Introduction

The strategically important Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip of land in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, protruding from its eastern border and connecting it to China’s Xinjiang province. Part of the historical Silk Road that connected China and Afghanistan, with Tajikistan to its north and Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) to its south, the corridor is about 350-km-long and 20- to 60-km-wide in different parts, covering an approximate area of 10,300 square km.^[1] Its rugged terrain and limited access makes movement across it challenging, with the main pass running through near-impassable mountains east of the Little Pamir.  The area is sparsely populated, consisting of 110 villages that are home to 12,000 inhabitants. It connects to China’s relatively short border—barely 75 km—with Afghanistan,^[2] which lies 5,000 meters above sea level. From China, the only access point is at the corridor’s southeastern end, known as the Wakhjir Pass; Tashkurgan in Xinjiang province is the nearest major town. Beijing considers Wakhjir Pass a counterterrorism frontline between insurgents in Afghanistan and its Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang.

Source: Author’s own

Since the United States’ (US) withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the relationship between the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and China has transformed, and is today characterised more by measured pragmatism than by ideology. For the Islamic Emirate, China represents a source of investment, especially when Afghanistan’s foreign exchange reserves remain frozen and little foreign aid is forthcoming; it sees Beijing as a global power providing it regional recognition, which could also help towards achieving international legitimacy.

China’s engagement with Taliban 2.0 is rooted in its security concerns and geo-economic ambitions. The security concerns relate to its restive north-western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the stability of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in which it has made huge investments and for which it has many Chinese nationals working in Pakistan. Starting in 2023, the Islamic Emirate appeared more inclined to opening the Wakhan Corridor and held numerous discussions with Beijing to initiate trade and commerce directly through this route. China also sees the Wakhan Corridor as an essential link for the BRI to enhance connectivity across Eurasia and the Middle East.

At the same time, however, it is aware that the corridor connects to Xinjiang, its most militarised zone marred by centuries-old separatist tendencies. This is a region where it has also faced pushback against its cultural onslaught on Uyghur Muslims and attempts at forced Sinicisation, including the rise of insurgency. This insurgency, coupled with the activities of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP)—a branch of the Islamic State (ISIS)—in Afghanistan, as well as that of other terror groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has forced Beijing to have second thoughts about the project.^[3]

The current Beijing position is that developing the Wakhan Corridor is not economically viable because of its challenging mountainous terrain, and carries more security risks than economic opportunities.^[4] It would rather use the corridor as a strategic buffer zone against potential threats from Afghanistan to monitor and mitigate risks related to regional stability and security. It favours a repeat of the 19^th-century scenario, when the British Empire in India, concerned about the expansion of Czarist Russia into Xinjiang, Tibet and Central Asia, gave the Wakhan Valley to Afghanistan to create a similar buffer zone.

In the early 20^th century, China had laid claim to parts of Russian Tajikistan and Afghanistan, including the Wakhan Corridor;^[5] the matter was eventually settled, and a formal border agreement between China and Afghanistan was reached in 1963. In practice, however, the border has existed in its current form since 1895, as decided by the Pamir Boundary Commission, when the Russian and British empires altered Afghan borders to make it a buffer zone.^[6] The geopolitical significance of the Wakhan Corridor is thus underscored by its history. Today, as interactions between Beijing and Taliban 2.0 aim to derive mutual benefits, deep-seated ideological suspicions complicate the relationship. Against this backdrop, this brief examines the rewards and risks for China and the Taliban over the issue.

China’s Relationship with Taliban 2.0

In the 1990s, China began reaching out to the Taliban for a complex mix of geopolitical, geo-economic, security, and strategic reasons. China’s then Ambassador to Afghanistan, Lu Shulin, met Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 2001, to express concern about the likely spread of terrorism to the volatile Xinjiang region. Though Omar assured Lu that he would not allow Uyghur insurgents to carry out attacks on the Chinese province, he also stated that any Uyghurs who may have joined the Taliban would not be removed.^[7]

After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the ouster of the Taliban from power, China was concerned about the US military presence near its borders. However, it also hoped that increased stability in the region, brought about by such presence, would alleviate security concerns in Xinjiang. Beijing’s approach to the Taliban primarily focused on security issues from 2001 to 2010.^[8] After 2010, as the Taliban gained a foothold in Afghanistan’s rural areas, Beijing re-established contacts with it, first through Pakistan,^[9] and later when the Taliban opened its office in Doha, by recognising the group as an important stakeholder for regional stability.^[10]

In 2015, Beijing facilitated negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan officials in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang.^[11] As the Taliban began to gain more territory, China intensified its diplomatic engagement with it. This included hosting Taliban delegations starting in 2019, following abrupt cancellation of the US’s talks with the group by the first Trump administration.^[12] In July 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted a Taliban delegation in Tianjin city and described the Taliban as a pivotal political and military force in the future of Afghanistan.^[13] Beijing took a still more proactive approach towards Taliban 2.0 to bolster regional influence and expand its circle of friends for security and geo-economic purposes. Between August 2021, when it returned to power in Afghanistan, and February 2024, the Taliban held a total of 1,382 diplomatic meetings with 80 countries. China tops this list with 215 meetings, highlighting its security concerns and geo-economic ambitions in the region.^[14]

Following the Taliban’s takeover, Beijing sent humanitarian aid worth US$31 million to help the new interim government.^[15] It sought global support for Afghanistan, advocated for the unfreezing of Afghan foreign assets and the lifting of sanctions. In January 2024, its diplomatic relations with the Taliban were advanced when Chinese President Xi Jinping officially accepted the credentials of the Taliban-appointed Ambassador to Beijing during a ceremony at the Great Hall of the People. In September 2024, China appointed a new envoy to Afghanistan, although it has not formally recognised the Taliban regime yet. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said at a post-credential briefing: “As a traditionally friendly neighbour, China has maintained diplomatic ties, exchanges and cooperation in various areas with Afghanistan,” and added, “China believes that Afghanistan should not be excluded from the international community.”^[16] The official acceptance of the Taliban-appointed Ambassador to China could well open up more diplomatic opportunities for the group in neighbouring countries.^[17]

China has also made commercial investments in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has significant deposits of natural resources such as copper, iron ore, coal, lithium, gold, gemstones, and rare-earth elements. However, due to political turmoil and a prolonged civil war, the actual value of these resources has never been properly assessed, though the Soviets had conducted some geological surveys during their occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.  In 2010, a survey by geologists and researchers with the US Army estimated that lithium reserves in Ghazni province, Herat, and Nimroz alone were worth trillions of dollars.^[18]

Following the return of the Taliban regime, Beijing has invested in oil extraction and lithium reserves in Afghanistan. In 2023, China’s Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company signed a contract with the Taliban government to invest US$550 million over the next three years in oil extraction.^[19] So too, according to Taliban officials, China wants to put US$10 billion into developing Afghanistan’s lithium reserves.^[20] Chinese telecommunication companies like Huawei are securing contracts to install CCTV cameras for surveillance in Afghanistan, highlighting the growing geostrategic and geo-economic ties between the Taliban and Beijing.^[21] Trade between the two countries has expanded, reaching US$1.3 billion in 2023, representing a 125-percent increase over 2022. Beginning December 2024, Beijing granted Afghan products 100-percent duty-free access to Chinese markets. In 2023, Afghanistan exported US$64 million worth of goods to China, nearly 90 percent of which consisted of shelled pines.^[22]

The Wakhan Corridor’s Worth for China

In 2008, Afghanistan’s then president Hamid Karzai had proposed to his Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao, that a road be constructed through the Wakhan Corridor to boost security and trade between the two countries.^[23] At the time, Beijing was not interested and argued that technical challenges and adverse weather conditions would hamper construction. China was then primarily focused on its security interests in Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2013, it provided a modest US$240 million in financial aid for the country’s reconstruction.^[24] In 2013, however, following the announcement of the BRI by Xi, China began making more substantial investments in the neighbouring states of Central Asia, and in Pakistan through the controversial CPEC. Its aid to Afghanistan also increased to US$327 million in 2013 alone; it added a further US$100 million in 2016.^[25]

In 2016, Afghanistan and China signed a memorandum of understanding on the BRI.^[26] The then Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan, Yao Jing, stated, “Without Afghan connectivity, there is no way to connect China with the rest of the world.”^[27] It was a clear move to integrate Afghanistan into China’s expanding economic sphere; there followed several discussions to extend the CPEC into Afghanistan. In 2017, Beijing pledged US$90 million to support infrastructure development in north-eastern Afghanistan, specifically focusing on fibre optic connections and a vital road segment in the Wakhan Corridor.^[28] However, the US-backed Afghan government remained reluctant to engage with the BRI, mindful of possible adverse reaction from Washington. In May 2021, there were further deliberations on building a trade route through the Wakhan Corridor, which were to start with China helping Afghanistan construct a road through the corridor,^[29] at an estimated cost of US$5.7 million.^[30] However, construction of that 50-km Little Pamir Road in Badakhshan province was soon suspended because of security concerns. Three months later, the Taliban re-established its rule over the country.^[31]

To strengthen its economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime, China, in September 2022, started a train service from Kashgar (in Xinjiang province) to Hairatan in Afghanistan’s northern Balkh province, passing through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.^[32] Tehran, meanwhile, in view of its growing relationship with Beijing, has floated the idea of Iran-Afghanistan-China connectivity and building a direct rail link to boost trade and commerce.^[33] Currently, China and Iran run train services through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Incheh-Bouran in northeast Iran.^[34]

After Taliban 2.0’s victory in August 2021, Chinese investments in Afghanistan increased substantially, following a broader development strategy, especially in extracting minerals from the region. In September 2023, the Taliban announced that it had started reconstructing a 50-km road connecting Badakhshan to Xinjiang at a cost of US$5.16 million, funded by its Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.^[35] The Taliban’s Ambassador to Beijing also started discussions with China to initiate traffic and trade along the route, which underscores the Taliban’s commitment to reviving this crucial ancient link. In January 2024, it announced that the road was nearly complete, with the remaining asphalt paving to be initiated soon. Given the strategic location, the Wakhan Corridor is poised to dramatically enhance direct trade between Afghanistan and China, bypassing the more costly routes through Central Asia. However, the Taliban government lacks sufficient funds to build roads and bridges along the Wakhan Corridor, and has repeatedly requested financial assistance from Beijing.^[36]

In December 2024, the Taliban’s interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani held a meeting with Chinese ambassador to Kabul, Zhao Xing, to discuss the strategic importance of, and potential of trade through, the Wakhan Corridor.^[37] The route would also provide China robust trade and energy routes into Central Asia, Iran, West Asia, and beyond. This will shorten pipeline distances and bolster energy security. The full development of the Wakhan Corridor will allow Beijing to assert its economic, strategic, and political influence in Eurasia.

Taliban’s Perspective

The Taliban recognises the construction of the Wakhan Corridor as a crucial economic opportunity, especially in fostering strong economic and trade ties with neighbouring China, Central Asia, and Iran. With Chinese investments in Afghanistan’s natural resources on the rise, it is urging Beijing to invest in this strategic corridor to unlock its full potential. In the last two years, the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan has become increasingly confrontational over issues of terrorism, security, and trade. Since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, attacks by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)^[a] in Pakistan have increased manifold. In the first 21 months of Taliban rule, Pakistan has experienced a 73-percent surge in terror attacks.^[38] The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan has experienced a 279.8-percent increase in terror-related incidents, escalating from 572 in 2021 to 2,173 in 2024.^[39]

Islamabad accuses Afghan nationals of being behind the attacks, as well as of engaging in smuggling and related crimes on its territory; Kabul dismisses the allegations.^[40] Pakistan has also blamed the Taliban for the worsening security situation and conducted airstrikes inside Afghanistan, prompting retaliation from Afghan forces.^[41] Before the full confrontation began, Pakistan had tried to use the closure of trade routes and border crossings with Afghanistan as bargaining chips for taming the TTP. Pakistan and Afghanistan have eight formal border crossings, of which Chaman and Torkham have international status and remain the main trade channels. The repeated closure of these for lengthy periods has strengthened the Taliban’s perception that Islamabad has taken a hard line, unlike towards the previous US-backed governments of Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai. Pakistan’s closure of these channels has inflicted heavy losses on Afghan traders.

Table 1: Closures of Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Crossings

Crossing	Period Closed	Days
Chaman	6 Oct 2021- 2 Nov 2021	27
Chaman	11 - 13 Dec 2022	3
Chaman	13 - 21 Nov 2022	7
Chaman	Oct 2023 - July 2024	~ 300 days
Torkham	20 - 25 Feb 2023	6
Torkham	13 - 23 Jan 2024	10
Torkham	13 Aug 2024 - 16 October 2024	60

Source: Author’s own, using various open sources

In October 2023, Pakistan passed a decree to expel illegally residing Afghans from its territories.^[42]  It has repatriated around 800,000 Afghans since, including ethnic and religious minorities, human rights activists, musicians, and artists.^[43] In January 2025, it approved a new plan to deport another 3 million Afghans, including officially recognised refugees, and those awaiting promised relocation to the US and other countries.

Though China is ready to include Afghanistan in the CPEC, the Taliban insists on being part of the larger BRI design. This clash of priorities has escalated, particularly as Pakistan has leveraged the border crossings at Chaman and Torkham to pressure the Taliban into tackling its TTP problem. The Taliban is actively working to reduce its reliance on Pakistani ports and crossings. It recognises the Wakhan Corridor as a strategic avenue to establish a direct trade link with China. The Taliban believes that gaining direct access through Wakhan will bypass Pakistan and dramatically cut travel time between Central Asia and China. The corridor will also enable China to strengthen its trade with Iran, West Asia, and Europe. It will generate revenue through transit fees, levies, and customs duties. It will even create a dependency for Pakistan on Afghanistan for access to Central Asia, highlighting geopolitical and geo-economic opportunities that the Taliban can capitalise on.

The Taliban is also determined to develop the corridor to ensure rapid deployment of its forces in response to any threats from Pakistan. During the change of government in 2021, Pakistan exploited the situation by establishing security posts on this crucial corridor, seeking direct access to Central Asia while circumventing Afghanistan. However, the Taliban decisively recaptured the posts on 27 July 2022, reinforcing its control over the area.^[44] With terrorism and border clashes increasing along the Durand line,^[b] the latest visit of the Pakistani intelligence chief to Tajikistan on 30 December 2024 has sparked widespread speculation. Are the two countries considering an alliance to counterbalance the Taliban after the recent armed confrontation between Kabul and Islamabad,^[45] or are they even working towards enabling Pakistan to ‘annex’ the Wakhan Corridor?^[46]

China’s Security and Geopolitical Concerns

To ensure security and stability along its north-western frontier of Xinjiang, Beijing, since 2000, has maintained a transactional and pragmatic relationship with the Taliban. Ever since China opened the Karakoram Highway in 1986, separatist tendencies among its Uyghurs have increased. There were reasons for it—Beijing’s repressive policies against the Uyghur Muslims, including preventive detention, forced abortions to enforce its ‘one-child policy’ and political and cultural violence. In response, many Uyghurs have fled the country, with an estimated 5,000 joining the Taliban and other Islamic terror organisations in the region, such as the ISKP and al-Qaeda.

Some of these organisations’ leaders have issued strong statements targeting the Chinese government for its treatment of Uyghurs.^[47] On 7 June 2024, for instance, the ISKP criticised the Taliban leadership for its relationship with China, given the latter’s treatment of Uyghurs.^[48] There have also been internal uprisings by the Uyghurs, such as in the town of Barin in Xinjiang in April 1990, when a huge crowd attacked government offices to protest forced abortions.^[49] In turn, China too, has come down heavily on the Uyghurs, especially with its ‘Strike Hard’ operation of 1996.

Though the Taliban has removed many Uyghur insurgents from bases close to the China-Afghanistan border, Beijing still fears a spillover of separatist and insurgent activities into Xinjiang. In end-December 2024, for example, Al-Julani, leader of the terrorist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS),^[c] appointed many Uyghur fighters to senior ranks in its ‘army’, increasing China’s worries.^[50] Again, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP),^[d] which mainly comprises Pakistan-based Uyghurs who want to set up an Islamic republic in Xinjiang, also announced that it had established a base in Afghanistan. Beijing fears that these and other extremist groups could use the Wakhan Corridor to enter Xinjiang; further, even tourists and merchants from Afghanistan, were they allowed into Xinjiang indiscriminately, could take back with them stories about the alleged cultural persecution of Uyghur Muslims, potentially fostering greater animosity towards Beijing among the terror groups. China also fears that developing the corridor will facilitate uncontrolled  movement between Pakistan and Central Asia, which could pose challenges to Chinese investments in the BRI due to the region’s porous borders.^[51]

Nor are the fears exaggerated. Since 2021, there has been a noticeable increase in attacks on Chinese workers in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. On 14 July 2021, for example, the TTP set off a bomb explosion in a bus carrying nine Chinese workers engaged in a CPEC project in Dasu, a town in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, killing them all, along with four locals.^[52],[53] On 26 April 2022, a Chinese teacher at the Confucius Institute of Karachi University was killed in a suicide bombing;^[54] on 25 March 2024, five Chinese were murdered in Shangla district, once again in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.^[55] Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Jaing Zaidong, has publicly expressed his outrage,^[56] while China has since suspended work on two of its projects in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.^[57] With Pakistan failing to provide security, Beijing is attempting to persuade the Taliban to rein in the TTP militants.^[58] Beijing’s relations with the Taliban are better than those of Pakistan, and China hopes to use this to persuade the Taliban to rein in the TTP. In December 2022, ISKP stormed a hotel in Kabul popular with Chinese visitors and investors, killing three Afghans and injuring five Chinese nationals. In January 2025, ISKP claimed the killing of a Chinese national in Afghanistan.^[59]

The worsening relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has made China even more cautious about investing in the Wakhan Corridor. Since Pakistan remains a geostrategically important partner for China, Beijing wants all security issues between the Taliban and Islamabad either resolved or at least put in cold storage to save the CPEC and its investments.

The CPEC blueprint seeks to link the existing Karakoram highway to Kabul from Peshawar. Beijing wants the Taliban to also be a part of CPEC for security and strategic reasons, to promote trade and indirectly foster people-to-people exchanges assertively. It believes this is vital to protect Beijing’s substantial investments in Pakistan and secure critical safety guarantees for Chinese workers and projects linked to CPEC from the Taliban rather than Islamabad. At present, since August 2023, China has been using the CPEC to export goods from Kashgar (in Xinjiang) to Afghanistan through the Torkham border crossing, which takes at least six days.^[60]

It is because of these geopolitical and security concerns that China maintains the Wakhan Corridor has no economic viability due to its rugged and mountainous terrain.^[61] From the Chinese side, there are no customs facilities on the Wakhjir Pass, indicating that Beijing cares more about security considerations than economic opportunities as far as the corridor is concerned.

Conclusion

Connecting with China through the Wakhan Corridor is not just a geopolitical and economic opportunity for Afghanistan; it is an essential objective. The corridor will enhance its capacity to deploy forces bypassing Pakistan, while generating substantial revenue. For China, the corridor provides a strategic link in its BRI to Eurasia and West Asia. However, the growing security threats posed by various terrorist groups and China’s increasingly close ties with Pakistan create a complex and challenging geopolitical environment that it cannot ignore.

China is trying to utilise the Wakhan Corridor not as a bridge to connect with Afghanistan, but as a strategic buffer against regional instability. Its approach is driven by critical security concerns in Xinjiang and geostrategic interests related to the China-Pakistan CPEC and BRI investments in Central Asia. While the future of the Wakhan Corridor is uncertain, its potential benefits are significant for both countries. China’s commitment to deepening its economic involvement in Afghanistan positions the corridor to play a crucial role in shaping its interests across Eurasia.

Endnotes

^[a] The TTP is a disparate grouping of Islamist militants, opposed to the Pakistani regime, who share the same ideology as Afghanistan’s Taliban, but claims to the entirely separate from it. It operates close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

^[b] The Durand Line is the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan established in 1873

^[c] HTS is a coalition of terror groups from northern Syria, that evolved out of a former branch of al-Qaeda.

^[1] Syed Raiyan Amir, “The Geopolitical Importance of the Wakhan Corridor in Central Asia,” MEPEI, https://mepei.com/the-geopolitical-importance-of-the-wakhan-corridor-in-central-asia/#:~:text=The%20Wakhan%20Corridor%2C%20a%20narrow,74%2Dkilometer%20stretch%20with%20China

^[2] Department of State, “International Boundary Study: Afghanistan – China Boundary,” The Geographer, United States of America 89 (May 1, 1969), https://library.law.fsu.edu/Digital-Collections/LimitsinSeas/pdf/ibs089.pdf

^[3] Harici.com.tr, “China is Wary on Opening New Road with Afghanistan,” Harici, December 1, 2024, https://harici.com.tr/en/china-is-wary-on-opening-new-road-with-afghanistan/

^[4] Zhao Ziwen, “Why China is Wary of Opening Up Afghanistan’s New Road to Xinjiang,” South China Morning Post, January 27, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3249931/why-china-wary-opening-afghanistans-new-road-xinjiang

^[5] Department of State, “International Boundary Study: Afghanistan – China Boundary”

^[6] Department of State, “International Boundary Study: Afghanistan – China Boundary”

^[7] Ryan Clarke, “Does China Have Unique Advantages in Afghanistan? Risks and Opportunities for Beijing’s Long Game,” East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, September 30, 2021, https://research.nus.edu.sg/eai/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/09/EAIC-36-20210930.pdf

^[8] “China’s Evolving Relationship with the Taliban,” European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS), December 2023, https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/resource-diplomacy-china%E2%80%99s-evolving-relationship-with-the-taliban/

^[9] V. Felbab-Brown,  “A BRI(dge) Too Far: The Unfulfilled Promise and Limitations of China’s Involvement in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, October 5, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-bridge-too-far-the-unfulfilled-promise-and-limitations-of-chinas-involvement-in-afghanistan/

^[10] Z.I. Yousafzai, “China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the US Withdrawal,” China Brief 22, no. 18 (2022), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-interests-inafghanistan-one-year-after-the-u-s-withdrawal/

^[11]Ananth Krishnan,  “China Foreign Minister Wang Yi Hosts Taliban, Calls them ‘Pivotal Force’,” The Hindu, July 28, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/taliban-leader-meets-chinese-fm-assures-not-to-allow-terrorist-forces-to-operate-from-afghanistan/article35582147.ece

^[12]Abdul Qadir Sediqi and Rupam Jain,  “Afghanistan’s Taliban Meets Chinese Government in Beijing,” Reuters, September 23, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-china-idUSKBN1W70I3/

^[13] Krishnan,  “China Foreign Minister Wang Yi Hosts Taliban, Calls them ‘Pivotal Force’”

^[14] Ariana News, “IEA  Has Had More than 1,300 Meetings with 80 Countries Since Takeover,” ATN News, August 8, 2024, https://www.ariananews.af/iea-has-had-more-than-1300-meetings-with-80-countries-since-takeover/

^[15] “China Offers $31m in Emergency Aid to Afghanistan,” BBC, September 9, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58496867

^[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202405/t20240530_11347691.html#:~:text=You%20asked%20whether%20China%20officially,excluded%20from%20the%20international%20community.

^[17] Abubakar Siddique, “The Azadi Briefing: China Upgrades Diplomatic Ties with The Taliban,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, February 2, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-china-diplomatic-ties-credentials-corruption/32802674.html

^[18] Iftikar Gilani, “Analysis – Vast Lithium Reserves to Transform Afghanistan from Aid to Trade Economy,” Anadolu Ajansi, December 13, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-vast-lithium-reserves-to-transform-afghanistan-from-aid-to-trade-economy/2446019

^[19] Diksha Madhok, Ehsan Popalzai, and Masoud Popalzai, “A Chinese Company has Signed an Oil Extraction Deal with Afghanistan’s Taliban,” CNN, January 6, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/06/business/china-company-taliban-oil-deal-hnk-intl/index.html

^[20] “China Eyes Afghanistan’s Lithium Reserves, Offers to Invest USD 10 Billion,” The Economic Times, April 15, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-eyes-afghanistans-lithium-reserves-offers-to-invest-usd-10-billion/articleshow/99521732.cms

^[21] Manoj Gupta, “Is Profiling China’s New Game Plan in Afghanistan? Huawei to Install CCTVs in All Provinces,” CNN-News 18, August 18, 2023, https://www.news18.com/world/is-profiling-chinas-new-game-plan-in-afghanistan-huawei-to-install-cctvs-in-all-provinces-exclusive-8540583.html

^[22] Fidel Rahmati, “China Offers Taliban Duty-Free Trade, Promising Zero Tariffs,” The Khama Press News Agency,  October 25, 2024, https://www.khaama.com/china-offers-taliban-duty-free-trade-promising-zero-tariffs/

^[23] Zhang Xin, “Afghanistan Re-Opens Request for Corridor Road,” China Daily, October 16, 2024, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-10/16/content_8800563.htm

^[24] Claudia Chia, Kunthavi Kalachelvam, and Zheng Haiqi, “Exploring China’s Afghanistan Policy,” Institute of South Asian Studies, June 25, 2021, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/exploring-chinas-afghanistan-policy/

^[25] Michael Martina, “China Says Afghan President Vows to Help China Fight Militants,” Reuters, October 29, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-afghanistan-idUSKBN0IH1D420141029.

^[26] Rustam Ali Seerat, “China Navigates a New Afghanistan with the Taliban as its Rulers,” Friedrich Naumann Foundation, July 5, 2024, https://www.freiheit.org/south-asia/china-navigates-new-afghanistan-taliban-its-rulers#:~:text=In%202016%2C%20China%20and%20Afghanistan%20agreed%20on,China%2DPakistan%20Economic%20Corridor%20(CPEC)%20and%20Gwadar%20Port.

^[27] Mariam Amini, “China’s ‘Silk Road’ Railway Hits a Snag in Afghanistan,” CNBC, October 13, 2016, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/13/chinas-silk-road-railway-disrupted-by-uzbekistan-security.html

^[28] Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi, “The Wakhan Corridor: China’s Inroad to Afghanistan,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies,  November 6, 2024, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13827-the-wakhan-corridor-chinas-inroad-to-afghanistan.html

^[29] Derek Grossman, “China and the Taliban Begin Their Romance,” RAND, July 22, 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/china-and-the-taliban-begin-their-romance.html

^[30] Harici.com.tr, “China is Wary on Opening New Road with Afghanistan”

^[31] Ziwen, “Why China is wary of opening up Afghanistan’s new road to Xinjiang”

^[32] Xinhua, “Land Corridor Via Rail Connects Afghanistan to China as 1st Freight Arrives,” Global Times, September 24, 2022,https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1275988.shtml

^[33] “Iran Eyes Connecting its Railway with China Through Afghanistan,” Tehran Times, November 20, 2024, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/506515/Iran-eyes-connecting-its-railway-with-China-through-Afghanistan

^[34] Mahnaz Abdi, “Iran-China Rail Route a Safe Gateway to Europe for China,” Tehran Times, July 21, 2024,

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/501371/Iran-China-rail-route-a-safe-gateway-to-Europe-for-China#:~:text=July%2021%2C%202024%20%2D%2016:,other%20countries%20and%20expand%20diplomacy.%E2%80%9D

^[35] Fidel Rahmati, “Wakhan Corridor Officially Connects Afghanistan to China: Taliban,” The Khama Press News Agency,  January 16, 2024, https://www.khaama.com/badakhshan-province-officially-connects-afghanistan-to-china-via-wakhan-corridor-official/

^[36] Rick Noack and Carolyn Van Houten, “A Taliban Highway Could Lead to the Future. But it’s Stuck in the Past,” The Washington Post, February 1, 2025, https://css.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/01/wakhan-corridor-highway-afghanistan-china/

^[37] Shreyas Deshmukh, “Wakhan Corridor: China’s Security and Economic Approach,” Wesal TV, March 11, 2025, https://wesal.info/opinions/wakhan-corridor-chinas-security-and-economic-approach/

^[38] Iftikhar A. Khan, “Terror Attacks Increased in Pakistan After Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan,” Dawn, June 1, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1757192

^[39] Khan, “Terror Attacks Increased in Pakistan After Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan”

^[40] Asif Shahzad, “Pakistan to Start Expelling Undocumented Immigrants on Thursday—Minister,” Reuters, November 1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-crack-down-undocumented-immigrants-nov-2-minister-2023-10-31/

^[41] “Afghan Taliban Hit ‘Several Points’ in Pakistan in Retaliation for Attacks,” Al Jazeera, December 28, 2024,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/28/afghan-taliban-hit-several-points-in-pakistan-in-retaliation-for-attacks

^[42] Mushtaq Ali, “Border Crossing with Afghanistan Swamped by Afghans After Pakistani Expulsion Order,” Reuters, November 3, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-afghanistan-border-crossing-overwhelmed-afghans-face-expulsion-2023-11-02/

^[43] Ayaz Gul, “UN Sounds Alarm Over Pakistan’s New Afghan Deportation Plans,” Voice of America (South and Central Asia), February 5, 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/un-sounds-alarm-over-pakistan-s-new-afghan-deportation-plans/7964352.html

^[44] “Taliban Captures Strategic Wakhan Corridor from Pakistan,” ANI, August 1, 2022, https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taliban-captures-strategic-wakhan-corridor-from-pakistan20220801213011/

^[45] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Pakistan Eyes Anti-Taliban Tie-Up with Tajik President,” The Economic Times, January 1, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-eyes-anti-taliban-tie-up-with-tajik-president/articleshow/116844837.cms

^[46] Umer Bin Ajmal, “The Wakhan Corridor: Separating Fact from Fiction Amid Social Media Frenzy,” TRTWORLD, January 13, 2025, https://www.trtworld.com/asia/the-wakhan-corridor-separating-fact-from-fiction-amid-social-media-frenzy-18253117

^[47] Ayjaz Wani, “Invest, Indebt, Incapacitate, Is China replicating its ‘Xinjiang Model’ in BRI Countries?,” Observer Research Foundation, August 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/research/invest-indebt-incapacitate-is-china-replicating-its-xinjiang-model-in-bri-countries

^[48] Ricardo Valle, “Central Asia,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,  https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/central-asia/?doing_wp_cron=1736761567.5138819217681884765625

^[49]Ayjaz Wani, “China’s Xinjiang Policy and the Silence of Islamic States,” Observer Research Foundation, August 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-xinjiang-policy-and-the-silence-of-islamic-states

^[50] Timour Azhari, Khalil Ashawi, and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Syria Appoints Some Foreign Islamist Fighters to Its Military, Sources Say,” Reuters, December 31, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-appoints-some-foreign-islamist-fighters-its-military-sources-say-2024-12-30/

^[51] Amir, “The Geopolitical Importance of the Wakhan Corridor in Central Asia”

^[52] C Krishnasai, “TTP Terrorist Responsible for Attacks on Chinese in Pakistan Killed,” WION, July 11, 2023, https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/ttp-terrorist-responsible-for-attacks-on-chinese-in-pakistan-killed-report-614312

^[53] Nisar Ahmad Khan, “9 Chinese, 4 Pakistanis Killed in Dasu Bus Tragedy,” Dawn, July 15, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1635150

^[54] Akhtar Soomro and Asif Shahzad, “Female Suicide Bomber Kills Three Chinese Teachers and Pakistani at Karachi University,” Reuters, April 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/van-blast-pakistans-karachi-kills-four-2022-04-26/

^[55] Aamir Latif, “5 Chinese Nationals Killed in Suicide Bombing Northwest Pakistan,” Anadolu Ajansi, March 26, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/5-chinese-nationals-killed-in-suicide-bombing-northwest-pakistan/3175179

^[56] Shahbaz Rana, “Chinese Envoy Miffed at CPEC Security Lapses,” The Express Tribune, January 10, 2025, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2506203/chinese-envoy-miffed-at-cpec-security-lapses

^[57] AFP, “Pakistan Official Says China Halts Work on Two Projects After Deadly Attack,” Arab News, May 23, 2024, https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2484796/pakistan

^[58] Tom Hussain, “China Pressures Afghanistan’s Taliban to Stop Attacks on its Interests in Pakistan, Dangles Economic Carrot,” South China Morning Post (SCMP), May 23, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3263802/china-pressures-afghanistans-taliban-stop-attacks-its-interests-pakistan-dangles-economic-carrot

^[59] Ayaz Gul, “Islamic State Claims Killing of Chinese National in Afghanistan,” Voice of America (South and Central Asia), January 22, 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-claims-killing-of-chinese-national-in-afghanistan/7946312.html

^[60] “First Chinese Cargo Shipment via Torkham Border Reaches Afghanistan,” Business Recorder, September 23, 2023, https://www.brecorder.com/news/40261203/first-chinese-cargo-shipment-via-torkham-border-reaches-afghanistan

^[61] Fidel Rahmati, “Beijing Cautious About Opening Wakhan Corridor Road: Chinese Media,” The Khama Press News Agency, January 28, 2024, https://www.khaama.com/beijing-cautious-about-opening-wakhan-corridor-road-chinese-media/

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Pakistan
• Afghanistan
• bri and wakhan corridor
• china afghanistan relations
• china relations with taliban
• china’s engagement with taliban 2.0
• chinese investment in afghanistan
• cpec in afghanistan
• wakhan corridor
• wakhan corridor dispute
• wakhan corridor strategic importance

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