Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has witnessed significant changes since its first push for modernisation in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. This has included regular updates in its doctrine, organisational structure, equipment, and weapons systems to better reflect the changing needs of modern warfare. The PLA’s doctrines have shifted from dominating in “local wars” on China’s periphery under Deng Xiaoping[1] to becoming a “world-class” military under Xi Jinping[2] for safeguarding China national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security as well as its maritime rights and overseas interests. Xi has initiated two major reforms: organisational and command-and-control reforms in 2015 and services-level force standardisation and doctrinal revisions in 2017.[3] However, his recent plans for an accelerated modernisation of the PLA, combined with aggressive actions to achieve its foreign policy goals, have caused concern worldwide, especially in the United States (US), the littoral states in the East and South China Sea, and India.
This report[a] examines the relevance of these developments from India’s perspective and discusses the recent upgrades in China’s military doctrine, organisational structure, and equipment and weapons systems in its four services—the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—and the newly established Information Support Force (ISF). It will then evaluate these developments in the context of PLA’s growing joint operational capabilities and combat preparedness as well as infrastructural, logistical, and technological support systems.
During the 1980s and 1990s, drawing lessons from the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, the PLA restructured its forces and sought to equip them with technologically advanced weapons systems.[4] Under Xi Jinping, the circumstances are different. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi stated that China is externally confronted with “frequent outbreaks of regional conflicts and disturbances, and intensifying global issues”[5] and that it needs to “adapt to the trend of a new global military revolution” and modernise its forces accordingly.[6] Xi further stated that “historic breakthroughs” have already been made in China’s military modernisation.[b],[7] At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi added that, in the midst of unprecedented global changes,[8] including shifts in the international balance of power, mounting unilateralism, external interference in Taiwan affairs, and “attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China”,[9] China’s armed forces need to be prepared to confront worst-case scenarios.[10]
To adapt to the challenges in the “new era”, Xi has established time-specific modernisation goals for the PLA:
- By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanisation, informatization, and intelligentisation” and boost the pace of modernisation in military theories, organisational structure, personnel, and weapons and equipment.[11]
- By 2035: “Comprehensively advance the modernisation of military theory, organisational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernisation of the country and basically complete the modernisation of national defence and the military.”[12]
- By 2049: “Fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century.”[c][13]
China has made progress towards its goals, especially in terms of building joint operational capabilities, combat readiness, and integration of technology with the armed forces.[14] Additionally, since the year 2020, the PLA has “adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region” as well as on border disputes with India.[15]
Underlying China’s enhancement of its military capabilities is the massive growth of its economy in the 21st century. China’s military expenditure in the last decade has stayed at around 1.7 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), while there has been a gradual decrease in its government expenditure, from 6.2 percent in 2010 to 5 percent in 2022 (see Table 1). These figures indicate that the growth in China’s military capabilities has remained in healthy proportion to its GDP (see Table 2). However, there is a lack of transparency in China’s defence budgets and expenditure; in absolute terms, China’s defence expenditure has seen a meteoric rise in the last decade, with a decline in 2023 due to exchange rate effects (see Table 2).
Table 1: The Defence Budget Share of China’s GDP and Government Expenditure
Year |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
2022 |
2023 |
Share of GDP |
1.7% |
1.7% |
1.8% |
1.8% |
1.7% |
1.7% |
1.7% |
1.8% |
1.6% |
1.6% |
1.7% |
Share of Government Expenditure |
6.0% |
5.6% |
5.5% |
5.3% |
5.0% |
4.9% |
4.9% |
4.9% |
4.9% |
5.0% |
Not Available |
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)[16]
Table 2: China’s Defence Budget (2012–2024)
Year |
China’s Official Announcements (Nominal US$ billion) |
IISS Estimates (Current US$ billion) |
SIPRI Estimates (Current US$ billion) |
Growth in China’s GDP |
2012 |
103.06 |
146.2 |
145.1 |
7.8% |
2013 |
116.28 |
162.2 |
164.1 |
7.8% |
2014 |
131.12 |
180.1 |
182.1 |
7.4% |
2015 |
142.39 |
193 |
196.6 |
7% |
2016 |
143.68 |
197 |
198.5 |
6.9% |
2017 |
151.49 |
209.3 |
210.4 |
6.9% |
2018 |
167.37 |
225 |
233.1 |
6.8% |
2019 |
177.52 |
234 |
240.3 |
6% |
2020 |
178.61 |
256 |
252 |
2.2% |
2021 |
209.16 |
285 |
293 |
8.4% |
2022 |
230 |
319 |
292 |
3% |
2023 |
224.79 |
319 |
296 |
5.2% |
2024 |
234.5 |
439 |
Not Available |
4.6% |
Sources: ChinaPower;[17] IISS;[18],[19],[20],[21] SIPRI;[22],[23],[24],[25] IMF;[26] Global Times;[27] PRC’s State Council Information Office;[28] Xinhua[29]
To further improve network information capabilities for the military, the PLA underwent another reorganisation of services in April 2024. On 29 April 2024, Xi Jinping disbanded the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), which focused on space and information warfare capabilities, and created the new ISF unit aimed at advancing the PLA’s competitiveness in information network warfare.[d],[30]
The ISF was not established as a replacement for the SSF but is instead meant to be an upgraded version of the SSF’s former corps grade organisation, the Information Communication Base (ICB).[31] While the SSF was a theatre grade organisation on par with the other military services, the ISF is a deputy theatre grade organisation.[32] Additionally, the SSF’s Aerospace Systems Department and the Network Systems Department were retained and have been redesignated as the Aerospace Force (ASF) and the Cyberspace Force (CSF), respectively. Together with the ISF, they now report directly to China’s Central Military Commission (CMC).[33]
With this reform, the PLA has been restructured into four services or branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force) and four arms or auxiliary units (ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistics Support Force).[34] The four arms will be positioned below the four services and the five theatre commands in the PLA hierarchy, although how they will interact with each other remains unclear.[35] Nevertheless, the theatre commands may now be able to gain smooth and efficient services from each of the arms.[36]
Figure 1: The New PLA Structure Post-ISF Creation

Source: The Jamestown Foundation[37]
Recent Modernisation Efforts
The People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA)
After Deng Xiaoping’s military reforms of the late 1980s, critical structural and operational reforms of the PLA were undertaken under President Xi Jinping starting in 2015, towards a comprehensive modernisation of the armed forces and their combat effectiveness,[38] including reorganising the seven military regions into five theatre army commands, the Xinjiang Military District, and the Tibet Military District.[39] The PLAA’s 13 group armies comprise several combined-arms brigades of 4,500–5,000 personnel.[40] These brigades, which serve as the primary manoeuvre force, have artillery, armoured vehicles, air defence, and air assault capabilities, and also include special operations forces and sustainment brigades.[41] The PLAA also has non-standard divisions and brigades that are typically located in areas that the CCP considers sensitive, including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Beijing.[42] Operationally, a military personnel rebalancing has been initiated, the teeth-to-tail ratio has been improved to boost support and logistical capabilities, and the PRC continues to push towards the indigenisation of the defence industry.[e],[43]
Since 2020, the PLAA has continued to modernise its equipment (from service pistols to tanks) and to focus on combined arms training to achieve President Xi’s goal of becoming a world-class military.[44] Reports suggest that next-generation QBZ-191 series of rifles are being developed, which will be an improvement over the currently operational QBZ-95-1 and 95B-1 rifles.[45] Branded under the Type 20 series, which also includes submachine guns and marksman rifles, these new indigenously manufactured rifles are similar to the US Marine Corps’s Heckler & Koch 416 rifle.[46]
Since the deployment of the most advanced Type 15 tank in Tibet during the 2020 Sino-Indian border standoff, multiple batches have been delivered to the Tibet and Xinjiang Military Commands in 2021 to safeguard China’s western borders.[47] Due to its lightweight and powerful engine, the Type 15 tank can be rapidly deployed in high-altitude mountainous and plateau terrains with low oxygen levels, unlike the Type 96 and Type 99 tanks.[48] Type 15 tanks are also reported to possess stealth technologies and have battlefield situational awareness capabilities that enable them to identify friends and enemies.[49] These Type 15 tanks would complement China’s “most-powerful” third-generation Type 99A tanks deployed near the Ladakh border in the Karakoram mountains.[50]
In 2021, the PLAA Xinjiang Military Command received the delivery of four new advanced weapons systems.[51] These included Type 08 armoured assault vehicles, a new-type 122mm-calibre self-propelled howitzer, the PHL-03 self-propelled long-range multiple rocket launcher system with jamming-resistant capabilities, and a new self-propelled rapid-fire mortar.[52] The Xinjiang Military Command is now believed to possess a complete modern ground combat system crucial for plateau combat.[53]
In 2020, the Tibet Military Command received the third-generation Dongfeng Mengshi (DM) assault vehicles for use in border defence missions in the northern Himalayas.[54] These assault vehicles are indigenously manufactured, lightweight, and multifunctional: they can abandon their transport function and become a command vehicle, a self-propelled howitzer, or a self-propelled long-range rocket launcher system.[55] In 2021, these DM vehicles were mass produced and were ready to be incorporated in the PLAA’s integrated joint combat system.[56] In 2020, a new Type 625 wheeled self-propelled anti-aircraft gun was used in a military exercise with the 77th Group Army of the Western Theatre Command.[57] The Type 625 combines a 25mm anti-aircraft Gatling gun with surface-to-air missile launchers.[58] These short-range defence (SHORAD) systems can be rapidly deployed in various combat scenarios and are also capable of cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and low-flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[59] In 2022, it was revealed that an upgraded Type 625E AA Gun Missile Integrated Weapon System has been developed, which is comparable to the US’s Manoeuvre Short-Range Air Defence system and Russia’s Pantsir system.[60]
The PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units are reported to be undergoing training to support amphibious operations and develop multidimensional assaults, including air support tactics and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T).[61] They are envisioned as the primary combat force in a greater joint operation and will conduct extraterritorial non-war military operations.[62] There is greater focus on group armies in the Eastern and Western Theatre Commands and the military districts of Tibet and Xinjiang.[63] The PLAA’s air defence forces have also deployed new counter-air electronic attack capabilities that will support the PLA-wide anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) mission.[64]
An important feature of the PLA is its emphasis on using the latest technologies. China’s recent military modernisation efforts have included developing and incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging disruptive technologies (EDT) in its military equipment as well as using civilian instruments for military purposes through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) development strategy and espionage activities.[65] In 2022, China developed an unmanned model of the Type 15 tank called VT-5, and in May 2024, photographs surfaced of advanced comprehensive electronic warfare (EW) systems on Dongfeng Mengshi CTL18A armoured vehicles.[66] Reports suggest that these systems utilise ultra-shortwave interference to disrupt enemy communications and intelligence devices.[67] In February 2024, researchers in China developed a vehicle-launched high-power microwave (HPM) weapon which creates high-frequency electromagnetic waves that can suppress drones, military aircraft, and satellites.[68]
The PLAA has also made investments in aerial and land unmanned vehicles. In 2020, the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command began using the Sharp Claw I UGV unmanned ground vehicle,[69] armed with a 7.62mm machine gun. Since 2022, the PLA Ground Force has also been using an unmanned reconnaissance and strike aircraft, KVD002,[70] during patrols and exercises near Taiwan. In the Western Theatre Command, a significant number of UAVs, likely the armed CH-4, have been deployed at the Ngari Gunsa airbase since 2021.[71] An AI-enabled WZ-7 Soaring Dragon UAV was also spotted at the Shigatse base in December 2022.[72]
Drawing on the heavy use of UAVs by Russia and Ukraine, China has prioritised the development of low-altitude dominance capabilities for the PLAA’s UAVs.[73] In 2022, PLAA air defence units focused on improving tactical air defence against low and slow threats such as Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) and loitering munitions through hybrid self-propelled air defence artillery systems (SPADA), small focused electronic warfare systems, and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).[74] In August 2023, PLA-affiliated academies developed two unmanned intelligent technologies, including a drone swarm system capable of “self-repair” and an augmented reality (AR) interaction system that allows individual infantry soldiers to control multiple unmanned aircraft and vehicles.[75] These systems enable drone reconnaissance and drone attacks, enhancing troops’ situational awareness on the battlefield.[76] In February 2024, it was reported that the PLAA’s 78092 unit was working with scientists to develop UAVs that would replace humans in complex overseas missions within a few years.[f],[77]
China’s satellite constellations, which enable surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communication systems, play a critical role in the development of the PLA’s capabilities. China has over 600 satellites in orbit, of which more than 360 are intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance (ISR) satellites which, together with AI, would help track vehicles and vessels.[78] Moreover, to develop intelligentised warfare capabilities, in 2021, Chinese scientists developed a new quantum radar technology that could detect stealth aircraft by generating a small electromagnetic storm.[79] In the same year, Beijing funded a research project called the China Brain Plan, which aimed to use brain science to develop new AI and biotechnology applications.[80] In July 2023, the PLA was reported to be developing “neurostrike weapons” designed to disrupt the brain functions of military personnel and civilians and influence government leaders or entire populations by using non-kinetic technology.[81] The weapons, which can use microwaves or electromagnetic beams, represent a significant development in China’s brain warfare capabilities.[82]
Optimising the PLAA
The PLAA has steadily reduced its number of personnel in the last three decades to create a leaner, more mobile force (see Table 3).[83] Under President Xi Jinping, the focus has been on modernising the PLA into a more efficient force.[84] Consequently, in 2015, while the number of PLAA troops was reduced by 300,000, in 2017, the total number was brought under one million.[85] However, the number of personnel in the PLA Navy and PLA Rocket Force increased from 2015 to 2023.[g],[86]
Table 3: PLA Personnel, 1980–2020 (in millions)
Year |
1980 |
1985 |
1990 |
1995 |
2000 |
2005 |
2010 |
2015 |
2020 |
2022 |
2023 |
PLA Army |
3.6 |
3.16 |
2.3 |
2.2 |
1.7 |
1.6 |
1.6 |
1.6 |
0.975 |
0.965 |
0.965 |
PLA Navy |
0.63 |
0.35 |
0.26 |
0.26 |
0.22 |
0.255 |
0.255 |
0.235 |
0.250 |
0.260 |
0.252 |
PLA Air Force |
0.4 |
0.49 |
0.47 |
0.47 |
0.42 |
0.4 |
0.33 |
0.398 |
0.395 |
0.395 |
0.403 |
Strategic Forces/Coast Guard |
0 |
0 |
0.09 |
0.09 |
0.1 |
0.1 |
0.1 |
0.1 |
0.145 |
0.145 |
0.145 |
Strategic Missile Forces |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
0.120 |
0.120 |
0.120 |
Reserves |
0 |
5 |
4 |
1.2 |
0.55 |
0.8 |
0.51 |
0.51 |
0.51 |
0.51 |
0.51 |
Paramilitary |
7 |
4.3 |
12 |
1.2 |
1.1 |
1.5 |
0.66 |
0.66 |
0.66 |
0.50 |
0.50 |
Others |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
0.15 |
0.15 |
0.15 |
Total PLA Personnel |
11.6 |
13.3 |
16.32 |
5.42 |
4.49 |
4.665 |
3.455 |
3.503 |
3.205 |
3.045 |
3.045 |
Source: Centre for Strategic and International Studies,[87] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)[88],[89],[90],[91]
The change in focus from the PLAA to its allied forces—PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) (and now ISF)—is the result of the PLA’s changing strategic goals and security requirements. While the PLA previously focused on ground operations and homeland defence, China now prioritises overseas interests[92] such as safeguarding sea lanes, enforcing maritime claims, and securing information infrastructures.[93] Moreover, by reducing non-combat and non-essential personnel, China can redirect resources towards the scientific training of personnel, research and development, and improved joint operations.[94] The PLA has also focused on recruiting more university and college graduates with science and engineering degrees towards building an informatised and intelligentised force.[95] As of 2023, about 57 percent of active PLA personnel had one or more college degrees.[96] In 2020, the PRC announced its plan to modify its single annual military conscription cycle to a two-phase system to account for the academic school year and allow for more efficient enlistment.[97]
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
The US military successes during the 1991 Gulf War and the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis reinforced the need for China to expand and modernise its naval capabilities.[98] China’s navy has since become a formidable military force, particularly in the near-seas region.[99] As of June 2024, the PLAN is the largest navy in the world, with over 234 warships compared to the US Navy’s 219[100] and is expected to grow to 435 by 2030.[101] The PRC’s 2019 defence white paper outlines that “the PLAN is speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas, and improving its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack,”[102] specifically aimed at developing A2AD force capabilities against the US.[103]
The PLAN has modernised both the surface and sub-surface segments of its fleet. In June 2022, China launched its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, which began its first round of sea trials in May 2024.[104] Fujian’s catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) launch system is a significant development over the short take-off, barrier-arrested recovery (STOBAR) systems of the first two aircraft carriers and enable it to launch heavier and larger fixed-wing aircraft.[105] Fujian’s catapults are powered by an electromagnetic system.[106] According to experts, Fujian will possess improved versions of the J-15 fighter jet, the next-generation J-35 stealth jet, the early warning aircraft KJ-600, and the JL-10 advanced trainer jet.[107] In April 2024, China announced that it is building its fourth aircraft carrier, likely a nuclear-powered supercarrier.[108]
In May 2024, the PLAN commissioned its tenth Type-055 Renhai-class cruiser, of which at least four are assigned to the Southern Theatre Command, which is responsible for operations in the South China Sea (SCS).[109] The first of these advanced ships entered service in 2020. Equipped with an integrated electric propulsion (IEP) system, the Type 055 is considered to be one of the world’s most powerful warships,[110] with a 130mm main gun, an HQ-9 long range surface-to-air missile (SAM), the YJ-18 Anti-Ship Missile (AShM), and the YJ-21 hypersonic AShM,[111] and advanced radar systems, sensors, and jamming antennas.[112]
In May 2024, the PLAN tested an electromagnetic rail gun which fired a smart bomb 15km high into the stratosphere at a speed exceeding Mach 5.[113] Although the test was declared unsuccessful, the testing of technology that can launch heavy projectiles at hypervelocity is indicative of the PLAN’s intent to develop cutting-edge technology.[114] China’s most recent destroyers are the 25 Luyang III (Type 052D) guided-missile destroyers (DDGs)—which include 12 lengthened Luyang III MOD DDGs—capable of launching cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and anti-submarine missiles.[115] China is now commissioning an upgraded version of the Type 052D that incorporates an extended-length helicopter flight deck and a new radar.[116]
PLAN’s Type 054A Jiangkai II-class frigates have increased from 30[117] in 2019 to 39[118] in 2024. A new Type 054B (Jiangkai III) frigate was launched in August 2023.[119] This next-generation frigate, which has an IEP system,[120] has been called a “mini destroyer”;[121] it is equipped with a 100mm main gun, a 32-cell missile vertical launch system, a 1130 close-in weapon system, an HQ-10 short-range air defence missile system, anti-submarine weapons, and advanced radar detection and stealth capabilities.[122] China also built the Jiangdao-class corvettes (FFLs) in large numbers over a relatively short period;[123] from 2013 to 2021, China commissioned 72 corvettes,[124] including 22 Type 056 and 50 Type 056A with greater anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and YJ-83 anti-ship missiles.[125]
In December 2023, China launched its fourth Yushen-class Type 075 LHA amphibious assault ship.[126] First launched in 2019, the Type 075 can carry helicopters, air-cushioned landing craft, and amphibious armoured vehicles.[127] The Type 075s are designed to enhance the vertical amphibious landing capabilities of the PLA and can carry out missions in regions like the Taiwan Straits and the SCS, as well as non-military operations such as international humanitarian aid.[128] Together with the eight Type 071 Yuzhao-class amphibious transport docks (LPD), they are modern platforms that are capable of regional and global expeditionary missions in support of both wartime and non-war contingency operations.[129]
In terms of aviation capabilities, the PLAN is developing variants of the J-15 fighter aircraft that currently operates from its carriers.[130] These include a catapult-capable variant, the J-15S tandem-seat variant, and the J-15D electronic warfare variant as well as a variant of the Y-9 aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol.[131] China is also developing the carrier-capable variant of the fifth-generation J-31 fighter, known as the J-35, and improving the design of a carrier-borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft KJ-600.[132] The PLAN is also developing the Z-20F helicopter, with improved ASW capabilities for the Renhai cruisers and Luyang III MOD destroyers and the Yushen LHAs.[133] Additionally, the PLAN is replacing older variants of the H-6 bombers with the larger advanced maritime strike bomber H-6J, which can carry up to six YJ-12 supersonic missiles and can reach the Second Island Chain.[134] However, in pursuit of increasing jointness in maritime strike operations, the PLAN’s H-6J-equipped regiments were transferred to the Air Force divisions in 2023.[135]
For its sub-surface operations, the PLAN currently has 59 submarines: six Type-094/094A Jin nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six Type 093 Shang I-class and Type 093A Shang II-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), and 47 diesel- powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS).[136],[137] The Jin SSBNs can carry 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), JL-2 (range of 7,000km), and JL-3 (range of over 10,000km) and are capable of targeting continental US from Chinese littoral waters, representing China’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent.[138] In the late 2020s or early 2030s, the PLAN is expected to launch its next-generation Type 096 SSBNs, which will be armed with longer range SLBMs.[139] Aided in part by Russian technology, the Type 096 will also overcome the noise problem currently faced by the Type 094 and thus will be difficult to detect.[140]
Amidst increasing risks of high-seas confrontation with the US, the PLA’s focus is on developing more nuclear-powered submarines that can remain submerged for prolonged periods and support long-distance operations with multipurpose weapons, overcoming the shortcomings of conventional submarines.[141] The PLAN is developing Shang III (Type 093B)-class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines with anti-surface warfare capabilities, which could be operational by 2025.[142] In addition, the PLAN’s inventory of conventional submarines is increasing.[143] In June 2024, the PLAN revealed a new submarine, unofficially named the Type 039C,[144] which is speculated to be China’s latest air-independent powered attack submarine with improved stealth capabilities.[145]
In October 2019, China revealed its first large displacement autonomous underwater vehicle, the HSU-001, which has long-range patrol capability and a sonar for detecting underwater targets.[146] In 2020, China’s unmanned surface vessel JARI underwent its first sea trial.[h],[147] In 2022, satellite images of China’s Sanya naval base revealed two extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicles (XLUUVs) capable of performing ISR missions and enduring at sea on longer missions.[148] The PLAN has also conducted sea trials on multiple UAVs with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL).[149] These include the SD-40, S-100 CAMCOPTER, AV-500, and CSC- 005, which specialise in ISR missions.[150] Satellite images of Changxing Island in Shanghai from June 2024 also revealed mock trials of the stealth-capable GJ-11 Sharp Sword unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).[151]
China has developed expertise in building medium-to-large UUVs which are used for seabed mapping and exploration.[152] These include the underwater glider Haiyan, which set an endurance record of 141 days and sailed 3,619.6km in the SCS in 2019,[153] and the Haidou-1 unmanned submersible,[154] which dove below 10,000 metres in 2021. These UUVs, although used for marine scientific research, can also be employed for military purposes like ISR missions and grey-zone operations.[155] In 2023, China also commissioned the world’s first autonomous seaborne drone carrier, the Zhu Hai Yun.[156] Although the unmanned carrier will undertake marine scientific research, some experts believe that it could be a forerunner to the Type 076 Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), which is currently in the development phase and will play the role of a drone mothership in the PLAN.[157]
The PLAN’s expansion and modernisation of its ships and weapons capabilities have allowed it to extend its operational reach beyond the near seas region into the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters around Europe.[158] The PLAN also has numerous logistical replenishment ships, auxiliary ships, and Fuyu-class fast combat support ships, which can support long-distance and long-duration deployments.[159] Supported by its crucial naval bases, such as in Djibouti, PLAN modernisation is also a means to assert its status as the leading regional power and a major global power as its capabilities enable it to conduct distant anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.[160]
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)
In the 75 years since its inception, the PLAAF has evolved from a homeland-focused limited force to a “strategic air force” with advanced long-range aircrafts, bombers, and drone systems.[161] Today, the PLAAF, together with PLAN aviation, is “the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region and the third largest in the world,” with more than 3,150 total aircrafts[162], of which approximately 2,919[163] are combat-capable.[i]
The PLAAF has continued to modernise and indigenise its aircraft, bombers, and drone systems. Its WS-series jet engines are now able to match the capabilities of those of NATO nations.[164] Since 2016, the PLAAF has also reorganised its theatre commands, bases, and regiments.[165] In mid-2023, a majority of PLAN aviation units, including fighter, bomber, radar, and air defence systems, were transferred to the PLAAF[166] to streamline bureaucratic duplication,[167] improve the standardisation of identical units, and unify all defensive air operations under theatre command air forces. With this transfer, the PLAAF also gained the responsibility for land-based maritime strike tasks in coordination with the PLAN.[168]
Modern and advanced fighters have increased from constituting 4 percent of China’s air force in 2004-05 to 58 percent in 2024.[169] These fighters include the Chengdu J-10C, the Shenyang J-16, and the Chengdu J-20A, which is the PLAAF’s most advanced tactical-combat aircraft with low-observable and stealth capabilities. All three of these types are fitted with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which is less vulnerable to jamming countermeasures.[170]
J-20 fighters are also continuously upgraded and increasing in number. In 2023, a design upgrade and a capability of an increased number of air-to-air missiles (AAM) were tested.[171] The J-20 also underwent small-scale flight tests after being fitted with the Shenyang WS-15 turbofan engine,[172] which were aimed at adding supersonic capability and a longer range[173] to the J-20s, thus placing US bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam within its range.[174] In the same year, the PLAAF received more than 200 J-10C, J-16 Flanker N, and J-20 tactical combat aircraft from the PLAN, which together amount to over 700.[175] The J-16 Flankers possess a long-range surface-attack capability and are likely to be equipped with the PL-17 very long-range air-to-air missile that is currently in development.[176] The PLAAF currently has at least six operational brigades of J-20.[177] In July 2024, it was reported that the J-20s have been deployed in the Tibet area, in addition to the usual J-7, J-8, J-10, J-11, and J-16 fighters and the KJ-500 early warning airborne and control system.[178]
In December 2023, images of the WS-20 fitted Y-20 Kunpeng aircraft, re-designated as the YY-20B, were released on Chinese social media.[179] While it is unclear whether the re-engined Y-20 has entered PLAAF service, the new engines will give the transport aircraft short take-off and air-refuelling capabilities along with greater endurance, thereby increasing its range beyond the first island chain.[180] The Y-20 could also be modified as a refuelling tanker for combat aircraft, thereby doubling the range of fighter jets such as the J-20 and J-31.[181] It can also be transformed into a strategic command centre for fighter jets and drones during combat.[j],[182]
The PLAAF’s bombers are also undergoing modernisation to improve their operational effectiveness.[183] The PLA’s bomber force currently comprises H-6 bomber variants, introduced to China in the 1950s and produced domestically based on the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber designs.[184] Since 2020, of the estimated 209 H-6 variants,[185] the PLAAF has increasingly deployed H-6K bombers.[186] The H-6K is capable of carrying six land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)[187] that can range targets in the Second Island Chain, the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missile, and the YJ-21 hypersonic missile.[188] In June 2023, a PLAAF unit used the H-6K bomber for the first time to conduct night-time encirclement flight exercises around Taiwan, demonstrating its all-weather, round-the-clock capabilities.[189] While the H-6 made China part of the three-member club of countries with strategic bomber operators (the other two being the US and Russia), its legacy status necessitated a shift in focus to developing the H-20 stealth strategic bomber.[190]
In March 2024, the Deputy Commander of the PLAAF, Wang Wei, declared that the H-20 would soon be publicly revealed.[191] However, in April 2024, it was reported that the H-20 development is facing engineering design challenges; its current timeline remains uncertain.[192] The bomber was reported to have been in development since 2016 and is reported to be China’s first indigenously developed large-scale stealth bomber with nuclear capabilities.[193] It is estimated to have a range of at least 8,500km[194] and can target the US military bases in Guam and Hawaii and cross the Himalayas to attack targets in India.[195] Through the H-20, Beijing hopes to compete with the US B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider bombers and complete its nuclear triad.[196]
In 2019, the PLAAF revealed the nuclear capable H-6N bomber, a derivative of H-6K, which can carry air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM).[197] Operationally fielded the following year, the H-6N has air-to-air refuelling capabilities, thus providing it with a greater range over other non-air refuelable H-6 variants.[198] However, the H-6N is subsonic, capable of only a 15-tonne payload, and is easily detectable.[199] Hence, in addition to the H-20, the PLAAF is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers capable of striking regional and global targets.[200]
The PLAAF is also upgrading its special mission aircraft, which are “force multipliers”[201] in terms of enhancing the endurance and operational capabilities of its fleet.[202] Among its airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, the KJ-2000, KJ-200B, and KJ-200AG entered into service in 2020 and 2022, respectively.[203] The KJ-500A was deployed in 2020 and increasing numbers of KJ-500 are being fielded, which includes at least one with aerial refuelling capabilities.[204]
Amid rising tensions with the US, Taiwan, and other Indo-Pacific countries, there have been sightings of a new next-generation KJ-700 with multiple capabilities such as aerial reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures deployment, air and maritime surveillance, and combat aircraft guidance.[205] Another KJ-3000, with advanced radar system and electronics, is also reported to be under development.[206] China’s aviation industry is rapidly developing greater numbers of its Y-20 large transport aircraft and its tanker variants, and the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600.[207] These large transport aircraft are meant to support a range of PLAAF’s operations such as airborne combat and control, paradrop, logistics, refuelling, reconnaissance, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.[208] In 2019, the PLAAF also fielded a new Y-9 communications jamming aircraft known as the GX-11.[209]
Several PLAAF units operate different high- and medium-altitude unmanned aircraft systems and vehicles.[210] PLAAF is focusing not only on modernising its drones but also on conducting integrated operations with fighter jets, early warning aircraft, helicopters, and other drones to reach maximum capabilities of the drone.[211] In this integrated MUM-T format, drones conduct ISR without revealing the position of the pilots and undertake beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile targeting.[212] After former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, many drones such as TB-001, BZK-005, and KV-001 conducted regional combat training missions with J-10s and J-16s.[213] In September 2022, the PLAAF for the first time unveiled an armed reconnaissance drone unit based in Northwest China and conducted an integrated exercise of its armed UAV aimed at border patrol and counterterrorism.[214] The drone practiced a long-endurance reconnaissance and attack manoeuvres in Northwest China, which includes the Xinjiang region and India border.[215] In April 2024, a new WZ-8 drone was sighted beneath the fuselage of a PLAAF Xian H-6 bomber intended for reconnaissance missions across Southeast Asia, including areas such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and North-East India, and Ladakh.[216] This drone possesses a speed of Mach 3+ and can fly at an altitude of up to 100,000 feet. However, unlike conventional drones, it needs an air-launching “mothership” to take off.[217] In May 2024, the PLAAF’s new, indigenously-developed WL-10 UAV with high altitude, long-endurance, and stealth and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities conducted flight operations in Japanese airspace in the East China Sea.[218]
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)
The PLARF, known as the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) until 2015, is the custodian of China’s land-based nuclear and conventional ballistic missile forces. Since its establishment in 1966, the PLASAF/PLARF’s small and unsophisticated missile force has progressively grown in size and capabilities.[219] The PLARF’s recent modernisation is aimed at enhancing its nuclear and conventional strategic deterrence capabilities.[k],[220]
In terms of nuclear capabilities, China’s stance is to maintain a minimum and credible nuclear deterrent force.[221] However, a recent threat assessment by the US Intelligence Community outlines that the PLA is pursuing “the most rapid expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history.”[222] China’s nuclear arsenal now includes roughly 500 warheads and is expected to reach 1,500 warheads by 2035.[223] This increase in nuclear warheads production is aimed to meet the development of new Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.[224] In conventional-armed capabilities, the PLARF has over 2,200 ballistic and cruise missiles and enough anti-ship missiles to target enemy vessels in the South China Sea.[225] To ensure launching capabilities, the PLARF has increased its number of brigades,[226] adding at least ten new missile brigades from 2017 to 2019 to currently possess approximately 45 brigades.[227]
Besides expanding its nuclear arsenal, the PLARF modernisation project has focused on improving its missiles capabilities to penetrate ballistic missile defence systems and its longer-range and accurate strike abilities and ensuring the survivability of its missile forces. For modernising its system penetration capabilities, China upgraded its DF-5 missiles with MIRV capabilities, providing it with increased warheads despite its limited missile force.[228] While the DF-5A can carry three and DF-5B can carry up to five warheads, the recently fielded DF-5C possesses a “multi-megaton yield” with up to ten warheads.[229],[230]
The PLARF also operationally deployed the DF-17 road-mobile Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), which were unveiled at the 2019 PRC military parade.[231],[232] The DF-17 is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) whose higher manoeuvrability and lower-altitude flight allows it to evade the enemy radar and missile defences.[233] It is suggested that the HGV system is developed to destroy enemy air and missile defence systems at the beginning of a conflict, leaving the adversary vulnerable to other less manoeuvrable missiles.[234] At present, the PLARF is upgrading three brigades[235] with DF-17s and deploying them in eastern theatres (Taiwan and the Korea region).[236] It is likely that the PLARF will soon equip its SRBM brigades with DF-17s.[237]
China has tested an advanced nuclear delivery system called the fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) missile system which can fly around the world at hypersonic speeds and cannot be tracked by missile defence systems.[238] In August 2024, China was reported to be developing a new type of HGV with speeds exceeding Mach 15 and a “skipping stone” trajectory, which would increase the range of the missiles from regional to global targets.[239]
The PLARF has continued to develop missiles with long-range and accurate strike capabilities. As of October 2023, China’s inventory had about 500 ICBM launchers with 350 missiles.[240] As of February 2024,[241] China has replaced its legacy DF-31 road-mobile ICBMs with newer versions of the DF-31A and DF-31AG and possibly a silo-based variant.[242] The DF-31As have a range of 11,200 km and can reach most of the continental US.[243] According to the commander of the US Strategic Command, China’s latest DF-41ICBMs, with a range up to 15,000km, became operational in 2020, and at least two brigades were equipped with the DF-41ICBMs.[244],[245] More bases are being upgraded with DF-41s, and approximately 28 DF-41 launchers have been deployed. Moreover, DF-41s are MIRV-capable and could carry three warheads.[246],[247]
The DF-21 road-mobile MRBM variants are also being upgraded to longer-range missiles, such as the dual-capable DF-26 IRBM and the nuclear-capable DF-31AG ICBM.[248] While there are estimated to be more than 140 of the former, the latter are numbered at 56.[249] Introduced in 2015, the DF-26 has a range of up to 4,000km and the capabilities to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and strike with precision both land and maritime targets in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS.[250] The DF-26’s swappable warhead capabilities raises a potential escalation dilemma for China’s adversaries because of the associated nuclear-conventional attack uncertainty.[251] An HGV-armed, dual-capable IRBM known as DF-27, with a range of up to 8,000km, is also reported to have entered service.[252],[253]
For maintaining precision-strike capabilities, China has continued to develop its constellation of military reconnaissance satellites and other reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications systems.[254] The PRC uses its BeiDou’s position, navigation, and timing (PNT) service capabilities to enable force movements and conduct precision guided munitions delivery.[255] In 2022, it was reported that China has developed several short-range missiles which use BeiDou and terminal infrared image guidance systems, giving it a circular error probability (CEP) of less than a metre.[256] The long-range DF-41 missile also uses BeiDou with an inertial navigation system and thus has a CEP of less than 100 metres.[257]
The PLARF’s modernisation also includes its ability to ensure the survivability of its arsenal and launch a counterattack on the enemy. Its MRBMs, IRBMs, and long-range cruise missile systems already use road-mobile launch facilities.[258] For instance, in 2017, the DF-31A was upgraded to a more mobile and responsive DF-31AG version that can fire missiles from off-the-road, rugged terrain by using a transport erector launcher (TEL).[259] China is also planning to develop rail-mobile and silo-based launching facilities for the DF-41.[260]
According to a 2024 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists report, China has focused on improving the survivability of its ICBMs and has constructed 320 new silos for solid-fuelled ICBMs in the northern fields of Yumen, Hami, and Yulin and 30 new silos in three mountainous areas of central-eastern China.[261] The PLARF has also loaded some ICBMs into these silos.[l],[262] With 350 new silos, China’s silo-based ICBMs now exceed Russia’s and are equivalent to about three-fourths that of the US ICBM force.[263] Moreover, China is expanding the quantity of silos for the liquid-fuelled DF-5 ICBM.[264] Such quantitative expansion of ICBM silos has raised concerns that China may shift its minimum credible deterrent posture to a launch-on-warning posture.[265]
Information Support Force (ISF)
The ISF was launched on 19 April 2024, following the disbanding of the PLA’s SSF.[266] At the launching ceremony, President Xi stated that the new force will be a strategic arm of the PLA and will advance its competitiveness in modern warfare by “coordinating the construction and application of the PLA network information systems”.[267]
The dissolution of the SSF and the creation of ISF suggest the CMC’s dissatisfaction with the former’s performance.[268] However, it is unclear whether this dissatisfaction was due to its operational or political functions, or a combination of both.[m],[269]
Ni Lexiong, a professor at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, attributes the creation of the ISF to the importance of information in modern warfare.[n],[270] Another reason for the formation of the ISF could be China’s response to similar efforts by the US to consolidate its military information networks under the aegis of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).[271]
The ISF’s exact structure and functions remain unclear.[272] Officially, the ISF will “build a network information system that fulfils the requirements of modern warfare”.[273] A PLA Daily commentator stated that the ISF “should provide strong support for combat operations, deeply integrate into the overall joint operational system of the military, and precisely and efficiently provide information support to serve and guarantee military operations in all directions and domains.”[274]
Thus, the ISF’s support function for the whole of PLA differ from that of the ASF and CSF, which will control domain capabilities.[275] This also comes against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war,[276] which aided China in recognising the importance of effective battlefield information support and narrative control.[277]
The development of information support capabilities has been a key goal for the PLA to achieve President Xi’s goals of building an “informatised” military that will assist in the transition to an “intelligent military” by the year 2035.[278],[279] The 2022 report to the 20th Party Congress also emphasised that China would “promote coordinated development and application of the network information system” for enhancing the combat capability of modern armed forces.[280] Therefore, the creation of the ISF is deemed important for achieving the 2027 milestone of invading Taiwan.[281]
Experts believe that the ISF will collaborate with the ASF and the CSF to conduct cyber and electronic warfare operations, information and network-centric warfare, and space and counterspace operations.[282] It would manage communications systems and protect the PLA’s information systems from cyber and EW attacks and leverage AI in its command-and-control systems to improve its decision-making process.[283] China is already collecting battlefield information through its military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and feeding this information to the CCP’s AI combat simulation system.[284] China’s AI-based EW system was reported to have intercepted and mined data from US military radars operating in the Pacific Ocean.[285]
In any future wars, the ISF is speculated to lead by dominating the information space of the adversaries.[286] This could pose a significant threat to adversaries, given China’s emphasis on cognitive warfare affecting not only the judgement of the enemy’s armed forces but also the public psyche.[287]
Reports of China’s disinformation campaigns and false narratives have increased in recent years. In the case of India, China’s information manipulations[288] surfaced against the backdrop of the 2020 Galwan clashes and psychological warfare strategies of assigning Mandarin names[289] to places in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. China’s disinformation reports in the European Union came to light during the COVID-19 pandemic.[290] Recently, the Philippines Foreign Ministry accused China of spreading fake narratives with respect to the maritime dispute regarding the Second Thomas Shoal;[291] the Filipino government claimed that Chinese diplomats released a fake audio recording of a conversation between its army head of the Western Command and a Chinese diplomat agreeing on a “new model” arrangement for resolving the dispute.[292]
The PLA reshuffle so soon after the major 2015 military reforms suggests that China under President Xi Jinping is not hesitant in experimenting with the PLA structure to achieve its goals. The creation of the ISF and the emphasis on developing network system capabilities also indicates China’s shifting priorities to non-combat tools of warfare such as information control and shaping public perceptions.[293]
An Evaluation of the PLA’s Military Modernisation
The PLA’s modernisation has been aimed at becoming a world-class military. For India, China’s military modernisation must be evaluated against its operational capabilities, both in terms of increasing focus on joint operations and combat readiness as well as infrastructural, logistical and technological support systems.
Joint Operations and Combat Readiness
A critical element of the PLA’s capabilities’ modernisation is building the effectiveness of the joint operations of PLA branches and its supporting arms so that it can achieve its aims in an integrated manner. The US’s joint operational successes in the 1991 Gulf War[294] and changing regional security threats, particularly the Taiwan independence movement and US support,[295] have forced the PLA to develop joint operational capabilities. Although the PLA began advocating for the Integrated Joint Operations (IJO) concept,[o] which has informatisation at the core, in the mid-2000s, the concept did not mature until the Hu Jintao era.[296]
However, under Xi Jinping, improvements in joint operations and combat readiness received a significant boost. As Chairman of the CMC, Xi initiated the reorganisation of the PLA in 2015. In 2016, he established the Joint Operations Command Centre (JOCC)[297] to coordinate the command structure and created the SSF and the Joint Logistics Support Force[298] to ensure an informatised military and to streamline the free flow of logistical supplies, respectively. However, the 2015 reforms could not effectively execute complex joint operations such as island landings, military blockades, and joint missile strikes.
This is due to several reasons.[299] First, the operations were guided by the antiquated military doctrine of ‘New Generation Operations Regulations’, issued in 1999, which was not in congruence with the post-2015 PLA structure.[300] Second, there were issues with planning, organising, and coordinating joint operations, together with technical difficulties such as networking of systems.[301],[302] Finally, the heavy tilt of the PLA force structure towards the ground forces[303] and the lack of a joint assignment system,[304] where PLA officers are trained with different services, hindered the achievement of full-fledged joint operational capabilities.
To overcome these hurdles, in November 2020, the CMC issued the ‘Chinese People’s Liberation Army Joint Operations Outline (Trial)’, which was meant to serve as top-level guidelines for integrated joint operations.[305] The guidelines focused on reforming the military doctrine or policy and are considered part of the ‘Third Big Campaign’ reform that sought to enhance the effectiveness of combat capabilities.[p],[306] The guidelines clarify the organisation and implementation procedures of joint operations, the rights and responsibilities of services, and unify the combat thinking of the personnel.[307] Although launched in a “trial” format, the guidelines are a notable update since the 1999 operations regulations.[308]
The concept of the IJO has also been strengthened through the incorporation of new sub-concepts such as “Joint Operations Capability Based on Network Information Systems”, “intelligentised warfare”, and “Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations”.[309] These concepts place at the core of the IJO information dominance and the implementation of stealth, precision, and unmanned warfare strategies.[310] In 2021, the PLA developed a new operational concept called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare” to leverage Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to rapidly identify critical vulnerabilities in an adversary’s operational system and mobilise joint forces to launch precision strikes against them.[311] Moreover, besides IJO, increased importance is given to improve the “combat readiness” of the PLA (e.g., through the 14th Five-Year Plan)[312] so that it can “fight and win wars.”[313] This emphasis on new military guidelines, concepts, and combat readiness has resulted in the PLA conducting more training and complex joint operations and adapting to the informational and intelligentised aspects of modern warfare.[314]
In 2021, the PLA Xinjiang Military Command conducted a joint fire strike confrontation drill with the PLAA and the PLAAF.[315] The PLA’s joint operations capabilities are also evident in its military exercises in the Eastern Theatre Command.[316] In August 2022, the PLA carried out the largest unplanned joint military exercises against Taiwan in response to the US Congress delegation’s visit.[q],[317] In May 2024, the PLA showcased its abilities by conducting Joint Sword-2024A exercises around the island of Taiwan in response to newly elected Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural “separatist” speech.[318]
In mid-2023, the PLA transferred PLAN aviation units such as fighter brigades, bomber regiments, radar and air defence brigades, and airfield units to the PLAAF to unify all defensive air operations under one theatre command.[319] In August of the same year, PLA forces demonstrated joint operations capabilities when the PLAN, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia blockaded a Philippine outpost in the SCS to prevent Philippine Coast Guard vessels from conducting their resupplying mission.[320]
In recent years, the Western Theatre Command has focused on developing joint training and combat preparedness exercises. In a drill carried out in the western theatre in April 2021, the PLAA’s air defence units were inducted in its air force command chain to function as a combined air defence system.[321] In February 2022, it was reported that, in contingencies, the Southern Theatre Command’s 75th Group Army could also be operationalised in the Tibet region bordering Arunachal Pradesh.[322] In November 2021, in the mountainous area bordering Arunachal Pradesh, a combined arms brigade affiliated with the PLA Xizang Military Command conducted an exercise testing the physical fitness and combat capabilities of troops in oxygen-scarce terrains.[323] In December 2022, again in the high-altitude plateau region bordering Arunachal Pradesh, the PLA conducted a live-fire shooting drill with long-range rocket artillery systems to test long-range precision strike capabilities.[324] This drill was conducted a few days before PLA troops attempted to enter Indian territory near the Tawang region of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).[325]
The increase in PLA joint operations exercises since the issuance of the 2020 guidelines demonstrate the capabilities of multiple PLA services in combat preparation, situation shaping, information-led task implementation, and improved joint combat command system.[326] These capabilities, although majorly directed to support China’s operations against Taiwan and in the South China Sea, have important implications for India, since both the countries’ armies are in a stand-off in the Ladakh sector of the LAC. However, notwithstanding the PLA’s improvements in joint operations capabilities, this training is still not mature and has limits beyond the First Island Chain.[327] The report also notes that several PLA media outlets have highlighted the need to remedy the lack of combat training and the poor decision-making abilities of the military commanders.[328]
Support Systems for the PLA’s Missions
Since 2008, China’s military modernisation has dovetailed with its increasingly assertive foreign policy.[329] From India’s perspective, China’s military modernisation must be assessed in terms of the PLA’s support systems that facilitate its “new era” missions to “fight and win wars”.[330] The military strategic aims of the PLA include safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security; protecting China’s maritime rights and overseas interests; deterring and resisting aggression; and opposing Taiwan independence.[331] In pursuit of these goals, China’s armed forces have asserted themselves in various missions in the East and South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and on the border with India,[332] and these missions have been supported by China in infrastructure, logistical, and technological capabilities.
Since the 2017 Doklam stand-off and 2020 Galwan clashes, China has upgraded and developed new air bases, road and rail networks, and communication systems in border areas with India. While continuing to upgrade roads opposite eastern Ladakh,[333] China has built a new G216 highway which provides access to disputed areas in the Aksai Chin region of the LAC.[334] This will serve as an alternative to the existing G219 highway and could be used for the rapid mobilisation of PLA troops in conflict scenarios.[335] Another G695 highway, within 10-15km of the LAC in the western sector, is also under construction.[336] Satellite images from July 2024 showed that China has also completed the construction of a bridge connecting the northern and southern banks of the Pangong Tso in Eastern Ladakh.[337]
Additionally, China is building a railway line that will connect Chengdu in its east to Hotan in its west and will run through Aksai Chin.[338] Some sections of the line have been completed and the westward extension from Shigatse to Pakhuktso may be completed by 2025.[339] Moreover, since 2017, China has upgraded or constructed 37 airports and heliports within Tibet and Xinjiang, including the dual-use Shigatse and Nyingchi Mainling airports.[340] In addition, 22 more airfields are planned to be built by 2035.[341]
China has also built an integrated border surveillance network along the border.[342] It has set up optical fibre cable connectivity for facilitating effective communication for the PLA.[343] In May 2024, China established its first ever 5G-Advanced (5.5G) synaesthesia integrated base station in the Lhoka (Shannan) region near the border with India’s Arunachal Pradesh.[344] This base station will enable the tracking of low-altitude UAVs and ground vehicles and will help in real-time positioning capabilities for the PLA.[345] In April 2024, China built another 5G-A base station on Mount Everest near the Indian border.[346]
With the support of this road, rail, and network infrastructure, China appears to have established a permanent presence in the region and forced India to develop similar infrastructural facilities in the area.[347] However, there is a significant infrastructure gap in favour of China.[348]
China is also developing technologically supported equipment that can sustain the harsh weather conditions of the high-altitude region of the Western Theatre Command. In 2022, regiments of the Xinjiang Military Command tested cold-proof equipment such as inflatable tents[349] and conducted drills with an integrated individual system consisting of instruments such as night vision goggles, a portable computer, and an assault rucksack.[350] These equipment systems would help troops adapt to different environments and improve their operational efficiency and combat capability. In January 2023, the official media outlet of the PLA released a video showcasing the efficient use of civilian logistics companies to deliver essential commodities to troops in China’s western border areas.[351] A unit with the Xinjiang Military Command was also reported to have the facilities to store equipment in insulated garages, with each piece having a heating device, enabling them to be instantly used in emergency scenarios.[352]
To support its troops in the Western theatre, China has built 628 Xiaokang “Well-Off” villages in the Tibet region closer to the border with India.[353] These villages have dual-use infrastructure such as houses, roads, public service facilities, and internet connectivity that serves China’s military outposts.[354] Besides, village residents or “border guardians”[355] are roped in with the border security police to patrol the area.[356] As of August 2024, China is reported to have constructed over 50 new villages along its western borders, 12 of which are in disputed areas with other countries including India, with at least one village near every Himalayan pass that borders India.[357] Besides serving as “sentries on the front line”, these villages establish China’s permanence in border areas that are claimed by India.[358] This echoes China’s strategy to establish credible territorial claims in the SCS by using fishing militias and developing artificial islands.[359]
China has also asserted its power in the Indian Ocean—a region that has historically had Indian influence. China has deployed its navy in the region to safeguard its maritime trade and energy imports and overseas military facilities and to keep an eye on India.[360] According to a December 2023 media report, an estimated six to eight Chinese warships are always present in the region, mostly to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.[361] China has also undertaken Sea Guardian naval exercises with Pakistan and supplied it with multi-role frigates.[362] It has also docked its warships in Sri Lanka.[363] However, Chinese research vessels, or the PLA’s “spy ships”, navigating the Indian Ocean are the greater concern for India.[364]
China has conducted vast oceanic surveys of the Indian Ocean since 2020 through civilian research vessels which are linked with the PLA through the military-civil fusion program.[365] At least 13 vessels have been identified which conduct research on energy sources and marine environments but have “displayed suspicious behaviour including docking at Chinese military ports or temporarily turning off tracking devices”.[366] These include the Yuan Wang 5, which docked at the Hambantota port,[367] the Yuan Wang 6 in Lombok Straits,[368] the Shiyan 06 in the eastern Indian Ocean,[369] and the Xiang Yang Hong 03, which docked at the Male port.[370] Data collected by these ships could be used for military purposes such as manoeuvring submarines during a conflict[371] and monitoring India’s satellite and missile launches.[372] In a year, 12-15 such research and fishing vessels are reported to be deployed in the Indian Ocean.[373]
China’s support system capabilities in terms of roads, rails, air bases, and network infrastructure will provide the PLA with significantly better access to disputed areas along the Indian border. Its technological abilities in making equipment and weapons which can function in an “all-weather” scenario will enable the PLA in sustaining its forces in harsh-weather conditions that are present at the LAC. In this respect, China’s village development programme and the use of “border guardians” have bolstered the PLA’s capabilities in conducting border patrols and asserting China’s territorial claims. Additionally, the PLA’s increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been a cause of concern for India.
Conclusion
Since the 2015-16 organisational reforms, President Xi Jinping has accelerated China’s military modernisation. The PLA has witnessed significant changes in its military doctrine, equipment, and weapons systems as well as an organisational restructuring through the creation of the ISF. The PLAA has continued to modernise its equipment, including tanks, artillery, UAVs, air defence and electronic warfare systems, and focused on combined arms training to achieve the goal of becoming a world-class military. It has also become a leaner and more efficient force, and more personnel have been transferred to the PLAN and PLARF to adapt to changing regional geopolitical changes.
The PLAN, now the largest navy in the world, has become a formidable military force in the near-seas region and is on the path to develop strategic deterrence and counterattack capabilities on the far seas, especially aimed against the US in the Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean. Together with PLAN aviation, the PLAAF is the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region and is developing capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations. The PLARF is also enhancing its strategic deterrence nuclear and conventional capabilities, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces and developing the ability to penetrate missile defence systems and counterattack survivability. Technology has played a significant role in the upgrading of capabilities of the four services. The importance of information network capabilities in modern warfare for China was reinforced through the creation of the ISF in April 2024.
An evaluation of these developments in terms of joint operations capability and warfare support systems suggests that the PLA has developed its capabilities in combat preparation, situation shaping, information-led task implementation, and improved joint combat and command systems, as reflected through the numerous joint operations exercises and drills that are conducted to improve combat preparedness. Moreover, China’s capabilities in infrastructure, logistical, and technological support have been the backbone of PLA missions to “fight and win wars”. These capabilities, although primarily supporting China’s operations against Taiwan and in the South China Sea, have important implications for India since the armies of both countries are in a stand-off in the Ladakh sector of the LAC.
The modernisation drives underscore a vital point in the machinery of the CPC since Xi became general secretary. Xi shares of the same aspirations and fears as his predecessors. His vision of a modern and battle-ready PLA is driven by his ambitions of a China that is at the centre of the global economy. Specifically, China has progressively created a favourable asymmetry in military strength to pose serious capability-related, operational, and logistical challenges for its immediate neighbours, including India. This modernisation could also be viewed as a way to establish that China is a force to reckon with in the post-COVID world, that it has learnt from past failures, and that it is stronger today than it has been in several years.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at ORF, New Delhi.
Satyam Singh is a former intern at ORF.
The authors would like to thank Vaishali Jaipal, former intern at ORF, for her research assistance.
Endnotes
[a] This report updates an earlier version published by ORF in 2023. See: https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-military-modernisation-recent-trends-3
[b] According to the 2019 National Defence Policy, China’s armed forces need to “strengthen the awareness of potential dangers, crises and wars, and actively adapt to the new landscape of strategic competition…and new developments in modern warfare, so as to effectively fulfill their tasks and missions in the new era.” See: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/DefensePolicy/index.html#:~:text=China%20advocates%20the%20ultimate%20complete,level%20required%20for%20national%20security
[c] While China has not defined what it means by a “world-class” military, it is likely to include developing a military that is on par or superior to the US military and any other power that Beijing may view as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests, such as India. See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
[d] According to PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian, the establishment of the ISF is of “profound and far-reaching significance to the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces and effective fulfilment of the missions and tasks of the People's military in the new era.” See: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16302635.html
[e] Teeth-to-tail ratio (TTR) is a military term that refers to the amount of personnel it takes to supply and support each combat soldier. See: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/mcgrath_op23.pdf.
[f] Newspaper reports alluded that this overseas mission, which was planned for the year 2035, may be against India, where the PLA would need UAVs purpose-built for flying at extremely low altitudes, capable of operating both alone and in swarms, and able to strike swiftly on critical command and supply installations deep behind enemy lines. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3249831/drone-007-chinese-military-plans-replace-human-agents-machines-special-operations-overseas
[g] The reasons for personnel optimisation were outlined in a 2016 opinion paper by the Central Military Commission. According to the paper, China’s military needed to respond to the “unprecedented great changes in the world”, “adapt to the evolution of war forms”, and “liberate and enhance [its] vitality”. It aimed to “optimise the proportion of military services” and transform the military from a “quantitative and large-scale model to a quality and efficiency model”. It also aimed to strengthen the “military through science and technology”, build “elite troops with Chinese characteristics”, and “firmly establish combat effectiveness as the only fundamental standard”. See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm
[h] JARI is reported to be the world’s first unmanned surface vehicle (USV) with multiple roles, i.e., anti-submarine, air defence, and surface combat, and the capability to track underwater targets up to 7km. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3046601/chinas-new-killer-robot-ship-goes-through-its-first-sea-trial
[i] The PRC’s 2019 defence white paper states that the PLAAF’s missions and tasks are transforming “from territorial air defence to offensive and defensive operations.” See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
[j] The Y-20 with PLAAF 27 aircrafts were reported to have intruded Taiwan’s air defence identification zone in July 2021. See: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/an-aircraft-us-fears-chinas-y-20-chubby-girl-gets-new/amp/
[k] According to the PRC’s 2019 defence white paper, the PLARF will work towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.” See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
[l] According to the 2024 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists report, “The silo fields are located deeper inside China than any other known ICBM base, and beyond the reach of the United States’ conventional and nuclear cruise missiles.” See: https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/
[m] The SSF emerged during the 2015 reforms to strengthen the PLA’s joint operational warfighting ability by creating synergies among the hitherto disparate cyber, information, and space capabilities (see: https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/05/chinas-new-information-support-force/). Its role became more crucial when, in 2017, Xi hoped to make “major progress” in building an informatised military, where all four services and five theatre commands collect and share data, by the year 2020 (see: https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/; https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/12/strategic-survey-2022-chinas-military-modernisation/). However, it is suggested that the SSF’s bureaucratic ineffectiveness towards achieving the 2020 goal might be the cause of Xi’s frustration[m] and the setting up of the ISF under his direct supervision (see: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html; https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/chinas-new-info-warriors-the-information-support-force-emerges/). It is also speculated that possible corruption within the SSF precipitated this restructuring (see: https://jamestown.org/program/planned-obsolescence-the-strategic-support-force-in-memoriam-2015-2024/).
[n] According to Ni, “When a certain military technology is very important to the outcome of a war, the troops in charge of this military technology will be separated from the original military branch and become a new branch of the military.” He added, “Now information, intelligence, and electronic warfare have become decisive, so this is why the information support force became a separate force.” See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3259938/new-force-chinas-pla-eyes-modern-warfare-information-support
[o] The term “integrated joint operations” (IJO) appeared in the 2004 China national defence white paper and was understood as the new military guideline for conducting of “local wars under informatized conditions” (see: M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949, 219-226). The 2010 white paper explicitly stated that the IJO had become PLA’s “basic form of operations”, implying that the PLA was training its personnel for such joint operations (see: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm). The 2013 Science of Military Strategy (SMS) published by the Academy of Military Science defined IJO as “completely linked (multiservice) operations that rely on a networked military information system, employ digitized weapons and equipment, and employ corresponding operational methods in land, sea, air, outer space, and cyber space.” It explains that integration requires fusion of operational strengths of “all services and branches” and suggests breaking “the hierarchical differentiation between strategic, operational, and tactical levels” and establishing multiservice integration at every command level (see: Sun Zhaoli, Science of Strategy, Academy of Military Sciences, Military Strategy Research Department, 124-127).
[p] The ‘First Big Campaign’ comprised the 2015-16 organisational reforms, and the ‘Second Big Campaign’ refers to the subsequent reforms in the size and composition of PLA units, training, and military education.
[q] The exercise included naval patrols, aircrafts violating Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, and firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan and showcased capabilities in amphibious landing, joint blockade, and combat readiness. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3188437/taiwan-strait-drills-shed-some-light-some-beijings-tactics?module=inline&pgtype=article
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