-
CENTRES
Progammes & Centres
Location
Russia’s growing footprints in Africa provide West African junta-led countries with an opportunity to recalibrate their foreign policy away from traditional western alliances as well as China. But in what ways does Moscow’s re-emergence in the region offer strategic options to these countries?
Image Source: x.com
While US President Donald Trump’s tariffs are resetting the global trading order, Africa is recalibrating its alliance with the West to move closer to Russia. In recent years, the Sahel region experienced deterioration in the security situation caused by the dwindling presence of the US and France. Capitalising in this shift, Russia has expanded its influence with the countries in the Sahel – the vast expanse south of the Sahara Desert.
Earlier this month, the foreign ministers of the three West African junta-led countries – Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger – travelled to Moscow and met with the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov. The meeting was aimed at establishing strategic relations in areas of common interest. Following the meeting, Russia expressed its readiness to help strengthen the military and security forces of the three countries.
The Sahel region experienced deterioration in the security situation caused by the dwindling presence of the US and France.
But how did this drift begin? What factors have led to the weakening of US and French influence in the Sahel region? Why are three African nations seeking closer military ties with Russia? Let’s understand.
Sahel is drifting into the Russian orbit, partly by choice. However, the choice of Russia as the preferred external partner for the Sahel is not difficult to grasp. The three West African nations, where coups in recent years brought juntas to power, formed a body called the Alliance of Sahel States or L’Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) in September 2023.
The announcement of the alliance took place in the presence of a Russian delegation led by Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. Russia is the first country to recognise the AES with the promise of security cooperation. From the beginning, the Alliance was poised to be more than just a security or military agreement. In early 2024, the AES countries upgraded their security alliance to a confederation.
The AES countries also left security alliances, such as the Sahel G5 and Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin, which are two African Union, UN, and Western-backed military missions meant to combat Salafi-jihadi terrorism.
Since then, the confederation has taken several bold steps to redefine its international alignment, including withdrawals from several neutral or Western-aligned regional political and security institutions. In early 2025, the AES formally withdrew from the West African political and economic bloc ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).
The AES countries also left security alliances, such as the Sahel G5 and Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin, which are two African Union, UN, and Western-backed military missions meant to combat Salafi-jihadi terrorism. The disengagement hints at the AES countries’ disenchantment with Western-led security frameworks, including the ones anchored by France.
Since the 1960s, France has sustained close ties with the French-speaking countries of the region, positioning itself as the principal security provider. This historic tie has translated into a series of military interventions aimed at stabilising the region.
In 2013, France launched a military intervention known as Operation Serval, aimed at addressing the growing threat of Islamist militancy in Mali. This operation was succeeded in 2014 by a more extensive and long-term initiative, Operation Barkhane, which expanded the scope of French military engagement across the broader Sahel region.
Facing fierce public animosity, France was forced to withdraw its troops from the AES countries, followed by neighbouring Chad, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.
However, France has recently faced violent protests in all three AES countries as well as other francophone countries in the region. Facing fierce public animosity, France was forced to withdraw its troops from the AES countries, followed by neighbouring Chad, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Today, France has only two military bases in Africa: Gabon and Djibouti.
Meanwhile, modest security assistance provided by the US as part of its trans-Sahara counterterrorism policy tool proved inadequate in the conflict-ridden Sahel region.
This rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, caused by the US and France’s dwindling presence there, has made room for several new players, notably Russia. Many countries in the region continue to nurture a soft spot for Russia, recalling how the Soviet Union supported their liberation struggle.
The three regimes had already broadly coordinated their diplomatic activity in line with their anti-Western outlooks. They emphasised the need to speak with “one voice,” The AES states have coordinated other major efforts to integrate in the last year, such as a united passport, joint tariffs, and a joint force to address the Salafi-jihadi insurgency that has spread across all three countries.
However, the recent joint visit marks another step in the bloc’s efforts to form a true multi-sectoral confederation that aims to coordinate diplomatic, economic, and military policies. It is also the bloc’s highest-ever level of joint diplomatic engagement with an external partner, in this case, Russia.
With its focus on collective defence and a framework of mutual assistance, the AES is increasingly aligning itself with the characteristics of an “African NATO”. In the future, with Russian support, AES may consider inviting nations to be observers and conducting joint military and counterterrorism simulation exercises to promote unity that can build a non-western regional security partnership.
Further, the AES may potentially draw many other countries of the region into Russia’s sphere of influence. For example, Chad and Togo expressed their interest in joining the AES to enhance regional cooperation and provide maritime access to the landlocked Sahel countries.
In May 2024, Chad and Togo participated in joint military exercises with the AES. In November, Chad annulled its defence agreements with France followed by the Russian pledge to provide the country with an alternative security partnership. And French troops completed their withdrawal from Chad by the end of January 2025.
Chad annulled its defence agreements with France followed by the Russian pledge to provide the country with an alternative security partnership.
Similarly, in February 2025, Sudan and Russia reached a preliminary agreement to revive a stalled 2017 deal that would allow Russia to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, following Russia’s commitment to provide “unrestricted military aid” to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in April 2024.
Earlier, in June 2024, leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) visited Mali and Niger. As these nations increasingly align with the AES, their ties with Russia are also deepening. Notably, this growing alignment also represents a challenge for China.
The AES juntas have specifically targeted China in their pro-sovereignty campaign against international mining interests, expanding the scope of this campaign to include not only Western companies but also Chinese entities.
On March 15, 2025, Niger’s military junta expelled three Chinese oil executives, reportedly due to disputes over wage discrepancies for local Nigerien staff and delays in Chinese-led oil projects. Additionally, the Nigerien Ministry of Tourism revoked the operating license of a Chinese-owned hotel in Niamey, citing allegations of discriminatory practices.
China has been a significant player in Niger’s oil sector since the 2008 signing of a joint petroleum production agreement, holding substantial stakes in Niger’s largest oil field, its sole refinery, and the Niger-Benin oil pipeline, which was completed in 2023. The growing tendency of resource nationalism suggests that these countries seek more favourable terms in mining agreements.
Niger’s military junta expelled three Chinese oil executives, reportedly due to disputes over wage discrepancies for local Nigerien staff and delays in Chinese-led oil projects.
As the competition between the US and China over influence in Africa intensifies, with both powers seeking increasingly deeper ties with the continent, the re-emergence of Russia provides these junta governments with an opportunity to balance their relations while reshaping the trajectory of their foreign policy.
On the other hand, Russia’s strengthened ties with African countries would enable the Kremlin to consolidate its influence and secure its interests. The nature of this interdependence is palpable in the burgeoning partnership between the Sahelian military governments and Russia.
This commentary originally appeared in The Indian Express.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at ORF where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global order. He has a ...
Read More +
PREV
