PDF Download
Arpan Tulsyan, “From Loss to Leverage: Reframing India’s Strategy on International Student Migration,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 525, Observer Research Foundation, March 2026.
Over the past two decades, the total stock of Indian students pursuing education abroad has increased from 0.68 million in 2019 to nearly 1.88 million[a] by the end of 2024, reflecting a three-fold increase in five years.[1],[2] This rise is driven by rising aspirations, the growing affordability of foreign education among India’s burgeoning middle class, and the increasing pull of global opportunities. Accordingly, what was once the privilege of an elite cohort has now become a mainstream ambition shaping household decisions, financial priorities,[3] and even the national policy discourse on mobility and migration.[4] It reflects the demand for quality education and a broader social transition: an India that is steadily becoming globally connected, upwardly mobile, and invested in transnational pathways of success.
The phenomenon is not entirely new—Indian students have long sought higher education overseas, particularly in English-speaking countries such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).[5] However, the scale, diversity, and complexity of this movement are marking important shifts. For instance, outbound student flows grew sharply in the post-pandemic period, rising by 71 percent in 2021 and 69 percent in 2022, thereafter moderating to 19 percent growth in 2023, before declining by about 15 percent in 2024, indicating an inflection rather than uninterrupted expansion. In December 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs, for the first time, reported that over 0.628 million Indian students are studying abroad at the school level, underscoring how outbound education is no longer confined to tertiary pathways.[6] Taken together, India is now the second-largest source of international students globally, next only to China.[7]
At the same time, the contours of this mobility are changing. For years, Indian students were concentrated in what might be called the “Big Four” destinations, i.e., the US, the UK, Australia, and Canada.[8] These countries were known to host world-class universities, offered English-medium instruction and post-study work opportunities, and were home to expanding diasporic communities that made integration easier. Recent policy shifts have disrupted this pattern. Stricter visa regimes, rising tuition fees, and tighter post-study work regulations in some of these countries have slowed growth, or in some cases even caused a decline in new enrolments.[9] The US, for instance, has tightened visa norms, Canada has introduced caps and restrictions on student visas,[10] while the UK has tightened rules around dependents accompanying international students.[11] These changes reflect growing tensions between destination countries that seek international students for their economic contributions, while also grappling with domestic anxieties around jobs, immigration, culture, and identity.
Under these pressures, Indian students are diversifying their choices, exploring emerging destinations in European countries, East Asia, and also within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are gaining prominence,[12] often because of more favourable visa terms, lower costs, or niche programmes that align with industry needs. This diversification both signals the resilience of Indian student demand for quality education and global exposure, and raises important questions for India’s policymakers: What are the implications of this dispersion for India’s human capital development, and how should the country address both challenges and opportunities offered by this outflow?
On the one hand, foreign education represents a powerful opportunity. Union Minister of State (MoS) for Education Sukanta Majumdar described it as a “prospect for cultivating a successful, prosperous, and influential diaspora,” which could be an asset for the country.[13] Accordingly, Indian students abroad are often seen as unofficial ambassadors, strengthening diaspora networks, contributing to soft power, and creating transnational bridges in trade, technology, and innovation.[14] Many graduates return to India with global outlooks, advanced skills, and professional networks that help develop domestic capacities. Others stay abroad but act as bridges, opening doors to knowledge, investment, and influence.[15] In today’s world, where talent itself is a form of power, India’s vast and dynamic student community can be an important geopolitical asset.
At the same time, the rapid outflow of students also poses challenges. Former Indian Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar once described the increasing trend of studying abroad as a “disease” and called attention to the resulting foreign exchange drain of US$6 billion from India.[16] The immediate concerns are therefore financial: billions of dollars in foreign exchange flow outward each year as tuition fees and living expenses. This also diverts household resources that could otherwise be invested domestically. In the long term, the risk of brain drain becomes crucial. While many students eventually return, a sizeable proportion settle abroad, resulting in a permanent loss of talent and shortages in critical sectors at home.[17] The attraction of better pay, work opportunities, and modern lifestyles often outweighs the incentives to return, leaving India with the paradox of being a major source of global talent while struggling to retain enough for its own development.
Against this backdrop, India’s outbound student mobility demands thoughtful policy choices. Should the government encourage greater domestic capacity-building to reduce the need for students to study abroad? Should it negotiate more favourable mobility pathways with partner countries? Or should it seek to strategically harness this flow, positioning Indian students as part of a broader strategy of economic diplomacy and diaspora engagement?
This paper underscores how India’s outbound student mobility cannot be reduced to simplistic binaries of loss versus leverage. The reality falls between these extremes: outbound mobility is a strategic flow of talent which, if actively managed, can fuel brain circulation and global influence. If neglected, however, it can deepen the loss of capacity and opportunity at home. Accordingly, it requires a layered policy response, encompassing so-called “retain, circulate, leverage, and reintegrate” strategies at the intersection of education, economics, and international relations.
The rest of this paper discusses the subject in greater detail by examining available data and the evolving landscape of India’s student mobility, deliberating the strategic implications of these trends, and outlining policy choices and recommendations. The objective of this analysis is not to halt mobility but to steer it: to balance individual aspirations with national priorities and transform potential brain drain into productive brain circulation, by positioning India’s student diaspora as both a development lever and a diplomatic asset.[18]
The numbers of Indian students who migrate abroad every year are recorded by the Bureau of Immigration (BoI) as the number of Indians who disclosed “study or education” as the purpose of their exit from the country.[19] According to this data, the annual outflow of students for university education has increased from 454,009 in 2017 to 759,064 in 2024 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Number of Indian Students Migrating Every Year to Study Abroad

Source: Author’s own, using data from the Ministry of External Affairs[20],[21],[22],[23],[24]
*Does not include the 628,305 students going abroad at the school level.
Figure 1 shows that after a pandemic-induced contraction in 2020, outbound tertiary enrolments rebounded sharply, indicating a sustained post-COVID-19 acceleration rather than a one-off recovery. However, from 2023 to 2024, there was a drop in Indian student enrolments, particularly due to declines across the ‘big four’. The US saw a drop from 234,473 to 204,058 students (-13 percent), while Canada experienced a sharper fall from 233,532 to 137,608 (-41 percent). The UK also witnessed a substantial reduction, from 136,921 to 98,890 students (-28 percent), and Australia recorded a decrease from 78,093 to 68,572 (-12 percent) (See Figure 2).
Figure 2: Indian International Students, ‘Big Four’ (2023-24)

Source: Author’s own, using data from the Ministry of External Affairs[25]
The decline signals a rebalancing in global student mobility patterns, driven by factors in the host country. As seen in Figure 2, enrolments to Canada dropped by over 41 percent in 2024. Indian media sources attribute it to tighter visa scrutiny, housing shortages, and restrictions on dependents.[26],[27],[28] Similarly, the UK saw a 27.8-percent fall linked to changes in family visa policies and spiralling living costs,[29] and the US registered a 13-percent decline, reflecting uncertainty around immigration pathways such as OPT and H-1B.[b],[30] Student migration to Australia also fell by 12.2 percent, attributed to stricter migration settings and affordability concerns.[31] Together, these trends underscore how restrictive policies and rising costs in established markets are reducing their appeal to Indian students.
They are, meanwhile, diversifying towards alternative geographies like Germany, France, Ireland, and Singapore, which offer lower tuition costs, English-medium instruction, and clearer post-study work pathways (See Table 1).
Table 1: Indian Student Enrolments (2021-2024)
| Country | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | YoY % change (2024 vs 2023) |
| US | 125,115 | 190,512 | 234,473 | 204,058 | −13.0 |
| Canada | 102,688 | 185,955 | 233,532 | 137,608 | −41.1 |
| UK | 77,855 | 132,709 | 136,921 | 98,890 | −27.8 |
| Australia | 8,950 | 59,044 | 78,093 | 68,572 | −12.2 |
| Germany | 16,259 | 20,684 | 23,296 | 34,702 | +49 |
| Russian Federation | 15,814 | 19,784 | 23,503 | 31,444 | +33.8 |
| Bangladesh | 10,493 | 17,006 | 20,368 | 29,232 | +43.5 |
| Uzbekistan | 503 | 3,430 | 6,601 | 9,915 | +50.2 |
| China | 3 | 1,967 | 7,279 | 4,978 | −31.6 |
| Cyprus | 162 | 726 | 1,477 | 3,162 | +114.1 |
| Iran | 600 | 1,063 | 1,325 | 1,977 | +49.2 |
Source: Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question no 1730, 10 March 2025[32] and Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question no. 2576[33]
The 2023–2024 comparison shown in the table reflects a clear rebalancing rather than a uniform decline in Indian student mobility. Historically high-volume destinations, like Canada, the US, the UK, and Australia, all recorded year-on-year declines; in contrast, Germany, Russia, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Cyprus posted growth, albeit from smaller bases, indicating a continued diversification of destinations toward lower-cost, regionally proximate, or policy-accessible alternatives. Overall, data shows that overall outbound mobility is stabilising at a high level, with growth momentum shifting away from traditional Anglophone destinations toward Europe, Eurasia, and regional options, rather than signalling a retreat from international education altogether.
The recent years have also seen a shift in the subject choices of Indian students going abroad (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Disciplines Pursued by Indian Students Abroad (2010-11 to 2020-21)

Source: NITI Aayog, 2025[34]
Figure 3 shows that Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields account for the largest and fastest-growing share of internationally mobile Indian students. In the US—which is the single largest destination for Indian students. About one-third of enrolments are in STEM programmes.[35] This is also because of STEM extensions in optional training, where students are allowed to extend their visas by two months post-study to find work. Germany’s growth also aligns with this trend, as about 60 percent of Indian students in Germany study Engineering.[36]
There is also a steady interest for professional and vocational qualifications like Medicine, MBA (Master’s in Business Administration) and Specialised Master’s in Finance, Analytics, Supply Chain Management, and Marketing: programmes driven by employability and network effects.[37] Third, there is a growing interest in new interdisciplinary and applied areas like AI (Artificial Intelligence), Data Science, Cybersecurity, and Sustainability, often driven by their pull as so-called ‘future skills’.[38],[39] Besides, medical education (MBBS) and allied health drive large student flows to specific countries like Russia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, where lower tuition and quicker entry to clinical training attract aspirants who miss limited and highly competitive domestic seats.
Studies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show that the pattern of international mobility is heavier at postgraduate levels, followed by doctoral studies.[40] Indian outbound flows tend to follow this general pattern: many students pursue master’s degrees and seek quick upskilling and employability upgrades.
There is also growing evidence that hybrid, blended, or twinning education models are rising, where students begin programmes online with partner universities and complete them abroad or do some part of the course virtually.[41] These pathways offer cost savings, better planning flexibility, and reduced visa pressure for students,[42] and are likely to gain further traction in India’s middle-class demographics.
This paper argues that the dynamics underlying Indian student mobility are shaped by persistent push factors, i.e., domestic educational constraints and compelling pull factors of the host countries. They are also aided by some critical enablers, conditions that are neither push nor pull, but they fuel mobility, making it feasible for Indian students to act on their aspirations.
Figure 4: Considerations in Choosing a Foreign Study Destination

Source: Author’s own, using data from the QS International Student Survey (2024) [50]
The top three factors by which students assess teaching quality are: in-country ranking of the university; its ranking in independent ratings; and availability of high-end technology.[51]
These perceptions are reinforced by ranking gaps and the limited performance of Indian universities in global rankings. In 2014, only 11 Indian universities featured in QS’s world rankings. Although this number has increased to 54 in the 2026 edition,[c] gains are still concentrated among the IITs and a few top universities.[52] Therefore, many students perceive that India’s mid-tier domestic institutions lag behind their international peers in competitiveness research, state-of-the-art infrastructure, and global rankings—a key driver of improved career prospects and upward mobility.
Taken together, these domestic constraints limit the aspirations of students. As a result, many of them view foreign universities as viable alternatives to overcome the bottlenecks at home and secure stronger career trajectories globally.
Global universities and host countries have built robust ecosystems, offering not only academic opportunities but also pathways for career advancement, financial aid, and long-term mobility.
A set of critical enablers function as facilitating conditions that lower barriers and smooth the migration pathway. They include:
These factors reduce financial, linguistic, and social uncertainties, making overseas study an attainable choice for a wide spectrum of Indian families.
The increasing movement of Indian students abroad for higher education is viewed from two varying perspectives: one that frames it as a loss resulting in substantial foreign exchange outflow, the depletion of India's talent pool, and the diversion of national resources; and another that celebrates Indian student outflow as an avenue for creating sizable networks, remittances, knowledge flows, and diplomatic capital that can be leveraged. This section explores this duality, examining the implications, challenges, and opportunities presented by these opposing framings and the pragmatic policy implications that emerge from balancing these perspectives.
The loss framing emphasises three linked harms: (a) direct foreign-exchange loss; (b) its distributional and opportunity-cost effects at home; and (c) the human capital loss from permanent or long-term emigration of skilled human resources.[75] The scale of the outflow is the leading cause of this worry, with data from the previous section indicating that 7–8 lakh (0.7–0.8 million) students migrate abroad each year: a figure that is perhaps higher and expected to rise further. These scales matter because they translate into both forex drain and talent drain.
Multiple estimates capture the scale of direct spending. For example, the International Consultants for Education and Fairs (ICEF) estimates that tuition and living expenses by Indian students were increasing sharply, amounting to about US$70 billion in 2025 (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Spending by Indian Students Migrating Abroad

Source: ICEF Monitor, 2023[76]
This forex drain is not only a direct loss to India’s reserves but also a reduction in household capital available for domestic investment. The Reserve Bank of India’s Balance of Payments (BoP) data identifies educational travel as a contributor to India’s current account deficit, rising from US$2.46 billion in 2015 to US$6.3 billion in 2024.[77] Further, according to a recent analysis by India Today, over the course of a decade, families sent INR 1.76 (lakh) crores to their children studying abroad—an amount which exceeds three times the annual budget allocated by the Indian government to higher education. Instead, this money could have built 62 IITs.[78] This comparison starkly reveals the opportunity cost of such a large outflow.
At the household level, the finances needed to send a child abroad often result in borrowing (education loans) or the diversion of savings that could have funded local investment.[79] There are also equity concerns: high-income households can buy global credentials, whereas poorer students cannot, which may further limit access to globally valued credentials.
A large share of internationally mobile students, especially at postgraduate and STEM levels, use post-study work pathways and settle abroad for long periods. OECD and migration policy studies show international students are an important feeder into skilled immigration, with the stay rates for STEM PhDs and many graduate disciplines being high in certain destinations like Germany.[80] When highly skilled people do not return, sectors such as healthcare and advanced engineering in the home country can face gaps, not only in numbers but in the kind of global experience, networks, and research and development (R&D) capacity that returnees would otherwise bring. This exodus constrains India’s ability to innovate, produce scientific breakthroughs, or sustain growth in research-driven sectors and entrepreneurial dynamism. Such chronic shortages, skills gaps in the workforce, and institutional inadequacies in multiple arenas have a cumulative effect, further accelerating outward movement and deepening domestic inequalities.
With such immediate and long-term negative impacts, the government’s priority should be on promoting internationalisation at home so that fewer students need to go abroad, tracking and targeting critical skills or bottlenecked professions by expanding domestic capacity and mitigating short-term forex pressure through policy tools.
The outflow of Indian students has also been reframed as a strategic opportunity for national development, global influence, and long-term gains. One way it does this is by reframing it as a long-term gain.
The first is the diaspora narrative that positions Indian graduates abroad as transnational assets, i.e., ambassadors of culture, engines of knowledge transfer, and bridges for economic and diplomatic engagement. Since 2000, the government has utilised the High-Level Committee of Indian Diaspora to champion a multi-sectoral engagement model leveraging cultural affinity, economic potential, and intellectual capital, and has positioned the diaspora as a pivotal partner in India’s global outreach and development.[81]
India created institutions such as the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) and the Indian Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF-OI) to encourage diaspora investments, philanthropy, and business partnerships by reducing bureaucratic hurdles and offering incentives like tax exemptions and streamlined foreign investment regulations.[82] Diaspora networks have opened markets for exports, creating cross-border ventures, accelerating market access and technology diffusion—particularly benefiting segments like India’s software industry.[83] Therefore, a vibrant and well-placed diaspora can amplify India's soft power, attract high-value foreign investment, and enhance the country’s international standing.
Student mobility also allows the Indian government to harness policy instruments like bilateral mobility pacts, joint research scholarships, and scientific collaborations, creating reciprocal channels for talent, investment, and collaboration. Examples include the Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Pact with Germany and scholarship schemes from partner countries like Australia that help create long-term ties.[84],[85]
Migration scholars perceive student outflow as ‘brain circulation’, a dynamic where mobility creates skills, networks, and diffusion rather than permanent loss.[86] Evidence shows that many returning migrants are highly educated and bring managerial know-how, technology, and international linkages.[87],[88] Returnees also bring global experience, new business models, and capital to drive growth and job creation in India, founding startups and spinning up R&D labs, thereby reversing conventional brain-drain assumptions.[89] For example, a 2002 survey by the Public Policy Institute of California found that 52 percent of the Indian-origin IT workers in Silicon Valley maintained strong business relations in India.[90] Another example is the Indus Entrepreneurs, an organisation of Indian-origin IT workers in Silicon Valley who regularly fundraise for India’s elite tech universities and support meritorious students from poor families.[91]
To reap such benefits, state governments are also targeting the diaspora through specific programmes. For example, the Tamil Talents Programme by the Tamil Nadu government is aimed at Tamil researchers and professionals abroad, especially those leaving countries like the US due to changes in immigration policy.[92] The programme offers competitive salaries, startup research grants, housing assistance, and fast-tracked visa processing to encourage their return and collaboration with Tamil Nadu’s academic and research institutions. It also plans an annual conclave as a platform where diaspora researchers can engage with local academic leaders, students, and policymakers to boost basic science research in the state.[93]
Although student migration drains resources temporarily, diasporic financial flows are two-way: they send remittances to families, their private capital is invested in buying homes and businesses, and savings parked in Indian banks contribute to domestic liquidity and investment. Remittances to India have been growing, reaching a record US$135.46 billion in FY 2024-25, a 14-percent increase from the previous year (see Figure 6). This surge reflects expanding diaspora earnings and improved digital transfer channels, which support foreign exchange inflows and indirectly bolster India’s economy.
Figure 6: Growth in Remittances to India (in US$ billion)

Source: Author’s own, using data from Reserve Bank of India[94],[95]
From this viewpoint, India can strategically leverage student outflows by positioning its graduates abroad as diaspora assets who enhance soft power, open markets, and enable technology diffusion. They can also be harnessed to negotiate bilateral mobility pacts and partnerships that protect India’s long-term interests. By actively engaging alumni and returnees through incentives for entrepreneurship and R&D collaboration, the government can convert mobility into reciprocal channels for skills and innovation. Finally, harnessing diaspora financial flows—especially record-high remittances—can offset forex losses and contribute to national development.
In sum, the leverage perspective sees this mobility as a critical opportunity to embrace ‘brain circulation’ over brain drain: facilitating return migration, encouraging collaborative projects, and leveraging foreign-trained talent for domestic priorities. However, the challenge is to develop policy frameworks, diaspora networks, and reintegration pathways that maximise these gains.
The phenomenon of Indian student outflow is neither an unequivocal loss nor an automatic gain. The debate between loss and leverage perspectives is, therefore, not binary. Both frames contain truth: unchecked outflows can cost foreign exchange and critical skills, and this outflow can be converted into strategic assets. Policy options must therefore be deliberate and devise strategies to limit the losses while maximising leverage.
This paper recommends a four-layered framework for addressing Indian student outflows, which can be visualised as concentric layers, each representing a complementary policy strategy. At the core is ‘Retain’, emphasising the need to strengthen India’s higher education ecosystem so that talented students have compelling reasons to study and build careers at home. India’s new initiatives like ‘Study in India’, foreign university campuses and dual degrees programmes, and internationalisation at home efforts fit into this. Surrounding this is ‘Circulate’, which involves maintaining close professional and knowledge exchange with diaspora, converting mobility into sustainable brain circulation, and engaging directly with them for social and financial investments in India.
The next layer, ‘Leverage’, highlights the importance of tapping into the Indian diaspora as a stimulus for international partnerships, cultural exchange, and soft power influence. Finally, the outermost ring is ‘Reintegrate’, which involves creating pathways for returning graduates to seamlessly re-enter India’s academic, industrial, and policy ecosystems (see Figure 7).
Figure 7 : A Policy Framework to Bridge the Loss and Leverage Perspectives

Source: Author’s own
Many countries of the Global South, which have experienced similar, large-scale student migration, offer ideas that align with these layers. For instance, China, which has the world’s largest student outflow and a diverse diaspora, has adopted a comprehensive, state-led approach to transform its migrants into strategic assets. First, China has invested heavily in high-value job creation sectors such as technology and manufacturing, creating attractive careers in cutting-edge industries. Returnees find comparable professional opportunities at home, which motivates them to return or stay connected. Cities like Beijing and Shanghai have built ‘Returning Students Science Parks’ and innovation hubs offering funding, infrastructure, and incubation facilities specifically targeting overseas-trained returnees to start companies and scale ventures.[96]
Unlike India, which lags massively in collecting credible data on student outflow, returnees, and their career trajectories, China has successfully tracked its diaspora, their demographics, associations, and career trajectories in real-time. Its digital or cultural engagement with the diaspora is continuous and systematic, compared to India’s ad-hoc or symbolic activities.
Similarly, Taiwan’s successful brain circulation model is built around the science-industry network model.[d] Its Hsinchu Science Park is a world-class hub for semiconductor innovation that retains globally trained scientists through attractive research conditions and strong university-industry ties.[97] Linkages between Taiwanese companies and global tech hubs allow boundaryless careers, permitting movement between countries while maintaining strong sectoral ties.
South Korea, for its part, has focused on home-based internationalisation through global curricula, global partnerships, and international faculty for specialised courses, with a targeted aim of reducing student outflow.[98] Since the 1990s, the Korean government has sought to leverage the diaspora “as significant human and financial resources for the country to draw on.”[99] This led to the establishment of a preferential visa for overseas Koreans and their descendants (F-4 visa), allowing them to work, invest, and buy land in the country.
Similar such strategies across the four layers of the proposed framework are in different stages of implementation in countries of the Global South. India has also undertaken important initiatives in the last few years. Internationalisation at home is a key focus area of the National Educational Policy (NEP), one that seeks to provide international curricula, offshore campuses of foreign universities, global collaborations, and joint degrees within the country, so that students can benefit from international-standard education without having to study abroad.[100]
To enhance brain circulation, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has based its pre-game diaspora engagement on four Cs: Care, Connect, Celebrate, and Contribute. The establishment of Pravasi Bharatiya Sahayata Kendras, helplines, the Indian Community Welfare Fund and the Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana (Overseas Indian Insurance Programme), MADAD Portal, Know India Programme (KIP), Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC), Promotion of Cultural Ties with Diaspora (PCTD), and the celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, reflect this initiative. Indian Missions/Posts abroad organise welcome ceremonies and orientation programmes to brief students on possible challenges or threats, and countermeasures during their stay abroad. However, a recent parliamentary standing committee noted that these efforts “do not seem to yield much.”[101] The committee, like this present analysis, underlined the need for a more continuous, coherent, and coordinated set of strategies. Accordingly, based on the four-layered framework discussed above, this paper outlines a comprehensive list of recommendations. Some of these may overlap, but they have been placed where their relevance is most closely aligned.
A. Develop Domestic Capacity and Quality, Particularly in Bottleneck Fields
B. Implement the NEP 2020 Internationalisation Reforms
C. Enhance Higher Education Employability
D. Implement and Internationalise the National Credit Framework (NCF)
E. Diaspora Knowledge and Innovation Networks
F. Reciprocal Mobility Partnerships and Bilateral Pacts
G. Elevate Diaspora Engagement in Diplomacy and Soft Power
H. Create Returnee Pathways
Indian student mobility is no longer just a personal choice; it is a structural phenomenon with wide-ranging fiscal, social, and strategic implications. Framing it purely as brain drain obscures the potential of global talent to contribute back through capital, knowledge, and networks. Yet, seeing it only as an opportunity also ignores the real and rising costs, as well as the skill shortages it leaves behind in critical sectors such as healthcare, science, and technology. A more productive path lies in deliberate management: reducing preventable outflows while maximising returns from global exposure.
This paper has outlined a layered strategy—retain, circulate, leverage, reintegrate—to convert outbound mobility into a system of sustainable brain circulation. It calls for deliberate interventions: expanding domestic capacity in bottleneck fields, building credible data systems, securing balanced bilateral mobility pacts, regulating education finance and intermediaries, and creating return pathways that are aspirational, not compensatory.
When aligned with the vision of NEP 2020 and supported by coherent policies across ministries, these steps can turn mobility into a managed flow of talent, fuelling innovation and competitiveness, and boosting India’s global standing. Simultaneously, institutionalised diaspora engagement through registries, return fellowships, co-investment vehicles, and mobility pacts can capture the upside of student migration through remittances, networks, and R&D spillovers.
India does not need to stop its students from going abroad. It needs to ensure they leave for the right reasons and are empowered, institutionally and personally, to return, contribute, and stay connected.
Arpan Tulsyan is Senior Fellow, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] Includes school students as well as university students.
[b] Optional Practical Training (OPT) and the H-1B visa are key post-study work pathways shaping international student mobility to the United States. OPT allows foreign graduates on F-1 student visas to work temporarily in the US after completing their studies and H-1B visa is a longer-term employer-sponsored work visa that enables skilled foreign workers to remain in the US beyond OPT.
[c] QS rankings are named for the following year to reflect the upcoming academic cycle. For the data collected in 2024-25, the ranking year mentioned is 2026.
[d]This refers to an institutional ecosystem that closely links universities, public research institutes, science parks, and private technology firms to facilitate the circulation of talent, knowledge, and capital. The model enables scientists and engineers to move fluidly between academia, government research, and industry. Returnee professionals are integrated into this network through targeted recruitment schemes, joint research platforms, venture incubation, and preferential research funding.
[1] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Question No. 1196: Indian Students in Foreign Countries,” Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1196, February 9, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/37588/question+no1196+indian+students+in+foreign+countries.
[2] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Annexure I: Data on Indian Students Abroad (as on January 1, 2025),” annexure to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 557, “Issues Faced by Indian Students Abroad,” December 4, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/CPV/557-en-01-04-12-2025.pdf.
[3] Winson Thomas and Honey Hashim, “Understanding Overseas Migration of Students from Kerala,” International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research (IJFMR) 7, no. 2 (March–April 2025), E-ISSN 2582-2160, https://www.ijfmr.com/papers/2025/2/42499.pdf.
[4] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Question No. 565: Outbound Student Migration and Foreign Exchange Outflow,” Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 565, July 24, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl%2F39835%2FQUESTION+NO565+OUTBOUND+STUDENT+MIGRATION+AND+FOREIGN+EXCHANGE+OUTFLOW.
[5] Bryce Loo, “India’s Moment: An Examination of Student Mobility from and to a Key Player,” World Education News & Reviews, February 6, 2025, https://wenr.wes.org/2025/02/indias-moment-an-examination-of-student-mobility-from-and-to-a-key-player.
[6] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Annexure I: Data on Indian Students Abroad,” January 1, 2025.
[7] Altbach, Philip G, “Realism about Indian Higher Education,” International Higher Education, no. 114 (Spring 2023), Boston College Center for International Higher Education, https://assets.pubpub.org/k87inej0/IHE_SpringIssueNo.114(2023)No.114_Realism_about_Indian_Higher_Education_19014-31726572835700.pdf.
[8] Davide Cava, “Indian Students’ Migration and Integration in Europe: A Case Study of Naples City (Italy),” Journal of South Asian Exchanges 2, no. 2 (2025): 1–14, https://saexchanges.com/v2n2/v2n209.pdf.
[9] Loo, “India’s Moment: An Examination of Student Mobility from and to a Key Player”.
[10] Shruti Bansal, “Why Are Indian Students Rethinking US, UK, Canada, and Australia for Studies?” India Today, August 20, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/study-abroad/story/why-are-indian-students-rethinking-us-uk-canada-and-australia-for-studies-2774087-2025-08-20.
[11] Surbhi Gloria Singh, “UK Visa Applications Fall 40% in 2025; Student Dependant Visas Down 85%,” Business Standard, April 14, 2025, https://www.business-standard.com/immigration/uk-visa-applications-fall-40-in-2025-student-dependant-visas-down-85-125041400369_1.html.
[12] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Destination-Wise (Country) Statistics of Indian Nationals Who Disclosed Their Purpose as Study/Education While Going Abroad for: 2020 to 2024,” Annexure A to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 565, July 24, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/CPV/RS-565-1-24-07-2025.pdf.
[13] Sanjay Maurya, “Over 50% Increase in Indians Studying Abroad: Govt Data,” Hindustan Times, December 18, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/over-50-increase-in-indians-studying-abroad-govt-data-101734528978625.html.
[14] Devender Kumar, Role of Diaspora in India’s Soft Power Diplomacy, May 2018, REVA University, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393408757_Role_of_Diaspora_in_India's_Soft_Power_Diplomacy.
[15] Kanika Bakshi and Vandana Yadav, “From Abroad to Home: Content Analysis of Returnee-Migrant Entrepreneurs in India,” European Economic Letters 14, no. 2 (2024), http://eelet.org.uk/index.php/journal/article/view/1570/1377.
[16] HT News Desk, “‘New Disease among Children’: V-P Jagdeep Dhankhar on Students Going Abroad,” Hindustan Times, October 20, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-disease-among-children-v-p-jagdeep-dhankhar-on-students-going-abroad-101729395818045.html#:~:text=%22There%20is%20another%20new%20disease,going%20to%2C%22%20Dhankhar%20said.
[17] George, A. Shaji, and Dr. T Baskar, “Brain Drain in India: Causes, Consequences, and Potential Solutions,” Partners Universal Multidisciplinary Research Journal, 1(4), 17–36. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14171090.
[18] Ashok Parthasarathi, “Brain Circulation: Turning Brain Drain into Immigration Policies Can Be a Ticket for Scientific Talent to Recirculate among Countries,” IAEA Bulletin 48, no. 1 (September 2006): 68–71, International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull48-1/48105396870.pdf.
[19] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Question No. 1196: Indian Students in Foreign Countries,” Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1196, 9 February, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/37588/question+no1196+indian+students+in+foreign+countries.
[20] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Question No. 1196: Indian Students in Foreign Countries.”
[21] Government of India, Ministry of Education, “Unstarred Question No. 2576: Higher Education Abroad.”
[22] Education Desk, “Indians Going Abroad for Higher Studies Up by 68% in 2022,” The Indian Express, February 6, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/education/indians-going-abroad-for-higher-studies-up-by-68-in-2022-8427568.
[23] Government of India, Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education, “Unstarred Question No. 1730: Students Pursuing Study in Foreign Countries,” answered in the Lok Sabha on March 10, 2025, https://sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/184/AU1730_aC8dIP.pdf?source=pqals.
[24] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Annexure I: Data on Indian Students Abroad.”
[25] Government of India,” Unstarred Question No. 1730.”
[26] Mansi, “Canada Turns Down 74% of Indian Student Visas as Immigration Rules Tighten,” India Today, November 4, 2025, https://bestcolleges.indiatoday.in/news-detail/canada-turns-down-74-of-indian-student-visas-as-immigration-rules-tighten-6263.
[27] Seeta Bhardwas, “Survey Reveals 55% of International Students Struggle with Housing in Canada amid New Immigration Caps,” Times of India, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/news/international-students-no-longer-able-bring-dependants-uk-student-visas.
[28] “Survey Reveals 55% of International Students Struggle with Housing in Canada amid New Immigration Caps,” Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/survey-reveals-55-of-international-students-struggle-with-housing-in-canada-amid-new-immigration-caps/articleshow/117884388.cms.
[29] India Today News Desk, “15% Drop in Indians Studying Abroad: Canada Down 41%, Russia Sees 34% Rise,” India Today, March 11, 2025. https://www.indiatoday.in/amp/education-today/news/story/15-drop-in-indians-studying-abroad-canada-down-41-russia-sees-34-rise-2692203-2025-03-11.
[30] Business Standard, “US Sees 13% Drop in Indian Student Applications, Russia Up 34%, Germany 49%,” Business Standard, September 15, 2025, https://www.business-standard.com/finance/personal-finance/us-sees-13-drop-in-indian-student-applications-russia-up-34-germany-49-125031100864_1.html.
[31] Neil Ghai and Prachi Verma, “Australia’s Cap on Foreign Students Pushes Indians to Explore Alternatives,” The Economic Times, November 24, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/study/australias-cap-on-foreign-students-pushes-indians-to-explore-alternatives/articleshow/115607582.cms .
[32] Government of India,” Unstarred Question No. 1730”
[33] Government of India, “Unstarred Question No. 2576.”
[34] Sonia Pant, Shashank Shah, Oshin Dharap, Arunima Goyal, and Uppragya Kashyap, International Student Mobility: A Global and Indian Temporal Overview, NITI Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. O-15012/29/25-R&N, Discussion Paper, November 2025, NITI Aayog, https://niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-11/Working_Paper_International_Student_Mobility_Final.pdf.
[35] Julie Baer and Mirka Martel, Fall 2023 Snapshot on International Student Enrollment, Institute of International Education, November 2023, https://www.iie.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Fall-2023-Snapshot.pdf.
[36] Arpan Tulsyan, “Beyond Brain Drain: Education Diplomacy in the Indo-German Partnership,” Observer Research Foundation, September 29, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/beyond-brain-drain-education-diplomacy-in-the-indo-german-partnership.
[37] Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), From India to the World: A Report on the QS International Student Survey 2024, QS, 2024, https://insights.qs.com/hubfs/Reports/QS%20ISS%202024%20Source%20India%20report.pdf.
[38] Times of India, “Over 7.6 Lakh Indian Students Went Abroad Last Year, Reveals Government Data: STEM, AI, and Ambition Driving the Exodus,” Times of India, August 20, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/study-abroad/over-7-6-lakh-indian-students-went-abroad-last-year-reveals-government-data-stem-ai-and-ambition-driving-the-exodus/articleshow/123399661.cms.
[39] ICEF Monitor, “Mapping ‘Sweet Spots’ of Opportunity for Fields of Study with High International Student Demand,” ICEF Monitor, January 17, 2024, https://monitor.icef.com/2024/01/mapping-sweet-spots-of-opportunity-for-fields-of-study-with-high-international-student-demand/.
[40] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “What Are the Key Trends in International Student Mobility? Education Indicators in Focus No. 88,” March 2025, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/03/what-are-the-key-trends-in-international-student-mobility_495dcfac/2a423a76-en.pdf.
[41] Khristin Fabian, Sally Smith, and Ella Taylor-Smith, “Being in Two Places at the Same Time: A Future for Hybrid Learning Based on Student Preferences,” TechTrends 68 (2024): 693–704, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11528-024-00974-x
[42] Rhytheema Dulloo and Fawad Naseer, “The Rise of Transnational Education: Exploring Models, Motivations, and Impacts,” in Bridging Global Divides for Transnational Higher Education in the AI Era, IGI Global, 2025, https://www.igi-global.com/chapter/the-rise-of-transnational-education/361835.
[43] Nina Arnhold, Sangeeta Dey, Sangeeta Goyal, Kurt Larsen, Namrata Tognatta, Andree Sursock, and Jamil Salmi, Realizing the Promise of the National Education Policy: From Good to Great in Indian Tertiary Education, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2022, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099080503142332315/pdf/P1747790711faf048085a70993d530a04de.pdf.
[44] Government of India, Ministry of Education, “Measuring the Pulse of Indian Education: Union Budget 2025–26 Unveils Transformative Initiatives,” Press Information Bureau, February 10, 2025, https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/PIB2101363.pdf.
[45] Sanjay Maurya, “JEE Advanced Results 2025: Over 54,000 Qualified for Admission in IITs,” Hindustan Times, June 2, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/jee-advanced-results-2025-over-54-000-qualified-for-admission-in-iits-101748870478913.html.
[46] United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) India, Economic Opportunities for Young People. New Delhi: UNICEF India, 2024, https://www.unicef.org/india/economic-opportunities-young-people.
[47] Education for All in India, “Vacant Engineering Seats in India 2025,” https://educationforallinindia.com/vacant-engineering-seats-in-india-2025/.
[48] Surbhi Gloria Singh, “69% Indians Prefer US for Higher Education over UK, Canada, Shows Survey,” Business Standard, April 23, 2024, https://www.business-standard.com/finance/personal-finance/69-indians-prefer-us-for-higher-education-over-uk-canada-shows-survey-124042300729_1.html.
[49] British Council, “Indian Students’ Interest in UK Higher Education for Studies Over the Next Three Years: Based on Student Sentiment Survey,” Opportunities Insight, British Council, March 31, 2022, https://opportunities-insight.britishcouncil.org/analysis/indian-students-interest-uk-higher-education-studies-over-next-three-years-based-student.
[50] QS, From India to the World, 2024.
[51] QS, From India to the World, 2024.
[52] Arpan Tulsyan, “Elite Drive or Systemic Shift: India in QS Rankings,” Observer Research Foundation, July 21, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/elite-drive-or-systemic-shift-india-in-qs-rankings.
[53] Maitri Porecha, “Exorbitant Fees in Private Medical Colleges Denies Access to Medical Education for Less-Privileged: Economic Survey,” The Hindu, January 31, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/business/budget/exorbitant-fees-in-private-medical-colleges-denies-access-to-medical-education-for-less-privileged-economic-survey/article69164980.ece.
[54] Porecha, Exorbitant Fees in Private Medical Colleges
[55] Prachi Verma and Neil Ghai, “Despite Domestic Push in Budget 2025, Medical Students Likely to Stick to Studying Abroad,” Economic Times (ET Bureau), February 6, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/study/despite-domestic-push-in-budget-2025-medical-students-likely-to-stay-study-abroad-course/articleshow/117958895.cms?from=mdr.
[56] Yashaswini Sri, “Fix Skill Gaps and Build Industry Connect to Make NEP Reforms Effective: Academics,” The Times of India, July 25, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/fix-skill-gaps-and-build-industry-connect-to-make-nep-reforms-effective-academics/articleshow/122888904.cms.
[57] Sanjay Sharma, “QS World University Rankings 2026: IIT Delhi Leads the Way, See the Full List of Indian Universities and Their Rankings,” Times of India, June 19, 2025,
2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/qs-world-rankings-2026-iit-delhi-leads-the-way-see-the-full-list-of-indian-universities-and-their-rankings/articleshow/121944658.cms.
[58] British Council, “Key Mobility Activities 2025‑26,” Opportunities Insight, British Council, https://opportunities-insight.britishcouncil.org/short-articles/opportunities/british-council-indias-key-mobility-activities-2025-26.
[59] DAAD India, India 2024, https://www.daad.in/en/download-publications/.
[60] Tulsyan, Beyond Brain Drain: Education Diplomacy in the Indo-German Partnership.
[61] UK Council for International Student Affairs, “Graduate Route,” January 28, 2026, https://www.ukcisa.org.uk/student-advice/working/graduate-route/?trk=public_post_comment-text.
[62] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Optional Practical Training (OPT) for F-1 Students,” https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/optional-practical-training-opt-for-f-1-students.
[63] Rajan, S. Irudaya, and Anand P. Cherian, “Indian Families – Mediated Migration Trajectories,” Working Paper 2022/082, DemiKnow, International Institute of Migration and Development, Kannur University, 2022, https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/decentering-migration-knowledge/working-papers/India-working-paper-2022.pdf.
[64] “Indian Nationals Received Highest Share of UK Work Visas in 2024, Second in Study Visas,” The Economic Times, May 13, 2025, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/latest-updates/indian-nationals-received-highest-share-of-uk-work-visas-in-2024-second-in-study-visas/articleshow/121130345.cms.
[65] Government of India and Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on a Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership,” Ministry of External Affairs, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/DE22B3878.pdf.
[66] “How Indian Students Can Study in Germany for Free: Scholarships, Fees & Tips,” upGrad Study Abroad, August 13, 2025, https://www.upgrad.com/study-abroad/articles/study-in-germany-for-free-for-indian-students/.
[67] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia, “Inaugural Maitri Scholars Program,” November 8, 2023, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/inaugural-maitri-scholars-program.
[68] Global Affairs Canada, International Scholarships Program (ISP) Dataset, Open Government Portal (Canada), June 29, 2018, https://ouvert.canada.ca/data/dataset/cc19bcda-3b32-47f9-9031-fad06be4cbfd.
[69] Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services, Unstarred Question No. 1759 on Education Loans, Lok Sabha, February 13, 2023, https://sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/1711/AU1759.pdf?source=pqals.
[70] Sridhar, G. Naga, “Education Loans See Record 20.6% Surge in April–October,” The Hindu BusinessLine, December 25, 2023, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-banking/education-loans-see-record-206-surge-in-april-oct/article67673949.ece.
[71] ICEF Monitor, “Number of English-Taught Degree Programmes Rises by 22% from 2021 to 2024,” ICEF Monitor, June 5, 2024, https://monitor.icef.com/2024/06/number-of-english-taught-degree-programmes-rises-by-22-from-2021-to-2024/ .
[72] Wingrove, Peter, Beatrice Zuaro, Dogan Yuksel, Marion Nao, and Anna Kristina Hultgren, “English-Medium Instruction in European Higher Education: Measurement Validity and the State of Play in 2023/2024,” Applied Linguistics, May 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/391687993_English-medium_instruction_in_European_higher_education_Measurement_validity_and_the_state_of_play_in_20232024.
[73] OECD, Education at a Glance 2025: How Do Student Profiles, Study Choices and Mobility Trends Shape Tertiary Education? Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/education-at-a-glance-2025_1c0d9c79-en/full-report/how-do-student-profiles-study-choices-and-mobility-trends-shape-tertiary-education_97e1e2bd.html.
[74]Michel Beine, Romain Noël, and Lionel Ragot, “Determinants of the International Mobility of Students,” Economics of Education Review 41 (2014): 40–54, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2014.03.003.
[75] Sandra Berger, “Brain Drain, Brain Gain and Its Net Effect,” KNOMAD Paper 46, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, November 2022, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099158408222442073/pdf/IDU-1323fa9f-7756-4666-b6a0-5018bf1c080a.pdf.
[76] ICEF Monitor, “Spending by Indian Outbound Students Could Reach US$70 Billion by 2025,” ICEF Monitor, November 8, 2023, https://monitor.icef.com/2023/11/spending-by-indian-outbound-students-could-reach-us70-billion-by-2025/.
[77] Shuriah Niazi, “Rise in Students Abroad Comes at a Cost for India’s Economy,” University World News, July 19, 2024, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20240719144742102.
[78] India Today, “Indians Sent Abroad Enough Money in a Decade to Build 62 IITs, Says RBI Data,” India Today, August 13, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/business/story/indians-sent-abroad-enough-money-in-a-decade-to-build-62-iits-says-rbi-data-2770702-2025-08-13.
[79] Neil Ghai, “1 in 3 Indian Students Now Take Loans to Study Abroad: Report,” Economic Times, September 4, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/study/1-in-3-indian-students-now-take-loans-to-study-abroad-report/articleshow/123690593.cms.
[80] OECD, What Are the Key Trends in International Student Mobility?.
[81] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, The Overseas Indian and India: Weaving a New Global Fabric, Ministry of External Affairs, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/WeavinganewfabricfinalReport.pdf.
[82] Smriti Singh, “India’s Diaspora Diplomacy in the Twenty-first Century,” Shikshan Sanshodhan: Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 3, no. 6 (November–December 2020): 7, Research Culture Society, https://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/SS202006003.pdf.
[83] Ramana Nanda and Tarun Khanna, “Diasporas and Domestic Entrepreneurs: Evidence from the Indian Software Industry,” Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 08-003, July 2007, https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/08-003_1983d651-4a02-4295-9512-a5aa3e451db2.pdf.
[84] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Signing of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on a Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership,” December 5, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl%2F35945%2FSigning_of_Agreement_between_the_Government_of_the_Republic_of_India_and_the_Government_of_the_Federal_Republic_of_Germany_on_a_Comprehensive_Migratio=&utm.
[85] Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Inaugural Maitri Scholars Program,” Media Release, September 2023, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/inaugural-maitri-scholars-program.
[86] Rosalie L. Tung, “Brain Circulation, Diaspora, and International Competitiveness,” European Management Journal 26, no. 5 (October 2008): 298–304, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2008.03.005.
[87] Ashok Parthasarathi, “Brain Circulation: Turning Brain Drain into Scientific Talent to Recirculate among Countries,” IAEA Bulletin 48, no. 1 (September 2006): 68–70, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull48-1/48105396870.pdf.
[88] Berger, “Brain Drain, Brain Gain and Its Net Effect.”
[89] Vivek Wadhwa, “View: Returnee Entrepreneurs Are Reshaping India’s Future, But Barriers Must Be Removed to Reap Rewards,” Economic Times, January 6, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/view-returnee-entrepreneurs-are-reshaping-indias-future-but-barriers-must-be-removed-to-reap-rewards/articleshow/117001605.cms?from=mdr.
[90] Public Policy Institute of California, “Brain Drain and Brain Gain in California,” PPIC Report, May 2002, https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/R_502ASR.pdf.
[91] TiE Global, “About,” https://tieuniversity.org/tie-global/ .
[92] A. Ragu Raman, “State Offers Grants, Jobs & Visas to Bring Researchers Leaving the US,” Times of India, May 18, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/state-offers-grants-jobs-visas-to-bring-researchers-leaving-the-us/articleshow/121240743.cms.
[93] IANS, “TN Unveils Tamil Talents Plan to Attract Global Researchers,” The Shillong Times, May 18, 2025, https://theshillongtimes.com/2025/05/18/tn-unveils-tamil-talents-plan-to-attract-global-researchers/.
[94] Government of India, “Year-Wise Details of Inward Remittances Received from Overseas Indians as per Reserve Bank of India (RBI) from 2018–19 to 2023–24,” Rajya Sabha Session 266, published 20 February 2025, https://up.data.gov.in/resource/year-wise-details-inward-remittances-received-overseas-indians-reserve-bank-india-rbi-2018.
[95] Gayatri Nayak, “Diaspora Remittances Hit New Record at $135.46 Bn in FY25,” The Economic Times, June 30, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/invest/diaspora-remittances-hit-new-record-at-135-46-bn-in-fy25/articleshow/122144367.cms.
[96] AnnaLee Saxenian, “From ‘Brain Drain’ to ‘Brain Circulation’, East–West Center Working Paper No. 37, December 2001, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/101155/2001_12_Transnational_Communities.pdf.
[97] Fukugawa, Nobuya, and Kuo-I Chang, “Science Parks in Taiwan and Their Value-Adding Contributions,” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 25-E-005, January 2025, https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/25e005.pdf.
[98] Kim, Sun-Jin, and Hyun-Joo Lee, “Internationalization of Higher Education in Korea,” International Journal of Continuing Engineering Education and Life-Long Learning 23, no. 2 (2023): 120–135, https://www.emerald.com/ijced/article-abstract/23/2/120/123125/Internationalization-of-higher-education-in-Korea?redirectedFrom=fulltext.
[99] Samuel Gerald Collins, "Return Migration and Korean Personhood in a Transnational Age,” The Review, International Institute for Asian Studies, August 22, 2023, https://www.iias.asia/the-review/return-migration-and-korean-personhood-transnational-age.
[100] Arpan Tulsyan, “From Promise to Potential: Tracking NEP’s Agenda for Internationalising Indian Education,” Observer Research Foundation, July 29, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/from-promise-to-potential-tracking-nep-s-agenda-for-internationalising-indian-education.
[101] Committee on External Affairs (2024–25), Sixth Report on Indian Diaspora Overseas, including NRIs, PIOs, OCIs, and Migrant Workers: All Aspects of Their Conditions and Welfare, including the Status of the Emigration Bill (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2025), https://sansad.in/getFile/lsscommittee/External%20Affairs/18_External_Affairs_6.pdf?source=loksabhadocs.
[102] “UGC Regulations for Establishment and Operation of Foreign Higher Educational Institutions in India,” University Grants Commission, November 8, 2023, https://fhei.ugc.ac.in/Downloads/Regulations.pdf.
[103] University Grants Commission, UGC Regulations for Establishment and Operation of Foreign Higher Educational Institutions in India (2023).
[104] U.S. Department of Education, Gainful Employment and Transparency Fact Sheet, 2021, https://www.ed.gov/sites/ed/files/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2021/gainful-employment-and-transparency-fact-sheet.pdf.
[105] Study in India, "Study in India Official Portal," https://studyinindia.gov.in/.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Arpan Tulsyan is a Senior Fellow at ORF’s Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED). With 16 years of experience in development research and policy advocacy, Arpan ...
Read More +