Introduction

Ports are vital to both the economic vitality and national security of states. As critical gateways of entry, they have long been vulnerable to threats such as trafficking, smuggling, and terrorism—and increasingly in the current era, cyberattacks. In response, the concept of port security is undergoing rapid transformation,^[1] expanding to include advanced surveillance and scanning technologies, institutional coordination among federal and international bodies, regulatory standardisation, enhanced maritime domain awareness, and cyber resilience mechanisms. Today, countries are shaping their port-led strategies in critical regions such as the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific, focusing on leveraging key ports^[2] to enhance economic, security, and geopolitical influence distinct from broader maritime approaches that include naval operations and security of the sea-lanes. Unlike maritime strategies emphasising military presence, a port-led strategy centres on civilian infrastructure to strengthen regional partnerships and economic resilience. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has thrown a new gauntlet in the port security mix through infrastructure development, trade connectivity, and regional alliances via port investments. For the United States (US), the approach to port-led strategy is now a function of prioritising economic statecraft, promoting US-led standards for port governance, sustainability, and digital integration.

Being the world’s leading maritime power and its largest importer, port security lies at the nexus of homeland protection and global influence for the US. With the growing contestation^[3] in the maritime domain, especially amid the strategic unravelling and recalibration^[4] of China’s BRI, the geopolitics of port infrastructure has shifted dramatically. China now maintains stakes in over 40 ports across 50 countries,^[5] turning these nodes into instruments of commercial leverage and strategic projection. For Beijing, ports, both domestic and overseas, are weaved in a network through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and are used for purposes beyond just trade, such as intelligence gathering, and forms part of its broader maritime revisionism. Massive export volumes, persistent trade surpluses, an expansive, state-supported and globally competitive shipbuilding industry,^[6] and the diversification of port access routes have ushered in a new era of Chinese maritime dominance.^[7] These developments have compelled the US to reassess its maritime posture and reimagine its competitive edge. China’s rapid advancement of a global port and maritime strategy through the BRI and similar collaborations serves as the broader context for America’s need to develop a port strategy. The former’s extensive investments in port infrastructure across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, and the strategic but latent securitisation of key nodes across important global ports underscore its intent to project economic, security, and geopolitical influence far beyond its shores. China operates or owns port on all continents except Antarctica and is involved through equity or ownership in 129 port projects. Outsized control of at least 17 of these ports has led to concerns of dual use (military and commercial),^[8] leading to an effective weaponisation of the BRI. These efforts are intended to be dual-use infrastructure: securing maritime trade routes and encircling potential rivals with a network of influence.

The US is the world’s largest naval power, with its active battle fleet surpassing the combined capacities of the next 13 largest navies of the world.^[9] While it has historically benefited from its maritime dominance, adapting to the 21^st-century security environment demands rethinking port architecture as a strategic asset. As the American economy expanded over the last seven decades, its ports rapidly acquired technological equipment to keep pace with the demands of burgeoning trade. While some of these have provided ports with ways to remain integrated with the global network of large trading ports, other technological acquisitions have eventually become liabilities. For instance, the procurement of large cranes, some of which are only manufactured in China, has been identified as a frontline vulnerability for American ports. Since a Congressional sub-committee investigation launched in June 2023,^[10] concerns over the use of such Chinese-manufactured cranes that are capable of transmitting information through sensors and espionage depict how ports have become a new front in the competition for technological and strategic superiority.

Cybersecurity, in particular, has grown as a threat over the years, with over 45 attacks targeting maritime infrastructure between 2010 and 2020,^[11] including the more recent ransomware attack on the port of Seattle last year.^[12] Trump’s strategy has bet on the domestic strengthening of port capacity and related security rather than using a competition with China framework−which is imagined as a direct consequence of that approach. As such, America’s port-led strategy in the Indo-Pacific must be viewed as a necessary counterweight, designed not only to reinforce supply chain resilience and economic partnerships but also to maintain regional balance and real-time maritime domain awareness. Framing the US approach against China’s expansive port-centric ambitions offers a valuable benchmark, particularly one that reveals broader global trends in maritime competition. This comparison also provides a stronger foundation for analysing Washington’s strategic investments in regional ports, logistics, and naval partnerships.

The Biden administration initiated targeted reforms^[13] and investments aimed at modernising domestic ports, strengthening supply chains, and enhancing cybersecurity. Through grant programmes, regulatory initiatives, and public-private partnerships, Washington laid the foundation for a more resilient strategy for maritime infrastructure. Many of these efforts are expected to be accelerated under the second Trump Administration, where the emphasis on a maritime renaissance based on industrial revival, energy dominance, and strategic decoupling from Chinese port infrastructure could be more rapid, assertive, and security-centric.

The return of Donald Trump to the presidency marks a critical inflection point in American national security. Under Trump, national strategy is more openly driven by commerce and trade considerations,^[14] with security increasingly seen as tethered to economic compulsions. In this context, ports will likely be recast as the first line of defence—not just physically but also in auxiliary ways, such as the vulnerabilities associated with technical equipment requirements at ports, particularly those that have to be imported, cyber protection and information-sharing. As the traditional boundaries between commercial infrastructure and national defence blur, ports have transitioned from being passive gateways of trade to becoming active nodes of power projection, networked operations, and even cyber vulnerability. As Trump advances a new era of naval modernisation, evidenced by his Executive Order^[15] centred around a larger but more flexible fleet, the role of ports as hubs for rapid deployment, maintenance, and resilience against electronic and cyberattacks will be fundamental to achieving his Reaganesque agenda of “peace through strength.”^[16]

In the age of electronic warfare and network-centric operations, ports are no longer just logistical hubs; they are integral to information flows, surveillance, force mobility, and critical supply chains. As trade has become more consequential than before, ports will be key nodes in not just ensuring stable trade but also extending power influence and deterrence abroad.

The Centrality of Ports in Economic Statecraft

Until the advent of modern shipping largely characterised by the rise of containerisation in the mid-20^th century, the distance between two geographies often acted as a natural buffer, allowing countries to trade even when mutual trust was limited. However, that dynamic has been upended in today’s era, where connectivity enables dominance and is indispensable to maritime powers seeking to maintain their influence. Currently, about 90 percent of global trade moves across oceans.^[17] In the old world, the primary security concern surrounding ports was the safe storage and handling of goods. Today, vulnerabilities lie predominantly in the operational domain, much of which is managed through interconnected electronic systems. As a result, the security of ports has become inseparable from national security itself.

Just as ports have historically been central to maritime trade and global commerce, they are equally important for inland connectivity, as they have a central role in ensuring the smooth supply of goods to the interior regions of countries. Timely and smooth inland distribution keeps inflation in check by balancing demand and supply, streamlines industrial development and supply chains, and strengthens overall economic resilience by linking ports with robust railroad networks, highways, and multimodal transport systems. In an era where geopolitics and geoeconomics are becoming more tightly intertwined, ports have acquired a renewed and strategic relevance. Under Trump 2.0’s vision of maritime dominance,^[18] ports are likely to gain importance as the strategic positioning of America as an exporting nation takes shape.

Today, the global scramble to mine critical and emerging minerals, which are essential for technologies ranging from renewable energy to advanced electronics and defence systems, has led to a concentration of supply chains in new geographies.^[19] Minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements are now recognised as the backbone of the next technological revolution. This has drawn much attention from powers like China and the US, both of which seek to secure steady supplies to maintain their competitive edge. Recent developments, which range from the rush for lithium and copper in Latin America (especially Brazil, Chile, and Argentina) to China’s investments in Africa, and emerging possibilities in the Arctic, underscore that new regions are poised to become pivotal in global trade flows. These shifts will necessitate not only the upgrading of existing port infrastructure but also the building of entirely new ports equipped to handle the specific requirements of critical mineral exports which have  deepwater access, large berths, specialised cargo handling equipment like large cranes for bulk materials, sufficient storage facilities, and access to processing or treatment plants on-site or in close vicinity. These facilities would also need to meet new standards for storage, processing, security, and environmental compliance, ensuring that the landing, shipping, and distribution of these sensitive goods are consistent, efficient, and secure. Thus, the race for critical minerals is not just reshaping geopolitics around global resource politics but also redefining global port and logistics strategies.

In 2022, 50 percent of global trade value was carried out through maritime routes, with the figure rising to 76 percent for the mining and quarrying sector.^{[20],[21],[a]} America has a network of more than 360 seaports that connect the whole country, and more than US$6 billion worth of goods reach US ports on a weekday.^[22] It is the largest importing country in the world, with an estimated US$3.37 trillion in cumulative value of goods imported in 2022.^[23] On the West Coast, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are the biggest in terms of tonnage capacity (as shown in Table 1) and are connected with the supply routes in the Pacific Ocean. For both these ports, China remains among the largest trade destinations, followed by Vietnam and South Korea. On the East Coast, the ports of New York and New Jersey are the largest in capacity, where trade with India, China and Germany ranks ahead. This kind of large-scale arterial connectivity with China−Washington’s largest trading partner−has translated into an asymmetric reliance wherein a high volume of supply chains connects both countries. President Donald Trump’s tariffs on the whole spectrum of countries, led by China, have impacted this dynamic. The ongoing trade has hit American ports and could impact the larger economy. A substantive reduction in container traffic at ports and airfreight has been reported.^[24] The introduction of retaliatory tariffs on China by the US, reaching as high as 145 percent, has resulted in this downward trajectory. Los Angeles, which is the largest port in the US, has already witnessed a sharp fall in container traffic.^[25] The port landfall in the US has also been impacted by the change in the country’s decision to end the ‘de minimis’^[26] programme, which allowed duty-free import of low-value goods in the US. In the week between the end of April and the beginning of May 2025, the number of Chinese ships leaving for US ports in California, especially Long Beach, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Seattle, has dropped by 29 percent from the previous week. Year-over-year, the number of Chinese ships has dropped by 44 percent.^[27] If these trends continue, it is likely to enforce a shift in the supply chain, even as both the US and China will look to source the products domestically or from alternative countries.

Supply chains continue to be snarled because of the high tariffs imposed by the US on China and a baseline tariff of 10 percent on all other countries. The ports of entry are points for the application of US tariffs, consequently impacting the volume of trade that enters the country. This, in turn, impacts the demand and supply in markets and controls inflation.

Table 1: Major US Ports- Annual Tonnage and Capacity

Major Ports	Annual Tonnage	Countries	Facts
Los Angeles, California (CA)   (Also known as ‘America Port’)	178 million metric revenue tons	China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea	Largest in North America, as it covers an area of 7,500 acres and has 25 cargo terminals.   Gateway for 20 percent of all incoming cargo, and is the busiest US port   Employs 1.6 million people
New Jersey and New York	141.3 million metric revenue tons	China, India, Germany	Largest on the East Coast
Long Beach, CA	93.0 million metric revenue tons	China, Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea	Noted for US-Asia maritime trade   Second-busiest US port
Savannah, Georgia	53.7 million metric revenue tons	China, Australia, the UK, India, the UAE	Noted for handling heavy goods such as cars, machinery, and agricultural products.
Houston, Texas (TX)	293 million metric revenue tons	Mexico, China, Brazil	Mainly trades in petroleum and petroleum products.
Corpus Christi, TX	174.3 million metric revenue tons	Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Taiwan, South Korea	The largest crude oil export gateway in the US.
Beaumont, TX	74.3 million metric revenue tons	China, Mexico, Spain, Japan, India	Trades (Export/Import) petroleum and petrochemical products, fertilisers, chemicals, crude materials, manufactured equipment, and machinery products.
Virginia	69.4 million metric revenue tons	China, Japan, Germany, Canada, Mexico	Supplies to over 200 countries   Mainly supplies to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northern Europe
Greater Baton Rouge, Louisiana (LA)	73.4 million metric revenue tons	Latin America	Forest products, agricultural products, biomass products, steel and pipe, ores and coals, petroleum products, and bulk and liquid bulk chemicals
Seattle-Tacoma   The Northwest Seaport Alliance	18.5 million metric revenue tons	China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Australia, New Zealand	Noted for US-Asia maritime trade
Charleston, South Carolina	27.7 million metric revenue tons	Germany, China, Belgium, South Korea, Singapore	Car parts, chemicals, electric batteries
Miami, FL (Port Miami)	9.7 million metric revenue tons	China, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru, Italy, Colombia	Deep Dredge Project for accommodating larger ships   Largest passenger port in the world
Oakland, CA	18 million metric revenue tons	Japan, China, South Korea, India, and Chinese Taipei	‘Cool Port’ for agriculture, dairy, meat and poultry, and value-added food and beverages as the industry expands exports through high-quality production and food safety innovations.
South Louisiana, CA	226.2 million metric revenue tons	China, Netherlands, Japan, Mexico, Colombia	Handles the largest amount of cargo shipping in all the US ports (handled 248,130,992 short tons of cargo tonnage in 2023, out of which 57,234,230 short tons were exports)
New Orleans (Port NOLA)	83.3 million metric revenue tons	Canada, China, UK, Germany, Mexico	Imports coffee from South America and Southeast Asia, chemicals from Mexico and North Europe, and wood products like plywood from Asia and South America. Exports include plastics like PVC to Asia, various chemicals to North Europe, and paper to Central America.
Baltimore, Maryland	40.6 million metric revenue tons	India, China, Japan, South Korea	Noted for coal exports

Source: Author’s own

Security

Ports are positioned at the helm of both internal and international security as they are gateways to foreign goods. They have historically^[28] been used for smuggling and trafficking, and require extraordinary screening facilities. As the volume of trade increases, the security challenges also compound, often requiring more of a coordinated approach to tackle the myriad challenges than usual. In the US, nine agencies have come together to form the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN): the Maritime Administration (MARAD); the US Coast Guard (USCG); the Military Sealift Command (MSC); the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM); the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC).^[29] Ports in the US are integrated with Homeland Security through various mechanisms like the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP).^[b] They also partner with the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The US Congress is central to funding the enhanced security of ports. With the Trump administration, cuts to other non-disaster security programmes, besides the PSGP, are expected. The funding cuts and the new approach to dealing with entry points are likely to impact how ports are monitored and authorisations are handled. The primary job of the CBP is to enforce US trade laws on all merchandise arriving at the ports. Its role is critical to monitoring the strict application of tariffs and the import landfall at seaports. Such an approach helps to keep trade as legitimate as possible by preventing dumping, protecting markets from illegal and unsafe goods, intellectual property theft and unfair trade practices – a concern about China’s dominant behaviour in the ongoing trade war. Between 2020 and 2024, the import revenue collected at US ports increased from US$2,42 trillion to US$3.36 trillion, reflecting compounding challenges for the CBP.^[30] The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security evaluate the adequacy of antiterrorism measures at foreign ports and implement a training programme for those ports deemed to have insufficient security.^[31]

Container Security Initiative  

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, US Homeland Security, including Port Security, underwent a profound transformation. Ships, like aeroplanes, could be potentially used to transport threats to foreign coasts. These fears were revised when, in the aftermath of the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the US Coast Guard dispatched ships to make sure that American ports faced no such threats.^[32] This underscored the vulnerability that ports themselves faced in the light of resurgent terrorism. The recognition that maritime trade routes could be exploited for terrorism or other hostile activities led to a sweeping re-evaluation of how goods, vessels, and personnel were monitored at ports of entry. One of the most significant initiatives to emerge from this period was the Container Security Initiative (CSI), launched by the CBP in 2002.^[33]

The CSI was designed to address the very real threat that terrorists could exploit commercial shipping containers to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous materials into the country. Recognising the sheer volume of containers arriving daily at US ports—over 11 million annually—the programme introduced a risk-based, forward-looking model that focused on screening containers before they ever reached American shores. The core principle of the CSI was to push the borders outward by screening high-risk containers at foreign ports of departure, thereby creating a multi-layered defence-in-depth approach.

Under the CSI framework, the responsibility for initial inspection and screening rests with the port of origin. Participating foreign ports are required to verify that cargo bound for the US is secure and free of any illicit or dangerous material. To facilitate this, the CBP deploys specialised liaison officers trained in the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) and risk assessment to partner ports. These officers work directly with host customs officials, using advanced targeting systems and intelligence-sharing to identify containers that require further inspection. High-risk shipments are flagged and examined—often using non-intrusive inspection technologies—before departure.

Since its inception, the CSI has expanded significantly and is now operational in over 61 ports across North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin and Central America. These ports account for a substantial percentage of cargo volume headed for the US, making CSI a cornerstone of the global trade security architecture. By integrating security screening into the international supply chain, CSI not only enhances US homeland security but also strengthens global efforts to safeguard commercial maritime activity from exploitation.

It was part of a broader suite of post-9/11 reforms that included the MTSA of 2002 and the establishment of the TSA. Together, these measures shifted the US approach to port security from a reactive to a proactive model—anchored in international cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and technological innovation. As threats continue to evolve, including cyber intrusions and geopolitical disruptions, the legacy of CSI remains central to how the US envisions secure and resilient ports in the 21^st century.

The Securing America's Ports of Entry Act of 2023 

In light of the mounting challenges facing the CBP—ranging from labour shortages and increased traffic flows to emerging threats posed by transnational criminal networks—the US Congress began exploring a structural overhaul of the country’s port security architecture. This effort culminated in the introduction of the Securing America's Ports of Entry Act of 2023 in the Senate. The legislation was designed to significantly bolster the capacity and preparedness of ports of entry, particularly land, air, and seaports, by mandating the annual hiring of an additional 600 CBP officers until staffing targets are met. In addition to workforce expansion, the Act directed the procurement of a comprehensive series of reports to assess and address three core needs: staffing, infrastructure, and equipment at US ports of entry.

These three pillars were seen as essential to urgently remedy shortfalls in personnel and manage projected increases in cross-border traffic volumes—particularly at major trade hubs such as the Ports of Los Angeles and Houston, and major land crossings with Mexico and Canada. One of the transformative aspects of the Act was its push for data-driven decision-making. A working model was developed that could dynamically forecast staffing and equipment requirements in alignment with seasonal variations in port traffic. This predictive framework was also designed to accommodate black swan events—like the COVID-19 pandemic—which exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains and significantly disrupted port operations. These disruptions not only slowed the movement of goods but also impacted employment and economic activity in port-adjacent communities.

The augmented security framework under the Act also prioritised^[34] the interdiction of illicit narcotics, particularly synthetic opioids like fentanyl, which increasingly reach the US through ports of entry. The legislation called for a significant investment in advanced non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies, including X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems, artificial intelligence-assisted targeting algorithms, and improved canine detection units. The goal was to enhance throughput efficiency while maintaining rigorous security standards, ensuring that the interdiction of high-risk shipments—especially those associated with drug trafficking—did not hinder legitimate trade and travel. By integrating cutting-edge technology with human oversight, the Securing America's Ports of Entry Act of 2023^[35] laid the foundation for a more adaptive, resilient, and intelligence-led port security system.

Regional View vs Self-Interest

At the regional level, maritime and port security is coordinated through the Organisation of American States (OAS). Combined activities between states include discussing mutual vulnerabilities, respective regulatory and legislative frameworks, implementation of the ISPS Code,^[c] maritime domain awareness, risk analysis, institutional collaboration, and port cybersecurity.^[36] Several factors threaten the regional perception and practical implementation of port security in North America, especially under the second administration of Donald Trump. First, Trump does not view regional security as a collective endeavour; instead, he tends to prioritise a unilateral, America-first doctrine.^[37] This significantly downgrades the notion of collective security, both in terms of institutional capacity-building and the conceptual understanding of regional interdependence. Second, Trump's belief^[38] that national interest must take precedence over any form of collaborative regional security undermines long-standing frameworks designed to coordinate responses to transnational threats, including those that impact port infrastructure and maritime trade.

Third, and most significantly, China’s expanding footprint across the Western Hemisphere—including in nearly all of the 32 member states of the Organization of American States (OAS), especially in Latin America and the Caribbean—poses a growing challenge to US port and maritime security. Chinese state-backed companies have made strategic investments in critical port infrastructure, telecommunications, logistics hubs, and energy corridors throughout the region. These investments often have dual-use potential, meaning they could be leveraged for intelligence gathering, cyber intrusions, or even logistical support to hostile operations in the event of a conflict or diplomatic rupture.

Ports in Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America, and along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America are increasingly tied to China's BRI, raising alarm in Washington about the potential for Beijing to exert economic and strategic influence over key maritime chokepoints. The ability of Chinese entities to operate within or near sensitive US maritime domains increases the risk of espionage, supply chain sabotage, and disruptions to naval logistics in times of crisis. Consequently, the Trump administration is likely to recalibrate its port security strategy to reflect a more adversarial view of China’s intentions in the Western Hemisphere. This could include more stringent scrutiny of foreign direct investment in port infrastructure, expanded partnerships with trusted allies to build counter-influence capacity, and the re-militarisation of certain maritime zones under the pretext of safeguarding national sovereignty. The perception that America's own backyard is increasingly under strategic encroachment by a geopolitical rival may galvanise a broader rethinking of hemispheric security cooperation—one that centres on exclusionary policies rather than inclusive regional frameworks.

The recent opening of the deep-water Chancay Port in Peru—funded and operated by China’s COSCO Shipping^[39]—marks a critical moment in Latin America’s maritime landscape. It also caused much concern in Washington. As one of the largest port infrastructure projects in the region, Chancay Port represents a strategic beachhead for China along the Pacific coast of South America. It is the first port in Latin America that is capable of accommodating the new generation of ultra-large container vessels, including ships with a capacity exceeding 20,000 TEUs (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units), a feat unmatched in the region. The port’s 17-metre-deep harbour and US$3.6 billion investment signify more than a commercial milestone—it symbolises China’s maturing capacity to project influence across the Americas. By successfully landing one of the world’s largest container ships in a region long considered within the US sphere of influence, Beijing has demonstrated a dual-use capability that fuses logistics and geostrategy, raising speculation that Chancay may one day serve functions beyond trade, including military logistics or signals intelligence collection.

This development has reportedly prompted the US to reconsider^[40] its strategic posture in the region, including its role in the Panama Canal—arguably the most critical maritime artery in the hemisphere. While the Panama Canal Authority remains under Panamanian control, US military and strategic interest in regaining^[41] some level of operational influence appears to be rising, particularly in the wake of Chinese state-backed firms securing logistics concessions at both ends of the canal. Panama, a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), now finds itself at the centre of this escalating maritime rivalry. There is growing speculation that the Trump administration is weighing the deployment of US military assets to Panama under the banner of “security cooperation,”^[42] a move aimed at countering the creeping influence of China in the Isthmus, and reassuring regional allies of continued American presence. The idea that Chinese-controlled ports in proximity to the canal could serve non-commercial purposes is viewed in Washington as a red line—one that may justify a more muscular regional presence.

This renewed focus on maritime competition is not limited to Latin America. Under Trump’s second administration, there is a parallel push to secure American interests in the High North, particularly Greenland.^[43] Trump’s previous attempt to purchase Greenland from Denmark—widely mocked at the time—is now seen in some circles as a harbinger of serious strategic intentions. With Arctic sea routes becoming increasingly viable^[44] due to climate change, and Russia and China intensifying^[45] their icebreaker construction (China has two operational icebreakers and plans for nuclear-powered ones, while Russia operates over 40), the US finds itself lagging. As of 2024, the US has just three operational polar icebreakers, only one of which is heavy-duty: the aging Polar Star.^[46] The Trump Administration has floated proposals^[47] to accelerate shipbuilding and expand naval presence in the Arctic, including expanding port infrastructure in Alaska and reviving interest in Greenland’s natural resources and potential dual-use military installations. Together, these moves suggest that the US maritime vision is shifting to a bi-hemispheric architecture—focused not only on securing the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards but also, on countering Chinese inroads in Latin America and pre-empting future conflict in the Arctic.

The Cybersecurity of Ports

Port security is a project of constant adaptation. These range from changes in infrastructure, technologies, and the integration of new and innovative systems in ports. The security of US ports, as is the case worldwide, is now critically linked to cybersecurity. On 21 February 2024, then-President Joe Biden issued an executive order to strengthen the cybersecurity of US ports.^[48] Given the increasing reliance of ports on data, cybersecurity is now increasingly associated with supply chain fortification and the US industrial base. Under Donald Trump’s second administration, this may be a bigger national imperative for the US, given the importance of trade in America’s foreign policy. While Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy may have overshadowed Joe Biden’s steps to attract investments in the US, the latter committed 20 billion infrastructure development investments in US ports through five-year grants from 2024 under the ‘Investing in America’ agenda.^[49] The marine transport system (MTS) of the US, comprising ports, terminals, vessels, waterways, and land-side connections, relies heavily on digital systems for operations like ship navigation, cargo movement, engineering, safety, and security monitoring. While these have transformed screening, movement and the delivery of goods, they have also introduced new vulnerabilities.^[50] In August 2021, the port of Houston was targeted in a cyberattack that exposed the port authority’s vulnerabilities in password management.^[51]

In response to rising vulnerabilities in the cybersecurity domain—particularly at US ports—the Biden administration adopted a two-pronged strategy^[52] through a landmark executive order aimed at strengthening institutional capacities and aligning maritime operations with national cybersecurity priorities. First, the administration focused on institutional reform by enhancing the authority and scope of the US Coast Guard. This included updating its mandate within the MTS to account for cyber threats that have become increasingly sophisticated and state-sponsored. Under Biden’s directive, the Coast Guard was granted discretionary powers to respond promptly to cyber incidents, including the authority to control the movement of compromised vessels, inspect potentially vulnerable digital systems, and provide real-time technical assistance.

A central focus of this effort was addressing concerns about foreign-manufactured port equipment, particularly ship-to-shore cranes—critical pieces of infrastructure that form the backbone of cargo handling at US commercial and strategic ports. Many of these cranes, which play an essential role in the country’s supply chains and logistics, are manufactured in China^[53] by companies such as Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC). Intelligence reports have raised alarms about potential embedded surveillance or remote access capabilities in such equipment.^[54] The US government brought out an advisory targeting ports and the US MTS in February 2024 of “the risks associated with integrating and utilising the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) state-supported National Public Information Platform for Transportation and Logistics (LOGINK), Nuctech scanners, and automated ship-to-shore cranes worldwide.”^[55] To counter this vulnerability, the Biden Administration mandated a shift toward domestic and allied manufacturing. A key move was the creation of a public-private framework that enabled PACECO Corp., a US-based subsidiary of Japan’s Mitsui E&S Co., Ltd., to establish advanced crane manufacturing capacity within the US.^[56] This was part of a broader onshoring strategy to reduce dependency on adversarial suppliers for strategic infrastructure.

Port infrastructure and its security are areas where China is outpacing the US. China now dominates global port infrastructure with its construction of ports and other related areas, including the volume of maritime trade^[57] and shipbuilding. For the US, countering China’s hostile maritime strategy is now an important part of its maritime resurgence and includes steps such as a functioning port infrastructure strategy, transparency in port infrastructure procurement, and other means to compete against China.^[58]

Additionally, the US Coast Guard issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) focused on cybersecurity standards for the MTS. This regulatory initiative seeks to establish minimum cybersecurity requirements across US ports, integrating internationally recognised standards such as those from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The goal is to protect critical maritime infrastructure against routine and targeted cyberattacks that could disrupt port operations, manipulate shipping data, or disable critical logistics platforms.

In contrast, the Trump administration's focus on port security was primarily physical and operational. While there was growing concern about cyber vulnerabilities during Trump's first term—particularly amid rising tensions with China—concrete regulatory measures were limited. The Trump Administration emphasised deregulation and relied heavily on private sector-driven cybersecurity improvements, rather than imposing federal cybersecurity mandates. However, in his second term, Trump is expected to prioritise port cybersecurity within a national security framework, potentially emphasising counterintelligence efforts, tighter restrictions on Chinese port equipment, and greater military oversight of digital infrastructure at strategic maritime hubs.

Together, these contrasting approaches reflect an evolving US posture toward maritime cybersecurity, where the Biden administration has built a rules-based regulatory framework and fostered allied industrial capacity, while Trump is likely to favour hard-line containment strategies and greater securitisation of port networks in response to foreign threats.

Federal Funding of Ports

President Biden made massive investments^[59] in modernising and securing American ports as part of a broader strategy to strengthen critical infrastructure and supply chain resilience. A cornerstone of this effort was the passage of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)—a US$1.2 trillion bipartisan infrastructure package signed into law in November 2021.^[60] This landmark legislation allocated more than US$6.5 billion specifically for port infrastructure programmes, including modernisation, dredging, resilience against climate-related risks, and technological upgrades. In addition, ports became eligible to compete for another US$27 billion in broader infrastructure and transportation grants, bringing potential federal investment into the maritime sector to over US$33 billion.^[61] In 2024, the US General Services Administration planned to invest over US$1 billion through the President’s ‘Investing in America’ agenda towards modernising dozens of federal Land Ports of Entry (LPOEs), keeping such developments consistent with domestic clean manufacturing and sustainable technologies.^[62]

These funds were channelled through programmes such as the Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP) under the MARAD, supporting projects that enhance cargo capacity, improve intermodal connections, and incorporate cybersecurity and surveillance technologies to better monitor port operations. The Biden administration’s port strategy (as shown in Table 2) was also closely aligned with climate goals, promoting the electrification of port equipment, reduction of diesel emissions, and increased use of shore power to improve air quality in surrounding communities.

Table 2: Major Outlines: The Biden Administration’s Port Investments

Port Specific Programmes – US$6.575 billion	Port Eligible Programmes – US$27.1 billion over 5 years
Army Corps of Engineers Coastal Navigation Construction - US$2.7 billion	RAISE Grants (formerly, BUILD Grants) - US$12.5 billion
Army Corps of Engineers Operations & Maintenance - US$1.2 billion	Infrastructure for Rebuilding America (INFRA) Grants - US$3.2 billion
Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP) - US$2.25 billion	Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvement (CRISI) Grants - US$5 billion
Marine Highways - US$25 million	National Infrastructure Project Assistance Program (new) - US$5 billion
Reduction of Truck Emissions at Ports (new) - US$400 million	Promoting Resilient Operations for Transformative, Efficient, and Cost-saving Transportation (PROTECT) Grants (new) - US$1.4 billion

Source: American Association of Port Authorities^[63]

In contrast, the second Trump Administration is expected to reframe port security within a narrower national security lens, deprioritising climate-oriented and environmental mandates. While Trump did allocate port-related funding during his first term, including through the BUILD and INFRA grant programmes, his administration was less inclined toward sustained federal investment and more focused on deregulation and leveraging private sector involvement.  Funding could be redirected toward enhancing surveillance, increasing Customs and Border Protection (CBP) presence, and hardening critical infrastructure against espionage or sabotage—especially in ports where Chinese-backed entities operate or where Chinese goods dominate the supply chain. This emerging divergence between Biden's infrastructure-heavy and climate-conscious port strategy and Trump's anticipated security-centric, geopolitically driven approach could reshape the future of US maritime priorities—both in terms of funding allocation and the guiding philosophy behind port management.^[64]

Ports, under Trump, are increasingly viewed as dual chokepoints—first, for stemming illegal immigration by tightening surveillance and manpower at maritime points of entry; and second, for disrupting the flow of illicit drugs, particularly fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, which often arrive through commercial shipments at major ports like Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Newark. The ports of Los Angeles and Shanghai have a Friendship Port Agreement, while the port of Long Beach and the Xiamen port in China have a Sister Port Agreement. Unlike the Biden administration’s vision of approaching port management and security from a development perspective, the Trump administration has taken a security approach with plans to militarise select coastal zones, weaving in the CBP for maritime interdiction.

Conclusion

Any country’s port-led strategy is seen as integral to its national maritime strategy. For America to retain its competitive edge over China, its port architecture in the Indo-Pacific must evolve from a dispersed, loosely integrated network into a protected system that balances both economic and military goals. A secure system of port connectivity will advance trust among its trading and strategic partners. A developing China strategy under Trump has inadvertently pushed the US towards acutely intensified trade relations with high tariffs from both sides. For Washington, even as it scrambles to secure favourable trade relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific, port-to-port relations with allies, friends and partners in the region will be critical for charting an economically and strategically favourable course. Some of America’s leading ports have sister port agreements with Chinese ports, underscoring both the indispensability and risks of such connectivity. As the Trump administration seeks to redo US maritime dominance through commercial shipbuilding capacity, revitalised domestic maritime industries, and a secure logistics network, aligning trade policies with key partners will be among the key metrics that shape the country’s maritime dominance in the next decade. America needs a framework for a port-led maritime strategy that integrates hard infrastructure upgrades, cybersecurity, regional partnerships, and economic diplomacy instead of recoiling from integrated connectivity with partner countries’ ports. Simultaneously, a calibrated plan to reduce dependence on adversaries like China−as outlined in Trump’s new maritime dominance plan−will feed into the regional balance that minilateral organisations like the Quad seek to maintain. Besides, the supply chain disruptions as a result of Trump’s upending of the economy will necessitate new port connectivity requirements between the US and its trade partners in the region. In a world where maritime dominance is once again the determinant of global influence, how the US navigates vulnerabilities while rejigging the economic matrix of its ports’ connectivity in the Indo-Pacific will shape its ability to deter adversaries, reassure allies, and sustain its leadership in the Indo-Pacific.

The Trump administration’s likely port strategy will be guided by a focus on outbound trade, even as America seeks to be the largest exporter in the world by attracting investments and onshoring manufacturing. As the US seeks to compete with China on old fronts, especially in the maritime domain, there may be a need for Washington to strike Port Agreements with key countries and sub-geographies in the Pacific and the broader Pacific region. As China continues to chip away at America’s maritime dominance in the Pacific, the US has shown some signs of regaining control in the Pacific theatre. The US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) allows US military personnel and equipment to be stationed at some military bases but does not allow the country to construct ports for military use. In August 2024, the US proposed construction of a civilian port in the Batanes Islands in the northernmost island of the Philippines, just 125 miles away from Taiwan.^[65] In September 2023, it has also shown seriousness towards developing a more calculated strategy towards the Pacific Island nations  from a port-led perspective as part of its US-Pacific partnership. In 2024, the US Congress also considered reviving a 20-year security pact with its Pacific Island allies in the light of an assertive China. The Compacts of Free Association, or COFA,^[66] extends economic assistance to Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. In exchange, it is expected that the nations will allow the US military exclusive access to their land, water and airspace, primarily through ports, and counter China’s access to their ports and territorial waters.

However, these strategies would require extensive and sustained economic commitments from the US—those that may run counter to the prevailing political mood under Trump’s leadership, which seeks to focus on tariffs and manufacturing at home. Unlike previous administrations that embraced multilateralism and alliance-based burden-sharing, Trump’s foreign policy is shaped by a transactional worldview where alliances are judged by their immediate return on investment. Trade, in particular, has emerged as both the focal point of cooperation and a key instrument of contention. Trump has consistently argued that American allies—whether in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Indo-Pacific, or Latin America—have relied too heavily on US financial and military support without offering reciprocal benefits. This perspective has fuelled a growing reluctance in Washington, especially within Trump-aligned political circles, to commit resources to global infrastructure projects or military deployments that are seen as favouring others over direct American gain.

In this environment, the appetite for a comprehensive strategy to counter China’s influence, especially in its backyard (Latin America, among others), appears increasingly uncertain. Within the Beltway, there is a palpable shift in thinking: the prevailing belief is that Washington should avoid entangling itself in the economic or strategic upkeep of other nations, and instead double down on protecting and promoting its core interests. This inward-looking posture casts doubt on the durability of US initiatives aimed at contesting China's growing footprint, particularly in areas like port infrastructure, digital networks, and energy corridors, where Chinese investments are entrenched. As America reassesses its global role under Trump's second administration, the question is not just whether it can counter China abroad, but whether it wants to.

---

Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director with ORF's Strategic Studies Programme. 

---

The Author thanks Ria Nair and Kashvi Chaudhary for their assistance in compiling the tables used in this paper.

All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

• International Affairs
• US Foreign Policy
• USA and Canada
• bri initiative
• port infrastructure development program
• trump 2.0 foreign policy
• Trump foreign policy
• us china relations
• us in indo pacific
• us maritime strategy

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.