Introduction<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">^[a]</a>

Drug trafficking is a non-traditional security threat that has consequences for public health and safety, and undermines political stability and economic development. Globally, drug trafficking flows are valued at US$650 billion, accounting for 30 percent of the total illicit economy.^[1]

India’s Northeastern Region (NER) has been grappling with the challenge of drug trafficking since the 1970s, primarily due to the region’s proximity to the Golden Triangle.^[b] The unfenced, porous Indo-Myanmar border facilitates a substantial flow of narcotics into India, impacting the socio-economic fabric of this region.

Myanmar is the largest cultivator of opium and producer of heroin globally after Afghanistan.^[2] Its strategic location within the Golden Triangle, with its overland routes and porous borders, enables the smooth flow of illicit substances, making it a big player in the regional drug trade network. These operations are often managed by organised crime groups, ethnic militias, insurgent organisations, and military factions, which also engage in other illicit activities such as arms smuggling, money laundering, and human trafficking.^[3]

In 2023, Myanmar became the world’s top opium producer, with illicit crop cultivation expanding from 99,000 to 116,000 acres.^[4] This rise has intensified the threat of drug trafficking in the NER. In FY 2022-23 alone, contraband worth over US$267 million were recovered in the NER states.^[5] There is a need for steadfast cooperation and coordination between national and international law enforcement agencies to curb the transnational syndicate. To this end, India and Myanmar have certain mechanisms in place, but have failed in arresting the drug trade.

The following sections will analyse the nexus between security threats and drug trafficking; assess the India-Myanmar border dynamics; and examine the factors behind the increase in poppy cultivation in Myanmar after the 2021 coup. It then addresses India’s concerns, focusing on the northeastern state of Manipur; explores existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms; and offers recommendations for ways forward.

Drug Trafficking and its Implications to National Security

The illegal movement of narcotics and drugs poses multiple threats to national security. First, it results in breaches of a country’s international borders by drug traffickers, which raises concerns about the state’s ability to control borders and protect its citizens from external threats.^[6] The ease of drug smuggling along these routes may suggest that the same channels could also be used for smuggling arms, explosives, and terrorists into the country.

Second, the money generated from the illegal sale of narcotic drugs could be used to finance insurgency and terrorist activities.^[7] In the NER, smaller militant organisations like the Kangleipak Communist Party are directly involved in drug trafficking to generate quick funds. While larger organisations such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) are not directly involved in the drug trade, they are believed to collect protection money from drug peddlers in exchange for the safe passage of drug consignments through their territory.^[8]

Lastly, drug trafficking harms the economy, public health, and political landscape. The widespread availability of narcotics increases domestic demand, leading to anti-social behaviour, which then creates disruptions in law and order. Public health is severely impacted, with increased rates of addiction, overdoses, and related diseases, which in turn strain healthcare systems. Furthermore, drug trafficking directly impacts the political process, with drug cartels subverting, penetrating, and corrupting state institutions to control the illegal drug trade.

India-Myanmar Security Dynamics<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">^[c]</a>

The India-Myanmar border faces unconventional security challenges, involving issues such as the movement of insurgents across borders, trafficking of narcotics and drugs, illegal arms trade, wildlife and human smuggling, and the illicit transportation of essential items. The vulnerability of the India-Myanmar border to these threats is primarily attributed to the nature and location of the border.

The delineation of the border is outlined in the India-Burma Boundary Agreement of 10 March 1967.^[d],[9] While the rest of the international border has been demarcated, disagreements persist regarding the alignment of certain stretches between the two countries. In 2018, the Indian Minister of Home Affairs stated that there were no significant issues and that only the marking of nine pillars along the international border in the Manipur sector remained to be addressed.^[10] However, the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent political instability due to the 2021 coup stalled the task.

Besides unresolved disputes, the India-Myanmar border is highly permeable due to four factors:

• A Superimposed Border: The border created by the Pemberton line divides communities in the region and separates tribes such as the Nagas, Kukis, Mizos, and Chins. Despite artificial separations, these tribes maintain strong cross-border social and economic ties with their clan members, prioritising clan loyalties over national affiliations. Such robust trans-border ethnic connections have impeded the nation-building process in the region and delayed the establishment of a clear international border.^[11]
• The Free Movement Regime (FMR): The FMR has complicated the delineation of the India-Myanmar border. Recognising that areas across the border constitute a unified socio-economic space for tribes, both governments have agreed to allow tribespeople to move up to 16 kilometres into each other’s territory without documentation.^[12] While this arrangement helps tribes maintain their long-standing connections, it has also been exploited by Indian insurgents, who use the FMR to cross into Myanmar to undergo arms training, establish safe havens, and re-enter India to conduct subversive activities.^[13] Additionally, this route has facilitated the flow of drugs and narcotics. The route has remained closed since the pandemic as well as the escalating violence in Myanmar, which has resulted in the influx of over 70,000 Myanmar nationals between 2021 and May 2024.^[14]
• Geography: The topography of the India-Myanmar border increases its vulnerability. The terrain includes high mountains in the north, to hills and river channels in the south, while the entire border area is densely forested. This challenging topography hinders the construction of transportation and communication infrastructure, resulting in a sparsely populated and underdeveloped border region. The lack of roads, communication links, and other essential border-guarding infrastructure complicates policing efforts by impeding swift and easy movement by border-guarding forces.^[15] This creates a conduit for the smuggling of opium, heroin, and synthetic drugs into and out of the country. This illicit trade has made the NER not only a transit hub, but also a destination, for trafficked drugs and narcotics.

Furthermore, the India–Myanmar border traverses a region marked by historical insurgencies and ethnic conflicts, which contribute to its overall insecurity. Following India’s independence, attempts by the central government to integrate the inhabitants of these areas into mainstream society were met with resistance. The tribal elite argued that due to differences in racial stock and socio-political and economic contexts from the mainland, the people of the region did not belong to India.^[16] This resistance manifested as uprisings in different periods, clamoring for a separate state.^[e] These insurgencies hindered economic development in the region and the overall nation-building endeavour.^[17] While the government is seeking peace through different accords^[f] to integrate insurgent groups into a political framework, the region remains volatile due to unmet demands and ongoing conflicts.

Reports from 2023 suggest that several insurgent groups such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), NSCN, and small groups of Kukis and Zomis have built camps in Sagaing Region, Kachin State, and Chin State in Myanmar, where they train cadets, smuggle drugs, and sell weapons to raise funds.^[18]

• Border Surveillance: The level of border guarding is inadequate. The Assam Rifles (AR) is the designated border guarding force, but it operates primarily from Company Operating Bases (COBs) located far from the border, which prevents effective 24/7 monitoring and control.^[19] This setup creates challenges such as delayed responses to border crimes and a lack of continuous surveillance, making the border vulnerable to insurgent and criminal activity.

Post-Coup Drug Trade in Myanmar

The COVID-19 crisis and the 2021 coup led to economic contraction in Myanmar. From an average annual growth rate of 6 percent between 2011 and 2019,^[20] Myanmar’s economy shrank by 18 percent in 2021, growing by just 3 percent in 2022.^[21]

One of the most crucial issues facing the country’s economy is the devaluation of the kyat, whose value has almost halved in 2022, resulting in a 16-percent inflation rate.^[22] The World Bank forecasts a mere 1-percent growth rate in 2024.^[23] The conflict between the military junta, pro-democracy groups, and ethnic groups has also impacted the economy, resulting in a decline in GDP per capita from US$1,480 in 2020 to US$1,150 in 2022.^[24]

The construction, garments, tourism, and hospitality industries have suffered year-on-year employment losses of 31 percent, 27 percent, and 30 percent, respectively.^[25] Additionally, large-scale economic losses and unemployment induced a food crisis—it is estimated that 10.7 million people faced acute food insecurity since after the coup till January 2024.^[26] Rural farmers have also been affected by armed conflict. The military takeover increased the cost of fuel-petrol by 33 percent and diesel by 29 percent.^[27] Additionally, since 2021, the US Dollar started becoming more expensive for Myanmar.^[g],[28] These developments have led to an increase in commodity prices; the price of cooking oil, for example, increased by nearly three times after the coup.^[29] The cultivation of poppy, which is a cash crop they have been cultivating since colonial times, has become a source of income in these economically trying times.

Opium Production

Opium production^[h] in the country is concentrated in the Shan and Kachin States but is now also increasing in parts of the Sagaing Region and Chin State. The financial returns from poppy are estimated to be 17 times more than those from the cultivation of rice.^[30] There has been a continuing shift from 2010 within Myanmar towards the production of synthetic drugs, such as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), that resulted in the eventual decline of opium production between 2014 and 2020.^[31] Despite this, organised crime groups continue to generate profits from trafficking heroin within Southeast Asia; latest data from 2020 show that the domestic heroin consumption of six tonnes was valued at US$144-315 million.^[32]

The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting shutdowns resulted in a surge in poppy cultivation as it became easier for people to grow and for buyers to purchase opium from villages. According to a 2023 survey by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), there was an 18-percent increase in the area of land in Myanmar grown to illicit crops, reaching 116,000 acres, and a 16-percent rise in the production of opium from 2022 to 2023.^[33]

Historically, illicit poppy cultivation in Myanmar and other parts of Southeast Asia was concentrated in small, unorganised plots grown by rural families for both household use and income.^[34] In Myanmar, however, there has been a shift since 2021 to more sophisticated cultivation methods, including increasing plot density, improving plant organisation, and enhancing irrigation and fertiliser use.^[35] The average opium yield per hectare increased from 14 kg in previous years to 19.8 kg in 2022 and 22.9 kg in 2023.^[36] In 2023, Myanmar’s potential dry opium production reached 1,080 metric tonnes—a 36-percent increase from the previous year and the highest since 2001 (see Figure 1).^[37]

Figure 1: Opium Production and Yields in Myanmar

Source: UNODC (2023)^[38]

In 2023, the average farm gate prices^[i] for fresh and dry opium were approximately US$317 and US$356 per kilogram, respectively, continuing the upward trend observed since 2021.^[39] The nominal price per dried kilogram of opium more than tripled compared to 2021 estimates. These rising prices are attributed to various factors, including conflict-related disruptions to markets, high prices of agricultural inputs, transport costs, and political and economic insecurity in the country.^[40]

In regions characterised by chronic armed conflict and political instability, the cultivation of opium has advantages over other crops. Opium is a short-term crop that is easy to grow, store, and transport, and has a longer shelf life. Traders also often visit villages to directly purchase opium. Despite market fluctuations, opium typically commands higher bulk prices than other crops. Furthermore, opium can be readily converted into cash, which is needed for essentials such as food, clothing, tools, and medicines. It also provides easy access to credit, which enhances its appeal in challenging contexts. Thus, growing opium supports sustenance and livelihood in areas in the Shan, Kachin, Sagaing, and Chin regions, which are impacted by the ongoing civil war.^[41]

Opium cultivation and use are also frequently intertwined with the culture and traditions of many upland communities. Opium is considered to be one of the world’s oldest cultivated plants and cultural drugs. In remote areas, where access to healthcare facilities is limited, opium is valued as a traditional remedy for various ailments, including fever, diarrhoea, dysentery, pain, and cough, and is also used to alleviate hunger. It is used in social rituals like marriage, funerals, and housewarmings.^[42]

Synthetic Drugs

Synthetic drugs like methamphetamine have gained popularity in this region and have resulted in a decrease in opium production since 2015. Synthetic drugs are easier to produce compared to heroin, are cheaper, and generate a good income. Heroin production requires proper soil conditions, suitable weather, and hard labour. In contrast, meth is synthesised indoors, in weather-impervious laboratories, by small teams of chemists and yields greater value for less labour. The easy availability of alternative raw materials facilitates low-cost production and secures a manufacturing space or facility. Forensic profiles are also diversifying, with primary precursors shifting from ephedrine and pseudoephedrine to phenylacetone (P-2-P)-based^[j] manufacturing methods.^[43] Therefore, alternative synthesis routes are available if the illegal trade of precursor chemicals is restricted.

The production of meth in the form of both crystal and “yaba” tablets has soared in the country. Shan State remains the epicentre of methamphetamine production in East and Southeast Asia, evidenced by the numerous large-scale methamphetamine trafficking cases^[k] in and around the state. In the past decade, organised crime groups in Asia have partnered with armed groups in Shan, particularly within the Special Regions, to engage in illicit drug manufacturing.^[44] However, Myanmar authorities have not identified any sizeable methamphetamine manufacturing facilities since April 2020; the only facilities seized in the past few years have been smaller methamphetamine tabletting operations in south Shan, which does not reflect the total supply of methamphetamine originating from the drug-producing regions of Shan.^[45] These areas are controlled by the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army, which have allied with organised crime groups.^[46]

Drug trafficking, while not overtly supported, has not been primarily targeted by the military government. There are several reasons for this. Political officials and the military establishment benefit financially from transnational organised crime, including illicit activities such as wildlife trafficking, illegal mining, logging, and the trafficking of people, arms, and drugs. These activities serve as a source of revenue for the government. The UNODC estimates that opiates constituted approximately 2-4 percent of Myanmar’s GDP in 2023.^[47]

Additionally, in fragile internal conditions, illegal economies serve as a buffer against ethnic insurgency clashes, stabilising the situation by maintaining a delicate peace between rival ethnic groups. This arrangement is tacitly accepted by the government, which refrains from intervening in organised crime activities controlled by ethnic insurgency groups. Historically, the Tatmadaw’s contentious relationship with these groups has contributed to Myanmar’s economic and political instability, resulting in the government adopting a hands-off approach to illegal activities.^[48]

Post-coup, the military junta in Myanmar has become preoccupied with consolidating its control over the country. Operation 1027, led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance^[l] from October 2023 onwards, signals such a shift. Clashes have surged by approximately 67 percent since the 2021 coup as resistance groups intensify efforts to remove the military from power.^[49] Resistance forces have made territorial gains and persuaded other ethnic armed groups (EAOs) to join the alliance. This has amplified pressure on the junta, further destabilising the region and complicating efforts to establish peace and order.^[m]

Lt-Gen Yar Pyae, a member of the State Administration Council, Union Minister for Home Affairs, and Chairman of the Central Committee on Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC), stated during a central committee meeting on drug control that the junta is committed to eradicating narcotic drugs as a part of their national duty. He also emphasised the need to collaborate with neighbouring nations, the United Nations, and regional bodies to get the desired results.^[50] From February 2021 to January 2024, authorities seized 6.05 tonnes of heroin, more than 629 million stimulant tablets, over 53 tonnes of ice, and drug-related accessories worth more than US$1.5 billion in 21,098 cases.^[51] A total of 29,486 people were also arrested in these cases.^[52] Despite these efforts, the regime has admitted that its strategies to curb drug trafficking are proving ineffective.^[53]

Opium-growing communities in Myanmar have received limited support for alternative livelihoods due to minimal international aid as a result of political issues. The situation briefly improved with reforms in 2011, but the Tatmadaw’s oppression of the Rohingya in 2017 and the 2021 coup led to renewed sanctions and a decline in development support. Traditional donors like Germany and the European Union (EU) have suspended aid, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) redirected US$42.4 million away from government projects, exacerbating funding challenges.

India’s Concerns

India shares a 1,643-km porous border with Myanmar. The proximity of India’s northeastern states—Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh—to the border facilitates easy access for drug smugglers, traffickers, and insurgent groups. This accessibility contributes to the trafficking and distribution of illicit drugs within these regions, aggravating local and regional security concerns.

Drug Trafficking Trends

Recent years have seen a surge in drug seizures in India’s northeastern states bordering Myanmar. Between July 2022 and July 2023, the Manipur police seized contraband valued at approximately US$193 million.^[54] In FY 2021-22, drugs worth US$10.17 million were seized, and in 2020-21, the haul was valued at US$14.36 million. Experts estimate that 90 percent of drugs smuggled into the NER originate in Myanmar.^[55] The year 2024 continues to reflect this trend, as indicated by drug seizure reports across several NER states.

Between 1 January and 25 April 2024, the Excise & Narcotics Department of Mizoram apprehended individuals involved in drug trafficking and alcohol-related activities; 2,297 individuals were arrested and 30 vehicles linked to these illicit activities were seized.^[56] The department confiscated large amounts of illicit substances, including 26.494 kg of heroin, 384.1001 kg of marijuana, and 112.528 kg of methamphetamine. Additionally, the department intercepted 5,127 vials of cough syrup, 1,678 tablets of alprazolam, and 136 tablets of tramadol.^[57]

Illicit Poppy Cultivation in Manipur

India is the only country in Asia that licenses farmers to cultivate opium gum for medical and scientific purposes. Legal cultivation is regulated in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.^[58] The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) issues licences to farmers, who must meet specific yield requirements and sell their entire opium harvest to the government. This regulated market contrasts sharply with the illegal cultivation and trafficking activities in the northeastern states.

Illicit poppy cultivation is prevalent in the NER, including in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, which share extensive borders with Myanmar’s Kachin State, Sagaing Region, and Chin State. These borderlands have similar geographical landscapes and are home to ethnic groups who reside in remote and mountainous areas. The similar socio-economic structure, enduring insurgencies, and shared cultural and geographical ties between these regions enable the persistence of illicit poppy cultivation.

In Arunachal Pradesh, opium cultivation is primarily concentrated in the Anjaw and Lohit districts, whereas in Manipur, it is most prevalent in the Saikul, Ukhrul, and Chandel districts. Opium cultivation is a tradition in certain areas in Arunachal Pradesh, whereas in other areas, it is a more recent practice adopted by villagers as a means of livelihood.^[59]

Reports indicate that opium cultivation in Manipur is more closely intertwined with the regional drug economy and connected to various actors, mainly from Myanmar.^[60] This region exhibits distinct patterns of drug use compared to Arunachal Pradesh, with residents consuming a broad range of manufactured drugs, including cough syrup, methamphetamine (often referred to as “WY from Myanmar”), heroin (originating from Imphal, the capital of Manipur), and pharmaceutical drugs such as alprazolam.^[61] This contrasts with Arunachal Pradesh, where opium remains the most commonly consumed drug in villages.

Manipur has experienced a significant increase in illegal poppy cultivation over the past decade. Poppy is known locally as kaani, and its farming has become widespread in the state’s hilly areas, which are primarily inhabited by tribal communities. According to the Narcotic and Affairs Border (NAB) unit of the Manipur police, illicit poppy cultivation is concentrated in the hill districts of Ukhrul, Senapati, Kangpokpi, Kamjong, Churachandpur, and Tengnoupal. Between 2020 and February 2021, law enforcement agencies eradicated 1,420 acres of poppy crops. From 2017 to 2019, Manipur police destroyed 2,858 acres of poppy fields.^[62] There are frequent seizures of drugs such as WY tablets, Spasmo Proxyvon (SP) capsules or painkillers, methamphetamine, opium, heroin, and brown sugar, as well as other contraband substances worth millions of dollars.^[63]

The emergence of heroin manufacturing units in Manipur drives primarily from the rise in poppy cultivation in Manipur. For instance, in December 2019, a heroin lab was busted in Kangpokpi and 41 kg of heroin worth INR 165.172 crore were seized. Three of the six drug labs destroyed in 2019 were in the Thoubal district. Between 2020 and 2022, security forces busted four more labs in Thoubal.^[64] This highlights the close link between poppy plantations and the drug trade, with poppy from Manipur being sold to dealers in Myanmar for drug production, which is then smuggled back into the state.^[65]

Routes of Drug Trafficking

Manipur is located near main drug trafficking routes from Myanmar, mostly through the Shan Hills and Tiddim in Chin State. The state is known as a transit hub for smuggling drugs to various parts of the world. There are two primary trafficking routes from western Myanmar to the northeastern Indian states of Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland. The more traversed route starts in Mandalay, passing through Monywa and Kalewa, before splitting towards either Tamu-Moreh on the India-Myanmar border, leading into Manipur, or southward through Rih-Champhai into Mizoram. Another route begins in Bhamo in Kachin State, travels down to Homalin in the Sagaing Region, then enters Nagaland, continuing to Assam, Kolkata, and the rest of India.^[66]

Reports suggest that, due to the growing conflict in Manipur in 2023, narcotic traffickers from Assam and Mizoram utilised excavators to create a 10-km pathway from the international border to the nearest habitation in Myanmar’s Chin State to continue the uninterrupted trafficking of drugs.^[67] Illicitly produced opium along the Indo-Myanmar border, particularly in Manipur, is transported to Myanmar for heroin production, then smuggled back into India. Medicinal preparations are also smuggled from India to Myanmar through similar routes.

As drug mafias and kingpins establish strong networks between Manipur and Myanmar^[n] for smuggling poppy into the Golden Triangle, and vice versa, Manipur faces multiple challenges: addressing poppy cultivation and the conversion of opium into heroin, and the confiscation of illegal drugs.

India’s porous border with Myanmar and the associated security challenges have heightened concerns for Indian authorities. The Indian government is concerned that the area may be turning into a drug production zone.^[68] The Chief Minister of Manipur, Biren Shah, has blamed the increase in poppy production on the influx of Myanmar nationals following the 2017 exodus of Rohingyas and the 2021 coup.^[69] The locals refute this claim and state that there is no proof of such a direct correlation.^[70]

Persistent Challenges

The increased narcotics and drug trafficking through the India-Myanmar border presents severe challenges to regional security and societal well-being. Easy access to heroin and synthetic pharmaceuticals in the border region has led to heightened substance abuse among the local population, further complicated by the threat of the HIV/AIDS virus.^[o] The northeastern states sharing a border with Myanmar have the highest adult HIV prevalence rates, with 2.70 percent in Mizoram, 1.36 percent in Nagaland, and 1.05 percent in Manipur.^[71] The high prevalence of HIV associated with injection drug use in Nagaland and Manipur is combined with multiple social, political, and economic factors, including poverty, unemployment, low capital formation, and a lack of industrialisation, which contribute to ongoing conflict and growing drug use among the youth.

The proceeds from drug trafficking also fuel insurgency and terrorism, and vice-versa. Northeast insurgent groups indirectly benefit from the trade by offering protection to drug mafias, ensuring safe drug shipment transit through their territories in exchange for financial gains. Both factions of the NSCN (Issak-Muviah and Khaplang) reportedly collect 20 percent of the value of drugs passing through their areas in Nagaland.^[72] UNLF, PLA, and ULFA have also set up camps along Myanmar’s borders and sustain themselves through the funds they derive from trafficking drugs and arms.^[73] Smaller groups like the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) are also increasingly involved in drug trafficking.

Drug trafficking also has an immediate impact on the political process, with drug cartels undermining, penetrating, and corrupting state institutions to control the illegal drug trade. The nexus between politicians, law enforcement, and drug kingpins, exemplified by the case of Lukhosei Zou,^[p] remains a crucial concern.^[q] This collaboration has created an environment where drug smuggling networks operate with impunity, shielded by those meant to dismantle them. As a result, the flow of narcotics continues to undermine law enforcement efforts and fuel instability in the region, making it challenging to address the root of the problem.

National, Bilateral, and Multilateral Mechanisms

The Legal Mechanism in India

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act of 1985 (NDPS Act) establishes the legal framework for drug law enforcement in India, with the NCB serving as the coordinating agency for its implementation. A key focus area in India’s counter-narcotics efforts is the “identification and eradication of illicit cultivation and the wild growth of cannabis and the opium poppy.”^[74] Engaging in illegal and unlicensed cultivation of opium, cannabis, or coca is a serious offence and carries severe penalties, including imprisonment for up to ten years and fines of up to US$1,350. For licensed opium farmers, embezzlement of opium receives harsher punishments, with potential prison sentences ranging from 10-20 years and fines of US$1,350-2,700.^[75]

Manipur has witnessed a notable increase in poppy cultivation over the past few years. Law enforcement agencies in the state, between 2017 and 2023, uprooted 18,664.5 acres of cultivated poppy (see Figure 2).^[76] Between 2017 and 2023, 2,817 individuals were arrested, and 2,243 cases were registered under the NDPS Act.^[77] However, most convicted individuals were mules or couriers, with no convictions of kingpins due to inadequate investigation procedures. The conviction rate remains low, as many officials authorised to seize drugs and make arrests under the NDPS Act lack familiarity with proper seizure protocols, leading to improper handling of evidence and prosecution.^[78] This is one of the loopholes that need to be addressed. Furthermore, the pressure to release arrested individuals from those in power and law enforcement agencies, as in the Zou case, also remains a concern.

Figure 2: Destruction of Manipur Poppy Plantations

District	Plantation destroyed (in Acres)
	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	Total
Imphal East	-	-	-	217	333	187.9	733.90
Bishnupur	-	25	20	220	130	-	395
Kakching	-	-	32.5	7	-	-	39.50
Churachandpur	352	399	29	353	317	1249.80	2699.80
Noney	-	-	-	-	-	12	12
Tamenglong	-	-	-	-	-	77	77
Kangpokpi	834	1270	442	535	208	1108.40	4397.40
Senapati	329	37	320	565	320	111	1682
Ukhrul	103	-	470	1252	786	407	3018
Kamjong	279	260	30	100	254	125.50	1048.50
Tengnoupal	250	250	613	508	388	566	2575
Chandel	92	-	350	895	185	460.50	1982.50
Total	2239	2241	2306.50	4652	2921	4305.10	18664.50

Source: NAB^[79]

Manipur’s state government has initiated campaigns, such as Nisha Thadoklasi and War on Drugs in 2018 and War on Drugs 2.0 in 2022, to combat illegal poppy cultivation and disrupt its distribution and trade. Despite these campaigns and operations to seize illicit drugs, the issue remains persistent and complex. The state has also utilised methods such as spraying herbicides using drones.^[r] Manually cutting down poppy plants requires significant work force. Drones and real-time satellite imagery are also used to identify poppy plantations in the hills.

An alternative development approach was introduced in 2022, where seeds of rabi crops, nursery items, tools, and equipment are supplied to 17 registered farmers societies from Senapati, Kangpokpi, Churachandpur, Kamjong, Ukhrul, Chandel, Tengnoupal, Tamenglong, and Noney in Manipur to convert Manipur into ‘Green Manipur’.^[80] While the government has been implementing this and other initiatives, the rise in illicit drug trafficking underscores the need for a multifaceted approach to address the problem effectively.

Bilateral and Multilateral Mechanisms

India has been actively engaging in combating drug trafficking with Myanmar. These efforts are aimed at addressing the illicit trade of narcotics, drugs, and psychotropic substances, as well as related offenses. India has undertaken various measures, including signing bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with Myanmar, intelligence sharing, and controlled delivery operations (CD).^[81] CD operations involve coordinated efforts to intercept and seize illicit drug shipments, thereby disrupting trafficking networks. India has also organised Director General-level talks with Myanmar to address drug-related issues with international implications.^[82]

Furthermore, the NCB of India regularly engages with the Central Committee on Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) of Myanmar through Field Level Officer (FLO) meetings at the international border. These meetings facilitate discussions and resolutions on drug-related issues in both countries, enhancing cooperation in combating drug trafficking.^[83] The 7^th Myanmar-India Bilateral Meeting on Drug Control, hosted online by Myanmar in January 2024, sought to tackle the growth of drug trade and the importance of international and regional collaboration to curb the issue.^[84]

Chemical seizures reported by Myanmar predominantly involve non-controlled substances and rarely include key precursors or pre-precursors of methamphetamine. Whether internationally scheduled or not, most of these chemicals appear to be smuggled into the country or diverted in special regions, e.g., Shan State. In 2023, only 80,000 pseudoephedrine tablets were seized, compared to 3.1 million tablets in 2022 and none in the previous year.^[85] Additionally, Myanmar has not reported any P-2-P seizures since 2020. Thus, there is a clear gap in law enforcement that needs to be mitigated.^[86]

To effectively address the drug problem, it is important to prioritise the control of precursor chemicals essential for drug production. Myanmar plans to enhance its cooperation with neighbouring countries to regulate these precursors. Steps towards this goal need to be formulated.

Multilaterally, India and Myanmar are members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC). They both participate in initiatives to enhance cooperation on various fronts, including combating illicit drug trafficking.

The 7th Meeting of the BIMSTEC Sub-Group on Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursor Chemicals, held in Chiang Rai, Thailand, in December 2022, saw representatives from all BIMSTEC member states come together to discuss the formulation of the BIMSTEC Plan of Action on Drug Control.^[87] Although a specific timeline for its completion has not been provided, the event underscored the importance of interaction and intelligence-sharing among BIMSTEC members to help manage and control narcotic drugs in the region.

India’s strategic dialogue partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, provides a platform for India to engage with ASEAN countries on a range of issues, including drug control. India also supports ASEAN’s stance on the five-point consensus on Myanmar, which calls for the Myanmar junta to open dialogues with other parties and stakeholders, provide humanitarian services, and work towards addressing the country’s current state of affairs. However, India’s engagement in ASEAN’s regional efforts on drug matters, particularly through the ASEAN’s Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) platform, has been limited. Increased participation in ASEAN initiatives could enhance India’s strategies and effectiveness in combating drug trafficking in the region.

Enduring Challenges and the Way Forward

The deteriorating political landscape in Myanmar is a significant concern, especially given the disturbances in India’s border regions. In July 2024, Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar interacted with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, U Than Swe of Myanmar’s military-led government on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Foreign Ministers Retreat to discuss the importance of preventing further destabilisation along the border. Jaishankar highlighted concerns about human, arms, and drug trafficking, noting the increase in trade and the declining health and safety conditions in the area.^[88] In the following weeks, Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval led a team to visit Myanmar at the 4^th Annual BIMSTEC Security Chiefs meeting. He held discussions with NSA Admiral Moe Aung of Myanmar about security issues along the border region and the impact of violence and instability on the Indian side.

Political Instability in Myanmar

The ongoing instability in Myanmar poses challenges for India while it attempts to curb the drug trade and maintain security along its northeastern border. The constant war between the People’s Defence Forces (PDF), ethnic armed groups, and military forces and the acquisition of border regions by ethnic armed forces along the Indian side necessitates consistent bilateral efforts and open communication with Myanmar’s incumbent regime and other key players, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic armed groups like the Arakan Army (AA) and the Chin National Army/Forces. India has initiated dialogues with the AA to protect its economic and security interests. Given the changing scenario and shift in power structures, engaging with other stakeholders will also be important.

Discontinuation of the FMR

The Indian government is considering discontinuing the Free Movement Regime (FMR) and constructing a fence along its border with Myanmar to curb narcotics trafficking, illegal activities, and the influx of Myanmar citizens.^[89] However, this initiative has faced resistance from the Mizoram government, social activists, and civil society, who argue that it could undermine ethnic ties and foster distrust. Additionally, the terrain near the border areas poses a challenge, with constructions just 10 km along the Manipur-Myanmar border taking a decade.^[90]

There is also concern that such measures might increase the use of illicit pathways across the border, potentially creating more opportunities for unlawful crossings into India. While aiming to enhance security and curb illegal activities, India must navigate the fine line between enforcement and maintaining the cultural and social cohesion that exists across its northeastern frontier.

Shortcomings of the Eradication Methods

While the Indian government, particularly in Manipur, has initiated efforts to destroy poppy farms to curb the production and movement of illicit drugs, these measures could create an inadvertent surge in farm gate prices. This, in turn, would create stronger incentives for farmers to continue growing opium poppy and may attract new participants to the industry. Forced eradication often fails to create lasting reductions in poppy cultivation.

In regions with extensive illegal opium production, a holistic approach to economic development is the only sustainable strategy to steer people away from poppy farming. Law enforcement agencies should carefully plan and implement counter-narcotics measures in tandem with the provision of economic alternatives. Such an approach would ensure that interventions are more effective and would minimise potential negative consequences such as social and economic disruptions in local communities.

By focusing on long-term strategies and sustainable economic development, policymakers can foster change that benefits the affected populations and contributes to a lasting reduction in opium poppy cultivation.

Lack of Comprehensive Approaches

Most northeastern states, particularly Manipur, have seen improvements in infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and mobile networks, facilitating easier transport and communication. However, despite the government’s efforts to enhance access to infrastructure and basic services, opium cultivation has increased in the past decade due to rising local and international demand and higher prices. These patterns suggest that development interventions alone may not be sufficient to tackle opium cultivation and that other root causes, such as armed conflict and political marginalisation, must also be addressed.

Additionally, acknowledging the traditional use of opium and the local and international demand is essential. A more nuanced approach is required to address these challenges, which may involve supporting alternative livelihoods and involving local communities in the decision-making process. This strategy, combined with legal measures, can help mitigate the complex issues surrounding opium cultivation.

Nexus Between Politicians, Law Enforcement, and Drug Kingpins

India has made strides in combating drug trafficking, but challenges remain. Law enforcement and criminal justice agencies must prioritise preventing corruption and misconduct in drug control efforts. Agencies vulnerable to corruption should adopt regular appraisals, conflict-of-interest disclosures, asset and gift declarations, and robust procedures to ensure accurate reporting. Confidential reporting of suspicious activities should be encouraged, with effective investigations conducted by internal affairs departments or independent oversight bodies. Enhanced protection for whistleblowers and witnesses is also crucial.

Strengthening legal frameworks is also required. Proposals include establishing dedicated courts, enacting standalone legislation to empower investigation agencies, fast-tracking prosecutions, and enforcing stricter penalties. Experts suggest extending preventive detention under the NDPS Act from one to two years and creating specialised courts to expedite case resolutions. Some also advocate for decriminalising recreational cannabis use to shift the focus towards more serious cases of narco-terrorism and trafficking while eliminating legal loopholes exploited by traffickers, such as the distinction between intermediate and commercial drug quantities, weak bail provisions, delays in prosecution, and inadequate preventive detention under the NDPS Act.

Surveillance Along Border Areas

Addressing the security challenges along the India-Myanmar border is crucial for India’s national security. To enhance border security, India must empower the Assam Rifles by assigning them the responsibility of guarding the border, along with providing sufficient human resources and advanced equipment.

Strengthening Regional Mechanisms

To effectively combat the narcotics trade, India must enhance its regional cooperation with neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, Nepal, and Bhutan. Intelligence-sharing and joint operations with these countries can play a pivotal role in dismantling transnational drug-trafficking networks. By collaborating on surveillance, border security, and legal frameworks, India and its neighbours can strengthen their collective ability to detect and intercept illicit drugs. Training and capacity-building programmes can also help standardise practices and protocols across borders, improving overall effectiveness in countering drug trafficking.

Conclusion

Non-traditional security extends beyond traditional state-centred focus and encompasses a wide range of issues. This includes both intra-state and inter-state threats and social, economic, and political vulnerabilities. Non-traditional security emphasises the broader question of safety and well-being for people living within a state as well as the challenges that confront human society in the current global system.

In light of these challenges, India’s policy towards Myanmar must be flexible, accounting for the dynamic nature of alliances and power structures within the country. India must prioritise the creation of a comprehensive strategy integrating diplomatic engagement, economic development, and security cooperation with Myanmar. Strengthening ties with different stakeholders within Myanmar, along with the military regime and regional partners, can help stabilise the border areas and enhance intelligence-sharing to combat drug trafficking.

India should support initiatives that promote alternative livelihoods and community-based approaches to uplift affected populations and mitigate the humanitarian impact of ongoing instability. By adopting a holistic approach that addresses both security and socio-economic needs, India can nurture long-term peace and stability in its northeastern border regions.

Endnotes

• Neighbourhood
• India
• Neighbourhood
• arms smuggling
• drug trafficking
• Golden Triangle
• heroin
• India-Myanmar relations
• Indo-Myanmar border
• insurgent groups
• Law Enforcement
• Myanmar
• Northeastern Region
• organised crime
• Political Stability
• poppy cultivation
• Public Health
• transnational syndicate

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