Originally Published 2005-02-19 12:59:51 Published on Feb 19, 2005
Although it would not be entirely false to suggest that Maoists have managed to capture the imagination of a large section of Nepalese society because of the widespread poverty and continued neglect by successive monarchs and political leadership, there are quite a few other, equally valid, reasons why Maoists have had a run of the Nepalese countryside.
Dangerous reds
Although it would not be entirely false to suggest that Maoists have managed to capture the imagination of a large section of Nepalese society because of the widespread poverty and continued neglect by successive monarchs and political leadership, there are quite a few other, equally valid, reasons why Maoists have had a run of the Nepalese countryside. 

It is, therefore, important to trace the genesis of he Maoist phenomenon to the Communist movement in Nepal, especially during the early 1970s whenthe Chinese cultural revolution and rise ofNaxalites in West Bengal inspired several young leaders to lean towards adopting an extremist path. In a way, the Jhapali Uprising, when members of the Nepali Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) killed several landlords, was a precursor to the current spate of violence. 

The 1980s also witnessed serious divisions within the ranks of the party, leading to the creation of the United National People's Movement (UNPM) which, over the sharing of political spoils, also subsequently split into two-one led by Nirmal Lama and Niranjan Govind Vaidya and the other led by Dr Baburam Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal-Prachanda. 

When Baburam Bhattarai's group was denied recognition as a political party, it designated itself as the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in 1995 and went underground. The declared objective of the party was to establish a "people's government" through" people's war" that was inspired by Marx-Leninism and Mao.

The plan of action to achieve this objective is expressed in the "strategy of surrounding the city from country side''. To carry out this mission, the party has created a clear-cut political and military structure. In 1998, the group set up a "Central Military Commission" with sub-commissions at the central, regional and district level. The entire country has been divided into three "zones" and twenty-seven "districts". Its "People's Liberation Army" today boasts of three "divisions", nine "brigades" and 29 "battalions". It is the face of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. 

The world outside Nepal first heard about Maoist insurgency on February 13, 1996. It was the day when Maoists declared "People's War" with simultaneous attack on several carefully selected, symbolic targets across Nepal like police posts, a bank, a distillery, a feudal landlord's mansion and a Coke factory in Kathmandu. 

The group distributed pamphlets and other propaganda material in several towns and villages to spread their message and the reason for declaring war. Even before the world could blink, the Maoists put in place a mass mobilisation drive and initiated village development and cooperatives projects to create an extensive base at the grassroots level. The move was so successful that by the end of June 1996, the Maoists were already planning the second phase of their war, the "Guerrilla War".

In subsequent months, the Maoists witnessed phenomenal growth, especially in the countryside. From the initial stronghold of six districts-Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Salvan and Gorka in the west and Sindhuli in the east- the Maoists today have presence in varying degrees in 73 out of Nepal's 75 districts. Only Manang and Mustang have remained out of their sphere of influence.. The group has established linkages with several regional and international insurgent and extremist groups and organisations including the India-based People's War or Naxalites. The group generates financial resources through extortion, and has accumulated wealth of anywhere between US $64 and $124 million. The group procures weapons and ammunition through their established linkages with various Indian insurgent groups and the LTTE. 

There is no doubt that the Maoists have political ambitions but they are acutely aware of their inability to take over the reins of the country. This leads them to make intermittent moves to negotiate with various political parties to force the King to accept their demand for a round-table, an interim government and elections. The Royal Massacre of June 2001, however, saw a few visible changes in the Maoist strategy. 

The group organised its first attack on the RNA in November 2001. Its leadership also turnedovertly hostile to the new King, Gyanendra. Though there was no love lost for the slain king, they used the tragedy to gain wider acceptance by openly expressing their angst at his death. The group called the new ruler a "murderer". 

But not surprisingly, soon after King Gyanendra took over the reins, the Maoists began hobnobbing with various political parties to force the King to call a roundtable. At one point the King made overt gestures to the Maoists but the two rounds of talks - held in November 2001 and April-August 2003 - remained inconclusive. Both the King and the Maoists, however, realise one fact: Neither can win, militarily.

The author is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, and Director, Information Services. 

Courtesy: The Pioneer, New Delhi, February 19, 2005.

* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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