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D.C.S. Mayal, “China’s Global Governance Initiatives: Diplomacy-Intelligence Convergence,” ORF Issue Brief No. 868, Observer Research Foundation, April 2026.
The Global Governance Initiative (GGI)—introduced by President Xi Jinping during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Plus meeting at Tianjin on 1 September 2025—is China’s fourth major global initiative of this decade.[i] The other three include the Global Development Initiative (GDI), launched on 21 September 2021 during the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); the Global Security Initiative (GSI), launched on 21 April 2022 in Hainan during the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference; and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), launched on 15 March 2023 in Beijing during the Communist Party of China (CCP) Dialogue with World Political Parties.
The GDI focuses on promoting international cooperation on development, the GSI on encouraging dialogue and consultation over international discord, the GCI on promoting exchange and mutual learning among civilisations, and the GGI on reforming global governance systems and institutions.[ii] The convergence of these four global initiatives within a span of five years forms a forward-looking framework that empowers Beijing to extend its strategic influence across key sectors like development, security, culture, and governance.
The GGI systematically addresses the fundamental question of global governance, i.e., by whom, how, and for whom it is conducted, while responding to the concerns of the international community and presenting itself as the correct choice for tackling global challenges and resolving the governance deficit.[iii] It advocates five core concepts: first, sovereign equality to ensure participation in global affairs by all countries; second, international rule of law for a just and orderly global governance system; third, multilateralism for greater solidarity and cooperation among all countries; fourth, a people-centred approach for universally beneficial and inclusive outcomes of global governance; and fifth, real results for a pragmatic and efficient global governance process.[iv] It is thus the newest layer in a broader project to reshape the international order in ways that favour Chinese power, norms, and interests.
Following Xi Jinping’s ascension to the top leadership position, China is no longer content with being a ‘rule-taker’; it now seeks to become a ‘rule-shaper’.[v] The country is increasingly playing an active role in international organisations, signalling its potential to lead and challenge existing institutions and norms. As China’s economic and military power rises, its influence within the United Nations (UN) is also growing phenomenally, despite it having joined the organisation in 1971, later than many other nations. China now contributes approximately 20 percent of the UN’s regular budget and nearly 23 percent of peacekeeping costs, a dramatic increase from less than 1 percent in 1994, positioning it as the second-largest financial contributor after the US.[vi] Moreover, Chinese diplomats have held the position of under-secretary-general of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) since 2007, enabling China to shape UN development programmes.[vii]
China has skilfully leveraged its position in the UN to shape norms, standards, and practices that bolster its global image, a fact that has been noted by several international players. For instance, on April 10, 2024, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation’s President Emeritus, Ambassador Andrew Bremberg, testified before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organisation: “Over the last decade, the CCP has grown increasingly assertive in its engagements at the UN. What was once described as a defensive ‘snapping turtle’ approach has been replaced with Xi Jinping’s ‘wolf warrior’ foreign policy.”[viii]
China is also exploiting multilateralism in global governance to transform existing international organisations into ‘China-fit organisations’ that amplify its preferred narratives and suppress dissenting views. Its financial clout and strategic placement of nationals and proxies in key UN positions, including in leadership roles in the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU), allows it to effectively reshape UN agendas to align with its long-term ambitions. This influence manifests in its ability to block unfavourable resolutions, promote narratives emphasising sovereignty and development over liberal democratic norms, and build coalitions to counter Western dominance.
A former UN employee, Emma Reilly, has provided evidence of China reshaping the international order through the UN by silencing discussions on sensitive topics, manipulating reports to align with its priorities, and downplaying human rights and democracy issues.[ix] A 2024 report by the US’s House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Majority Staff too reveals that China has co-opted international institutions like the UN and the World Health Organisation, often neglecting its commitments. One testimony highlights China’s substantial impact on global standards, particularly through support for telecom companies Huawei and ZTE, viewed by the US as national security threats.[x] Evidence also suggests that China imposes conditions on its donations, including restrictions on funds for states with ties to Taiwan.[xi]
From 2015 to 2023, the UN and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) engaged in an increasing number of formal agreements, projects, and visible collaborations, reflecting a growing mutual legitimisation and integration of goals.[xii] Following this, the GDI, GSI, and GCI continued reshaping multilateral engagement on China’s terms, providing developmental, security, and cultural leverage, respectively. The recently launched GGI is expected to extend this trajectory, promulgating approaches similar to those used during the BRI’s heyday to assert China’s vision of governance and international order. Under the GGI, China is expected to accelerate its efforts to reform UN structures and norms and to consolidate its leadership under the garb of protecting the interests of emerging economies.
The GGI seeks to reform major global governance institutions considered by Beijing to be under-representative, inefficient, and dominated by Western powers. It confronts three perceived weaknesses in contemporary global governance: the under-representation of Global South countries in international institutions, the erosion of authority within existing governance frameworks, and what Beijing terms the ‘effectiveness deficit’ in addressing transnational challenges.[xiii] Commentaries also highlight that the GGI does not aim to ‘start a new venture’ but to uphold multilateralism and strengthen global governance, especially by addressing the under-representation issue.[xiv]
The GGI’s institutional focus encompasses a comprehensive array of multilateral bodies and regulatory domains critical to global order-setting. At the core is a focus on reforming the UN as the central pillar of global governance, including traditional UN organs like the UNGA, the United Nations Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and specialised agencies.[xv] Significantly, the GGI emphasises technical standard-setting bodies such as the ITU and International Organisation for Standardisation, recognising these forums as critical venues for embedding its technological preferences into global technical frameworks. The initiative further prioritises emerging governance domains where international norms remain nascent and malleable.[xvi] This positions China to shape regulatory architecture from inception rather than engage in contested reforms of established Western-dominated institutions.
China’s leadership in international organisations has advanced significantly through the GGI in a short time and has gone far beyond symbolic status-building.[xvii] Today, it is widely regarded as a frontrunner in the global race for 6G dominance—its leadership extends beyond technology to shape global standard-setting through active participation in the ITU. Its growing influence in the ITU has empowered Chinese firms to shape emerging technologies, a shift that Western observers interpret as weakening long-standing Western control over global technology standards and governance norms.[xviii] China has also held the FAO’s director-general post since 2019;[xix] this is accompanied by its expanding biotechnology capacity positions,[xx] and has resulted in its growing influence over agricultural biotechnology norms within the FAO, as well as a role in potentially shifting FAO voting blocs and consensus patterns. In addition, China-linked government-organised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have proliferated at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). These organisations deploy procedural manoeuvres to derail sessions, muzzle independent NGOs, harass activists, pressurise staff, gatecrash events, and spy on Uyghur advocates during Geneva human-rights talks.
Finally, China remains the top obstructionist member of the UN Committee on NGOs, where it makes extensive use of questions to NGO applicants for consultative status, automatically triggering the deferral of the application. Between 2020–2024, 18 percent (747) of the total of questions to NGO applicants were posed by China, with a surge to 28 percent in 2024. China ranks among the most frequent perpetrators of reprisals against individuals cooperating or seeking to cooperate with the UN, with 41 cases or situations documented in the UN secretary-general’s annual reports on reprisals between 2010 and 2024.[xxi]
These strategic manoeuvres on the global stage are inflicting tangible losses on Western countries. Trillions of dollars in global trade are being redirected to Beijing, weakening Western blocs on vetoes in international votes, and pushing a ‘hands-off sovereignty’ approach that prevents liberal interventions, like sanctions. All such actions invariably clear the path for China’s peaceful rise to dominance, or Pax Sinica.
The GGI identifies critical ‘governance-deficit areas’ demanding urgent multilateral attention, including international financial systems, artificial intelligence (AI) governance, cyberspace, climate policy architecture, trade rulemaking, maritime law interpretation, ocean governance, and outer space resource management.[xxii] By establishing agenda-setting authority in these frontiers, China seeks to entrench rules that simultaneously advance its technological and commercial interests, legitimise its state-centric surveillance governance model, and extend its geopolitical influence across global supply chains, financial systems, and strategic domains. This approach reflects a calculated shift from reactive institutional contestation toward proactive norm entrepreneurship, a strategy that proves particularly effective in domains where international precedent is limited, and competing power blocs have not yet consolidated competing governance paradigms.
Beyond the UN system, the GGI addresses Bretton Woods institutions, i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, advocating financial system reforms that elevate the role of emerging market currencies and development financing mechanisms aligned with Beijing’s infrastructure objectives.[xxiii] The initiative stresses on comprehensive financial governance reforms, targeting the IMF, the World Bank, and UN economic bodies, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and ECOSOC. Beijing advocates restructuring these institutions to better reflect emerging economies, economic weight, and development priorities, particularly increasing the renminbi’s international role in cross-border payments and expanding development financing alternatives to Western-dominated mechanisms.[xxiv] Beyond traditional institutions, the GGI also supports increasing the influence of multilateral platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, and aligning with aspirations of the Global South for more equitable decision-making. [xxv]
China is already the frontrunner in 57 of 64 emerging and disruptive technologies and aims to become the world leader in AI by 2030. Its approach to AI governance through the GGI emphasises ‘cooperative and pragmatic frameworks’ that accord primacy to state control, data sovereignty, and national security over transparency and individual privacy protections. Operating through UN mechanisms such as ECOSOC and novel multilateral structures, Beijing promotes norms that legitimise state-level surveillance infrastructure, while positioning Chinese technological standards as globally accepted models.[xxvi] The recently established Chinese-led World AI Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) and Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI) represent institutional vehicles for this normative agenda, conducting capacity-building initiatives in Global South countries, thereby expanding the adoption of Chinese AI governance paradigms and technology ecosystems across developing economies.[xxvii] Operationally, Beijing advances this agenda through multilateral forums such as the 2024 Group of Friends for International Cooperation on AI Capacity-Building and UNGA resolutions for promoting AI capacity development.[xxviii] Concurrently, China strategically engages in international standard-setting bodies to embed its technological preferences into global frameworks, thereby leveraging developmental diplomacy and technical influence to shape AI governance architectures.[xxix]
Besides promoting GGI for reforming existing institutions, China also builds parallel organisations like the Hong Kong-based International Organization for Mediation (IOMed), which proposes global AI governance bodies that reflect Chinese leadership visions. The convention to establish the body entered into force in August 2025, with 37 signatories and eight ratifiers: China, Nicaragua, Venezuela, the Republic of Congo, Kiribati, Pakistan, Kenya, and Dominica.[xxx]
Beijing advances the doctrine of cyber sovereignty, arguing that each state should exercise full control over its digital infrastructure, data flows, and online content, with minimal external scrutiny. This vision travels through standards’ bodies, digital Silk Road projects, and bilateral agreements, normalising extensive online surveillance, data localisation, real-name‑ registration, and content controls that mirror China’s domestic model.[xxxi] The sale of surveillance equipment, software, and services enables existing regimes to better control their populations, thereby strengthening and facilitating the spread of authoritarian governance. The sale of surveillance technology also increases the dependence of client governments on Beijing for their political survival. This emerging network of technologically dependent authoritarian regimes represents Beijing’s digital hegemony in the developing world.[xxxii] Investigations reveal that China-supported smart city projects in African urban centres generate data streams accessible to state security agencies, augmenting HUMINT with digital monitoring under the cloak of governance modernisation.[xxxiii] Southeast Asian multilateral organisations and government bodies targeted by state-sponsored cyber-espionage campaigns, such as the Red November group, are also given precedence under GGI frameworks, blurring the lines between overt cooperation and covert intelligence operations.[xxxiv]
China’s GGI promotes a vision for reforming international climate governance by emphasising sovereign equality, multilateralism, and equitable representation for the Global South, countering perceived Western dominance in accountability structures. Beijing actively engages UN climate forums to advance principles like Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), technology transfer, and South–South cooperation, establishing itself as a developing world leader.[xxxv]
China’s climate policy serves as a practical demonstration of its leadership position, with Xi Jinping having outlined ambitious targets like a 7–10 percent net greenhouse gas emission cut by 2035 and development of 3,600 gigawatt renewable capacities, showcasing China’s execution of the ‘dual carbon’ goal ahead of schedule. This positions Beijing as a multilateral stabiliser, revitalising climate governance under GGI principles.[xxxvi]
The GGI’s climate policy invariably enhances China’s human intelligence (HUMINT) operations by embedding intelligence gatherers and influencers within ostensibly benign cultural[xxxvii] and development[xxxviii] channels. These tactics target the foreign elite, policymakers, academics, and business leaders to secure insights on climate negotiation positions and shape policy toward Beijing’s preferences. China’s diplomacy in Pacific Island climate talks under GGI,[xxxix] for instance, promotes resilience projects that blend aid with data-sharing networks, enabling HUMINT access to local leaders’ priorities on funding and emissions deals, subtly steering outcomes toward Beijing’s preferences.
The oceans harbour vast mineral resources beneath the seabed and abundant fisheries and biodiversity within their depths. Ocean governance is thus a critical domain where China has proactively tested innovative initiatives to surmount persistent structural impediments, while progressively amplifying its participation and leadership across established multilateral institutions.[xl] The GGI furnishes a strategic blueprint for China’s engagement and pre-eminence in global ocean governance. It guides China’s phased strategy: short-term sovereignty protection via diplomacy and cooperation; medium-term stability through public goods in deep-sea mining, polar affairs, and biodiversity; and long-term leadership in implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and participating in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Seabed Authority (ISA) to foster an equitable ocean order.[xli]
China holds prominent positions in key UN-affiliated maritime and ocean governance bodies, leveraging them for influence. As of 2025, it maintains a Category A seat on the IMO Council, re-elected with the highest votes (155 out of 169) in November 2025, ensuring its continued representation since 1989. It has also established a dedicated Permanent Mission to the IMO in July 2025.[xlii] Through UN-related bodies, Beijing promotes interpretations of the UNCLOS that legitimise its nine-dash‑ line and expansive jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea, despite the 2016 arbitration ruling that rejects historic rights claims under the UNCLOS.
China actively contributes to ocean governance through multilateral engagement in the UN. It has promulgated domestic laws like the Territorial Sea Law and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Law in line with the UNCLOS; has built joint marine research centres with nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Pakistan; and has assisted continental shelf studies in Nigeria and Seychelles. As the largest funder of the ISA and International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, it pays full contributions, has acquired five deep-sea mining areas, contributed two reserved areas, and co-built the world’s first ISA joint training centre, while joining regional fisheries organisations; combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; and acceding to nearly all IMO conventions with enhanced maritime rescue and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, China hosts symposia like the Sanya Global Maritime Cooperation forum, supports Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf submissions, and promotes sustainable fisheries and biodiversity via World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, earning recognition for advancing UNCLOS implementation and multilateralism.
The country is also strengthening its maritime legal framework and actively participating in the formulation of international rules, using multiple measures to position itself as a preferred venue for international maritime dispute resolution. Having established a diversified dispute resolution mechanism that includes mediation, arbitration and litigation, from 2022 to 2024, Chinese courts have handled 6,823 foreign-related maritime cases, of which 6,071 have been concluded. The cases have involved parties from 143 countries and regions.[xliii] It has cultivated influence in international courts and tribunals by promoting Chinese judges, leveraging diplomatic and economic ties, and advocating for ‘reform’ of dispute settlement mechanisms to dilute adverse precedents and constrain future cases that challenge its maritime posture.
GGI narratives on global ocean governance can be used to recast China’s IUU fishing and distant-water fleet as legitimate food security and cooperative fisheries contributions, masking subsidies, maritime militia integration, stock depletion, and presence in contested/high seas areas. Fishing vessels, research ships, and civilian platforms provide cover for HUMINT/technical intelligence collection, gathering hydrographic data, enabling naval tracking and cable mapping, and providing support to the People’s Liberation Army while remaining embedded in commercial traffic.[xliv]
Amid major shifts in the global economy, the trade system is confronted by serious challenges. Unilateral US actions undermining the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanisms have weakened enforcement of trade rules, heightening frictions and market uncertainty. This erosion of multilateralism threatens global recovery and highlights the urgent need to reform the WTO to make it fairer and more effective.[xlv] In 2025, China rallied 164 members against US ‘power-based’ tariffs, advocating transparency and multilateral rules to counter protectionism, and rerouting trade flows in a calculated bid to reshape the world’s economic battlefield.[xlvi] With the launch of the GGI, China will continue to advance its influence in WTO trade rulemaking, giving precedence to equitable norms for the Global South, Chinese development priorities, and opposing unilateralism. Beijing’s 2025 announcement to forgo new special and differential treatment benefits, while retaining its developing nation status, reflects its economic weight and displays its commitment to championing of reforms and modernising rules without demanding special exemptions.[xlvii]
The GGI also advances reforms in UN bodies like the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to shape outer space governance, emphasising cooperative frameworks that align with Beijing’s strategic interests. Beijing promotes resource management for asteroids and lunar sites under CBDR principles, embedding Chinese priorities while submitting positions to COPUOS working groups that stress Outer Space Treaty (OST) compliance for lunar activities.[xlviii] [xlix] This selective interpretation of the OST enables state-controlled exploitation of space resources, mirroring maritime strategies, as evidenced by China’s advocacy for updated treaties that allow utilisation without explicitly prohibiting extraction, letting their state firms extract materials legally, matching China's sea resource strategies while claiming treaty compliance. In addition, China’s overseas space ground stations, such as the Espacio Lejano in Argentina that has been operational since 2017, enable satellite tracking that supports intelligence gathering, including potential interception of US and allied signals. These facilities provide space situational awareness critical for military operations while officially supporting missions like Chang’e-4, raising concerns over the facilitation of HUMINT operation.[l]
One of the key hidden aspects of China’s expansive global domination ambition is its distinctive model of mass HUMINT operations, which uniquely integrate overt public diplomacy with covert HUMINT activities. This multifaceted approach leverages governance reforms and multilateral engagement to provide an enhanced platform for China’s unique mass HUMINT operations, enabling it to augment its reach and effectiveness globally. Building on established approaches through the GDI,[li] GSI,[lii] GCI,[liii] and even the BRI,[liv] the GGI is positioned to become another launch pad for broadening the country’s HUMINT operations. These operations are expected to further weave together people-centric intelligence gathering, extensive influence networks, and coordinated state-led public diplomacy into an integrated strategy that aligns with China’s overarching governance and development goals.
China’s approach to HUMINT operations stands out for its scale and complexity in an era dominated by technical intelligence collection methods. Unlike many countries that rely predominantly on advanced technology and a limited number of specialised agents, China employs a vast, decentralised strategy, often described as the ‘thousand grains of sand’ or ‘human wave’ approach. This method mobilises ordinary Chinese individuals, such as students, tourists, businesspeople, and members of the global diaspora, to collect small, seemingly inconsequential pieces of information during daily routine activities. These fragments are then aggregated for comprehensive analysis, which not only enriches China’s intelligence, but complicates foreign counter-intelligence efforts by masking the true identity of operatives and obscuring clear links to the Chinese state. This strategy is bolstered by cultural concepts such as ‘guanxi’, ‘face’, and ‘shame’, which incentivise participation and foster loyalty. Complementing HUMINT, China integrates technical surveillance across various bilateral, multilateral, and international cooperation platforms, aiming for deeply contextual intelligence that advances its strategic, diplomatic, and economic objectives globally.[lv]
This distinctive approach of aggregating small amounts of information from a wide array of sources has considerably benefited the Chinese in a way that appears less threatening to the world. Paul Moore, a former China analyst for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), explains the difference this way: “If a beach were a target, the Russians would send in a sub, frogmen would steal ashore in the dark of night and collect several buckets of sand and take them back to Moscow. The U.S. would send over satellites and produce reams of data. The Chinese would send in a thousand tourists, each assigned to collect a single grain of sand. When they returned, they would be asked to shake out their towels. And they would end up knowing more about the sand than anyone else.”[lvi]
MI5 Director Ken McCallum, too, reiterates the scale and magnitude of Beijing’s espionage activities with a stark analogy: “While the Russian intelligence services may create bursts of bad weather, China is changing the climate.”[lvii]
Though the GGI is still in its early phase, its distinctive emphasis on governance reform is poised to provide broader legitimate access and operational cover for China’s extensive mass HUMINT activities. This evolving GGI framework is expected to enable intelligence operations on an unprecedented scale and complexity, positioning it as a critical instrument in advancing China’s expanding strategic objectives on the global stage in the coming years.
After the launch of the GGI, China has materially eroded India’s strategic and economic interests by strengthening Beijing’s institutional leverage and neighbourhood dominance. China is rapidly increasing its participation in formal standard-setting organisations like the ITU. In 2021 alone, for instance, Chinese companies submitted 830 technical documents to the ITU for wired communications—more than South Korea, the US, and Japan combined. By September 2024, the ITU had approved three Chinese proposals for 6G mobile technologies as candidate frameworks for further study.[lviii] The FAO Director-General Qu Dongyu has been alleged to have tailored the agency to Chinese interests. Findings include FAO deliveries to Europe of banned Chinese pesticides, UN projects being aligned with China’s BRI, and Chinese government entities being contracted for tasks such as the development of the FAO’s website.[lix]
Chinese dominance in ITU standards’ setting will risk jeopardising India’s telecom independence. Adoption of Chinese rules could force companies like Huawei/ZTE to insert gadgets with hidden spy features for global surveillance in the Indian market, raise costs for Indian technology, and weaken digital control. In addition, delay tactics—like the China Inspection Quarantine—in the export of water-soluble fertilisers create conditions for a ‘soft blockade’. This threatens India’s horticultural sector, which makes up one-third of its agricultural GDP and relies on China for 80 percent of supplies, risking crop yields amid Chinese government-owned Syngenta’s growing agro-input dominance.[lx]
China’s expanding influence in the UNHRC also undermines India’s interests by blocking scrutiny of cross-border issues like Uyghur rights and religious freedoms, which overlap with India’s concerns over Islamist extremism and border security with Xinjiang. Further, in the UNHRC Committee’s session of September 2022 alone, China accounted for 83 of the 418 deferrals of NGO applications from Russia, Egypt, North Korea, the US, India, and other countries, as well as well-established NGOs.[lxi] The GGI has thus compelled New Delhi to incur substantial costs in counterbalancing a Sino-centric global order.
The success of Beijing’s earlier global initiatives suggests that the GGI has the potential to reshape global governance structures. As per Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, together with the GDI, GSI, and GCI, the GGI promises much-needed stability for this volatile world and has received swift and clear support from more than 140 countries and international organisations.[lxii] Russian President Vladimir Putin has noted that the GGI aligns closely with Russia’s view on Eurasian security. Even the UN’s leadership has welcomed the initiative’s multilateral focus.[lxiii] This new initiative thus completes the previous three Chinese major initiatives, providing the last piece in an overarching framework that challenges the Western-led global order. While specific measures remain to be announced, the GGI reveals Beijing’s ambition to reshape international governance structures and establish alternative institutional arrangements, even as officials frame it as enhancing existing institutions and upholding UN principles.[lxiv]
China’s GGI thus marks an evolution in bold Chinese statecraft in which public diplomacy, governance reform, and a uniquely scaled HUMINT architecture are systematically integrated to reshape global order while avoiding overt confrontation. With the US leadership fading under President Trump’s pullback, Beijing fills the gaps by working inside existing international organisations (like the UN, WTO, and IMO) as well as creating new ones (like the IOMed, World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization [WAICO], and Global AI Governance Initiative [GAIGI]), while shaping emerging areas like AI, space, and deep-sea mining where rules are still under formulation.
Framing these interventions as South–South solidarity and inclusive multilateralism, Beijing cultivates institutional dependence across the Global South, embeds dense HUMINT and influence networks, and normalises its preferred norms from inception rather than contesting entrenched Western regimes. The resulting convergence of soft-power narratives and covert HUMINT mobilisation enables China to incrementally refashion international institutions in line with its strategic interests, making it tough for others to keep global institutions open and secure.
For India, this Chinese surge in international institutions directly imperils its strategic interests and autonomy, and it must initiate countermeasures to safeguard open global institutions.
Col. D.C.S. Mayal (Retired) is senior fellow, Center for Land Warfare Studies, and adjunct faculty, Manipal Academy of Higher Education.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[i] “Xi Proposes Global Governance Initiative at Largest-Ever SCO Summit,” Xinhua, September 2, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20250902/76bd8d070bd94499a4f4b11d4573f9a0/c.html.
[ii] “Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 1, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202509/t20250901_11699912.html.
[iii] Xi Xiao, “The Global Governance Initiative: China’s Contribution to Addressing the Global Governance Deficit,”ChinAffairs+, September 23, 2025, https://www.chinaffairsplus.com/p/the-global-governance-initiative.
[iv] Wang Yi, “Implementing the Global Governance Initiative for a Community with a Shared Future for Humanity,” Remarks at the 23rd Lanting Forum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 27, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/jh/202510/t20251027_11741537.html.
[v] Jiangyu Wang, “China’s Impact on International Trade Law,”Chinese Developmentalism in the Global Legal and Economic Order, edited by Matthew Erie, Jacques deLisle, and Jaclyn Neo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2026), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5404089.
[vi] “China’s Malign Influence at the United Nations,” The Sunday Guardian Live, date unknown, https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/chinas-malign-influence-at-the-united-nations-160512/.
[vii] Tsai Cheng-Chia and Andrew H. Yang, “How China Is Remaking the UN in Its Own Image,” The Diplomat, April 9, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/how-china-is-remaking-the-un-in-its-own-image/.
[viii] “VOC Testifies on the Hill,” Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, April 11, 2024, https://victimsofcommunism.org/voc-testifies-on-the-hill/.
[ix] “China Accused of Influencing Votes at UN to Serve Its Interests, Whistleblower Claims,” The Economic Times, April 17, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-accused-of-influencing-votes-at-un-to-serve-its-interests-whistleblower-claims/articleshow/109361897.cms.
[x] Staff Report, “CCP Political Warfare: Federal Agencies Urgently Need a Government-Wide Strategy,” House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, Majority Staff, October 24, 2024, https://oversight.house.gov/report/staff-report-exposing-the-ccps-destructive-political-warfare-and-influence-operation/.
[xi] A.S. Brar, “China and the UN: Investigating Multilateral Bureaucracy,” Observer Research Foundation, May 4, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-and-the-un-investigating-multilateral-bureaucracy.
[xii] Sebastian Haug, “Mutual Legitimation Attempts: The United Nations and China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” International Affairs 100 (2024), no. 3: 1207–1230, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae020.
[xiii] Alan Hope, “Beijing’s New Approach to Taiwan,” China Brief 25, no. 20: 2–7, The Jamestown Foundation, October 31, 2025, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/CB-V-25-Issue-20-October-31.pdf.
[xiv] Shanghai Observer, nd, “How to Understand the Profound Connotations and Significance of the Global Governance Initiative?” https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=981636.
[xv] “Implementing the Global Governance Initiative for a Community with a Shared Future for Humanity,” Remarks, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 27, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202510/t20251027_11741537.html.
[xvi] “China’s Global Governance Initiative: Shaping a New Era of Multilateralism,” Africa China Centre, September 7, 2025, https://africachinacentre.org/chinas-global-governance-initiative-shaping-a-new-era-of-multilateralism/./
[xvii] Christina Wagner, “China’s Malign Influence at the United Nations,” Sunday Guardian Live, November 15, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/chinas-malign-influence-at-the-united-nations-160512/.
[xviii] “Briefing: China's Progress in 6G Technology,” China Briefing Substack, March 25, 2025, https://thechinabriefing.substack.com/p/briefing-chinas-progress-in-6g-technology.
[xix] “Director-General Biography,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, https://www.fao.org/director-general/biography/en.
[xx] “NSCEB: Future of U.S.-China Biotech Competition,” US Senate Committee on Biotechnology, December 2025, https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/NSCEB-Future-of-U.S.-China-Biotech-Competition-Dec-2025.pdf.
[xxi] “New ISHR Report Uncovers China's Tactics to Block Civil Society Access to the United Nations,” April 28, 2025, https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/new-ishr-report-uncovers-chinas-tactics-to-block-civil-society-access-to-the-united-nations/; “At the UN, China Is Deploying a Growing Army of Puppet NGOS to Intimidate Human Rights Defenders,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, December 1, 2025, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-targets/united-nations-ngo-gongo-intimidate-human-rights/.
[xxii] Alan Hope, “SCO Summit Focuses on Shaping Emerging Frontiers,” The Jamestown Foundation, September 5, 2025, https://jamestown.org/sco-summit-focuses-on-shaping-emerging-frontiers/.
[xxiii] “Beijing’s Latest Global Leadership Bid,” The Jamestown Foundation, October 31, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/beijings-latest-global-leadership-bid/.
[xxiv] “Implementing the Global Governance Initiative for a Community with a Shared Future,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 26, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202510/t20251027_11741537.html.
[xxv] “Beijing’s Latest Global Leadership Bid”; “China’s Global Governance Initiative: Shaping a New Era of Multilateralism,” Africa China Centre, September 7, 2025, https://africachinacentre.org/chinas-global-governance-initiative-shaping-a-new-era-of-multilateralism/.
[xxvi] Rogier Creemers, “China’s AI Governance Initiative and Its Geopolitical Ambitions,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, July 21, 2025, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/chinas-ai-governance-initiative-and-its-geopolitical-ambitions/.
[xxvii] “Implementing the Global Governance Initiative,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/jh/202510/t20251027_11741537.html.
[xxviii] “SCO Summit Focuses on Shaping Emerging Frontiers,” The Jamestown Foundation, September 7, 2025, https://jamestown.org/sco-summit-focuses-on-shaping-emerging-frontiers/.
[xxix] “Notes from the Asia-Pacific Region: China Unveils Global AI Initiatives,” International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), July 30, 2025. https://iapp.org/news/a/notes-from-the-asia-pacific-region-china-unveils-global-ai-initiatives.
[xxx] “Inauguration Ceremony of IOMed Held in Hong Kong,” Xinhua, October 20, 2025. https://english.news.cn/20251020/b39c2a0755234d219826b4d69f7da776/c.html
[xxxi] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Law-Based Cyberspace Governance in the New Era,” March 20, 2023, http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/zfbps_2279/202303/t20230320_709283.html.
[xxxii] M. Flemming, “The Tech Trojan Horse: China’s Strategic Export of the Surveillance State,” PIPS Brief No. 12.3, Project on International Peace and Security, Global Research Institute, College of William & Mary, April 2020, https://www.wm.edu/offices/global-research/research/pips/white_papers/2019-2020/flemming-final.pdf.
[xxxiii] “China’s Smart Cities in Africa: Should the United States Be Concerned?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 17, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-smart-cities-africa-should-united-states-be-concern.
[xxxiv] Insikt Group, Recorded Future, “RedNovember Targets Government, Defense, and Technology Organizations,” September 23, 2025, https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/rednovember-targets-government-defense-and-technology-organizations.
[xxxv] Deng Pan, “Global Governance Initiative a Vision for Revitalizing Global Governance,” China Diplomacy, September 28, 2025. https://en.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-09/28/content_118101290.shtml.
[xxxvi] Pan, “Global Governance Initiative a Vision for Revitalizing Global Governance.”
[xxxvii] D.C.S. Mayal, “Chinese Global Human Intelligence Operations through Cultural Diplomacy,” Journal of the United Service Institution of India (2023) 153, no. 634: 45–55, https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI%20Journal%20-%20Oct-Dec%202023-45-55.pdf.
[xxxviii] D.C.S. Mayal, “Deciphering Emerging Chinese Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Footprints under the Cloak of Global Development Initiative (GDI),” Centre for Emerging National Jammu & Kashmir Observers and Strategic Studies, February 17, 2025, https://cenjows.in/deciphering-emerging-chinese-humanintelligence-humint-footprints-under-the-cloak-of-global-development-initiativegdi/.
[xxxix]Global Times, “Global Times: How China-PICs Climate Cooperation Implements GGI to Bridge North-South Development Gap,” Yahoo Finance, September 6, 2025. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/global-times-china-pics-climate-032100432.html.
[xl] Nong Hong, “China’s Approach to Ocean Governance: Multilateralism Based Policy and Practice,” China-US Focus, November 27, 2020, https://chinaus-icas.org/research/chinas-approach-to-ocean-governance-multilateralism-based-policy-and-practice/.
[xli] Duo Ding, “China’s Global Governance Initiative Offers Guide for Regulation of Oceans,” National Institute for South China Sea Studies, September 8, 2025, https://en.nanhai.org.cn/index/research/paper_c/id/660.html.
[xlii] Xinhua, “China Wins Highest Vote to Secure 19th Consecutive Term as IMO Category A Council Member,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, November 29, 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202511/29/content_WS692a49aec6d00ca5f9a07d7b.html.
[xliii]Yin Cao, “More Intl Maritime Cases Land in China,” China Daily, December 19, 2025, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202512/19/WS6944a8bca310d6866eb2f714.htm.
[xliv] “China’s Maritime Militia: Fishing for Resources, Militarizing the Indian Ocean,” Modern Diplomacy, January 9, 2025, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/01/09/chinas-maritime-militia-fishing-for-resources-militarizing-the-indian-ocean/.
[xlv] Yu Zuo, “Study on WTO Reform and China’s Strategy amid China-US Trade Tensions,” Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media (2025) 97: 26–32. https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/2025.LD23956.
[xlvi] Thinktank.pk, “Why China Is Rallying WTO Nations against Global Trade Chaos,” October 8, 2025, https://thinktank.pk/2025/10/08/why-china-is-rallying-wto-nations-against-global-trade-chaos/.
[xlvii] Qing Li, “China to Forego Special and Differential Treatment in Future WTO Negotiations.” Reuters, September 23, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-forego-special-differential-treatment-future-wto-negotiations-2025-09-23/.
[xlviii] Group of 77 and China, “Statement of the G-77 and China during the Sixty-Seventh Session of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Agenda Item 5: General Exchange of Views),” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, June 2024, https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/2024/statements/5_G77andChina.pdf.
[xlix] Cong Fu, “Remarks by China’s Permanent Representative to the UN Office at Geneva at the Open Debate on Outer Space Security in the 78th Session of the UN General Assembly,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 30, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zwbd/202405/t20240530_11366160.html.
[l] Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Eyes on the Skies: China’s Growing Space Footprint in South America.” October 4, 2022. https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/.
[li] Mayal, “Deciphering Emerging Chinese Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Footprints under the Cloak of Global Development Initiative (GDI).”
[lii] D.C.S. Mayal, “GSI: China’s Shield for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations,” Scholar Warrior, Spring 2025, no. 2, https://www.claws.in/publication/autumn-2021/.
[liii] D.C.S. Mayal, “Unveiling China’s Global Human Intelligence Strategy through the Evolving Global Civilization Initiative,” USI Occasional Paper No. 4, United Service Institution of India, https://usiofindia.org/pdf/DCS_Mayal_ocassional_Paper.pdf.
[liv] D.C.S. Mayal, “Growing Chinese Intelligence Footprints through Belt & Road Initiative in South Asia,” Scholar Warrior, Autumn 2021, 33–40, https://www.claws.in/publication/autumn-2021.
[lv] D. Major, “China’s Intelligence Services and Espionage Operations,” Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 15, 2016, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hearing-chinese-intelligence-services-and-espionage-operations.
[lvi] David Wise, “America’s Other Espionage Challenge: China,” New York Times, March 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/opinion/china-espionage.html.
[lvii] R. Evan Ellis, “The Trouble with China’s Global Civilization Initiative,” Diplomat, June 1, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/the-trouble-with-chinas-global-civilization-initiative/.
[lviii] “Tech Standards: A Strategic Imperative,” Financial Express, April 1, 2022, https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/tech-standards-a-strategic-imperative/2478021/; “China’s Rise as a Standards Power: The Basis of Long-term Geopolitical Influence,” Clingendael Institute, September 2024, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2025/standardisation-with-chinese-characteristics/3-chinas-rise-as-a-standards-power-the-basis-o.
[lix] “Wie China die UN-Ernährungsorganisation FAO Instrumentalisiert,” Tagesschau, June 30, 2023, https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/china-un-fao-100.html.
[lx] “EXPLAINER | Is India's Food Security under Threat from China,” New Indian Express, July 20, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/explainers/2025/Jul/20/explainer-is-indias-food-security-under-threat-from-china.
[lxi] “China's Growing Influence at the UN Human Rights Council,”Sur - International Journal on Human Rights, December 14, 2023, https://sur.conectas.org/en/chinas-growing-influence-at-the-un-human-rights-council/.
[lxii] Yi Wang, “China Ready to Work with Int’l Community to Implement GGI for Community with Shared Future for Mankind,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, October 28, 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202510/28/content_WS69002880c6d00ca5f9a071d0.html.
[lxiii] “Beijing’s Latest Global Leadership Bid,” The Jamestown Foundation, November 11, 2025, https://jamestown.org/beijings-latest-global-leadership-bid/.
[lxiv] “Beijing’s Latest Global Leadership Bid.”
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Col (Dr) DCS Mayal was commissioned in 3 Mahar in 1991 and transferred to the Intelligence Corps in 1997. As an Intelligence Corps Officer, he ...
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