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Aparna Roy and Radhey Wadhwa, COP30: Milestones, Misses, and the Road Ahead to COP31, Observer Research Foundation, January 2026.
COP30, held in Belém, Brazil, from 10–21 November 2025, unfolded amid profound geopolitical and climatic flux.[1] Hosted in the heart of the Amazon, the summit was symbolically charged yet politically constrained. The adoption of a “global mutirão” decision—invoking collective action rooted in Brazilian tradition—attempted to anchor multilateralism in solidarity.[2] At the same time, however, the conference was defined by certain absences: the conspicuous withdrawal of the United States (US) from the process following its exit from the Paris Agreement, and a persistent gap between ambition and delivery across core negotiating pillars.
Even so, COP30 marked a subtle but important inflection. Developing countries, long positioned as rule-takers within the climate regime, played a more assertive role in shaping discourse—particularly on issues of finance, adaptation, and trade. With COP31 scheduled in Türkiye and COP32 in Ethiopia, the climate process is entering a phase in which agenda-setting power is gradually shifting away from the Global North.[3] In this context, India’s bid to host COP33 acquires strategic significance.[4] The pathway from Belém to Bharat is not merely geographical; it represents a potential transition from fragmented global leadership to a more cohesive, development-conscious Global South leadership in climate governance.
Climate finance once again sat at the heart of COP30 negotiations, underscoring its role as both the backbone and the fault line of global climate cooperation. Parties reaffirmed the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance adopted at COP29, committing to mobilise at least US$300 billion annually for developing countries by 2035, alongside a longer-term aspiration of US$1.3 trillion per year by 2035.[5]
A key political outcome was the endorsement of Brazil’s “Baku to Belém Roadmap,” which outlines pathways to scale climate finance through a combination of reformed multilateral development banks (MDBs), greater private-sector mobilisation, and improved alignment of global financial flows.[6] While the roadmap signals intent, it remains aspirational rather than operational.
The numbers, however, expose the scale of the mismatch. As shown in Figure 1, international finance commitments from developed to developing nations between 2019 and 2023 remained highly skewed towards mitigation.[7]
Figure 1: International Adaptation Finance Commitments from Developed to Developing Countries (2019–‘23)
Source: UNEP adaptation gap report, 2025[8]
Note: Broken down into adaptation (orange), mitigation (green), and cross-cutting finance (blue).
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), developing countries require approximately US$900 billion annually from 2025, rising to US$1.46 trillion by 2030—figures that far exceed current commitments.[9] Even the much-celebrated US$300-billion target risks institutionalising under-ambition rather than correcting it. Figure 2 shows these requirements against global climate finance flows, illustrating a widening gap between existing and expected commitments.[10]
Figure 2: Global Climate Finance Flows vs. Estimated Annual Investment Needs (2018-‘50)
Source: Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025, Climate Policy Initiative[11]
Equally troubling is the issue of access. Funds such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) remain difficult to tap, particularly for least developed countries and small island states, due to complex accreditation processes, high administrative burdens, and limited domestic capacity.[12] COP30 did little to address these structural bottlenecks. Despite stronger language compared to previous COPs, the finance framework continues to lack a clear, transparent, and universally agreed definition of what qualifies as climate finance, perpetuating trust deficits between the Global North and Global South.
With the Glasgow commitment to double adaptation finance expiring in 2025, expectations at COP30 were high, particularly among climate-vulnerable countries facing escalating risks. The final decision “recalls efforts to at least triple annual adaptation finance outflows” by 2035 and urges developed countries to increase their trajectories.[13]
While politically significant, this outcome fell short on urgency. Extending the timeline from 2030 to 2035 delays critical resources at a time when climate impacts are intensifying. For many developing countries, this delay is not procedural; it is existential.
The adaptation gap remains stark. Global public adaptation finance declined from US$28 billion in 2022 to US$26 billion in 2023.[14] As illustrated in Figure 3, adaptation finance needs and modelled costs far exceed international adaption flow.[15] COP30 reaffirmed the importance of adaptation but stopped short of delivering the scale, speed, and predictability of finance required.
Figure 3: Adaptation Needs, Costs, and Public Finance in Developing Countries
Source: Emission Gap Report, 2025[16]
Despite expectations, fossil fuels were not formally embedded in COP30’s negotiating agenda and emerged only in the summit’s later stages as the most contentious issue. The precedent set at COP28, calling for a transition away from fossil fuels without timelines or binding commitments, remained largely unadvanced.
The final COP30 text avoided any reference to a fossil fuel phase-out framework.[17] Instead, the Brazilian Presidency announced that roadmaps on fossil fuels and deforestation would be pursued outside the formal United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, raising concerns about accountability and inclusiveness.[18]
Over 80 countries, primarily from the European Union and small island states, pushed for explicit phase-out pathways.[19] In contrast, the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), led by India, reiterated that energy transitions cannot be dictated by developed-country timelines that overlook development needs, energy access, and historical responsibility. The impasse highlighted a deeper truth: without equity at its core, energy transition debates risk reproducing old asymmetries under new transition narratives.
COP30 marked a notable shift in how climate-linked trade measures are treated within the UNFCCC process. For the first time, the COP cover decision included explicit language on trade, reflecting growing concern among developing countries over unilateral instruments such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
The final text reaffirmed that climate measures “should not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.[20] The Brazilian Presidency also announced plans for a dedicated dialogue and a high-level event in 2028 to examine the climate–trade nexus.[21]
These developments signal an important recognition: trade is no longer peripheral to climate negotiations. For many developing countries, unilateral trade measures are viewed less as climate solutions and more as mechanisms that shift mitigation burdens onto countries with the least historical responsibility and fiscal space. Figure 4 illustrates the functioning of the EU’s CBAM, highlighting how compliance costs are transferred to the non-EU exporter countries.[22]
Figure 4: Functioning of the EU’s CBAM
Source: The Conference Board[23]
Finalising the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators was a priority at COP30. Parties agreed on 59 indicators covering sectors such as water, agriculture, health, and adaptation planning, including finance, technology, and capacity-building dimensions.[24]
As shown in Figure 5, the GGA framework evolved across COP29 and subsequent subsidiary body sessions before being adopted at COP30.[25] While this marks progress, the outcome remains uneven. Several indicators were criticised as difficult to measure, insufficiently contextualised, or thematically incomplete. Acknowledging these concerns, the COP30 Presidency committed to further refinement at the 2026 Bonn climate talks.[26]
Figure 5: Timeline: GGA Framework Across COP29, COP30, and Subsidiary Body Sessions
Source: Carbon Brief[27]
Hosting a COP in the Amazon raised expectations for a decisive outcome on forests. While Brazil’s push for a global deforestation roadmap failed to secure consensus, the launch of the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF) emerged as a flagship initiative. Designed to mobilise US$125 billion through a payment-for-performance model using satellite monitoring, the TFFF aims to realign the economics of forest conservation, yet remains outside the UNFCCC framework.[28]
Additional pledges included a US$2.5-billion commitment led by France and EU partners to protect the Congo Basin.[29] Still, the absence of a formal forest outcome at an Amazon-hosted COP was widely viewed as a missed opportunity, underscoring the persistent fragmentation between climate and biodiversity governance.
As the world moves from COP30 in Brazil to COP31 in Türkiye and COP32 in Ethiopia, a clear pattern is emerging: climate governance is gradually shifting towards the Global South. This transition presents both opportunity and responsibility. India’s bid to host COP33 positions it uniquely to shape a development-first, equity-centred climate agenda that reflects Global South realities rather than Global North prescriptions.
Three priorities should guide this journey:
The renewed political focus on adaptation finance at COP30 offers a window for collective Global South action. Priorities must include vulnerability-based allocation, simplified access procedures, predictable disbursement timelines, and greater clarity on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement,[30] which enshrines developed countries’ obligation to provide finance.
Developing countries are no longer passive recipients of adaptation knowledge. From Bangladesh’s community-based early warning systems to India’s city-level heat action plans and Brazil’s riverine forest resilience programmes, the Global South is already innovating. Institutionalising platforms for co-learning and scaling such solutions can shift adaptation from dependency to leadership.
A just transition cannot be uniform. For the Global South, energy transitions must proceed without compromising development priorities. India’s leadership through the International Solar Alliance, its non-fossil capacity targets, and the National Green Hydrogen Mission—alongside China’s dominance in solar manufacturing and Vietnam’s rapid renewable deployment—demonstrate how comparative advantages can be leveraged collectively. A consensus-driven, differentiated transition framework is essential to prevent climate action from becoming another site of global inequity.
Aparna Roy is Fellow and Lead, Climate and Energy, ORF.
Radhey Wadhwa is Research Intern, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[1] “COP30 closes with agreement to step up support for developing countries”, United Nations Climate Change Conference,” United Nations, November 22, 2025, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cop30.
[2] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity in a Global Mobilization against Climate Change, UNFCCC Secretariat, November 23, 2025, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Mutir%C3%A3o_cop30.pdf
[3] “Challenging COP 30 Talks Elude Consensus on Fossil Fuels, Deforestation,” SDG Knowledge Hub, November 27, 2025, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/challenging-cop-30-talks-elude-consensus-on-fossil-fuels-deforestation/.
[4] Piyush Verma and Abhinav Jindal, “Why India’s bid for COP 33 is particularly poignant for the Global South,” ORF America, September 25, 2025, https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/india-global-south-cop33
[5] UNFCCC, Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity in a Global Mobilization against Climate Change
[6] UNFCCC, Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity in a Global Mobilization against Climate Change
[7] United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on Empty, UNEP, October 29, 2025, https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2025
[8] Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on Empty, October 29, 2025
[9] Arya Roy Bardhan, “Mobilising Predictable Finance and Technology: A COP30 Priority,” Observer Research Foundation, November 18, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/mobilising-predictable-finance-and-technology-a-cop30-priority
[10] Baysa Naran et al., Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025 , Climate Policy Initiative, 2025, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2025/.
[11] “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025,” Climate Policy Initiative, June 23, 2025, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2025/
[12] Roy Bardhan, “Mobilising Predictable Finance and Technology: A COP30 Priority.”
[13] UNFCCC, Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity in a Global Mobilization against Climate Change
[14] United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “Slow climate adaptation threatening lives and economies,” UNEP, November 14, 2024, https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/slow-climate-adaptation-threatening-lives-and-economies
[15] Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on Empty, October 29, 2025
[16] Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on Empty, October 29, 2025
[17] UNFCCC, Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity in a Global Mobilization against Climate Change
[18] Carla Ruas, “Brazil aims for alternative route to fossil fuel roadmap after COP30 failure,” Mongabay, November 2025, https://news.mongabay.com/2025/11/brazil-aims-for-alternative-route-to-fossil-fuel-road-map-after-cop30-failure/
[19] Damien Gayle, “More than 80 countries join call at COP30 for roadmap to phasing out fossil fuels,” The Guardian, November 18, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/nov/18/more-than-80-countries-join-call-at-cop30-for-roadmap-to-phasing-out-fossil-fuels
[20] UNFCCC, Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity in a Global Mobilization against Climate Change
[21] Fermín Koop et al., “COP30 Climate Talks in Brazil Wrap Up in Overtime, Not Addressing Fossil Fuels,” Dialogue Earth, https://dialogue.earth/en/climate/cop30-climate-talks-in-brazil-wrap-up-in-overtime-not-addressing-fossil-fuels/.
[22] “EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Primer for Stakeholders,” The Conference Board, 2024, https://www.conference-board.org/publications/EU-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-primer-for-stakeholders
[23] “EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A Primer for Stakeholders”
[24] Selamawit Wubet, “A decade after Paris: Where are we with the Global Goal on Adaptation?,” Global Centre on Adaptation, December 4, 2025, https://gca.org/a-decade-after-paris-where-are-we-with-the-global-goal-adaptation/
[25] Portia Adade Williams et al., “How to track progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation,” Carbon Brief, October 7, 2024, https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-how-to-track-progress-towards-the-global-goal-on-adaptation/
[26] “COP30: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Belém,” Carbon Brief, November 23, 2025, https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop30-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-belem/
[27] Williams et al., “How to track progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation”
[28] Charles (Chip) Barber et al., “The Tropical Forests Forever Facility Could Finally Finance Nature Conservation. Will Funders Back It?,” World Resources Institute (Insights), November 26, 2025, https://www.wri.org/insights/financing-nature-conservation-tropical-forest-forever-facility
[29] “Africa: Trends to watch in 2026,” Mining Indaba, December 11, 2025, https://miningindaba.com/articles/africa-trends-to-watch-in-2026
[30] Article 9.1 of Paris Agreement establishes that developed country parties shall provide financial resources to developing country parties in implementing its mitigation and adaptation actions. This provision affirms climate finance as a legal obligation grounded in equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC).
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Aparna Roy is a Fellow and Lead Climate Change and Energy at the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED). Aparna's primary research focus is on ...
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Radhey Wadhwa is a Research Assistant with the Climate Change and Energy vertical at the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED). His research focuses on international ...
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