Introduction

Perhaps true to the oft quoted aphorism from the late Mao Zedong, that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,”^[1] China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Xinjiang in 1949 and Tibet in 1950 soon after the formation of People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. Since then, China has been continually building civilian, military, and dual-use infrastructure in both these regions to strengthen its hold over them.^[a] All infrastructural development on the other side of the Indian frontier, close to its northern borders (from Shaksgam Valley in the northwest to the India-China-Myanmar tri-junction in the east), continues to have a direct impact on India-China political and security dynamics.

Infrastructure development commenced immediately after the annexation of East Turkestan (later renamed XUAR) and Tibet, the prominent ones being the road arteries of Qinghai-Tibet (National Highway G-109 and Expressway G-6, both of which connect Lhasa all the way to Beijing) and Sichuan-Tibet (National Highway G-318 or Eastern Highway).^[b] The Xinjiang-Tibet highway (National Highway G-219 or Western Highway) cutting across Aksai Chin was formally opened to traffic in October 1957. The Damshung^[c] airfield was the first to be operationalised in Tibet in May 1956. Tibet was connected by rail with the mainland for the first time much later, when the Qinghai-Tibet Railway began operating in 2006.^[d] The TAR government started implementing its ‘Plan for Construction of Xioakang Villages in Border Areas’, close to Indian northern borders (including territories disputed by India), in 2017.

All this infrastructure is being built under the guise of economic development and tourism, of and to China’s border areas. The advantages accruing are increased connectivity and integration of the XUAR and the TAR with the mainland. The projects, being developed and continuously improved, are readily available instruments of state power. They serve as dual-use nodes that enable Beijing to pressure neighbours without triggering open conflict. Given China’s well-known ‘grey zone’ tactics,^[e] the possibility of the PLA using this enhanced infrastructure to de facto occupy—or at least attempt to occupy—border territories disputed with India, and deploy military assets in those areas under the pretext of civilian activity, cannot be ruled out.

India and China have had two recent standoffs: the first on the Doklam plateau in mid-2017 and the second in the Galwan River Valley in mid-2020.^[f] Both have had long-lasting political and military fallouts. A time series study and analysis of open-source imagery platforms indicate an accelerated surge in infrastructure building in the region which started after the Doklam faceoff. It continues to progress at a rapid pace, undoubtedly serving both civilian (trade and tourism) and military purposes.

China has been investing heavily in infrastructure close to Indian northern borders, ingenuously overcoming the extreme difficulties of the terrain and the high altitudes of the TAR and the XUAR. This has facilitated an unprecedented tourism boom and expanded mining of precious and rare resources in both regions, but it is also serving China’s strategic and military objectives, specifically with India as the adversary.

The infrastructure thrust includes multiple road alignments, improved rail infrastructure, an increased number of airports and helibases, Xiaokang (“well-off”) villages, and hydroelectric power projects. It has tremendously improved the PLA’s logistical capabilities and reach; it has consolidated its hold over the restive TAR and XUAR regions, and also enhanced its ability to project military power along China’s western frontiers and strengthen its positions near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. This dual-use infrastructure could well encroach upon lands disputed with India in the future and constitutes a serious security threat.

A parallel can be drawn with China’s approach along its eastern coast in the South and East China Seas and its northern borders in that, in both these areas, its actions have been intended to make the world realise it can very well take over these regions. As a result, these territories are by default China’s.

This report seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the infrastructure developments and enhancements along India’s northern borders since the Doklam incident. It is presented in three parts: Part One highlights the infrastructure objectives set out in the Chinese 14^th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025); Part Two analyses the developments and enhancements of road infrastructure along India’s borders; while Part Three looks at the development of railway infrastructure in the same region.

China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025): Infrastructure Objectives[2]

China’s 14^th Five-Year Plan, covering the years 2021-2025 and now in its final stages of implementation, was passed by its National People’s Congress in March 2021. First published by Xinhua, China’s state-run press agency, on 13 March 2021, it earmarked US$30 billion on infrastructure projects in Tibet alone.^[3] It differs from past plans in that it also includes a short section on ‘long-range objectives’ for 2035.

Chapter 11 of the Plan, ‘Building a Modern Infrastructure System’, is devoted to infrastructure. It seeks to “coordinate and promote the construction of traditional infrastructure and new infrastructure and build a complete, efficient and practical, intelligent, green, safe and reliable modern infrastructure system.” The following are some of its key points:

• Section 2, ‘Accelerate the Construction of a Transportation Powerhouse’, states: “Build a modern comprehensive transportation system, promote the integrated development of various transportation modes, and improve network effect and operational efficiency. Improve the comprehensive transportation channel, strengthen the construction of strategic backbone channels out of Xinjiang and into Tibet.”
• Table 5 in Section 2 lists ‘Transportation Powerhouse Construction Projects’. The list includes the construction of a Sichuan-Tibet Railway (STR) from Yaan (Sichuan) to Linzhi (TAR), promoting preliminary work on the Shigatse (TAR) to Hotan (XUAR) railway, opening up the G-219 Western Highway along the border, and upgrading the G-318 Eastern Highway, as part of ‘Strategic Backbone Channels’.
• Table 6 of Section 2, ‘Modern Energy System Construction Projects’, includes the building of hydropower bases on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River.

Chapter 32 is devoted to ‘In-depth Implementation of the Regional Coordinated Development Strategy’. It includes:

• Section 5, ‘Promote Development Projects in Border Areas.’ Table 12 gives a list of border towns to be improved, such as Miling and Zayu (both of them in the TAR). The section further states: “We will improve infrastructure and public service facilities in border villages, build about 200 new villages and achieve universal coverage of road access, electricity, communications, postal services and radio and television in natural villages along borders.” It adds: “We will build highways along and across borders from Metok (TAR) to the Yunnan-Tibet boundary via Zayu (TAR).” Also, “We will build airports in Tashkurgan (XUAR), Lhuntse (TAR) and 20 other general border airports.”

Road Infrastructure Close to the Indian Border: Developments, Enhancements, and Their Implications

In the eight years since the India-China standoff at Doklam, China has been massively enhancing the overall density of its road network close to Indian northern borders, in the two autonomous regions of the TAR and the XUAR. Among the national highways and expressways being built, those in the following list hold significance for any Indian threat analysis. They all cover the region from Shaksgam Valley in the XUAR to the India-China-Myanmar tri-junction in the southeast: 

• G-314 – Urumqi (capital of XUAR) to Khunjerab Pass (China-Pakistan border)
• G-684 – Mazar, XUAR (on G-219) to Ilisu, XUAR (on G-314)
• G-216 – Altay (XUAR) to Kyirong (TAR)
• G-315 – Xining (capital of Qinghai province) to Kashgar (XUAR)
• G-0612 Expressway – Xining to Hotan (XUAR)
• G-580 – Aksu (XUAR) to Kangxiwar (XUAR)
• G-219 – Western Highway, Kanas (XUAR) to Dongxing (Guangxi province)
• G-109 – Central Highway, Beijing to Lhasa
• G-6 Expressway – Beijing to Lhasa
• G-214 – Xining to Menghai (Yunnan province)
• G-317 – Chengdu (Sichuan province) to Gar (TAR)
• G-318 – Eastern Highway, Shanghai to Zhangmu (to Nepal)
• G-693 – Gerze to Taklakot (both in the TAR)
• G-694 – Jiru to Yatung in Chumbi Valley (both in the TAR)
• G-695 – Lhuntse (TAR) to Mazar (in the XUAR)
• G-4218 Expressway – Yaan (Sichuan province) to Yecheng (XUAR) 

Figure 1: China’s Road Infrastructure Along India’s Northern Borders

Source: Base Map of Amnye Machen Institute, Tibetan Centre for Advanced Studies, Dharamshala, shows Tibet and adjacent areas under China’s occupation; Scale 1:3,200,000. All additional markings by the author.

The major highways and expressways named above are all mentioned in two primary Chinese documents: the National Highway Network Plan, 2013-2030, announced in June 2013;^[4] and the National Highway Network Plan, 2022-2035, announced on July 2022.^[5]

Figure 2: Roads to Shaksgam Valley

 

Roads to Shaksgam Valley’^[6]

G-314 and G-684

The roads to Shaksgam Valley in China’s northwest are the most important road developments of the last eight years. Even as negotiators on both sides were trying to end the India-China Doklam standoff—which lasted 74 days from 16 June to 28 August 2017—China had begun to construct a natural surface road in the Shaksgam Valley, their first such road in the area. Earlier, in 2016-2017, China had started building two large-sized settlements as well along what is now called National Highway G-684 (slated to join the Western Highway, G-219 at Mazar, with the Karakoram Highway G-314 at Ilisu). The settlements were at Yilike and Toquzbulaq (northwest of Sokh Bulaq, en route to Ilisu). The cited reason was to house labour/construction parties and migrated populations, but they had obvious military utility for billeting and storage too. By mid-2018, 70 km of the natural surface, unpaved road, along the Shaksgam River, within the Shaksgam Valley, entering from the northwest at Sokh Bulaq, had been completed. However, since then, although the road (which gets frequently damaged due to landslides) has been regularly maintained, it has not seen any extension or improvement. It was the only entry point into Shaksgam valley till, in early 2018, China also started constructing another road from Ilisu (on G-314), moving southeast to Sokh Bulaq.

From the beginning of the 2020s, more roads have been built with a clear aim to improve access to Shaksgam Valley from the northern and eastern directions as well. The first began from the east, in late 2021, from Balti Brangsa (on the existing road of Xaidullah in XUAR) to the Karakoram Pass (on the India-China border) to the Shaksgam Pass, the eastern edge of Shaksgam Valley. It entered Shaksgam Valley, from north of the Shaksgam Pass, in late 2023. Treacherous mountains and glaciated terrain in the area around Shaksgam Pass forced the Chinese to try out multiple alignments in the first few years, but by mid-2025 the road had extended into the valley. It continues to be developed westwards along the Shaksgam River within the valley.

From mid-2022, another road was built approaching Shaksgam Valley from the north. Moving southwards from Yilike (on G-684), it entered Shaksgam Valley at Aghil Pass (60 km from Indira Col, the northernmost point on India’s border) in mid-2023 and is being extended towards the southeast along the Shaksgam River, up to the Shaksgam Pass. With these three roads, China now has access to Shaksgam Valley from the west (northwest XUAR), the east (TAR), and the north (southern XUAR). Its deployments and positions in Aksai Chin are thus now almost connected with the Karakoram Highway (G-314) via Shaksgam Valley. Connectivity has also now been established between Ilisu (on G-314) and Mazar (on G-219), thereby connecting the Western Highway with the Karakoram Highway, making Shaksgam Valley accessible from both east and west. Roads from both the East and West, approaching the Shaksgam tract, continue being developed at a fast pace.

Other Important Roads

G-216

This road, from Altay in XUAR to Kyirong in TAR,^[7] was first conceived by China in 1953 but was never built. It was reauthorised by China’s National Development and Reform Commission 65 years later, in May 2018, with work commencing later that year.^[8] From Altay, the road moves southwards to Urumqi, Korla, and Minfeng (along G-315), all of them in XUAR, to Gerze (on G-317) in TAR, to Kyirong, a county in Shigatse City, TAR, on its Nepal border. The most crucial part of the highway, from Minfeng to Kyirong, where it crosses the mighty Kunlun mountain range and is the most challenging stretch, is currently being built. For some distance, this highway runs parallel to G-219, crossing east of it when alongside the Ladakh border. Satellite images show evidence of construction connecting G-216 and G-219 at Sumxi and Rudok, both in TAR.

G-0612 Expressway

This road, from Xining in Qinghai to Hotan in XUAR, mentioned in both the National Highway Network Plan 2013-2030 and the National Highway Network Plan of July 2022, was started in 2018 and is still under construction. It is a key project of the 14^th Five Year Plan^[9],[10] and follows the alignment of the existing G-315.

G-580

Work on this road, from Aksu to Hotan to Kangxiwar, all part of XUAR, began in 2018, with the Aksu-Hotan stretch being completed in 2020.^[11] The extension to Kangxiwar, announced in the National Highway Network Plan of July 2022, where it will meet the highway G-219, is still being built.^[12] Kangxiwar is less than 100 km from the Karakoram Pass, which makes this highway, cutting across the Kunlun mountains southwards from Hotan, extremely significant for India’s Ladakh frontier.

Extension of G-219 (Western Highway)

When the Doklam standoff occurred, China’s Western Highway G-219 connected Lhasa in TAR with Yecheng/Kargilik in XUAR.^[g] In keeping with the programme announced in the July 2022 National Highway Network Plan, G-219 is being extended northwards from Lhasa to Kanas in XUAR and thereafter southwards to Dongxing in Guangxi Province. Once completed, it will be the longest highway in the country at 10,065 km.

The road from Pai, south of Nyingchi along the Yarlung Tsangpo river, to Metok—the point at which Yarlung Tsango (Brahmaputra in India) enters India in Arunachal Pradesh—has also been realigned as part of G-219. Completed in 2021, this new road, crossing the high Himalayan ranges through a tunnel at Doshong La, has nearly halved the earlier distance between Pai and Metok from 360 km to 175 km, reducing travel time from 11 to five hours.

 G-6 (National Trunk Highway System Expressway)

Announced in 2017, this expressway from Beijing to Lhasa will be one of the seven planned national radial expressways leaving Beijing. It is being constructed alongside the existing G-109; G-6 will have a higher classification when completed, being of better, upgraded quality. The stretch from Golmud (Qinghai) downwards to Nagqu (TAR) is almost complete at the time of writing.

G-317 (Upgrade)

The existing provincial highway from Amdo, on Central Highway G-109, to Gar on G-219—both of them in the TAR—is being improved and will be merged with the newly named National Highway G-317, which will start at Chengdu in Sichuan province and end at Gar,^[13] opposite Eastern Ladakh.

G-693

This is another newly named highway being built, connecting Gerze on G-317 to Barka on G-219, both of them in TAR.^[14] Barka lies immediately north of the renowned Mansarovar Lake, close to the India-China-Nepal tri-junction.

G-694

This highway is being constructed southwards from Jiru^[15] into the Chumbi Valley up to Yatung, all of them in the TAR.

G-695

This highway, also newly named, will run closest to India’s northern borders,^[16] going south and west of G-219. It will stretch from Lhuntse (close to the Arunachal Pradesh border) to Mazar (XUAR) near the Karakoram Pass, merging with G-219 at Mazar. It will bring a number of existing road alignments under one head and is being developed at a rapid pace.

G-4218 Expressway

The construction of this road, which will run from Yaan in Sichuan to Yecheng in the XUAR (and is thus colloquially called the YaYe Expressway),^[17] began in early 2022.^[18] It will move along India’s northern border up to Yecheng/Kargilik, and is expected to be completed by 2030.

The Bridge Over Pangong Tso Lake

About a third of the famous Pangong Tso Lake falls within India, while the rest is Chinese territory. In August 2021, not long after the last India-China clash in Galwan in mid-2020, China began building the first ever bridge over this 135-km-long lake. Spanning the narrowest part of the lake, about 450 km, the first bridge was a basic one, completed in May 2022. Thereafter, a second, higher bridge of the ‘beam and deck’ type—515 metres long and nine metres wide, part of National Highway G-695—has also been added, beginning construction in early 2022 and completing it in late 2024. The first has now been completely dismantled.

Figure 3: The Bridge Over Pangong Tso

Implications

Among the new roads, G-695 (Lhuntse to Mazar in XUAR) and G-216 (Altay in XUAR to Kyirong in TAR), lying to the west and east, respectively, of the Western Highway, offer the PLA simultaneity of movement, reducing traffic on the busy G-219, enabling it to disperse movement of mobilising forces and achieve higher force projection ratios in much shorter timeframes. If hostilities ensue, it will be easier for the PLA to switch forces from one sector to another; it facilitates mobile patrolling and area domination.

G-6 (Beijing to Lhasa), G-0612 (Xining in Qinghai to Hotan in the XUAR), and G-4218 (Yaan in Sichuan to Yecheng in the XUAR) are among the roads still under construction. All three lead up to India’s northern borders: G-6 runs parallel to the existing G-109, but is wider and more robust; G-0612 goes alongside G-315, while G-4218 follows two existing national highways, G-318 and G-219. With their enhanced capabilities, they will be able to take increased and sustained traffic, both civilian and military.

Satellite imagery shows that China has been improving, widening and upgrading all its prominent roads westwards of its Western Highway G-219 and southwards of its Eastern Highway G-318 which move towards Indian borders. They are all being blacktopped and interconnected with freshly built lateral roads, connecting them to border towns. The aim is to achieve a logistical edge, despite the difficult terrain and treacherous weather conditions, in the event of a protracted conflict. The bridge over the Pangong Tso Lake, in particular, is a logistical bonanza, reducing time taken and distance drastically in the movement of personnel and equipment.

Railway Infrastructure Developments, Enhancements, and Their Implications

Compared to its network of roads, China’s rail infrastructure close to India’s northern borders is still very limited. A People’s Daily report noted that in the TAR, at the end of 2024, “the total operational road length and railway length were 124,900 km and 1,359 km respectively.”^[19] The Chinese railheads closest to the Indian border at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh are Hotan and Yecheng, both in the XUAR and both about 265 km away. The railheads at Milin and Nyingchi, both in the TAR and operationalised in mid-2021, are 20 km and 45 km from the Arunachal Pradesh border, while the one at Shigatse in the TAR, operationalised in 2014, is 125 km north of the Sikkim border and 775 km east of the India-China-Nepal tri-junction.

However, this paucity of railways is being rapidly overcome, especially since the Doklam clash. Some of the recent initiatives are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Key Constructions and Enhancements

Golmud (Qinghai) – Ruoqiang (XUAR)

Work on this line, part of the Golmud-Korla Railway (GKR), began in 2014 and was completed in June 2020. It connects the two provinces and is also a link with the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (QTR) and the Taklamakan Railway Loop Line, which encircles the Taklamakan Desert.

Hotan (XUAR) – Ruoqiang (XUAR)

Track-laying began in May 2020; the line was declared operational in mid-June 2022.^[20] This was the last stretch of the 2,700-km Taklamakan Railway Loop Line to be completed.

Xining (Qinghai) – Lhasa (TAR) Upgrade

This controversial line, called the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (QTR), the first rail track to enter Tibet, has been functioning since 2006. The upgrade of this line to ‘high speed rail (HSR)’ status, which includes electrification and increased capacity, started in July 2022 and is in progress.

Lhasa (TAR) – Linzhi/Nyingchi (TAR)

Work on this 435-km line (informally called LaLin), part of the Sichuan Tibet Railway (STR) project, commenced in late 2014 and was completed in June 2021. This is the second rail thrust into Tibet, this time from the east, while the QTR was from the northeast.

Chengdu (Sichuan) – Yaan (Sichuan) – Linzhi (TAR)

 Track-laying on this line, also part of the STR, began in late 2014. While the stretch from Chengdu to Yaan was operationalised in December 2018, the Yaan – Linzhi portion is likely to be completed only by 2030.

Kunming (Yunnan) – Bomi (TAR), the Yunan Tibet Railway (YTR)

This third railway line to Tibet, called the Yunan Tibet Railway (YTR), entering it from the southeast, has been under construction since early 2010. Bomi in TAR, where it will end, will also be part of the STR, thereby linking the YTR to the STR. Satellite imagery shows that the Dali–Lijiang–Shangri-La stretch (all three in Yunnan province) of the YTR was completed in late 2023, while work on the Shangri-La-Dechen stretch (also within Yunnan) is underway.

Hotan (Xinjiang) – Lhasa (Tibet), the Xinjian Tibet Railway (XTR)^[21]

Building a fourth rail line into Tibet, this one from the north, the Xinjiang-Tibet Railway (XTR), is an extremely ambitious project because of the terrain and weather conditions. It was first envisaged in 2008, when it was included in China’s revised ‘Medium and Long-Term Railway Network Plan’ announced that year, and approved by its National Development and Reform Commission. Work has been slow to start, but is expected to do so this year, with a fully state-owned company having been set up to oversee construction and operations.

Implications

The military-civilian fusion in developing railways in XUAR and TAR is obvious. As the South China Morning Post put it, “China’s military and railway authorities are working together to streamline military transport and ensure the smooth delivery of military consignments.”^[22] It marks the first notable military-civilian joint initiative since a crucial Communist Party policy meeting in July 2024, which pledged to “improve military-local contact mechanisms” and “refine military-local standardised work collaboration mechanisms.” Subsequently, a joint directive issued by both the Central Military Commission and China Railway said: “Both parties should strive to forge a new era of seamless cooperation between the military and civilian sectors in the realm of transport and logistics.”^[23] Thus new rail tracks are giving the PLA a faster and more effective option to transport heavy military equipment over longer distances than by road.

Connecting Ruoqiang (in southeastern XUAR) with both Hotan (further west in the XUAR) and Golmud (to the east, in Qinghai) by rail gives the PLA an advantage: the force complement of its 76 Group Army (GA) located in Qinghai, as well as in Gansu and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR), both to the east of Qinghai, can now be inducted by rail to Hotan, and thereby areas opposite Ladakh, relatively faster. Reinforcements and relief from other parts of China can also be mobilised more quickly close to India’s northern borders. So too, can the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) use the railways to mobilise its missile arsenal there.

Conclusion

Success in armed conflicts depends not only on the fighting prowess of the armed forces of the antagonists, but also on their infrastructure. China is using infrastructural growth as a tool of hegemony. Its emphasis on developing infrastructure in both the XUAR and the TAR could well be due to its rising geopolitical tensions with India.

China is positioning itself systematically for future border conflicts with India. Its strategic construction patterns are a crucial component of its broader military and geopolitical ambitions against India. By building dual-use infrastructure, it strengthens its ability to mobilise military assets quickly, reinforcing its dominance in the region, while posing a direct challenge to India along the LAC.

China is displaying a clear intent to redefine infrastructure as a tool of coercion.  It aims to further integrate and solidify its iron grip on the TAR and the XUAR, further merging them into its social and economic fabric.

China’s actions should force India to rethink its national security posture. India needs to equally accelerate enhancing the pace of its border infrastructure development. Failing to do so will leave the region vulnerable to incremental gains by China that could add up to irreversible strategic shifts.

This report has attempted, using available satellite imagery, to analyse China’s thinking behind the bewildering scale of its infrastructural enhancements. It is only part of the story so far; there is bound to be further expansion in the coming years. A more detailed analysis of developments across various types of infrastructure near India’s northern borders would help to bring out China’s true intent and capabilities over time.

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Col. Rajiv Lathar is a Serving Army Officer of the Indian Armed Forces.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

References

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“China to Build 461,000 Km of Highways by 2035, World-Class Highway Network by 2050.” Global Times. July 12, 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1270363.shtml.

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Keju, Wang. “Qinghai Section of Golmud-Korla Railway Begins Operations.” China Daily, June 30, 2020. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202006/30/WS5efb04a9a310834817256359.html

Lathar, Rajiv. “Chinese Infrastructure Rush across Northern Borders: What Has Changed in the Last Four Years Plus and Why Is It Significant,” CLAWS Issue Brief No. 414 (2025), https://claws.co.in/chinese-infrastructure-rush-across-northern-borders-what-has-changed-in-the-last-four-years-plus-and-why-is-it-significant-2/

Lathar, Rajiv. “The Shaksgam Siege: Chinese Interests and Intent,” Journal of the Centre for Air Power Studies 14, no.3 (2025).

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Endnotes

^[a] China refers to Xinjiang as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and Tibet, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).

^[b] While G-109 and G-318 were operationalised in December 1954, G-6 is a much more recent development completed after many years in 2021.

^[c] This paper uses Tibetan names as far as possible as listed in maps by the Amnye Machen Institute Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, available at http://www.tibetmap.com/TARbr.html. Wherever Tibetan names were unavailable, the Chinese name was used.

^[d] Some Tibetans called it the ‘Second Invasion of Tibet’.

^[e] Grey-zone tactics are military tactics below the level of armed conflict, designed to assert control without provoking actual war.

^[f] India and China have had a long list of clashes over their disputed border prior to Doklam in mid-2017 and Galwan in mid-2020, starting from 1959, and including a full -scale, month-long war in October-November 1962.

^[g] Western Highway G-219 is one of the three prominent highways on the other side of India’s China border, the other two being Eastern Highway G-318 and Central Highway G-109.

^[1]  Quotations from Chairman Mao (Archived from the Original on January 26, 2021) (Peking Foreign Languages Press).

^[2] The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, “The 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of Long-term Goals for 2035,” The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, March 13, 2021, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.html;

“Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May 13, 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five-year-plan/.

^[3] “Issue Brief – China’s 14th Five-Year Plan,” United Nations Development Programme (2021), https://www.undp.org/china/publications/issue-brief-chinas-14th-five-year-plan

^[4]National Highway Network Planning: 2013-2030, https://web.archive.org/web/20191110222911/https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbghwb/201402/P020140221361534132568.pdf.

^[5] National Highway Network Planning (2022), https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202207/P020220712348051707026.pdf

^[6]Refer to Figure 2 for all names and locations of interest.

^[7]Claude Arpi, “The Most Serious Strategic Development on Indian Frontiers,” Claude Arpi’s Blog, January 13, 2021, www.claudearpi.blogspot.com/2021/01/the-most-serious-strategic-development.html.

^[8] Claude Arpi, “A New Road between Tibet and Xinjiang,” Claude Arpi’s Blog, May 23, 2020, https://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2016/12/a-new-road-between-tibet-and-xinjiang.html#:~:text=The%20portal%20provides%20further%20details,790m%20yuan%20for%20rolling%20stock.”

^[9] “G0612 Xining-Hetian Expressway Huangyuan-Xihai Highway Started Construction,” Seetao, April 7, 2023, https://www.seetaoe.com/details/209812.html

^[10]National Highway Network Planning 2022, 21

^[11] “Xinjiang G580 Line Hetian to Kangxiwa Highway PPP Project Construction General Contracting Headquarters, August 28, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20220409210041/http://www.gonglutielu.com/glzj/56403.jhtml

^[12] National Highway Network Planning 2022, 52.

^[13]National Highway Network Planning 2022, 42.

^[14]National Highway Network Planning 2022, 57.

^[15]National Highway Network Planning 2022, 57.

^[16]National Highway Network Planning 2022, 57.

^[17] “G4218 Line Kangding to Xinduqiao Section High-Speed Project Was Approved,” Seetao, March 3, 2021, https://www.seetao.com/details/67350.html

^[18] “Construction of G4218 Line Kangding-Xinduqiao Expressway Started,” Seetao, January 27, 2022, https://www.seetaoe.com/details/136202.html

^[19] Liu Botong, “SW China's Xizang Makes Remarkable Economic, Social Achievements over 60 Years,” People’s Daily Online,  August 11, 2025, https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0811/c90000-20351598.html

^[20]Kate Zhang, “New Railway Completes 2700 Km Loop of Taklamakan Desert in Move to Integrate Xinjiang with Rest of China,” South China Morning Post,  June 17, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3182031/new-railway-completes-2700km-loop-taklamakan-desert-move

^[21] Zhang Tong “China Counts Down to Start of Work on Xinjiang-Tibet Railway,” South China Morning Post, August 9, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3321311/china-counts-down-start-work-xinjiang-tibet-railway

^[22] Leopold Chen, “China’s People’s Liberation Army Working with Civilian Rail Authorities to Boost Logistics,” South China Morning Post, December 17, 2024, www.scmp.com

^[23] Chen, “China’s People’s Liberation Army Working with Civilian Rail Authorities to Boost Logistics.”

• International Affairs
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• india china border dispute
• india china border infrastructure
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