Introduction

China is increasingly using armed coercion tactics—such as deploying military, paramilitary, and dual-use assets—to exert pressure on its southern neighbours and secure political goals without triggering open conflict. In 2024, this calibrated strategy manifested itself through large-scale military drills, aggressive naval and aerial patrols, the occupation of contested maritime features, harassment of fishing fleets and coast guard vessels, and high-risk aircraft intercepts. These actions are designed not only to impose immediate pressure on the target state but also to signal deterrence to a broader Indo-Pacific audience, discouraging similar pushback against Beijing’s strategic ambitions.

In parallel, China continues to project its power in a calculated manner, often aiming to force adversaries into strategic retreats or policy recalibrations. When smaller neighbours challenge Beijing over territorial sovereignty, be it through ship deployments in contested shoals or military standoffs like those with India, China responds with both pressure and posturing that yields immediate tactical advantage. However, such coercion is not cost-free. It frequently provokes political, economic, and military backlash, especially when the targeted nation exhibits strong resolve. In such cases, the efficacy of China’s strategy depends less on its military hardware and more on the political will and resilience of the state under pressure.

Once China extracts its intended strategic gains through armed coercion, it frequently pivots to a charm offensive, offering diplomatic overtures and economic incentives to defuse tensions and stabilise bilateral ties. This cyclical pattern of pressure followed by placation is designed to secure long-term leverage without permanently alienating the target. Yet, when geopolitical blowback escalates to the brink of armed conflict, especially if the adversary’s response is unexpected, China often recalibrates or retreats. Its coercive strategy is fundamentally opportunistic, not reckless—calibrated to achieve maximum effect at minimal cost, without triggering uncontrollable escalation.

A critical variable in this calculus is the potential involvement of external actors. Beijing is acutely wary of provoking United States (US) intervention in regional disputes, especially when dealing with pivotal states. To illustrate, Vietnam—an important ASEAN player and strategic swing state—has enough clout to sway the regional consensus. China’s coercion against Vietnam, therefore, is measured, designed to assert dominance while stopping short of pushing Hanoi into the US’s security orbit. In contrast, on the Himalayan frontier with India, Beijing perceives a more permissive environment. It calculates that the Sino-Indian border dispute remains geographically and strategically compartmentalised, with limited likelihood of external actors getting involved. This perception has emboldened China to adopt a more aggressive position.

Yet, armed coercion has its clear limitations. As highlighted in the work of James Siebens and colleagues, China may have been effective in deterring its neighbours from crossing Beijing’s red lines, but far less successful in compelling them to adopt policies aligned with its interests. Harassment and low-intensity provocations have rarely translated to concrete territorial concessions. Instead, they often provoke nationalist backlash, entrench resistance, and deepen defence partnerships with external powers.

To be sure, each Indo-Pacific country confronts a distinct Chinese playbook of coercion, but the common threads—intimidation by the navy, economic pressure, and diplomatic isolation—are increasingly being met with coordinated responses. Internal capability augmentation, regional diplomacy, and external balancing remain the most effective countermeasures against Beijing’s tailored coercive strategies.

China’s southern neighbours fall broadly into two camps in their responses to Beijing’s armed coercion. The countries in the first group—the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, India, and the North Asian powers, South Korea and Japan—have adopted an assertive stance. These states have not only spoken out against China’s coercive behaviour on international platforms but have also invested heavily in domestic defence capabilities and deepened security partnerships with external actors, most notably the US. The second group—Bhutan, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia—shares many of the same concerns but pursues a less vocal approach. These nations prefer private diplomacy, often lobbying China behind closed doors or maintaining a low-profile resistance that nonetheless signals firm disapproval of its actions.

This special report offers a comprehensive assessment of China’s armed coercion in the Indo-Pacific in 2024, with a focus on its southern flank. It is presented in two sections: the first examines China’s coercive strategies against the more proactive states; the second turns to the quieter yet no less consequential cases, where states have opted for a subtler diplomatic path. The report identifies the key patterns, strategic shifts, and geopolitical consequences of Beijing’s actions over the past year, laying the foundation for what is intended to be an annual, evidence-driven evaluation of Chinese belligerent behaviour across the region.

Read the report here.

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• china in indo pacific region
• china neighbouring countries
• china's military aggression
• chinese aggression in the indo pacific
• chinese military aggression
• foreign relations of china
• india china relations
• us china relations

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