Introduction 

In 2025, a year marked by multiple inter-state conflicts and unpredictable great-power behaviour, India’s national security outlook remained complex. Although the five-year border standoff with China in the Himalayas eased—with both states resuming direct flights, implementing an easier visa regime, and engaging in bilateral interactions across formal and informal tracks—the structural rivalry continued throughout the year.

Nearly 60,000 troops remain deployed on either side of the Line of Actual Control, with no de-escalation and de-induction in sight. Beijing’s sustained military and nuclear modernisation, along with its close collusion with Pakistan, evident during Operation Sindoor, necessitates that India maintain its guard. New Delhi’s threat perception is further shaped by China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, especially the frequent appearance of scientific research ships following India’s NOTAMs, and Beijing’s growing influence in India’s neighbourhood. The spectre of instability in India’s east, brought about by the mayhem in Bangladesh following the Sheikh Hasina government’s ouster, only adds to these complications.

In India’s west, Pakistan remained unstable in 2025, aggravated by the state’s inability to tackle security challenges and stem its economic collapse. Yet, its domestic challenges did not deter it from carrying out an attack that killed 26 civilians in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. Intended to incite communal tensions, the killings sparked nationwide outrage, compelling India to move from strategic restraint to punitive strikes. On 7 May, India launched Operation Sindoor, targeting roughly nine terrorist locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), including the operational centres and headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. A hundred terrorists were killed. New Delhi also suspended the Indus Water Treaty and carried out air-missile-rocket-drone strikes at airbases and military infrastructure across Pakistan. Although the operation was paused on 10 May, India is holding on to the option of resuming it in response to any state-sponsored terrorism in the future.

Amidst this challenging landscape, India’s decisive and consistent actions against Left-Wing Extremism were perhaps the rare bright spot. The campaign to eliminate the insurgency by 31 March 2026, informally named Operation Kagar, has gathered momentum, with Chhattisgarh spearheading the final crackdown on Naxalite cadres and hideouts. A number of senior political and military leaders of the movement have either been arrested or eliminated. Nevertheless, pursuing the battle to its logical end will require a whole-of-government approach that should not end with the current counter-insurgency operation.

Overall, despite resource constraints, India’s national security establishment has responded actively to an evolving threat landscape. The military’s push for jointness and theaterisation, alongside efforts to strengthen air and naval capabilities, reflects a commitment to addressing the China challenge. Similarly, enhanced inter-agency coordination and intelligence-led operations in Naxalite-affected regions and Jammu and Kashmir have delivered results. The National Investigation Agency’s clampdown on terrorist financing and money laundering has also dented the capabilities of terrorists and their ecosystem of supporters. As developments in Bangladesh show, however, New Delhi must become nimbler in anticipating emerging trends and adopting more appropriate and proactive measures. Reforms in the intelligence apparatus that complement these efforts are also imperative.

This also holds true in the domain of critical and emerging technologies, where a raft of advancements has taken place in cyber, drones, space, quantum computing, and chemical and biological weapons. New Delhi has ramped up its capabilities in the last decade, particularly in the cyber and space domains. It must adopt a similar strategy for its R&D in other technological innovations, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), which is poised to transform warfighting and impact the working of the national security establishment.

This second edition of our annual report, Current Trends in India’s National Security, brings together ORF’s subject matter experts to decipher the vital trends discernible in their respective areas. The report is divided into two sections. The first examines major national security challenges, covering geographies like China, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Northeast, as well as issues that include defence reforms, cybersecurity, terrorism, Left-Wing Extremism, and intelligence. The second section evaluates key technological domains such as space, nuclear, AI, quantum computing, and chemical and biological weapons. Operation Sindoor forms the backdrop for many of these assessments.

With this annual publication, ORF’s aim is to spur meaningful conversations on the national security issues that confront India and stimulate debate about the strategies and pathways that the country’s policymakers must craft for a secure and stable future.

Read the report here.

All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Sameer Patil is Director, Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology, ORF.

Atul Kumar is Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.

• International Affairs
• Defence and Security
• Internal Security
• China
• India
• india bangladesh relations
• india china relations
• india national security
• indian relationship with neighbouring countries
• national security strategy india
• Operation Sindoor
• unrest in Nepal

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