defence self-reliance and global military influence through MCF has raised geopolitical concerns.[8] MCF has drawn global concern and scrutiny, leading to sanctions, particularly from the US, on Chinese companies alleged to be advancing the PLA’s military objectives under the guise of civilian research programmes.[9] China’s shift away from unambiguous references to MCF appears to be a strategic attempt to obscure its military objectives and minimise international backlash. Recognising that some of its initiatives, including MCF and the BRI, have ignited concerns about Beijing’s intentions, China has adopted lower-profile rhetoric when promoting them, albeit without changing their core strategic objectives.[10]
China appears to be putting old wine in a new bottle by replacing the MCF terminology with “Integrated National Strategic Systems and Capabilities” (INSS&C), in an effort to rationalise bureaucratic and industrial coordination and to dilute global opposition, while pursuing the same objectives under a less contentious name. Since early 2022, the CCP has seemingly deemphasised the term MCF in public discourse, favouring INSS&C instead. The term INSS&C appears to have originated in June 2017 when Xi addressed the first meeting of the Central Committee’s Central Commission for Military-Civilian Fusion Development (CCMCFD), and charged it with gradually building up INSS&C. Xi used INSS&C in conjunction with MCF in his 2017 speech to the 19th Party Congress, suggesting that the completion of projects, achievements in defence research, and enhanced MCF would contribute to building China’s overarching INSS&C.[11] Xi’s work report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 omitted any mention of MCF, only calling for consolidating and enhancing INSS&C, all while addressing many of the components traditionally associated with MCF.[12]
MCF has been incorporated into almost every strategic programme since Xi came to power in 2013, including the Made in China 2025 initiative and the 2017 Next Generation AI Plan. MCF is a Chinese national strategy to transform the PLA into a “world-class military” by 2049 by exploiting dual-use technologies for military applications and promoting innovation in critical industries. To further China’s military objectives, the MCF strategy has enabled the CCP to acquire intellectual property, research, and technological innovation from global citizens, academics, and private industry.[13] China seeks and obtains foreign technology through various means, including Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), overseas acquisitions, legal technology imports, the establishment of foreign Research and Development (R&D) centres, joint ventures, academic partnerships, talent recruitment, theft, and industrial and cyber espionage.[14]
According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China has adopted a “whole-of-society” approach to secure leadership in AI, advanced materials, and new energy technologies.[15] Although the Chinese MCF strategy aims to develop and acquire advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defence Science and Technology (S&T) industries, its broader purpose is to strengthen all instruments of national power by incorporating these technologies into its economic, military, and social governance models. MCF strives to establish an infrastructure that connects the military and civilian sectors in a manner that catalyses innovation and economic development, yields an effective unity of effort in advancing dual-use technologies, especially those suited for “intelligentised” warfare, and facilitates effective industrial mobilisation during wartime.[16]
Washington now recognises that technology is at the core of the US-China competition. At present, the US is ahead in most areas; however, there is no clear victor yet in certain emerging technologies such as AI and quantum computing. Washington’s concerns can be grouped into five broad categories. First, China’s theft of foreign technology, its demands for technology transfer from companies as a price for their entry into the country, and its strategic acquisitions of foreign firms to gain technological know-how. Second, the use of technologies acquired for civilian purposes being diverted for military applications. Third, Chinese students in US universities and academic collaborations that may aid entities working to enhance China’s military capabilities. Fourth, Chinese investments in Western technology companies and startups, which allow access to and control over emerging technologies. Finally, the activities of Chinese research laboratories—such as those established by BeiDou and Huawei in third countries—being used to enhance China’s technological base and strengthen military capabilities back home.[17]
The overall management and implementation of the MCF strategy involves the most powerful organs in the party-state: the Politburo, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission (CMC). In addition to signifying its importance, the elevation of the MCF to a national-level strategy was intended to overcome obstacles to implementation across the party-state. This elevation led to the establishment of the CCMCFD in 2017, chaired by President Xi. The stated objective of the CCMCFD is to build China’s “national strategic system and capabilities.” The elevation of the MCF strategy and the creation of the CCMCFD signal the importance that CCP attaches to MCF, given the scope and scale of the strategy’s ambitions.[18] In 2017, China unveiled the 13th Five-Year Special Plan for S&T MCF in an effort to seize the upper hand in the global battle for control over emerging technologies, including plans to develop a coordinated system for fundamental and innovative R&D in AI, biotechnology, advanced electronics, quantum technologies, advanced energy, modern manufacturing, next-generation networks, and new materials.[19]
China’s MCF system integrates a vast network of government bodies, military institutions, research centres, and private enterprises to accelerate technological and military advancements. It involves ministry-level organisations under the State Council, key organs of the CMC, leading military universities and academies, state-sponsored research institutions, and private firms specialising in AI, robotics, unmanned systems, cyber security, and Big Data. MCF initiatives foster collaboration between central, provincial, and municipal governments, PLA units, academic entities, and industries, with over 35 national-level MCF industrial zones established across China.[20]
Since 2013, the BRI has served as a cornerstone of China’s global strategy. The integration of the Maritime Silk Route (MSR), Health Silk Route (HSR), Digital Silk Route (DSR), and Polar Silk Route (PSR), along with the Space Information Corridor (SIC), into the BRI has allowed China to efficiently monitor, analyse, control, and potentially disrupt global communications—particularly within countries participating in the BRI.[21] The BRI now faces criticism for creating debt traps, causing environmental harm, and posing financial risks. Amid domestic economic slowdowns and diminishing returns, support for large-scale BRI projects has declined. With the BRI stalled, China has shifted focus to the GDI, emphasising smaller-scale grants, capacity building, and training programmes to maintain influence while avoiding high infrastructure costs.[22]
While the GDI does not officially replace the BRI, it serves as a complementary initiative to address some of the criticisms levelled against the BRI. Chinese officials have described the GDI and BRI as “twin engines” for global cooperation, suggesting a strategic realignment rather than an overhaul.[23] This shift allows China to maintain its global engagement while mitigating the financial risks associated with massive infrastructure investments.[24] Like the BRI, the GDI also aligns with China’s long-term ambition of achieving its “Middle Kingdom” dream, leveraging economic diplomacy, capacity building, and strategic partnerships to reshape global governance, counter Western influence, and sustain China’s geopolitical and economic ascendancy on the world stage.
The GDI is Beijing’s framework to enhance sustainable development, economic cooperation, and global governance, particularly in the Global South. It aligns with the United Nations (UN) 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and serves as an alternative to Western initiatives such as the Group of Seven-led (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and the European Union’s (EU) Global Gateway (GG).[25] In May 2024, the EU’s then Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen, admitted that Beijing’s more flexible infrastructure investments were outpacing the bloc’s attempts, with the EU finding it difficult to keep up with China’s expanding global influence. Notwithstanding the €300 billion GG initiative introduced in 2021, bureaucratic complexity and stringent requirements have hindered progress and reduced its competitiveness.[26] With the objective of raising up to US$600 billion over five years, the US and other G7 countries formally rebranded the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative as the PGII in June 2022, seeking to counter Chinese initiatives.[27] Under GDI, the areas of cooperation include poverty reduction, food security, pandemic response and vaccines, financing for development, climate change and green development, industrialisation, the digital economy, and connectivity.[28]
The core objective of the GDI is to steer the global discourse on development, bring it under Chinese guidance, and infuse it with native ideals.[29] The GDI has gained momentum within the UN and broader global development efforts since its launch at the 76th UN General Assembly in 2021, where President Xi linked it to the UN’s 2030 SDG Agenda. By September 2024, over 100 countries and international organisations, including the UN, had backed the initiative, with more than 80 nations joining the Group of Friends, highlighting its growing global influence.[30] The Group of Friends of the GDI is a diplomatic platform established by China at the UN in 2022 to promote its GDI. On 20 September 2022, UN Secretary-General António Guterres also voiced support for the GDI in advancing the SDGs, describing it as a blueprint for tackling global challenges and “setting things right.”[31]
In theory and on paper, the GDI seeks to establish a more equitable and inclusive global development order, aiming to realise a “shared future” by empowering developing nations and promoting collective prosperity. It emphasises principles such as prioritising development, adopting a people-centred approach, ensuring that the benefits of development are shared by all so that no country or person is left behind, fostering innovation-driven progress, promoting harmony between humanity and nature, and focusing on tangible outcomes.[32] In practice, the GDI holds the potential to reshape international development cooperation and expand China’s influence over the internal affairs of partner nations. Leveraging advanced technology, the GDI framework could facilitate the use of intangible means for surveillance and governance control, with potential military applications.[33]
China’s MCF strategy drives the integration of dual-use technologies into GDI projects, enhancing economic, infrastructure, and social development while expanding Beijing’s global influence. Advancements in 5G, AI, and Big Data are being applied across smart cities, energy grids, and transportation systems under the GDI framework. According to a November 2024 report, Chinese-supported smart city surveillance systems now operate in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. These projects, which integrate AI, facial recognition, and urban monitoring technologies, are facilitated by companies such as Huawei, which offers financing through its Smart City Solutions programme.[34] Similarly, China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system enhances precision agriculture, disaster response, and connectivity in GDI recipient nations. In South Asia, Pakistan became the first country to officially adopt BeiDou for both military and civilian purposes, strengthening China-Pakistan cooperation in space exploration, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and satellite navigation. China also supports Pakistan’s space research and astronaut training to deepen their strategic partnership.[35]
From hybrid rice to flowers, tropical agriculture to dry farming, and technology demonstration centres to poverty alleviation pilot projects, China and Africa have deepened agricultural cooperation with notable achievements. These exchanges have expanded since the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).[36] MCF-driven innovations in AI diagnostics, robotic surgery, and biotechnology claim to have strengthened healthcare systems in partner nations through medical aid, hospital construction, and vaccine distribution. During the COVID-19 pandemic, of the 56 countries to which China pledged vaccine doses, all but one were participants in its BRI.[37]
In the 2023 GDI report, China claimed to have supported global pandemic response efforts while strengthening capacity building for future crises. It reported deploying over 1,000 medical team members to 56 countries, providing free medical services, training, and consultations. China also claimed to transfer vaccine development technology, co-producing vaccines with more than 20 countries, achieving an annual overseas production capacity of 1.9 billion doses. Beijing states that it has supplied over 2.2 billion COVID-19 vaccine doses globally. As the world’s second-largest vaccine donor, China also claims to promote international collaboration in vaccine R&D, production, and innovation.[38]
China’s MCF strategy also plays a role in shaping its GDI by embedding dual-use technological exports into global development projects to secure long-term strategic leverage, shape international technological standards, and counter Western-led development frameworks. By integrating advanced technologies, China claims to have enhanced the economic and infrastructure capacities of partner nations; however, Beijing has also expanded its geopolitical and strategic influence in recipient nations. These technological exports, often backed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms aligned with CCP agendas, create dependencies that strengthen China’s global positioning.
China’s 5G- and AI-driven surveillance systems, developed through MCF, are embedded in GDI projects, and are being employed to modernise digital infrastructure worldwide. Huawei’s 5G networks and Safe City surveillance systems have been deployed across Africa and Southeast Asia, enhancing governance and security capabilities while also enabling China’s long-term digital influence.[39] China’s assistance to Egypt in developing satellite capabilities not only aids technological advancement but also secures long-term strategic partnerships, shaping regional infrastructure development standards.[40] According to the 2023 GDI report, China has collaborated with international organisations and developing countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America to combat desertification.[a] It has also encouraged Chinese enterprises to leverage advanced expertise and technology in desertification control while supporting local afforestation efforts.[41]
China’s integration of MCF and GDI has strengthened its global influence by fostering economic dependencies while simultaneously advancing its military modernisation. Through strategic partnerships with developing nations, China is expanding its geopolitical reach, gaining access to critical resources, and shaping international governance frameworks in alignment with its interests. China secures long-term economic influence by embedding dual-use technologies into infrastructure projects.[42] Additionally, China’s DSR, a key extension of the BRI, integrates smart city projects with cyber infrastructure, deepening economic dependencies in partner nations.[43] China can also leverage GDI partnerships to expand military ties, often under the guise of security cooperation. In South Asia, under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing has supplied military equipment to enhance Islamabad’s defence capabilities while securing Chinese access to the strategic Gwadar Port.[44] By merging MCF-driven technologies with GDI projects, Beijing is blurring the line between economic aid and military collaboration, creating interdependent security and economic structures that expand its influence and counter Western-led alliances.
China’s university collaborations under the GDI and MCF also serve as key mechanisms for advancing dual-use research, talent development, and global influence. Chinese universities, particularly those affiliated with the Defense S&T Innovation System, have played a role in developing AI, quantum computing, advanced materials, cyber security, and aerospace technologies for both civilian and military applications. These institutions are central to the MCF strategy, particularly in the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields. According to former US Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-proliferation Christopher A. Ford, around 80 Chinese universities conduct classified military research.[45] In China, SOEs sponsor students in exchange for service commitments, aligning academic expertise with military objectives. Under China’s AI strategy, the CMC’s S&T Commission tasked Tsinghua University with establishing a military intelligence laboratory, further reinforcing the integration of academia with military development. The now-disbanded PLA Strategic Support Force has also partnered with multiple universities, while municipalities promote industrial clusters linking SOEs, research institutes, and private firms.[46]
Under the GDI, China is expanding academic cooperation with universities in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America through scholarships, research grants, and joint innovation laboratories. Programmes such as the China-Africa S&T Partnership Plan facilitate knowledge transfer while embedding Chinese technological standards in partner nations.[47] These collaborations also enable China to export digital infrastructure, AI capabilities, and surveillance technologies, strengthening its influence in emerging economies. China strategically recruits foreign researchers, scholars, and students through initiatives such as the Thousand Talents Program and the China Scholarship Council, attracting expertise in AI, semiconductors, and quantum science.[48] Restrictive immigration policies and visa limitations introduced by the Trump administration in the US—particularly targeting Chinese students and researchers in STEM fields—have inadvertently benefited China. As the US imposes hurdles, China is positioning itself as a more welcoming environment for researchers, thereby strengthening its S&T capabilities at Washington’s expense.[49] This strategy allows China to access cutting-edge global research and incorporate it into MCF-driven projects, enhancing its competitiveness in critical and emerging technologies. By integrating university collaboration into the GDI and MCF, China is shaping global technological norms, cultivating pro-China academic networks, and establishing long-term dependencies in partner countries—thereby reinforcing its vision of a multipolar world order with China at the centre.
As part of its elite-to-elite diplomacy, China provides training to foreign officials and policymakers in areas such as economic governance, cybersecurity, and public administration. These initiatives aim to shape participants’ perspectives and align global governance practices with Chinese standards and policies. China has trained government officials from developing nations through institutions such as the China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong, offering insights into its economic model and regulatory framework.[50] According to the 2023 GDI report, in November 2021, China launched the ‘Future of Africa’ vocational education initiative and an employment “through train” programme for African students. It continues to establish Luban Workshops and aims to create at least 800,000 local jobs through Chinese companies in Africa. In August 2022, the World Vocational and Technical Education Development Conference brought together over 700 global representatives to discuss digital skills, green jobs, industry-education integration, and poverty reduction.[51]
By integrating MCF with GDI, China is likely to challenge Western economic initiatives by integrating MCF-driven digital infrastructure into GDI projects and deepening military ties with partner nations, countering US-led initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). This integration is expected to expand China’s alternative global governance model, countering Western-led economic and security frameworks dominated by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Through the fusion of economic development, digital infrastructure, and strategic security partnerships, China seeks to reshape global norms, emphasising state-led governance, technological sovereignty, and “win-win” cooperation over Western liberal-democratic models.[52] By embedding MCF-driven technologies, China strengthens its economic influence while ensuring partner nations’ reliance on Chinese standards and institutions. Developing countries are increasingly adopting Chinese digital governance models, thereby weakening the Western push for open and democratic digital spaces. China is also likely to embed defence cooperation within GDI projects, offering dual-use technologies and security training programmes to countries outside Western alliances.
The GDI and MCF are two distinct Chinese strategic frameworks, and there is no conclusive public evidence available to prove that the CCMCFD officially links MCF technologies to the GDI. However, there are areas where their objectives and mechanisms complement or overlap, particularly in dual-use technology deployment across global infrastructure projects. The BeiDou Satellite System, for instance, supports the GDI’s civilian applications while simultaneously enhancing the PLA’s navigation capabilities. Similarly, the construction of the Gwadar Port under the CPEC shows the convergence of civilian and military interests. By steering dual-use technology development, the CCMCFD enables capabilities that the GDI redeploys for international cooperation, thus advancing both civilian and military objectives.
China’s MCF strategy and GDI reflect intertwined national goals of technological advancement and international development that face growing structural and strategic challenges. The dual-use nature of MCF technologies raises global concerns about GDI’s civilian credibility, especially amid intensifying geopolitical scrutiny. Export controls imposed by the US and its allies further constrain China’s access to critical technologies, undermining both MCF innovation and GDI delivery. Domestically, fragmented governance complicates coordination across ministries, agencies and provinces. Internationally, partner nations increasingly view GDI projects as soft-power extensions of China’s military-industrial ambitions, risking reputational backlash. Economically, China’s development finance dropped from over US$80 billion in 2016 to US$5 billion in 2021, constraining funding for both the initiatives. Despite massive investments, technological self-reliance remains elusive in sectors such as semiconductors and aerospace. Additionally, overcentralisation under President Xi also risks strategic rigidity, reducing adaptability in a dynamic global environment.
China’s export of surveillance technologies poses serious ethical concerns regarding privacy, governance, and human rights in recipient countries. These technologies are increasingly adopted by authoritarian regimes, as they offer new means to stifle dissent, deepen repression, and tighten control over state institutions without public accountability.[53] Their authoritarian design rooted in domestic use by the Chinese state, particularly in Xinjiang to surveil and contain Uyghur Muslims, risks normalising digital repression across the world.[54] The lack of transparency in data practices further threatens foreign data security and national sovereignty.[55] China challenges global norms around governance, transparency, and human rights by exporting advanced surveillance technologies economically, enabling governments especially in developing countries to deploy these technologies at the cost of personal freedoms. These tools are frequently adopted in the absence of strong privacy laws, enabling expanded state control and the suppression of dissent.
China’s MCF strategy and GDI are deeply interconnected, serving both economic and strategic objectives. While framed as development partnerships, these initiatives subtly enhance Beijing’s national capabilities and geopolitical influence. The integration of MCF and GDI strengthens China’s global position by embedding dual-use technologies and fostering long-term digital and economic dependencies. This synergy allows China to institutionalise state-led governance models, promote alternative mechanisms to counter Western-dominated systems, and expand military-strategic ties. By incorporating dual-use technologies into development projects, China extends its economic reach while creating strategic dependencies that challenge Western governance frameworks. Additionally, infrastructure investments facilitate growing security partnerships, bolstering the PLA’s global presence and countering US-led initiatives. This integration accelerates the transition toward a China-centric multipolar order, reinforcing Beijing’s ambition of achieving “national rejuvenation” and global leadership by 2049. However, as China refines this MCF-GDI confluence model, mounting concerns over debt dependency, security risks, and influence over critical infrastructure are prompting many nations to reassess Chinese-funded projects and tighten regulatory controls.
Col (Dr) DCS Mayal (Retired) is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies and Adjunct Faculty at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] In desertification projects, China deploys remote sensing satellites, drones, geospatial data platforms, and AI systems that serve both environmental management and potential military applications.
[1] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” (Pentagon, Washington DC, December 18, 2024), https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF, IV.
[2] Paul Haenle and Nathaniel Sher, “Initiative Diplomacy: China’s New Rules for Global Governance, Security and Development,” East Asian Policy 15, no. 04 (2023): 15, 16, https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793930523000260.
[3] Hoang T. Ha, “2023/9 “Why Is China’s Global Development Initiative Well Received in Southeast Asia?,” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, last modified February 21, 2023, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2023-9-why-is-chinas-global-development-initiative-well-received-in-southeast-asia-by-hoang-thi-ha/.
[4] Gokireddy H. Bindu and Amrita Jash, “China’s Shift from CMI to MCF: Military Modernization and the Defense Industry at the Core,” Issues & Studies 60, no. 03 (September 2024): 4, doi:10.1142/s1013251124500127.
[5] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 22.
[6] Manoj Joshi, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, the US Response, and Implications for India,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 345, Observer Research Foundation, January 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-s-military-civil-fusion-strategy-the-us-response-and-implications-for-india.
[7] Kanza Sohail, “The Military-Civil Fusion Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party & the Concerned America,” Paradigm Shift, September 14, 2024, https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/military-civil-fusion/.
[8] Bindu and Jash, “China’s Shift from CMI to MCF,” 1.
[9] Matt Ho, "Has China Gone into Stealth Mode with Its Military-Civil Fusion Plans?," South China Morning Post, June 5, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3087785/has-china-gone-stealth-mode-its-military-civil-fusion-plans.
[10] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 22.
[11] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 29.
[12] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 28.
[13] Sohail, “The Military-Civil Fusion Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party & the Concerned America.”
[14] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 21.
[15] Joshi, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, the US Response, and Implications for India.”
[16] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 28.
[17] Joshi, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, the US Response, and Implications for India.”
[18] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 30.
[19] Sohail, “The Military-Civil Fusion Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party & the Concerned America.”
[20] “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024,” 33.
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[22] Col (Dr) DCS Mayal, “Deciphering Emerging Chinese Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Footprints Under the Cloak of Global Development Initiative (GDI) – CENJOWS,” February 18, 2025, https://cenjows.in/deciphering-emerging-chinese-human-intelligence-humint-footprints-under-the-cloak-of-global-development-initiative-gdi/.
[23] Andreea Brînză, "What Happened to the Belt and Road Initiative?," The Diplomat, September 6, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/what-happened-to-the-belt-and-road-initiative/.
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[26] Andy Bounds and Daria Mosolova, "EU Fighting to Counter China’s Influence in Global South, Says Top Official," Financial Times, May 12, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/690e65c5-ee93-4a21-b4c7-12110ae48984?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[27] Mykyta Simonov, "The Belt and Road Initiative and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment: Comparison and Current Status," Asia and the Global Economy 5, no. 1 (June 2025), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100106.
[28] Progress Report on the Global Development Initiative (CIKD, 2023), http://bi.china-embassy.gov.cn/fra/sgxw/202306/P020230620670430885509.pdf
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[30]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “3 Years On, China-proposed Global Development Initiative Gathers Momentum for Speeding Up Modernization,” China Africa Forum, https://2024focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zpfh_1/202409/t20240924_11495373.htm.
[31] Xinhua, “UN Chief Says China’s Global Development Initiative Helps Achieve Global Goals,” GDI, last modified September 21, 2022, https://en.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/gdi/2023-11/30/content_116849703.shtml.
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[33] Mayal, “Deciphering Emerging Chinese Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Footprints Under the Cloak of Global Development Initiative (GDI) – CENJOWS.”
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Col (Dr) DCS Mayal was commissioned in 3 Mahar in 1991 and transferred to the Intelligence Corps in 1997. As an Intelligence Corps Officer, he ...
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